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ABSTRACT
This thesis explores the relationship between contemporary governance restructuring 
in Dublin and funding arrangements for Area Partnership Companies (APCs) under 
the 2000-2006 Local Development and Social Inclusion Programme (LDSIP) by 
means of an empirical case study. It analyses how governance changes and 
associated impacts on funding arrangements for APCs are experienced, perceived 
and explained by individuals from different professional and institutional backgrounds. 
Particular emphasis is placed on the rise of control-focused business-like performance 
and monitoring practices and their impact on the plans and activities of APCs.
The analysis of empirical material indicates that contemporary neo-liberal policies and 
practices associated with the Strategic Management Initiative (SMI) have been 
instrumental in modifying the local partnership model in Ireland and more specifically, 
the governance framework and practices of APCs. These policies and practices are 
investigated against the backdrop of three sets of key themes that have been identified 
based on the review of empirical material: first, the gradual alignment of APCs with the 
apparatus of the state; second, the design and implementation of accountability 
procedures underlying the allocation of funding; and, third, the adoption of managerial 
practices and value-for-money (VFM) criteria for the public sector. This thesis 
underscores that the re-organisation of the local partnership model has been 
influenced by the ethos of the New Public Managerialism (NPM), which became a 
prominent strategy for governance re-structuring in OECD countries throughout the 
1990s.
Empirical evidence suggests that the influence of governance restructuring on 
contemporary funding arrangements for APCs in Dublin facilitated:
• their transition from quasi independent players into a new regulatory framework for 
local development controlled by the state, and
• their transformation from area-based development models based on the ethos of 
local partnership and participatory democracy towards service delivery agencies of 
the state.
The key objective of the research is to investigate the extent to which the theoretical 
frameworks provided by actor-network theory (ANT), urban regime theory (URT) and 
the regulation approach (RA) can explain the current design of funding arrangements 
for APCs in the context of contemporary governance restructuring in Ireland and the 
associated proliferation of market-led principles and practices. The assessment of the 
empirical data in the light of the three competing theories suggests that theoretical 
concepts associated with the regulation approach are best suited to explain the 
observed relationship between governance restructuring and funding arrangements for 
APCs during the metamorphosis of the local partnership model in Dublin.
INTRODUCTION
This study examines the extent to which funding arrangements1 for Area Partnership 
Companies (APCs) have been affected by public-sector modernisation and related 
changes in power relationships within Dublin’s institutional governance landscape. 
Moreover, it explores the associated implications for the modus operandi of APCs. It 
is argued that the contemporary governance changes at sub-national level which 
affect APCs are inextricably linked to national political priorities the origins of which 
can be traced back into the mid-1980s.
The launch of the 1987-1990 Programme for National Recovery in Ireland led to a 
transition of the political system from traditional principles of direct state 
interventionism or statism2 towards the development of conceptual approaches 
leaning on neo-corporatism3 and neo-communitarianism4 (Harvey 1997; Putnam 
2000; Atkinson 2002; McCarthy 1999, 2006). Under social partnership, the Irish state 
system underwent a change from a traditional hierarchical government (in a Weberian 
sense), where the state is strictly divided into a public and a private sphere, towards a 
more flexible system of corporatist governance involving groups from civil society in 
selected areas of decision making (Adshead 2003). In Dublin -  reflecting international 
trends towards neo-liberal5 policies and entrepreneurial planning (Newman and 
Thornley 1996; Swyngedouw et al. 2002) -  a variety of partnership-like urban 
development projects have been established as public-private partnerships between 
the local authorities and private investors (MacLaran and Williams 2003) or, to a 
lesser extent, tripartite urban regeneration groups involving community participation 
(Hogan 2005; Bartley and Shine 2003).
APCs were first piloted in 1991 under the 1991-1993 Programme for Economic and 
Social Progress (PESP). 12 APCs were established in designated disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods as an area-based response to limitations of the statutory governance 
apparatus in addressing local symptoms of social, economic and political 
marginalisation experienced by individuals and households situated at the edge of 
society (NESC 1990; CPA 1997). The provision of core funding from the European 
Union (EU) was instrumental in establishing APCs as formally independent
Throughout this thesis, the term funding arrangements refers to processes, procedures and protocols 
that regulate, influence and/or impact on the receipt, the processing and the allocation of funds by
APCs.
2 Here the term statism refers to a social or political system which is characterised by a high degree of 
state intervention in the field of economic and social policy.
3 A neo-corporate model involves the collaboration of actors representing the state, the private sector 
and civil society with a view to negotiating a national social and economic strategy in response to 
international economic pressures (Jessop 2000).
4 A neo-communitarian approach is based on targeting economic development and social cohesion in 
less competitive areas by means increasingly involving citizens and groups representing the 
voluntary and community sector (bottom-up approach) (Jessop 2000).
5 The terms neo-liberal and neo-liberalism generally refer to contemporary processes of economic 
restructuring. At its core, they emphasise the superiority of free markets over statutory regulatory 
efforts in regards to achieving human welfare (Watts 2000). State interventions, according to neo­
liberalism, should be minimal and, if necessary, only of a corrective nature; i.e. the state should only 
interfere to “constrain private activity to promote public interest only in situations of market failure -  
where desired goods are not supplied at acceptable prices" (O'Neill 1997: 291).
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companies limited by guarantee. By establishing APCs outside the direct control of 
central and local government, it was intended to increase the scope for innovation in 
tackling issues related to long-term unemployment and social exclusion in a ‘neutral 
space’; i.e. the approach was based on shared responsibility and ownership among 
the parties invited to the partnership table. Throughout the 1990s, APCs developed 
into an integral part of Ireland’s landscape of local governance. They operated 
alongside a variety of quasi-independent, state-funded area-based initiatives and 
programmes involved in delivering anti-poverty and welfare-related programmes in 
designated disadvantaged areas that typically suffer from high levels of long-term 
unemployment and poverty (CPA 1994; Walsh et al. 1998; Walsh 1999).
The pilot programme of 12 APCs was extended under the 1994-1999 Community 
Support Framework6 and 26 new 'second generation’ APCs were established in the 
mid-1990s under the 1994-1999 Operational Programme for Local Urban and Rural 
Development (OPLURD). APCs were encouraged to pursue a bottom-up7 approach, 
which finds expression in the development of programmes utilising local know-how. 
The focus of the pilot-stages was ultimately directed to developing local responses to 
long-term unemployment. Programmes, for example, supported local enterprise 
creation or the development of training and education initiatives to up-skill local people 
who did not have qualifications to find a job in the (local) labour market. This involved 
the provision of employment-related advice, outreach activities to engage with those 
most distant from the labour market, and, moreover, the promotion of attitudinal 
change and self-confidence (CPA 1994). As the programme continued, the remit of 
APCs became more diverse. APCs became more involved in information and 
advocacy campaigns targeted at encouraging a more tailored and co-ordinated 
statutory service delivery to disadvantaged individuals and providing new 
opportunities and life chances for disadvantaged groupings such as lone parents, 
early school leavers or workers in the black economy.
In the course of successive local development programmes8, measures increasingly 
aimed at the initiation of developmental work and capacity building in communities, 
which have often led to the creation of opportunities to counteract out-migration and 
infrastructural deficits or address local drug abuse and high levels of early school 
leaving ‘from the bottom up’ (OECD 1996; Geddes 1998; Parkinson 1998). It is 
noteworthy, that the more successful projects were joint initiatives where APCs
6 The CSF outlines the utilisation of EU Structural Funds within the corresponding Irish National 
Development Plan (NDP). Three successive CSFs (1989-1993, 1994-1999 and 2000-2006) were 
agreed between Ireland and the European Commission.
Pringle (1999) provides a structuralist reading of the term ‘bottom-up’ and defines it as the process of 
designating relatively small areas in order to address specific local needs influenced by the local 
public opinion, designed to supplement rather than to replace universalist policies of welfare 
provision. Walsh (1999) describes ‘bottom-up’, in a more pluralist fashion, as a situation where 
localities become prime movers in local economic development, linking it explicitly with local 
economic self-help.
8 1. The 1991-1993 PESP
2. The 1994-1999 OPLURD
3. The 2000-2006 LDSIP
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managed to negotiate ‘buy in’ from a variety of different stakeholders: the local
residents/communities, businesses, trade unions and -  probably most relevant -
statutory bodies and politicians. APCs are usually evaluated by their capacity to
develop successful approaches to deal with concentrations of poverty, to encourage
civil involvement in decision making and to reduce the financial burden of public
consumption that curtails the national capacity for growth in more productive areas. As
a result of Ireland’s economic growth -  which raised the GNP per capita above the EU
average -  Ireland received less structural funds under the 2000-2006 Community
Support Framework. Therefore, EU-funding for APCs was discontinued in 2000. As a
result, APCs became entirely dependent on exchequer funding under the 2000-2006
Local Development and Social Inclusion Programme (LDSIP)9. This funding
dependency facilitated state-led governance restructuring directed at the harmonisation
and integration of state-funded local development initiatives and local government
systems (cf. Borscheid 2005). It is argued that a growing emphasis on workfare
principles in welfare restructuring (NESC 2005; Murphy 2006) and an increasing focus
on public-sector modernisation under social partnership propelled plans to streamline
local development bodies under the LDSIP encompassing the wider framework of
governance restructuring (Government of Ireland 1997; NESC 2002b, 2002a; Boyle
and Butler 2003; McCarthy 2006). For example, the NESC report The Developmental
Welfare State provides a policy framework that refers to APCs as a mechanism which
complements an interlocking system of service provision, income supports and activist
measures (cf. NESC 2005: 156):
Their [i.e. APCs’] mission today can be expressed as seeking to improve the 
inclusiveness of Ireland’s labour market by appropriately supplementing or 
influencing active labour market policies at the national level so that more of their 
clients in deprived areas can access Ireland's stronger economy (NESC 2005:
189)
Contemporary measures of welfare restructuring and public-sector modernisation both 
aim at coupling the value of public spending with quality outcomes through promoting 
a ‘professionalisation’ of individuals and structures throughout the statutory 
governance apparatus. The experience of APCs in Dublin is examined here to 
illustrate the extent to which the new managerial ethos of stepping up the performance 
of the governance system has permeated the modus operandi of state-funded local 
development companies through funding arrangements.
There is some evidence that funding dependencies facilitate the re-positioning of 
APCs in accordance with centrally-devised key principles of governance restructuring 
(Bartley and Borscheid 2003). Funding arrangements for APCs need to be seen as 
part and parcel of the contemporary reorganisation of Dublin’s governance landscape
The LDSIP is the third local development programme (see Chapter 2). Similar to the targets of its 
predecessors, the LDSIP’s key objectives are the development of local strategies and programmes 
from 'the bottom up’ (see above) that counter social and economic disadvantage of individuals and 
groups in designated disadvantaged areas and neighbourhoods. Under the 2000-2006 National 
Development Plan (NDP), € 279.34 Million has been allocated to the LDSIP to support 38 APCs, 33 
Community Groups and 4 Employment Pacts (cf. ADM 2002).
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and associated principles emphasising value for money for state-funded services and 
activities. In the context of this study, the concept of value for money is based on 
Power’s definition (Power .1997), which consists of the triad of fiscal efficiency 
(optimising the cost-benefit ratio such as the costs of placing a number of individuals 
into training measures), procedural effectiveness (substantive impacts of funded 
activities such as the improvement of quality of life of individuals that underwent 
training) and organisational economies (the generalised economic returns yielded 
such as the optimisation of the quality of management and professional work 
practices) (see Chapter 1, Section 1.4.1, Table 1.1). It is argued that state-promoted 
governance restructuring based on value-for-money driven agendas and performance- 
oriented funding arrangements have had considerable implications for the modus 
operandi of APCs.
More specifically, it is argued that the proliferation of managerial practices and 
associated changes in governance led to funding arrangements for APCs which 
facilitated the design and implementation of cost-efficient, outcome-oriented and 
innovative local participatory bottom-up approaches aimed at ameliorating social 
polarisation and spatial fragmentation. The comparative use of three competing 
theoretical frameworks will provide specific entry points for investigating forces that 
shape funding arrangements for APCs. In summary, the main rationale of this study is 
threefold:
• first, it analyses to what extent the in-depth empirical data from the case study can 
establish links between the funding arrangements of APCs and identified key 
concepts of public-sector modernisation such as institutionalisation10, 
accountability11 and value for money12 (VFM);
• second, it illustrates power geometries that are influential in determining the role of 
APCs within Dublin’s governance system;
• third, it explores the extent to which the theoretical frameworks provided by 
concepts such as actor-network theory (ANT), urban regime theory (URT) and the 
regulation approach (RA) can account for governance-induced changes in the 
funding arrangements of APCs -  i.e. it seeks to identify which theoretical 
framework is most suitable to explain the empirical findings gathered in the local 
case study.
10 Throughout this study, the term institutionalisation refers to processes of intensifying formal linkages 
between Area Partnership Companies and public sector/statutory administration.
11 A variety of definitions for the term accountability exist (e.g. Sullivan 2003). Throughout this paper, 
accountability is usually used as a two-pronged concept. Accountability consists of:
(a) a reciprocal vertical component that refers to the need of APCs and their political sponsors to give 
account to one another on the one hand, and to be held to account by their constituents, on the other;
(b) a horizontal component that refers to the nature of inter-stakeholder arrangements among players 
who are responsible for locally progressing the work of APCs (see Chapter 6, Section 6.3).
12 This study uses the definition of value for money provided by Power (1997). The concept of VFM 
consists of three indicators: economy, efficiency and effectiveness (see Chapter 1, Section 1.4.1, 
Table 1.1).
4
These three theories were selected because they have been widely applied by 
theorists, scholars and political analysts to describe and explain power configurations 
in governance in OECD countries (Hubbard et al. 2002). In brief, ANT argues that 
what we perceive as established structures -  such as institutions -  consist of a variety 
of human and non-human entities each of which can potentially exert influence on one 
another and, moreover, have the capacity either to enrol other humans and things into 
‘their’ network or, alternatively, exclude them from being part of it. It has frequently 
been deployed to analyse processes concerning institutional (e.g. Law 1997) and 
social (e.g. Murdoch and Marsden 1995) power structures. URT is a concept 
developed in the U.S. (Stone 1989). It specifically focuses on how powerful alliances in 
cities achieve a capacity to govern. URT argues that power necessitates the informal 
combination of resources and incentives among key stakeholders from the public 
sphere, the world of business and other sections of civil society. The RA is mainly 
concerned with (statutory-led) interventionist measures geared at overcoming 
economic crisis situations which are part and parcel of capitalist production processes. 
The RA sees urban governance arrangements as a means to stabilising existing 
power structures tailored to sustain the current societal economic mode of wealth 
creation and buffer adverse social consequences that could endanger political stability 
and, hence, economic prospects. The three theories are discussed more 
comprehensively in Chapter 3.
On the grounds of the literature reviewed, it is assumed that ideas and principles from 
the regulation school are more likely to provide an appropriate explanatory framework 
for the characteristic features of funding arrangements of APCs in the context of local- 
governance restructuring in Dublin than the conceptual approaches provided by ANT 
and URT. In order to test assumption, a methodological strategy based on the ‘null- 
hypothesis approach’ is employed here13. This sets out to ascertain if the conceptual 
ideas provided by ANT and URT are better suited, in the first instance, than the RA to 
explain and account for the design of funding arrangements for APCs in the light of 
processes that are associated with governance restructuring in Dublin. This involves 
testing if the theoretical frameworks provided by ANT and URT exceed the explanatory 
potential of the RA in accounting for the processes shaping funding arrangements for 
APCs in Dublin. If this is found not to be the case, then the RA, following the proposed 
null-hypothesis approach is, by default, accepted as the most successful theoretical 
approach.
The study is divided into eight chapters: Chapter 1 discusses relevant literature as a 
backdrop for the analysis of the material and data gathered in the empirical research
13 A null hypothesis is a statement about a research parameter based on an assumption that evidence 
can prove something as true. A null hypothesis is put forward with a view to disproving it and, at the 
same time, validating an alternative hypothesis (HA). In this case the alternative hypothesis (HA) 
reads as follows: the RA is better suited to explain funding arrangements for APCs that are 
associated with governance restructuring in Dublin than ANT (e.g. University of Glasgow n.d.; 
Nickerson 2000). This is an approach that follows Karl Popper’s falsification principle (cf. Alemann 
and Forndran 1990).
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on APCs. The literature review suggests the existence of parallel trends between 
international and Irish developments in governance restructuring, the modernisation of 
the state apparatus and the role of area-based local development initiatives therein. 
The chapter is broken into three distinct but thematically interconnected sections. Part 
1 underlines a co-dependency between the increasing importance of cities for 
economic activities and societal cohesion as the latter is considered a backbone for 
political stability and, hence, economic potency. Part 2 looks at the reasons for the 
establishment of, and role for, area-based approaches to local development in the 
context of the institutional framework of the EU. It also discusses the experience of 
APCs in building relations involving stakeholders from the state and civil society. 
Furthermore, it illustrates potential systemic power imbalances within the conceptual 
design of APCs and draws attention to their role in complementing national economic 
growth and competition policies. Part 3 underscores that the international proliferation 
of entrepreneurial urban governance and new approaches to welfare re-structuring 
have been accompanied by policies promoting a better use of fiscal resources within 
public administration, which have also come to affect local-governance systems, 
including APCs in Dublin.
Chapter 2 stresses contemporary challenges for APCs in Ireland. It describes their 
gradual transition from area-based pilot projects that were initially situated at arms- 
length distance from public administration into permanent structures of the institutional 
framework of governance. It describes key features of APCs and outlines their role 
within the broader framework of state-restructuring under social partnership, which 
was introduced as a remedy in response to social and economic decline in 1987. The 
chapter also addresses key objectives of APCs, institutional dependencies within the 
governance framework, the nature of principal funding arrangements and both the 
organisational structure and working models of APCs. Moreover, it summarises 
advantages and drawbacks of the area-based approach. Reflecting on the literature 
reviewed, this chapter points towards a causal relationship between (a) policies 
promoting a leaner and more efficient statutory apparatus and (b) the use of funding 
and accountability arrangements for APCs as a means to facilitate the harmonisation 
between national plans for restructuring governance and the remit of APCs.
Chapter 3 introduces actor-network theory (ANT), urban regime theory (URT) and the 
regulation approach (RA) as three competing theoretical frameworks within which the 
empirical findings may be situated. These theories are frequently applied in mapping 
power relations in urban governance scenarios. As each theory offers a different 
perspective on the research object, the key concerns and weaknesses of the 
theoretical approaches are discussed. This chapter points out the strengths and 
weaknesses of each theoretical framework in regard to their potential to explain 
influential factors and forces shaping funding arrangements of APCs in Dublin’s 
changing gpvernance landscape. Part 1 of the chapter introduces the three theoretical 
frameworks. It briefly addresses (a) key principles concerning their views on the
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emergence of power configurations, (b) their conceptual weaknesses and (c) their 
relevance for the analysis of evolving governance structures influencing APCs in 
Dublin. Part 2 provides a more detailed examination of the capacity of the three 
theoretical perspectives to facilitate, and give conceptually grounded direction to, 
empirical case research in the changing institutional environment within which APCs 
are situated. It highlights the potential of the three analytical frameworks for exploring 
the nature and evolution of power relationships and their instrumental role in (a) 
governance restructuring generally and (b) more specifically, their effects on the 
funding arrangements of APCs. Following examples from the literature, it is argued 
that the three theoretical frameworks provide distinctly different perspectives on 
policies and practices designed to promote public-sector modernisation and 
governance restructuring. Reflecting on the conceptual theoretical shortcomings 
outlined in the first part of this chapter, the second part highlights how specific notions 
and undercurrents within each theoretical framework can be utilised to help explain the 
design of contemporary funding and accountability arrangements for APCs in a 
changing landscape of urban governance in Dublin.
Chapter 4 details the methodological approach deployed for assessing local- 
governance restructuring and its repercussions on funding APCs in Dublin. Following 
the review of processes associated with (urban) governance modernisation and the 
role of area-based policies as a form of targeted welfare (Chapter 1 and 2), it is argued 
that the re-alignment of the relationship between the state and government-funded 
APCs is facilitated through the adoption of business-like New Public Management 
(NPM)-principles as a template for the SMI-induces public sector reform in Ireland. 
Three sets of key criteria serve as a surrogate measure to ascertain the extent to 
which the three broad theoretical perspectives provided by ANT, URT and the RA 
(Chapter 3) can account for the NPM-inspired evolution of governance and its 
Implications for funding arrangements for APCs. The design of the empirical 
investigation focuses on:
• processes associated with the gradual institutionalisation of APCs
• characteristic features of the prevailing accountability and monitoring system to 
control APCs; and
• the growing emphasis on assessing the use of resources of APCs against value- 
for-money criteria.
This affords the opportunity of a focused in-depth assessment of complex processes 
that occur at the interface between state-funded APCs and their political paymasters14 
and the impact of these dynamic processes on funding arrangements. The chapter 
outlines the chosen research approach and explains why, based on both practical 
reasons and the nature of the research agenda, a single case-study area in Dublin 
was selected. After briefly situating the work of APCs within contemporary 
developments in urban governance in Dublin, a short description of the case study
14 In this study, state-funded local development structures/agencies usually refer to companies that are 
core-funded under the LDSIP.
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area serves to illustrate the fragmentation of Dublin in terms of affluence and 
deprivation and provide a snapshot of the socio-spatial context within which APCs 
operate. Subsequently, the approach towards the generation of data and information 
through interviews and secondary data sources is delineated. The data generation is 
mainly based on interviews with individuals from APCs, Area Development 
Management (ADM) and Dublin City Council (DCC) and affiliated parties and, 
therefore, mainly captures perceptions of professionals and officials involved in 
promoting, implementing, mediating and/or adapting to state-initiated initiatives of 
governance restructuring in Dublin under the LDSIP. In addition, the inclusion of views 
from individuals working in the local community sector and government officials serves 
to highlight and illustrate commonalities, challenges and discrepancies in viewpoints:
• between locally identified concerns and priorities for the state-funded local-
development sector as defined within the sphere of policy-making and public
administration; and
• between professionals from APCs and both individuals working in the local-
development sector and senior officials placed at central positions within public
administration.
Chapter 5 provides a profile of the case-study area. This is to illustrate the nature of 
disadvantage that prevails in parts of suburban Dublin addressed by APCs. It also 
serves to highlight the severe nature of local problems associated with social and 
economic deprivation. Quotations from comments made by local activists and 
community workers are used to underline the extent and the structural experience of 
poverty. This adds a qualitative dimension to the quantitative assessment of 
disadvantage based on census data. The incorporation of qualitative data not only 
complements the profile obtained by census data but also illustrates the magnitude of 
the challenges faced by the local APC.
Chapter 6 investigates the practices associated with the institutionalisation and 
incorporation of APCs into the statutory apparatus, the design and implementation of 
accountability procedures and guidelines regulating the allocation of funding and the 
promotion of value for money-driven performance measures. The analysis looks at the 
material reviewed and the data gathered. The overall objective is to tease out 
perceptions, attitudes and opinions of a variety of individuals from different institutional 
and professional backgrounds that are either involved in, or affected by, processes 
designed to intensify the degree to which APCs work collaborate with public 
administration. Empirical data is discussed with a view to:
• eliciting tensions and trade-offs occurring at the collaborative interfaces between 
key actors involved in local decision-making processes;
• shedding light on perceived impacts of state-initiated efforts to modernise 
governance systems in the context of economic pressures associated with the 
constraints of economic of globalisation;
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• assessing to what extent the two aspects above are mediated through funding 
arrangements and associated accountability and performance-monitoring systems.
Chapter 7 summarises and highlights conceptual ideas rooted in ANT, URT and the 
RA vis-à-vis the findings from the analysis of the data. It reflects on the key findings 
from the case study outlined in Chapter 6 with a view to providing an assessment as to 
which of the three competing theoretical frameworks employed in this case study can 
most appropriately account for the changes moulding the relationship between urban 
governance re-structuring and APC funding.
Chapter 8 summarises the main findings and makes final observations in regard to the 
implementation of business-like policies promoting public-sector modernisation and 
governance restructuring, on the one hand, and a vision of an innovative local- 
development sector that is capable of complementing these policies without sacrificing 
principles of participatory local decision making, on the other. It draws conclusions 
concerning the NPM-inspired governance transition experienced by APCs under the 
LDSIP and how this was facilitated through the creation of resource dependencies via 
the funding mechanism. This chapter also comments on the employment of the three 
theoretical frameworks in the Dublin context and discusses the potential of this study 
to contribute to a more theoretically-based orientation in empirical research.
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1. LITERATURE REVIEW
1.1 Introduction
This thesis sets out to analyse the impact of a growing emphasis in policy and practice 
on good governance and associated financial accountability and performance-oriented 
monitoring systems on funding arrangements for Area Partnership Companies (APCs) 
in Dublin under the 2000-2006 Local Development and Social Inclusion Programme 
(LDSIP). Against the backdrop of a neo-liberal state modernisation15, the main 
objective of this thesis is to carry out a comparative assessment of the potential 
applicability of three contemporary theoretical perspectives to explicate the design of 
the funding framework for APCs in an era of changing governance.
In order to carry out an analysis of evolving funding arrangements for APCs, with a 
particular focus on urban governance restructuring, this study intends:
• to examine changes in urban governance in OECD countries and draw parallels to 
the situation in Dublin in regard to the promotion of area-based development 
initiatives;
• to identify key factors that determine the characteristic features of APCs in Dublin 
and the role they play in urban governance;
• to introduce three competing theoretical frameworks that can explain the role of 
APCs in Dublin’s changing governance landscape: actor-network theory (ANT), 
urban regime theory (URT) and the regulation approach (RA).
It is argued that an intensification of performance-oriented contractual relationships 
between APCs and their political sponsors facilitates the design and implementation of 
effectiveness-oriented actions (outcome) that contribute to better use of resources and 
enhance the scope for ameliorating symptoms of urban deprivation through local 
participatory democracy. Moreover, it is theorised that the RA provides a better 
explanatory framework for the analysis of the empirical data than either URT or ANT 
for the purposes of an in-depth analysis of the relationship between governance 
restructuring in Dublin and its implications for funding arrangements of APCs.
Against this backdrop, the overall objective of the literature review is to highlight the 
relationship between the emergence of area-based approaches to addressing urban 
deprivation, on the one hand, and international developments in economic
15 Larner (2003) criticises the undifferentiated use of the term neo-liberalism because it is typically used 
as a concept that represents Anglo-American processes of economic restructuring (for a definition of 
the terms neo-liberal/neo-llberalism, see page 1, footnote 5). Larner (2003: 509) also underscores 
that the neo-liberal discussion generally neglects spatial and scalar diversity in regards to the impacts 
of neo-liberal policies and, moreover, “the differences between processes such as deregulation, 
privatisation and marketisation were rarely discussed” (emphasis added). In the context of state- 
modernisation, neo-liberal policies find expression In (a) the deregulation of frameworks that restrict 
entrepreneurial activities, (b) the contractual outsourcing and privatisation of public services and (c) 
the introduction of business-like governance as the basis for running public services. Having regard 
to these issues, this thesis on local governance restructuring in Dublin exemplifies the impact of neo­
liberal concepts in the Irish context.
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restructuring, urban entrepreneurialism and state modernisation, on the other. The 
discussion of the literature in this chapter contextualises the ensuing interrogation into 
the current funding mechanism of APCs and associated processes in Dublin’s 
governance landscape. In anticipation of the wide body of literature that deals with 
contemporary developments in governance, this chapter aims at briefly describing 
different perspectives, competing views and debates concerning urban governance 
and state-restructuring within which APCs are situated. The discussion at the 
beginning of this chapter also serves to frame local practices of APCs at the 
neighbourhood level in Dublin against the backdrop of the wider factors and conditions 
that prompted the development of area-based responses to counteract urban 
processes of spatial, political, economic and societal disintegration that are associated 
with economic globalisation.
The review is divided into four main sections covering international and European 
trends concerning the development of area-based approaches as a targeted response 
to address urban deprivation and the reflection of these trends in the Irish scenario. 
Part 1 deals with the increasing importance of the economic competitiveness of cities 
for national economies and the role of social urban regeneration projects therein. Part 
2 provides an overview of international developments leading to the promotion of area- 
based responses in the European Union in the context of the ‘bigger picture’ of 
restructuring state-civil society relationships and spheres of economic production. It 
sketches out the role of APCs within the institutional framework of the state, outlines 
key objectives and briefly reviews and discusses the experience of APCs in building 
relations involving stakeholders from the state and civil society. Part 3 outlines the role 
of market-led public-sector modernisation in restructuring urban governance systems. 
The first section of Part 3 deals with the international proliferation of the New Public 
Managerialism16 (NPM) and its core principles. It also discusses the concept of value 
for money and touches upon its implications for performance monitoring and stepping 
up organisational performance of stakeholders involved in contemporary governance 
networks. It is argued that the Irish counterpart to NPM, the Strategic Management 
Initiative (SMI), was instrumental in progressing institutional restructuring in Dublin. 
The second section illustrates the implementation of the SMI as the dominant 
ideological framework for re-positioning APCs within Dublin’s governance landscape.
The literature offers different perspectives on issues concerning urban governance. 
This study interrogates the relationship between changes in Dublin’s governance 
landscape and resulting implications for funding arrangements of local APCs. In 
particular, it is intended to identify the merits of public-sector modernisation and its 
potential effects on the work of APCs. In order to get an informed overview of 
processes shaping urban governance, the literature consulted for this case study
16 The term New Public Managerialism refers to strategies that (a) make the statutory apparatus more 
responsive to the needs of the citizen and the economy, (b) optimise the use of fiscal income in 
statutory service-provision and (c) create flexible structures that can address tasks in a less 
bureaucratic manner (see Section 1.4.1).
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draws on publications from the area of business and management studies, public 
administration and, finally, social and political sciences. Each strand has a different 
(ideological) standpoint, focus and approach in regard to both the remit of analysis and 
interpretation of governance-related issues and processes:
• Literature on financial and business aspects of governance typically highlights the 
importance of market-led organisation of territory and society. Authors from this 
thematic current usually argue in favour of the deregulation of markets and call for 
a curtailing of the regulatory powers of the state that interfere with market forces 
(e.g. Ohmae 1995; Strange 2000).
• Public administration literature takes a more pragmatic stance. Writers tend to 
focus on the implications of market forces for the re-scaling of governance under 
current societal conditions in a way that maintains administrative control of society 
in a citizen/consumer/client/customer-friendly way (United Way of America 1996; 
White 2001; Lee 2004). In this field of research the emergence of external 
structural powers driving governance restructuring is typically being dealt with as a 
deus ex machina -  i.e. the nature of the politico-economical and social conditions 
and characteristic features responsible for the formation, stabilisation or alteration 
of governance are not part of the epistemological interest but treated as a given -  
and enabling -  framework for governance.
• The perspective provided by literature from social and political science offers a 
multi-dimensional view on governance. In particular, scholars influenced by 
geographical thinking tend to favour a political-economy approach, which focuses 
on the relationship between the current logic of global production of goods and 
services, their spatio-societal impacts and associated implications for multi-scalar 
statutory regulatory functions (e.g. Peck and Tickell 1994; Brenner 1999; Tickell 
and Peck 2003; Jessop 2004). The framework provided by the political economy 
approach stresses the complexity of contemporary urban governance systems. It 
offers a viewpoint on governance restructuring that takes into account the 
functional connectivity between urban places through a wide array of interrelated 
socio-political and economic activities. The regulation approach often provides the 
theoretical backdrop for scholars analysing governance from the political economy 
perspective. The particular analysis of local phenomena and detailed processes 
concerning urban governance restructuring has also been facilitated by concepts 
rooted in actor-network theory (e.g. McGuirk 2000) and urban regime theory (e.g. 
Lauria 1997b).
The literature reviewed stresses different views, key themes, perspectives and aspects 
in relation to exploring contemporary forms of urban governance. Urban governance 
restructuring does not happen in a vacuum. It occurs in spaces that have been 
constituted over time and reflect an array of social, economic, political and cultural 
processes that have had an impact on its current composition. According to Massey 
(1991), place-specific characteristic features emerge as interplay of ‘cause and effect’. 
That is, local features are a result of a dialectical and multi-layered relationship over
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time between the locale and its exposure to external influences. Within this framework 
a variety of often diametrically opposed vested interests and factors interact, negotiate 
and bargain in a plethora of inter-institutlonal and Inter-organisational links, networks, 
fora, partnerships and round-table structures with a view to influencing policy 
outcomes at various spatial scales, ranging “from the neighbourhood to the globe” 
(Hubbard et at. 2002: 176; cf. Mayer 1992; Rhodes 1994; Swyngedouw 2000). The 
proliferation of area-based partnerships in Europe and, more specifically, APCs in 
Ireland, is an integral part of a new multi-scalar model of governance. Against this 
backdrop, it is argued that a study on the relationship between local-governance 
restructuring and funding arrangements for APCs in Dublin is best situated within the 
conceptual perspective offered by scholars and analysts writing from a political 
geography perspective in an Anglo-European context.
1.2 Context 1: the rote of social cohesion in the competitive city
The following discussion serves to position local practices of APCs at the 
neighbourhood level in Dublin against the backdrop of wider processes that 
encouraged the establishment of area-based responses to counteract processes of 
spatial, political, economic and societal disintegration in cities. These processes are 
associated with economic globalisation -  such as the increasing economic importance 
of cities and regional networks for national economies, the proliferation of 
entrepreneurial and business principles in running cities and public administration and 
the re-configuration of statutory welfare delivery in the aftermath of the Keynesian 
welfare state.
The literature suggests that the emergence and development of entrepreneurial area- 
and issue-based urban governance systems in an economy is part and parcel of a 
strategy aimed at securing the economic competitiveness and fiscal solvency of cities. 
A body of literature has emerged highlighting the paramount role of cities and 
entrepreneurial strategies in the development of the global economy and the 
processes of wealth creation and social cohesion within nation states (Harvey 1989; 
Dunford and Kafkalas 1992; Healey et at. 1995; Castells 1996; Harvey 1997; Jewson 
and McGregor 1997; Lauria 1997b; Hall and Hubbard 1998; Oatley 1998a; Brenner 
1999; Urban Studies 1999; United Nations 2001; Antipode 2002; McGuirk 2003a; 
Moulaert et at. 2003). The success of national economies appears to be mainly 
determined through the ability of cities and their hinterlands either to maintain or create 
competitive advantage in specific economic activities in order to strengthen their 
position within a global hierarchy of cities and “become integrated in international 
networks that link up their most dynamic sectors” (Castells 1996: 381)17:
The distinct feature of 'competition states' and 'entrepreneurial cities' is their self-
image as being proactive in promoting the competitiveness of their respective
In European OECD countries, examples are provided by Hatz (2002) and Redak et at. (2003) for 
Vienna, Lund Hansen et at. (2001) and Andersen (2003) for Copenhagen and Collinge and Hall
(1997) and Bryson (2003) for Birmingham.
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economic spaces in the face of intensified international (and also, for regions and 
cities, inter-and intra-regional) competition (Jessop 1997a: 28).
From the early 1980s, the emergence of urban entrepreneurialism and the competitive 
city discourses became manifest in intensified city/place marketing, efforts directed at 
re-imaging the city, the spread of a variety of economic-driven urban renewal schemes 
and the promotion of so-called flagship projects (Harvey 1989; Newman and Thornley 
1996; McGuirk 2003b; Moulaert et at. 2003) -  often at the expense of addressing 
equality aspects and social issues (Brenner 1999; Jessop and Sum 2000; MacLeod et 
at. 2003; McGuirk 2003a). The literature consulted suggests that ‘otherness’ -  as for 
example captured in systemic political, social, economic and cultural differences 
among nations, regions, cities or neighbourhoods -  requires place-specific responses 
to economic and societal challenges (Massey 1991). Urban case studies in OECD 
countries reveal that the emulation of successful approaches to secure foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and related economic activities is dependent on the capacity for 
adaptability, creativity and flexibility of actors, coalitions or groups at national, city or 
neighbourhood level (Jessop and Sum 2000; Lund Hansen et at. 2001; Swyngedouw 
et at. 2002; MacLaran 2003).
Even though Swyngedouw et at. (2003: 2) maintain that “large-scale Urban
Development Projects (UDPs) have, indeed, become one of the most visible and
ubiquitous urban revitalization strategies pursued by cities in search of economic
growth and competitiveness”, case studies indicate that the promotion of micro-area
infrastructure -  such as local projects at the district or neighbourhood level to
counteract tendencies of societal polarisation associated with policies of
disinvestment, suboptimal planning and income inequalities -  has complemented
entrepreneurial strategising (Bartley and Waddington 2001; Bassett et al. 2002;
Juchelka 2002; Ward 2003). These views highlight that the competitiveness of cities is
not only determined through their economic performance, but is increasingly
influenced by a successful policy approach to tackle issues concerning poverty and
socio-economic marginalisation:
An important criterion of the success of cities, or whether they work, is the 
existence of social cohesion [...] The achievement of social cohesion is no longer 
seen as merely a costly redistributive activity but one which contributes to 
economic competitiveness through the mobilisation of skills, creativity and active 
citizenship (Oatley 1998b: 3).
Harvey (1997), for example, illustrates the mutually constitutive and repercussive 
relationship between the existing form and successive construction, development or 
transformation of urban space and social processes. Following Harvey (1997: 26), the 
establishment of area-based partnerships in Dublin can be interpreted as a process of 
reforming governance through “community mobilisation and the transformation of 
militant particularism” into more moderate forms of civic engagement with the 
authorities. Harvey also sketches out a dialectical relationship between society and
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(urban) space and highlights the importance of more inclusive and participatory 
systems of decision-making processes at the grassroots level:
The urban and the city are not simply constituted by social processes but are also 
constitutive of social processes [...] Social processes, in giving rise to things, 
create the things which then enhance the nature of those particular social 
processes (Harvey 1997: 23, original emphasis).
Harvey (1997) argues that the issue of social cohesion has emerged on the political 
agenda because a widening gap in standards of living in societies and increasing 
relative poverty, with the inherent danger of unwanted forms of community mobilisation 
and militant particularism, could jeopardise locational advantages. In an earlier paper, 
he emphasises that “the city has to appear as an innovative, exciting, creative, and 
safe place to live or to visit, to play and consume in” (Harvey 1989: 9). Jessop and 
Sum (2000: 2290) point out that “cities can be entrepreneurial [...] also in regard to 
economically relevant factors that are not monetised and/or do not enter directly into 
exchange relations”. It is in the context of widening social disparities that new models 
of social and economic urban regeneration were developed.
According to Harvey (1997) economic activity and income generated through 
economic activity is the basis for the provision of resources and opportunities required 
to maintain standards of living and adequate levels of service provision. This is 
particularly visible in the US-American context where, for example, financing public 
services through tax revenue is overly dependant on income generated from taxing the 
local private sector. Hence, as mirrored in the debate on city boosterism and growth 
machines (Peterson 1981; Logan and Molotch 1996), fiscal and systemic pressure 
necessitates the subordination of welfare issues and the re-scaling of governance 
systems to policies tailored to attract business into the limits of a particular 
administrative catchment area (e.g. Stone 1989).
In contrast to the US scenario, the European design of the economic system tries to 
achieve relatively equal living and working conditions across the national and EU 
territory as the foundation stone for prosperity. This ethos is captured in EU structural 
and social policies (European Union 1992; Government of Ireland 2005) and 
associated redistribution mechanisms. At the same time, however, an intensification of 
competition for economic activity and growth between nations, regions and cities with 
adverse effects for less valued competitors can be observed (Moulaert 2000; Dunford 
and Kafkalas 1992; Swyngedouw et al. 2002). The competition for economic activity 
through the promotion of locational advantages has also led to an increase in the 
provision of tax incentives and other concessions and the potential of business 
interests to influence the sphere of politics (Brenner 1999; Punch 2004). There is 
some indication that EU social and economic policies have been supplemented by 
business-friendly US-style approaches to local governance (Bartley and Shine 1999), 
which are mirrored in contemporary efforts to restructure urban governance and the 
role of APCs therein.
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1.3 Context 2: the role of area-based initiatives in the Ell
New forms of stakeholder collaboration in urban governance and their constitutional 
make up were established as a result of new policies that have been applied as a 
remedy to processes of international economic restructuring and its adverse effects 
that successively started unfolding in the mid-1970s in OECD countries (Martin and 
Sunley 1997; Moulaert 2000). This study revolves around the structural forces in 
urban governance re-organisation that influence funding and performance-monitoring 
arrangements of APCs.
Special attention is directed at the role public-sector reform plays in increasing the 
capacity of APCs to optimise the relationship between resource efficiency and 
procedural effectiveness, on the one hand, and public and local accountability, on the 
other. It is intended to ascertain to what extent public-sector modernisation has added 
value to the work of APCs in regard to increasing the possibility for facilitating 
participatory approaches and structures targeted at ameliorating urban deprivation in 
designated disadvantaged areas.
In Europe, the emergence and institutionalisation of area-based initiatives is linked to 
EU and national policies directed at balancing unequal growth and facilitating a 
decentralisation process of statutory powers into horizontally-organised networks of 
decision making that can take account of and develop responses according to place- 
specific conditions (Geddes 1998; Parkinson 1998; OECD 2001). The rationale that 
underpins this section is to outline the role of area-based responses as a response to 
adverse effects of economic restructuring in designated disadvantaged areas 
throughout the EU and highlight their potential to induce participatory decision making 
in the political arena. Geddes (2000: 797) argues that the principle of local partnership 
“is fast becoming a new orthodoxy across the EU in policies to combat social 
exclusion”18. This is relevant because APCs in Ireland and comparable area-based 
partnership-type agencies in EU member countries have similar structures and 
agendas as they were established as a result of European anti-poverty measures and 
structural support programmes designed for designated disadvantaged areas. Urban 
APC-type agencies throughout the EU pursue similar strategies and experience 
problems in piloting bottom-up models designed to complement statutory governance 
systems (ENTRUST 2004).
18 Broadly speaking, social exclusion refers to situations where citizens cannot exercise a variety of 
rights -  for example, economic, social and political -  that are considered normal by members of ‘their1 
mainstream society (Moulaert 2000; Atkinson 2002). The development of a variety of competing 
concepts, policies and languages of social exclusion clearly represents a departure from income 
poverty as the principle indicator of ‘being poor and from traditional ways of dealing with the 
manifestations of multiple forms of deprivation (Sibley 1995; Levitas 1998, 2003). The National 
Development Plan 2000-2006 (Government of Ireland 1999: 187) defines social exclusion as “the 
'cumulative marginalisation from production (unemployment), from consumption (poverty), from social 
networks (community, family and neighbours), from decision making and from an adequate quality of 
life”.
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The reorganisation of statutory structures finds expression in a transformation of the 
traditional, clearly divided, power symmetry attributing certain tasks, policy instruments 
and responsibilities to the state, the market and the public into an interacting multi­
scalar power-field (Jessop 2004). These new multi-tiered bargaining networks operate 
on the basis of mutual interest and commitment of expertise and resources. Urban 
governance coalitions involve various stakeholders from civil society19 such as 
business interests, trade unions, (quasi) non-governmental organisations, voluntary 
and community organisations, charities, religious groups, the mass media and supra­
national organisations, agreements or programmes (Goodwin and Painter 1996; 
Kearns and Turok 2000; Devas 2001). These interest groups usually involve some sort 
of statutory involvement, be it in terms of individuals and/or funding, but operate at 
arm’s-length distance from the state. Even though new governance forms generally 
provide a platform for participation of (organised) interests from civil society in decision 
making within selected political areas, representation and power among those who are 
involved is not necessarily in balance. Local partnership-type arrangements in cities 
are portrayed as a complex power-field that is prone to foster competitive and often 
conflict-laden processes of negotiation, lobbying, collaboration and brokerage (Oatley 
1998a), first, among those involved and, second, between those involved and 
outsiders who want to be included (Hambleton 2000).
1.3.1 The emergence of area-based approaches to local development in the EU
Before area-based approaches became a prominent policy tool to tackle local 
deprivation in Ireland and other OECD countries, the employment of positive territorial 
discrimination through local development initiatives and programmes had long been 
applied in the U.S. and the UK. According to Pringle (1999), the failure of universalist 
welfare policies to cater for the needs of people experiencing poverty led to a more 
targeted approach to welfare provision. Following developments in the US, in the late 
1960s and early 1970s, the UK government addressed local manifestations of poverty 
through area-based schemes such as the designation of Educational Priority Areas 
(EPAs), General Improvement Areas (GIAs), Community Development Projects 
(CDPs), Housing Action Areas (HAAs) and Comprehensive Community Programmes 
(CCPs) (Pringle 1999: 265; cf. Bound et al. 2005; Maguire and Truscott 2006).
The establishment and institutionalisation of local area-based policies in Ireland 
throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s mirrors efforts in OECD countries to 
improve the governability of society in an era of economic globalisation that 
increasingly produces socio-economic and spatial inequalities (Geddes 1998; 
Parkinson 1998; Moulaert 2000). Area-based development agencies became a 
prominent tool of welfare intervention in EU member countries to regulate the 
juxtaposition of market interest and societal well-being through more democratic, 
citizen-friendly and “softer forms of steering the economy and society” (Knill and
Johnston (2000: 84) defines civil society as “Those segments of a capitalist society which lie outside 
both the sphere of production and the state” .
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Lenschow 2003: 1). This often involves an outsourcing and/or spreading of 
responsibilities from the state to civil society. New agencies effectively function as a 
regulatory tool and ideally work alongside the authorities to identify new ways 
collaboratively to address symptoms associated with structural inequalities in society 
(Newman and Verpraet 1999; COM 2001; Moulaert et al. 2003). APCs are tasked to 
follow an approach of ‘trial and error’ and develop innovative pilot projects that can 
stimulate cross-sectoral networking, consensus-building, integration and institutional 
learning. Thereby it is intended to overcome both local (indigenous) and, in the 
medium run, wider (external) structural (e.g., bureaucratic, political, economic) 
obstacles considered responsible for the conditions that led to the establishment of 
APCs in the first place (OECD 1996).
APC-type organisations in Europe operate in geographically confined areas identified
as lagging behind in terms of “factors such as lack of adequate education,
deteriorating health conditions, homelessness, loss of family support, non-participation
in the regular life of society and lack of job opportunities” (Geddes 2000: 783; cf.
Parkinson 1998; OECD 2001; Walsh and Meldon 2004). They have most commonly
been commissioned to address issues related to equality of working and living
conditions, urban renewal, economic development, unemployment, environmental
issues, health, crime, we If a re-services, and active citizenship. As the main objectives
of the EU are geared towards “economic and social progress which is balanced and
sustainable” (European Union 1992: 5), it is understandable that the omnipresence of
area-based partnership companies in the landscape of European governance is
inextricably intertwined with expressed concerns about social cohesion as a
foundation stone for political and economic stability (Geddes 1998; Parkinson 1998;
COM 2001; OECD 2001; Knill and Lenschow 2003; Parkinson 2003). Geddes (1998;
2000) summarises findings of an extensive European research project on local
partnerships in ten EU member states:
While there is a degree of rhetoric in this, partnership is being introduced not only 
into the language, but also into the structures, practices and processes of EU 
policy-making as a key part of the attempt to counterbalance fears of 
fragmentation with notions of integration, and as a means of mobilizing agencies 
and actors behind economic and social policy goals. A local partnership approach 
has become a standard feature of many EU programmes and initiatives, including 
the LEDA programme to promote local economic development, the URBAN 
initiative aimed at deprived neighbourhoods in cities, the LEADER I and II 
programmes for rural development, the Poverty 3 programme, aimed at the 
integration of the most excluded social groups, and the so-called Territorial 
Employment Pacts (Geddes 2000: 784).
The wide range of actions addressed by APCs (see Introduction) calls for strong 
internal and external networks of collaboration among partners and interest groups 
(Rhodes 1994). According to Fukuyama (1999), these forms of working together are 
based on reciprocity and are often passed on through tradition or path-dependent 
networks of trust. The design and promulgation of both formal and (even more so) 
informal institutional forms of local (internal) and extra-local (external) cross-sectoral
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collaboration between key stakeholders differ considerably from former statutory 
interventionist approaches designed to bridge ideological and operational divides 
between the state, the market and civil society (e.g. Knill and Lenschow 2003).
These multi-dimensional forms of collaboration often hinge upon a series of reliable 
networks, functional interfaces and accountability systems that are based on credible 
commitment from the stakeholders and, in particular, from the political paymasters and 
local authorities involved (Geddes 2000; Considine 2002)20. The main ingredient for 
success appears to be the capacity of the local partnership to draw all relevant 
stakeholders into a meaningful working relationship as to combine institutional, 
political and economic power. In this environment, communities tend to be overly 
reliant on their own social capital21 and the capacity of professional APCs to engage 
with a variety of powerful individuals, agencies, organisations and businesses with a 
view to mobilising resources, know-how and clout that is required for the pursuit of 
local social and economic development of disadvantaged neighbourhoods (Bartley 
and Saris 1999; Purdue 2001 )22.
1.3.2 Spaces of participation
A principal strategy towards achieving inclusive and collaborative working 
arrangements is the construction of networks involving relevant stakeholders through 
brokerage. Brokerage is often associated with, or regarded as a form of lobbying. It is 
usually an effort to motivate and cajole interest groups and stakeholders for the 
development of local projects, measures and actions representing those local needs 
and wants, that are in line with the agenda given to local APCs (Chapter 2, Section 
2.3.2). The crux of addressing spatial manifestations of multiple inequalities through 
area-based approaches, however, seems to be the translation of partnership rhetoric 
into action. Atkinson (2002: 787) points out that, first, “it takes time and requires 
considerable resources to empower local partnership coalitions and communities to 
participate in a manner that gives them a genuine input into the policy process”, and, 
second, that “an increased role for citizens/communities in the policy process poses a 
challenge to traditional forms of decision making and service delivery by public 
bureaucracies”. Raco and Flint (2001) illustrate the conflict-laden and often 
competitive relationship between local partnerships and local authorities. The key
20 Even though local partnerships across the EU differ in relation to their remit, composition and 
integration into representative democratic systems, they usually represent multi-stakeholder interests 
involving -  to a varying degree -  local authorities, trade unions, employers, public representatives 
and community interests (Geddes 2000).
21 Social capital is a contested concept: following Grootaert (1998: 2), throughout this thesis social 
capital is used to refer to “the set of norms, networks, and organisations through which people gain 
access to power and resources, and through which decision making and policy formulation occur" 
and their contribution to economic growth. According to Grootaert, this definition is, for example, 
broader than Putnam’s focus on social capital. Putnam (1993) regards social capital as a form of 
horizontal civic engagement between individuals that is focused on having an effect on the 
productivity of the community.
Moreover, getting commitment from powerful actors and the governing elites appears to be more 
difficult in economically and politically weaker neighbourhoods where communities are under­
resourced to engage in successful negotiation and involvement (cf. Purdue 2001).
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issue frequently surfacing in state-civil relations is the question of whether partnership- 
type agencies, as government-appointed and state-funded bodies, should be allowed 
to interfere with and challenge local authorities. The answer probably lies in the new 
challenges to the governability of society. Traditional bureaucratic structures such as 
local authorities were often considered not flexible enough to develop tailor-made 
strategies that can respond to place-specific local developments (e.g. COM 2001). Yet 
resistance from within the establishment led to turf wars and power struggles that limit 
the scope of local partnerships to stimulate more effective and inclusive governance 
(e.g. Flynn 2000). This appears to be facilitated by an interplay of various factors such 
as bureaucratic inertia, resistance to change, a complex self-perpetuating institutional 
dynamism of the statutory apparatus and long-established forms of behaviouralism 
and attitudes towards outsiders (i.e. individuals that are not considered ‘stable-mates’ 
or do not have a ‘public servant pedigree’). As a consequence, co-operation often 
depends on goodwill and informal one-to-one relationships.
1.3.3 Institutional integration
The launch of European Governance: A White Paper by the Commission o f the
European Communities (COM 2001) addresses a variety of issues associated with the
proliferation of multi-level governance structures. The Commission argues for "greater
institutional integration of both a vertical and horizontal nature” across the gambit of
actors involved in governance issues (Atkinson 2002: 783):
The White Paper proposes opening up the policy-making process to get more 
people and organisations involved in shaping and delivering EU policy. It promotes 
greater openness, accountability and responsibility for all those involved (...) by 
following a less top-down approach and complementing its policy tools more 
effectively with non-legislative instruments (COM 2001: 3-4).
On the one hand, partnership structures discussed here are designed to respond to 
local concerns and facilitate the sustainable social and economic re-organising of 
‘local space’ through principles associated with participatory démocratisation ‘from 
below’ and social inclusion23. On the other hand, there is some indication that undue 
heavy-handed enforcement of institutional codes of practice and new public 
management standards are taking the upper hand over principles of innovation and 
democratic experimentalism (Geddes 2000; Rouillard and Giroux 2005). For example, 
the proliferation of business-like audit and performance-monitoring measures, detailed 
legally-binding contractual arrangements and competitive bidding processes for the 
allocation of resources to local partnerships are often geared towards the achievement 
of tangible short-term goals (Flynn 2000; Considine 2002; Elliott 2002). The following 
question arises: does the pursuit of financial efficiency and the introduction of
23 The principle of social inclusion as an overriding term is not undisputed. Levitas (27-28/03/2003: no 
page numbers) for example argues that the concept is meritocratic in nature as:
a) it stresses “opportunities for people to climb out of poverty, not the abolition of poverty itself. 
Inclusion does not necessarily imply a redistributive agenda”;
b) it divides society into two camps of insiders and outsiders, the latter of which includes the 
marginalised, dysfunctional individuals that pose a problem to societal well-being.
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business-like professional ethics (Schwartz 2004) discourage or encourage the pursuit
of community-based empowerment and institutional learning?
The inclusiveness and accountability of partnerships is particularly relevant in the 
context of social exclusion. There is, again, a growing body of research which 
indicates the tendency in many local partnerships for excluded social groups, even 
when these are the ‘targets’ of the partnership’s activity, to be marginalized within 
partnership processes (e.g. Chanan, 1992, 1997; McArthur, 1995; Madanipour et 
al., 1998), raising serious questions as to the effectiveness of participatory 
mechanisms of partnership, and whether ‘partnership governance’ reinforces 
rather than reduces processes of exclusion (Geddes 2000: 787).
Even though the concepts of governance and partnership suggest a more democratic
or participative approach to political decision-making processes, some scholars argue
that the scope for transforming group-specific interests effectively into policy depends
on the ability of actors to shift the power-symmetry towards their own agenda and,
moreover, have the capacity to take responsibility for their actions (Stone 1989; Mayer
1992; Kearns and Turok 2000):
This horizontal or pluralist style does not mean, however, that these local 
negotiation systems are necessarily open to democratic influence. On the 
contrary, the participants may form an exclusive group, and only selected interests 
may be represented (Mayer 1992: 260).
The ability to become a member of an ‘exclusive circle', in turn, is determined by 
certain factors that attribute weight to the agenda being pursued. The literature 
suggests that the agenda-setting process is influenced by:
• “the nature of the relationship among stakeholders at certain political and 
economic conjunctures” (Devas 2001: 394);
• formal and informal modes of communication; and
• both the social capital (e.g. the quality of networks available) and economic 
resources (bargaining capacity) that can be brought to the table (Kearns and Turok 
2000; cf. Stone 1989; Raco 2000; Purdue 2001).
1.3.4 A brief discussion of area-based initiatives in OECD countries
Case studies from OECD countries reveal that local partnership-type organisations 
involved in governance restructuring or public-sector modernisation are faced with 
systemic weaknesses that effectively reduce their capacity to become ‘movers and 
shakers’ in stimulating structural changes and influencing established power 
relationships in a substantial way (Oatley 1998a; Geddes 1997, 1998, 2000; Parkinson 
1998; Kearns and Turok 2000; Raco 2000; Devas 2001; Medd 2001; OECD 2001; 
Purdue 2001; Raco and Flint 2001; Considine 2002; Scott and Thurston 2003; Lamer 
and Craig 2005). Some of those systemic obstacles that reduce the potential of APC- 
type organisation are: fiscal pressures that lead to a subordination of social to labour- 
market policies (which often results in a focus on welfare-related service delivery and 
labour-market disadvantage); a lack of concerted vertical and horizontal policy co­
ordination between different levels of government, public administration and statutory 
service-delivery agencies; difficulties to devise a mechanism that can bring together, 
and motivate, a multitude of relevant and committed stakeholders; overly bureaucratic
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reporting, monitoring and accounting procedures that result in administrative 
deadweight; the prioritisation of output-oriented short-term goals and objectives that 
prevent genuine grassroots participation and the process-oriented actions that are 
required for local developmental and capacity-building initiatives work within 
disadvantaged communities.
Taking into consideration the raison d'être and the wider institutional environment 
within which local partnerships are embedded, the question arises as to whether or not 
these local bodies with limited resources and very limited influence on the political 
economy can meet the high expectations associated with their role as strategic 
brokers, namely:
• to counteract spatial fragmentation and socio-economic polarisation;
• to encourage shared commitment and networked (cross-sectoral) collaboration of 
stakeholders from different institutional and other backgrounds; and
• to promote democratic governance by means of stimulating mainstream institutions 
support and institutionalising models of best practice that have been developed on 
the ground through participatory forms of democracy.
In the pursuit of successful governance structures to secure governability of 
increasingly complex relations between the state, the economy and civil society, 
critical voices describe area-based multi-stakeholder APC-type agencies as a 
complementary model, assisting the modernisation of classical top-down regulatory 
policies (Mayer 1992; Peck and Tickell 1994; Harvey 1997). It is argued that the 
experimental character of these relatively new structures limits their capacity to 
instigate meaningful change on the structural environment within which they are 
embedded (e.g. Swyngedouw 2000), mainly because they are institutionally anchored 
and ideologically controlled by political paymasters who:
• first, pursue economically-guided imperatives based on entrepreneurial strategies 
and the promotion and introduction of managerial practices;
• second, still operate and delegate from within relatively inert and inward-looking 
bureaucratic structures that are slow to react to innovation (e.g. COM 2001) and, 
furthermore, “notably in the most heavily centralized countries” (Le Galès 1998: 
482) are not likely to welcome and be responsive to challenges regarding their 
authority and procedural behaviour from non-elected or appointed bodies ‘from 
below’ (Raco and Flint 2001).
This seems to be an anomalous situation because area-based development initiatives 
have been promoted from within government administration as a means to facilitate 
the resolution of legitimacy problems of the state in issues concerning fiscal solvency 
and societal restructuring in an era of increasing global competition for resources (see 
above and cf. Rhodes 1994). It appears that the prevailing concept of local APC-type 
development agencies needs to be re-visited as the first step towards the development 
of a workable and new modus vivendi.
22
Urban case studies on governance scenarios stress that the following factors are 
profoundly important in determining the institutional capacity of local partnership 
coalitions to progress towards the implementation of initially agreed (joint) objectives 
(Stone 1989; Murdoch and Marsden 1995; McGuirk 2004):
• the creation of meaningful incentives for commitment that goes beyond passive 
membership;
• the removal of systemic policy blockages that prevent inter-agency collaboration 
and institutional learning;
• the building of effective and transparent relationships that link the complex 
interfaces between the stakeholders involved.
The material reviewed here shows that the flow and organisation of power in 
restructuring contemporary state-civil society relationships through APC-type agencies 
does not seem to be optimally orchestrated. Case studies point out that often, a 
deficient ‘interlocking’ systemic compatibility between state-led structures and local 
APC-type companies is aggravated by an ideological friction among stakeholders 
involved concerning the envisaged modus operandi of area-based development 
agencies. It is indicated that this prevents concerted support for multi-stakeholder 
collaboration and, furthermore, limits choices for pursuing participatory involvement at 
the local level. Contemporary forms of inter-sectoral networking, co-operation, 
coordination and collaboration appear to be overly dependent on the social capital and 
professional expertise gathered under the umbrella of local APCs, on the one hand, 
and the good will of key individuals from within the statutory apparatus, on the other 
(Himmelman 2002; Pobal 2006a). The literature reviewed stresses that the 
modernisation of the public sector has been rolled out to APC-type agencies in order 
to facilitate the effectiveness of collaboration within less hierarchical forms of state- 
initiated multi-stakeholder governance arrangements. More transparency in decision 
making, shared responsibility and accountability should increase the potential for 
participatory planning and policy making. Some authors highlighted that business- 
inspired institutional codes of practice governing collaborative arrangements do not 
always seem to take into account the local realities faced by APCs.
Against this background, it is argued that the introduction of new managerial practices 
has also been instrumental in shaping funding arrangements and institutional practice 
in Dublin. This study explores funding arrangements for APCs in the context of 
contemporary institutional re-structuring of Dublin’s governance landscape. It seeks to 
assess to what extent performance and accountability systems associated with public- 
sector modernisation have facilitated the scope for participatory decision making 
among stakeholders involved in addressing urban disadvantage, moreover, to make 
judgements on their contributions to adding value to the work of APCs. Therefore, it is 
considered crucial firstly to outline the background and characteristic features of 
public-sector reform, both internationally and in Ireland.
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1.4 Context 3: the rote of public-sector reform
New forms of entrepreneurial governance and welfare re-structuring have been 
paralleled by business-like modernisation of bureaucracies based on the ethos of New 
Public Management (NPM) (Flynn 2000; Considine 2002). NPM promotes a better use 
of fiscal resources within the statutory apparatus vis-à-vis outcomes achieved. NPM- 
principles were also rolled out to state-affiliated/-funded local partnership 
arrangements in urban governance to maximise the use of resources available to 
promote participatory forms of community mobilisation and local démocratisation (e.g. 
Newman and Verpraet 1999; Atkinson 2002). The following sections sketch out the 
background and key principles of NPM and their role in public-sector reform.
1.4.1 International developments: the New Public Managerialism
The anticipation of various challenges in managing the newly-emerging complex
landscape of state-led governance in a situation of tight budgets, growing economic
and fiscal pressures and the associated social and political challenges led to a new
order of public-sector organisation and regulatory arrangements in OECD countries
throughout the 1990s (Desai and Imrie 1998; Clarke et al. 2000a; Flynn 2000;
Hambleton 2000; Butler and Collins 2004; Rouillard and Giroux 2005). According to
Considine (2002: 22) ‘‘the public services of many advanced systems have been
reinvented according to a new orthodoxy that requires enlarged management
prerogative as a means to induce higher outputs. Input controls, precedent, and due
process are consequently viewed as a source of organizational rigidity (Lane; Osborne
and Gaebler; Walsh)”. The thinking underlying this new order is widely associated with
the concept of New Public Management (NPM), which can be understood as a means
“to make the state more entrepreneurial” (Power 1997: 43; cf. Osborne and Gaebler
1992; Clarke et al. 2000a; Bislev et al. 2002):
The dimension of this ‘new order’ includes the pursuit of efficiency over other 
objectives, the division and dispersal of functions with the focus on intra- 
organisational goals, and the propagation of perspectives which regard social and 
political issues as technical and/or procedural matters, that is, matters to be 
‘managed’ (Desai and Imrie 1998: 635-636).
Originating in the USA, the UK and New Zealand, practices borrowed from the private
sector functioned as a template for fiscal policy reform and restructuring public service
delivery in increasingly dispersed service-related governance systems in OECD and
other market economies (Clarke et al. 2000a; Flynn 2000; Butler and Collins 2004).
Even though Clarke et al. (2000) stress that NPM is not a sharply-defined concept,
Bislev et al. (2002) provide a useful working framework (cf. Hambleton 1998)24:
[NPM] [...] points to three significant new demands that pervade most versions of 
it: responsiveness -  making the state systematically responsive to citizens; 
efficiency -  measuring and minimising the amount of resources consumed by the 
public sector in producing its results; and liberalisation -  changing government 
structures in the direction of more variation in organisational forms, systematic
24 In the UK context, Hambleton (1998) talks about the emergence of a new managerialism as a 
contract-based mechanism that tries to straddle a market-led re-institutionalisation of the bureaucratic 
landscape with democratic empowerment models. In that way public service delivery was expected to 
cope with and respond to external pressures originating in the economy and in the public domain.
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decentralisation, and a measure of privatisation (Bislev et al. 2002: 200, Footnote, 
original emphasis).
The pursuit of managerialism in public administration is guided by the key principles of 
reducing costs through optimising internal economies -  as a predominant feature of 
managerial reforms -  and, concomitantly, shifting decision-making capacity from civil 
servants into the political arena (Flynn 2000)25. Public-sector modernisation went hand 
in hand with a controlled move away from ‘rowing’ (i.e. the direct service provision by 
the state) towards ‘steering’ (i.e. the management of service provision by the state) 
(Osborne and Gaebler 1992; Considine 2002). The new managerial approach involved 
the contractual out-sourcing of services that had formerly been centrally provided by 
the state: private sector interests, public-private partnerships or state-funded special- 
purpose bodies (‘quangos’) such as APC-type local development initiatives became 
increasingly involved in the delivery of public services and carrying out planning duties 
on behalf of the public sector, whilst the managerial powers were retained in the 
centres of statutory administration.
Power (1997) observes that these trends have been accompanied by an audit 
explosion26, which was a response to a more institutionally and legally complex 
governance system that needed monitoring. The focus of the new auditing culture for 
an extended multi-stakeholder approach to service delivery rests on measuring value 
for money (VFM) or 'best value'. Value for money is mainly measured on the basis of 
what Power (1997) calls the The Three Es1: economy, efficiency and effectiveness. 
These terms are explained in Table 1.1 below.
Table 1.1: Value for money (the 3 Es)
Indicator Explanation
Economy: Accountability for obtaining the best possible terms under which 
resources are re-acquired.
Efficiency: Accountability for ensuring that the maximum output is obtained from 
the resources employed or that a minimum of resources are used to 
achieve a given level of output/service.
Effectiveness: Accountability for ensuring that outcomes conform to intentions, as 
defined in programmes.
Source: Power (1997).
25 Flynn (2000) critically argues that the emulation of business-inspired managerial practices in the
public sector is often resisted, and challenged, by powerful alliances within public bodies subject to
change. The resistance is based on a culture of beliefs, a specific mindset and/or attitudes among 
public servants concerning their own perception of how to best conduct their profession. Replacing 
long-established codes of behavioural practices, organisation of bureaucratic procedures and career 
paths by performance monitoring based business principles may either not be welcomed or 
considered not feasible (or both) by individuals placed within public administration under current 
modes of bureaucratic organisation (cf. Knox 2002; Butler and Collins 2004).
26 The term ‘audit explosion’ refers to an exponential increase in the circulation and implementation of a
plethora of centrally developed financial accountability mechanisms and performance-monitoring 
indicators.
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Flynn (2000) notes that efforts to create an output-oriented budget -  which is based on 
value-for-money principles -  requires adequate (i.e. market-principled) measurements 
of success. These are however, particularly difficult to develop for agents of public 
service delivery:
[...] managerial control through measurement and specification either of outputs 
(the volume of work done) or outcomes (the results) in the absence of a measure 
of value, raises arguments about what should be measured and how that 
becomes part of the debate about who should control the work (Flynn 2000: 42).
The issue at hand is the inadequate design and application of financial and
performance auditing tools that cannot represent the totality and value inherent in
contemporary process-oriented, client-focused and quality-driven organisations (e.g.
Elliott 2002)27. Power (1997: 120) concludes that NPM-related auditing “tends to
dominate evaluation and [...] tends to be measured in terms of auditable outputs"
(emphasis added). Instead of stepping up organisational performance, the pursuit of
outcomes can also have rather perverse effects as, for example, auditees may decide
to develop strategies effectively contesting monitoring and evaluation mechanisms
they consider ill-designed for appropriately capturing their performance:
New motivational structures emerge as auditees develop strategies to cope with 
being audited; it is important to be seen to comply with performance measurement 
systems while retaining as much autonomy as possible (Power 1997: 13)
International examples and case studies indicate that the new managerial thinking
became influential in restructuring contemporary public service delivery welfare:
The New Public Management has championed a vision of public managers as the 
entrepreneurs of a new, leaner, and increasingly privatized government, emulating 
not only the practices but also the values of business (Denhardt and Denhardt 
2000: 549).
Furthermore NPM was developed into a prominent policy tool directed at aligning 
procedural workings of non-statutory multi-stakeholder partnerships to business-like 
modes of practice exercised in public administration. Different approaches to NPM 
have been applied, refined and extended to all spatial and political levels across the 
range of new governance structures that vary according to local conditions (Desai and 
Imrie 1998; Flynn 2000; Considine 2002; Townsend and Townsend 2004; Rouillard 
and Giroux 2005; Roberts et at. 2005; Page 2006). For example the OECD report 
Local Partnerships for Better Governance refers to the role of APCs as a governance 
tool that facilitates “greater efficiency in resource allocation and better co-ordination of 
actions” and that, moreover, “can help complement market outcomes and the 
redistribution function of the state” (OECD 2001: 107).
The introduction of new managerial practices in Ireland is mirrored in the Strategic 
Management Initiative (SMI), which brought about a new orientation towards a 
business-like provision of public services across government bodies and the gamut of
27 “It is one thing to assess performance against certain standardised outputs to which it should conform 
[...] and quite another thing to assess the impact or outcomes (unintended as well as intended) of
performances, including those which comply to the given standards” (Elliott 2002: 501)
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grant-receiving or contract-based actors occupying the space of local governance in 
collaboration with -  or on behalf of -  the state.
1.4.2 The Irish case: the Strategic Management Initiative
International developments described in the previous section show that public-sector 
modernisation is inextricably connected with the political objective of securing fiscal 
solvency and not endangering economic opportunities and competitiveness through 
social consumption. Economic interest groups in Ireland have been lobbying for 
stronger pro-growth economic policies and an even more ‘enabling’ statutory 
regulatory framework28. Some examples that illustrate the move towards a "New era in 
corporate governance” (Harney 27/11/2001: no page numbers) include the increasing 
role of public-private partnership arrangements in both planning and service provision, 
the transferral of significant powers from government departments to industry or 
sector- specific regulators29, and the development of key indicators and Regulatory 
Impact Assessments (RIAs) as a guidance for government interventions concerning 
the private sector, the third sector (i.e. the Community and Voluntary Sector) and 
public services (Forfas n.d.; DoT 2004)
It is argued that contemporary urban governance changes in Dublin reflect 
international trends in public-sector reform. Under the current local development 
programme, APCs have increasingly become the subject of auditing and performance- 
monitoring procedures and institutional changes that are directly linked with the 
Strategic Management Initiative (SMI). As it is argued that public-sector reform has 
had positive knock-on effects on the operational and procedural effectiveness of 
APCs, it is considered crucial to highlight the origins and key objectives of the SMI, 
which is the Irish response to international trends of economic restructuring and 
associated societal and political repercussions on the competitiveness of the national 
economy.
The SMI was initiated by the Department of the Taoiseach (DoT 1996; Ahern 
07/11/1997; Bartley et at. 1999; DoELG 2000) with a view to creating a business- 
friendly, cost-effective and more professional public sector (McCarthy 2006). The SMI 
“was largely born of the social partnership experience” (McCarthy 1999: 18). It 
complements a wider trend of the deregulation and privatisation of statutory 
companies and services that had been on the political agenda in Ireland since the mid- 
1980s. It was launched in February 1994 by the then Taoiseach, John Bruton, T.D. 
(FG) (Teahon 1997).
28 For example, a press release announcing the launch of the Business Regulation Forum Report on 
25/04/2007 had the following headline: ‘Reducing administrative pressures could save business in 
Ireland €500 million annually'. The report states that “the administrative and regulatory burden on 
Irish business is perceived to be too high and affecting Ireland’s competitiveness in the international 
economy” (DoETE 25/04/2007: no page numbers) and calls for a further reduction of red tape for Irish 
businesses.
29 Such as the establishment of the Competition Authority (1991), the Office of the Director for 
Corporate Enforcement (2001), the Financial Regulator (2003), and the Irish Auditing and Accounting 
Supervisory Authority (2003).
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In summary, the key objectives of the SMI are as follows:
• to deliver an “excellent service to the customer” (Teahon 1997: 55);
• to maximise the potential of the public service to contribute to national (economic) 
development; and
• to guarantee an efficient and effective use of resources.
Once the strategic thrust and the core areas of the SMI had been developed by a
group of senior civil servants30, representation from the social partners was selectively
invited to become involved in working groups preparing detailed programmes for
implementation (Teahon 1997; OECD 1997). The philosophy of the SMI is captured in
two influential reports. Delivering Better Government (DoT 1996) and Better Local
Government (DoELG 1996) outline the agenda towards a leaner public sector and
functioned as a template for decision makers. In the foreword of the former report, the
then Taoiseach John Bruton, T.D. (FG), relates the necessity for public-sector
rationalisation to economic pressures:
In an increasingly competitive environment, a flexible, efficient and effective Civil 
Service is essential. It is vital that we have an Irish Civil Service geared to meet 
the challenges this country faces. [...] A more results and performance oriented 
Civil Service is essential. Rigorous systems of setting objectives and managing 
performance need to be put in place to support this. Civil Servants must be clearly 
rewarded for good performance and take responsibility for poor performance,
within a structure that emphasises teamwork within and between Departments
(DoT 1996: Foreword).
Better Local Government was drafted by the co-ordinating group of secretaries31. It
sketches out a general vision for modernising the public service that has been inspired
by public-sector management in New Zealand and Australia (DoT 1996; cf. MacSharry
and White 2000: 90). Bartley et at. (1999) suggests a variety of influences on
governance restructuring in Dublin from the UK, the Netherlands, and the US -  with a
particular influence of linkages with twin cities. However, public-sector modernisation in
New Zealand, which “was heavily influenced by North American management theories
from the mid-1980s” (Bartley and Shine 2003: 160), has probably left the biggest mark
on Irish governance reform:
The move towards new public management styles [...] has drawn heavily upon the 
Strategic Management Initiative disseminated by the Co-ordinating Group of 
Secretaries in the Department of the Taoiseach. Their report, Delivering Better 
Government: A Programme for Change for the Irish Civil Service (May 1996), was 
drawn from their experiences of (and subsequent report on) the New Zealand 
system of government. The material of their report was collected in connection 
with a joint project prepared as a part of a dedicated MSc Class for Assistant 
Secretaries3 in Trinity College Dublin in 1993/94 (Bartley etal. 1999: 19).
30 Political analysts suggest that this highly influential role of public servants in the sphere of policy 
making seems to be an integral part of Irish policy (Murphy 2002; Adshead 2003; Bartley and Shine 
2003) -  a phenomenon, however, that is not confined to the Irish experience. Flynn (2000; 36) states 
that “it is not always politicians who launch managerial changes. In some countries (for example, the 
Netherlands, Finland and Sweden) public management reform has been shaped and fuelled largely 
by mandarins rather than by ministers".
31 The group was formed by, and consisted of, senior civil servants from various departments and 
offices (see Appendix 1, Table A-1.2).
32 See Appendix 1, Table A-1.3.
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Taoiseach Bertie Ahern, T.D. (FF), in his opening address to the 1997 National
Conference of the Institute of Public Administration (IPA), commented on the structural
changes in the public service as a proactive way to create favourable economic
development conditions 'from the inside out’:
We are experiencing a time of significant change in the way government does its 
business [...] It is interesting to note that the impetus for change comes not only 
from external sources. I believe that within the civil and public service there is a 
strong commitment to, and indeed a thirst for, real and lasting change (Ahern 
07/11/1997: no page numbers).
Outlining the merits of the SMI, former Taoiseach John Bruton, T.D. (FG), illustrated
the link between public sector and national competitiveness in his opening address to
the to the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA) Conference
on the 10th of September 1998:
The cost of the civil and public service, the extent and cost of Government 
programmes, and the combined effects of these on the economy, and its 
competitiveness in particular, require that financial management systems be 
comprehensive, be effective, and ensure that value for money is achieved (DoT 
1998: no page numbers).
In June 1998, as part of the SMI-related programme for the renewal of local
government (DoELG 1996), central government established the interdepartmental Task
Force on the Integration o f Local Government and Local Development Services
(hereafter Interdepartmental Task Force; see Appendix 1, Table A-1.4). The members
of the Interdepartmental Task Force wrote reports that propagated the merits of
vertically and horizontally integrating local government with the existing multi-agency
system operating in various local development initiatives. The Interdepartmental Task
Force was chaired by Noel Dempsey, T.D. (FF), the then Minister for the Environment
and Local Government. In December 1998, the Interdepartmental Task Force produced
its first report Task Force on the Integration o f Local Government and Local
Development Services (DoELG 1998), the so called Dempsey Report (Bartley et al.
1999). Minister Dempsey outlined the objectives of the report as follows:
The [Dempsey] report sets out a framework under which local government and the 
local development agencies, including area partnerships, county enterprise boards 
and LEADER groups, will by a series of steps operate in an integrated fashion.
The framework will set the local development agencies continuing to report to their 
relevant Government Departments; in the case of area partnerships, the 
Department of Tourism, Sport and Recreation; county enterprise boards, the 
Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment, and Leader groups, the 
Department of Agriculture and Food. Implementation of the report's 
recommendations will be overseen by the task force. The task force will shortly be 
consulting with the four pillars under Partnership 2000, with local government and 
local development interests, as regards implementation (Dail Eireann 21/10/1998: 
no page numbers).
The report develops concrete recommendations on how to successfully put local- 
authority reform into practice and sets out the core principles of local government 
reform:
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The ultimate vision guiding this exercise is that of an integrated local government / 
local development system which builds on the experiences and strengths of both 
systems (DoELG 1998: no page numbers).
More specifically, the objectives for local government reform outlined in the report are 
as follows:
• to increase the scope for local participation;
• to move from a clientelist to a customer-driven service orientation33;
• to focus on efficiency in terms of value for money and improved vertical and 
horizontal co-ordination with other stakeholders in local development; and
• to develop new funding arrangements in order to create an enabling budget for 
local authorities.
In essence, the Interdepartmental Task Force emphasised that the highly fragmented 
area of local development needed two basic ingredients that were considered 
imperative in order to make local development compatible with the value-for-money- 
driven agenda of the new public managerialism as the ideological core of public-sector 
reform. First, a co-ordination “of Government business at local level” (DoELG 1998: 
31) and, second, efficient channels to facilitate mediation between national policy and 
the local level. One of the principal objectives for the SMI was to introduce a new 
governance system that is able “to minimise functional and territorial overlaps” 
between organisations and to “greatly increase effectiveness of State Agencies and 
local and community activities at local level” (DoELG 1998: 29).
The efforts of the Interdepartmental Task Force culminated in the Local Government 
Act 2001 (Government of Ireland 2001), which sets the framework for governance 
restructuring. It gave way to, and backed up, the institutional restructuring of Dublin’s 
governance landscape that had profound implications for APCs. The White Paper 
Regulating Better (DoT 2004) outlines the government's vision for public-sector 
modernisation. It names six core principles that should foster the creation of a 
business-friendly and competition-oriented governance framework that plays an 
enabling role for job creation and economic growth (cf. Government of Ireland 2005).
The objectives of local government modernisation, restructuring governance and 
promoting better regulation -  as outlined in the reports by the Coordinating Group of 
Secretaries, the Interdepartmental Task Force and the White Paper Regulation Better 
-  are targeted at improving the relationship between inputs, understood as resources 
dedicated to the implementation of government programmes, and the benefits for 
participants or strategic partners in maintaining economic competitiveness (i.e. 
outcomes). The reports of the Interdepartmental Task Force focus on geographically 
and structurally aligning the state-funded local-development sector with local
33 In the context of public service provision, the term client is associated with a paternalistic dependence 
of the individual on the public servant whereas the term customer suggests that public service is 
tailored to meet the needs of the individual (Hambleton 1998).
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government to achieve better synergies between the statutory apparatus and the 
state-funded local-development sector and, effectively, better cost-effectiveness34.
For example, the NESC report Achieving Quality Outcomes: The Management o f 
Public Expenditure (NESC 2002a) emphasises the key role of the Department of 
Finance, and even more so of the Comptroller and Auditor General (C & AG), in 
ensuring the implementation and monitoring of key principles of the SMI35. The 
Comptroller and Auditor General (C & AG) started issuing Value for Money Reports in 
1994. The 1999 report on APC-type structures funded under the 1994-1999 
Operational Programme for Local Urban and Rural Development (OPLURD) highlights 
the necessity for the introduction of cost-effective measures and outcome-orientation 
of activities of local development agencies funded by the state. The modernisation of 
the statutory administrative apparatus in Ireland is well-documented in the publications 
by the I PA36.
1.4.3 Summary
Contemporary developments in regard to streamlining local-governance structures can 
be interpreted as a strategic goal of central government that responds to economic 
pressures anticipated by policy makers. The re-shuffling of responsibilities and a re­
organisation of the local development arena is targeted at an 'optimisation' of the 
interaction and interfaces between the state and civil society (i.e. between the state 
and both business interests and civil society) and the internal organisation of 
government. The emphasis on value-for-money principles added a new dimension to 
traditional performance-monitoring practices.
The ethos of the SMI is clearly captured in the documents drafted by the 
Interdepartmental Task Force (NESC 2002a; Ô Broin 2003). These documents set the 
framework for launching an economically-driven re-structuring of governance that 
equally affects local authorities, government departments and state-funded local 
development organisations such as APCs. The SMI promotes the infusion of business- 
inspired managing and performance-auditing systems into the public sector as a 
measure underpinning national (economic) competitiveness.
Table 1.2 from the United Way o f America website illustrates the chain of translation 
from financial resources invested (input) into a societal dividend in form of less social
34 The Interdepartmental Task Force was critical of APCs' contributions to influencing mainstream 
programmes and policy-making at national level (DoELG 1998; Turok 2000).
35 The Comptroller and Auditor General has to make sure the finances are used in "accordance with the 
approval of the Oireachtas” (NESC 2002a: 78) and “to conduct, on a discretionary basis, 
examinations of the economy and efficiency of operation of the organisations that are audited as well 
as examinations of the adequacy of management systems that are in place to enable public agencies 
to appraise the effectiveness of their own organisations" (ibid.).
36 Particularly working papers by Richard Boyle on the impacts of public-sector reform on the 
community and voluntary sector (Boyle 2002c, 2002b, 2002a) and reports led by Boyle, which look at 
the review on local government reform (e.g. Boyle et al. 2003), the role of government and key 
stakeholders (Boyle 2004) and the development of performance indicators in the civil service (Boyle 
2005).
31
deprivation or higher potential of economic competitiveness (outcomes). Efforts to put 
these principles into practice can be illustrated by institutional changes in the field of 
local development in Dublin, in general, and the APCs, in particular (Chapter 6, 
Section 6.2). It is imperative, however, to understand the reasons and processes that 
led to the conceptualisation and institutionalisation of APCs. This will be dealt with in 
the following chapter.
Table 1.2: From inputs to outcomes
Program Outcome Model
Resources dedicated 
to or consumed by 
the program, e.g.
■ money
■ staff and staff time
■ volunteers and 
volunteer time
■ facilities
■ equipment and 
supplies
Constraints on the 
program e.g.
■ laws
■ regulations
■ funders' 
requirements
What the program 
does with the inputs 
to fulfil its mission, 
e.g.
■ feed and shelter 
homeless families
■ provide job 
training
■ educate the public 
about signs of 
child abuse
■ counsel pregnant 
women
■ create mentoring 
relationships for 
youth
The direct products 
of program activities, 
e.g.
i number of classes 
taught 
i number of 
counseling sessions 
conducted 
i number of 
educational materials 
distributed 
i number of hours of 
service delivered 
i number of 
participants served
Benefits for 
participants during and 
after program activities, 
e.g.
■ new knowledge
■ increased skills
■ changed attitudes 
or values
i modified behavior
i
i improved condition 
i altered status
Source: United Way of America (1996)
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2. AREA PARTNERSHIP COMPANIES IN IRELAND
2.1 Introduction
Throughout the EU, area-based approaches were set up to address shortfalls in 
governance relating to societal challenges such as economic decline, unemployment 
and social polarisation through a collaborative approach between government and 
interests groups from civil society (see Chapter 1, Section 1.3.1). The processes that 
contributed to the establishment of Area Partnership Companies (APCs) in Ireland and 
that had a bearing on their further development are well-documented in national 
(NESC 1990; CPA 1994; Walsh 1996; CPA 1997; Walsh 1998; Walsh et al. 1998; 
Kirby and Jacobson 1998; Bartley et al. 1999; Bartley and Saris 1999; Pringle et al. 
1999; Turok 2000, 2001; Bartley and Borscheid 2003; Haase and McKeown 2003) and 
international publications (OECD 1996; Geddes 1997, 1998, 2000; Parkinson 1998; 
ENTRUST 2004; OECD 2005a, 2006, 2007).
This chapter contextualises the role of APCs within the wider institutional framework of 
the national governance model of social partnership and sheds light on the local 
partnership model as a local complementary measure for addressing policy challenges 
related to statutory employment policies and welfare services. Furthermore, it 
describes key functions, institutional dependencies, funding arrangements, the 
organisational structure and working models of APCs and, finally, discusses 
contemporary challenges concerning their role in governance. It is hoped to clarify how 
APCs are envisaged to address institutional and administrative weaknesses within the 
Irish governance system “while taking into account local needs” (OECD 2001: 107).
2.2 Area Partnership Companies within the national governance framework
National economic restructuring processes in the aftermath of the oil crisis and an 
accelerating international division of labour in the 1970s caused a decline of industrial 
activities, particularly in the traditional manufacturing sector37. As a result, structural 
unemployment, social consumption and related expenditures increased dramatically, 
which soon threatened the state with bankruptcy (Walsh et al. 1998; Clarke et al. 
2000b; MacSharry and White 2000; O Riain and O'Connell 2000; Kirby 2002). By the 
early 1980s, massive public overspending, heavy borrowing, high-peak emigration 
levels, mass unemployment and, in terms of EU standards, high levels of social 
consumption combined with persistent poverty led to comparisons of Ireland with so- 
called third-world countries or the ‘Poorest of the Rich’ (The Economist 1988). The 
NESC38 report A Strategy for Development 1986-1990 (NESC 1986) outlined possible 
scenarios for improving public finances and keeping inflation in check. The report laid
37 This had detrimental effects on traditional working class areas throughout the country and is well 
documented for the inner city of Dublin (e.g. MacLaran 1999; Punch et al. 2004).
38 The National Economic and Social Council was established in 1973. NESC’s role is “to advise the 
Government on the development of the national economy and the achievement of social justice" 
(NESC 2004: no page numbers). Moreover, NESC is an organ for people from various backgrounds 
with an interest in the national economy and social justice to exchange their views (ibid.).
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the foundation stone for the first national partnership agreement, the 1987-1990 
Programme for National Recovery (cf. NESC 1990; McCarthy 1999; MacSharry and 
White 2000; Cradden and Roche 2003; Jacobson et al. 2006).
The NESC suggested focusing on the creation of a socially-acceptable business- 
friendly environment for the Irish economy that is also beneficial for the majority of 
employees (O Riain and O'Connell 2000). The NESC recommendations became 
manifest in a series of consecutive multi-annual national partnership agreements 
between government and the social partners (employers, trade unions and farming 
organisations)39. Apart from other commitments concerning a variety of policy areas 
(Callanan 2003), the most prominent measures of the agreements were directed at 
stipulating competitive labour costs for the employers (moderate corporate taxes and 
wage increases for the work force) and increasing the take-home pay for the majority 
of pay-as-you-earn (PAYE) employees.
Social partnership became the paradigmatic governance model underpinning the 
unprecedented Irish economic development process of the ‘Celtic Tiger’ throughout 
the 1990s (The Economist 1997; Allen 1999; Sweeney 1999; MacSharry and White 
2000; Nolan et al. 2000; Kirby 2002, 2004; Murphy 2002; Cradden and Roche 2003; 
Jacobson et al. 2006)40. By the early 1990s, however, despite high levels of out­
migration functioning as a pressure relief valve to increasing levels of unemployment41, 
staggering unemployment remained prevalent (Wood 2000)42. The persistence of 
social exclusion in so-called ‘poverty black spots’ with long-term unemployment rates 
of up to 50 per cent and more led to the establishment of APCs (NESC 1990; Kirby 
and Jacobson 1998; Walsh et al. 1998; Pringle et al. 1999) as a local version of social 
partnership (McCarthy 1998; Teague and Murphy 2004).
1987-1990: Programme for National Recovery (PNR)
1991-1993: Programme for Economic and Social Progress (PESP)
1994-1996: Programme for Competitiveness and Work (PCW)
1997-2000: Partnership 2000 for Inclusion, Employment and Competitiveness (P2K)
2000-2003: Programme for Prosperity and Fairness (PPF)
2004-2005: Sustaining Progress (SP)
2006-2016: Towards 2016 (T16)
40 Often heralded as foundation stone for the success of the Celtic Tiger economy (The Economist 
1997; Sweeney 1999; MacSharry and White 2000), a number of analysts do not agree on the 
achievements attributed to the introduction of national partnership model. The model received both 
sympathetic and more extensive criticism for being overly dependent on foreign direct investments 
and, moreover, for neglecting aspects of social equality (Breathnach 1998; Kirby and Jacobson 1998; 
Allen 1999; Glebe 2000; Haughton 2000; O Riain and O'Connell 2000; Wood 2000; NESC 2002b; 
IDA Ireland 2004; Kirby 2004).
41 In economic terms, out-migration is an externalisation of costs from the state (i.e. costs involved in 
either providing a job, training or welfare transfers) to the emigrant (social and financial costs of 
moving abroad). In Ireland, emigration has long been an efficient regulative force to labour-market 
fluctuations. However, even though migration patterns probably slightly ameliorated effects of crises, 
it could not compensate for the scope of structural inadequacies in national job-supply in Ireland.
42 Unemployment rates in Ireland for selected years: 1988: 16.3 per cent; 1990: 13.1 per cent; 1992: 
15.3 per cent (Wood 2000)
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2.2.1 The introduction of APCs as a pilot project
In 1990 the National Economic and Social Council (NESC) proposed to employ multi­
sectoral area-based programmes in those 'black spots' that actively encourage 
involvement from local communities (Central Review Committee 1991; Walsh 1999; 
Bartley et al. 1999)43:
The Council recommends that the other policies in this report need to be 
complemented by a radical approach to the problem of long-term unemployment 
using targeted special employment measures. [...] Evidence suggests that 
concerted, intensive, programmes in small areas, containing elements of housing 
and environmental improvement, as well as retraining and employment schemes 
and ‘outreach’ health and educational projects, can have an impact over and 
above the separate effects of individual programmes. Furthermore the more 
closely involved are communities in the planning and delivery of area-based 
projects, the more they will reflect local needs and priorities. [...] In the Council’s 
view, the very high priority which it attaches to tackling the problems of long-term 
unemployment must be operationalised by devoting resources to it (NESC 1990:
17-18).
But central government action did not respond to such calls for greater participatory 
democracy and joined-up measures as a way to combat issues related to long-term 
unemployment until “in 1991 the EU took action by 'going in the backdoor' behind 
central government” (Bartley et al. 1999: 25). The establishment of APCs was 
facilitated by “criticisms from the EU and other quarters about the narrow (economic 
growth) focus of the first national partnership programme” (Bartley and Borscheid 
2003: 234).
Also, the availability of funding based on EU social and regional policy cannot be 
underestimated and is strongly associated with the establishment and continuation of 
APCs as a player in local governance (McCarthy 1998)44. Apparently, at last, the EU 
was effectively ‘twisting arms’ by means of providing funding incentives and thereby 
overcame central government's inertia to change. In the end, an alliance of 
progressive Irish forces (i.e. individuals with the power to induce change in decision­
making fora) and pressure from the EU -  coupled with the central state's determination 
to maximise the withdrawal from EU structural funds -  gave way to the launch of APCs 
in Ireland (Bartley and Saris 1999)45.
43 Before the establishment of area-based responses, poverty had long been recognised as a structural 
phenomenon in Ireland. Between the 1960s and 1980s, in a supplementary effort to counterbalance 
perceived deficits in government social and economic policy, a diversity of mostly fragmented and 
under-resourced community development initiatives and models were called into being. The 
availability of statutory funding in the 1970s and 1980s to community development initiatives was very 
much subordinated to labour-market policies (Ô Cinnéide and Walsh 1990), which continued to be 
the key focus of state-funded anti-poverty measures.
44 Under the 1991-1993 PESP and the 1994-1999 OPLURD, the EU provided 75 per cent of the core 
funding for Area Partnership Companies.
45 The pilot of APCs under the PESP and their institutionalisation under the OPLURD did not happen 
based on consensus. APCs were established “partly to supplement local authorities because of their 
narrow range of functions, inward-looking culture and bureaucratic style of operation (Walsh, 1998)” 
(Turok 2000: 5). However, local authorities saw partnerships as competitors, as quangos without 
democratic legitimacy, not as partners. The local authorities did not did not come to terms with the 
fact that relatively autonomous state-funded agencies were operating within the territory of local 
government. The need for a closer coordination of activities between partnerships, state agencies 
and the local authorities was highlighted in the Interdepartmental Task Force Report (DoELG 1998),
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According to Parkinson (1998: 15) the key role of EU funding in establishing APCs
“only reinforces the view that the partnerships are something of an alien import”.
Padraig O hUiginn, then Chairman of the Central Review Committee46 (CRC)
(Appendix 1, Table A-1.1) that monitored the early stages of the partnership approach,
gave the following reasons for establishing APCs:
For some time now it has been clear that we have not as a community succeeded 
in transferring progress made on some fronts into effective measures to reduce 
the extent of, and hardship caused by long-term unemployment. This area 
partnership initiative will range from developing skills and self-confidence to 
devising more relevant training and education and will focus on increasing access 
to existing job opportunities and on creating new sustainable jobs (Central Review 
Committee 1991: 1).
Following the initial recommendations of the NESC (1990) 12 APCs were established
in designated disadvantaged areas (8 in urban and 4 in rural areas) as a pilot project
under the 1991-1993 Programme for Economic and Social Progress (PESP), the
second national partnership agreement:
The proposed strategy will be area based, will have local communities as the 
primar [sic] movers, will integrate the various existing initiatives, will involve a 
progression, in particular to ensuring second-chance education leading to 
qualifications and therefore, with a great real possibility of a job (Government of 
Ireland 1991: 75).
From its outset, the main remit of APCs was “to reproduce at the local level the
partnership approach that has worked so well at the national level in the Programme
for National Recovery and in the agreement of the Programme for Economic and
Social Progress” (Central Review Committee 1991: 3). In other words, APCs were set
up to locally supplement national welfare and labour-market intervention through “a
problem-solving approach, to mobilise the resources of those who had a potential
contribution to make and to be flexible in devising remedies, including a willingness to
experiment” (McCarthy 1998: 42, cf. NESC 2005) with a focus on increasing labour-
market participation (Fine Gael et at. 1994). The involvement of local stakeholders from
civil society in decision-making processes47 was expected to contribute to developing a
better understanding of local issues related to long-term unemployment, inequality and
societal fragmentation:
Local partnerships were seen by some as a way of renewing the culture of 
governance by making public organisations more dynamic and responsive to the 
needs of civil society (Turok 2000: 3).
Furthermore, tripartite collaboration was hoped to improve governance through 'vertical 
learning’ (OECD 1996); i.e. to inform practise at central government level through 
locally-developed pilot projects so as to facilitate the alleviation of high levels of poverty 
and social exclusion.
which paved the way for the 2001 Local Government Act and the establishment of City/County 
Development Boards (see Chapter 6, Section 6.2).
46 The Central Review Committee was established under the 1987-1990 Programme for National 
Recovery to monitor the implementation of the social partnership agreements. Until 2000 it provided a 
“platform for dialogue between the government and social partners on emerging issues of mutual 
concern” (McCarthy 1999: 6).
47 This principle is frequently associated with the term bottom-up (Pringle 1999; Walsh 1999).
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2.2.2 Operational matters
In finally setting up APCs as a local version of the social partnership model (Central 
Review Committee 1991; McCarthy 1998) -  which was mirrored in the composition of 
the APC board (Figure 1) -  the Irish Government performed a ‘tightrope walk’. On the 
one hand, there was an overall reluctance to devolve power to local organisations 
operating outside statutory administration. On the other hand, compliance with EU 
priorities was required to secure structural funds for local development programmes 
tackling social exclusion48. Initially, APCs were supported and monitored by the Central 
Review Committee, which consisted of representatives of the social partners, 
government departments and, at a later stage, relevant state agencies (Central Review 
Committee 1991). The Central Review Committee was situated under the umbrella of 
the Department of the Taoiseach (see Appendix 1, Table A-1.1).
Since 1992, the local development programmes in designated disadvantaged areas 
have been administered by Area Development Management Ltd. (ADM)49. The 
organisation was established in 1992 by agreement between the European Union and 
Irish Government (ADM 1995). ADM was set up as an independent partnership 
company with comparable organisational structures to those of APCs. The creation of a 
special-purpose body outside established government structures was considered 
necessary because, first, local government neither had an interest nor the capacity to 
facilitate local multi-stakeholder bottom-up initiatives (Department of the Environment 
and Local Government 1998) and, second, it was not deemed appropriate to run the 
programme from within government buildings (McCarthy 1998). The government 
contracted ADM to appraise the strategy and action plans of APCs, to allocate core 
funding, to provide technical assistance and to monitor the implementation of their 
action plan50.
The tasks that have been given to APCs can be briefly summarised as follows (Central 
Review Committee 1991; CPA 1994; Fine Gael et al. 1994; Government of Ireland 
1995; ADM 1995, 2000; OECD 1996; Parkinson 1998):
• to pro-actively develop measures targeted at increasing labour-market participation 
of the most disadvantaged groups. This is often based on direct provision of
48 According to Saris et al. (2002), the concept of ‘social exclusion’, i.e. the declared political will to 
address symptoms of spatially concentrated structural disadvantage in EU member countries, has 
been equally embraced by the EU and the Republic of Ireland, “partly because its relative lack in 
content and its lack of historical and ideological overtones (Bartley, 2000)’’ (Saris et al. 2002: 174). 
Hence social exclusion, with its general objective to address local symptoms of multiple 
disadvantages, is a concept that facilitated the development of a partnership approach linking a 
variety of different interest groups from different sectors: the state, the private sector, trade unions, 
politicians and citizens.
49 On 11/08/2005, Area Development Management Ltd. was renamed into Pobal. However, as most of 
the empirical research took place before 2005 and in order to prevent confusion with Pobail 
(Department for Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs), the name ADM is used throughout this 
study.
50 Under the LDSIP, ADM has been responsible for Area Partnership Companies, Community Groups 
and Employment Pacts (ADM 2000). Furthermore, ADM manages the RAPID initiative, the Equal 
Opportunities Childcare Programme, the Rural Transport Initiative, the Special Support Programme 
for Peace and Reconciliation, the Millennium Fund for Access to Third Level Education and the 
Integrated Service Process.
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information and running retraining or job placement programmes to those that are 
not considered employable or job-ready. In parallel, employers are encouraged to 
adopt a more positive attitude towards the recruitment of individuals who are long­
term unemployed. In addition, APCs also support the development of local 
enterprises and give assistance to individuals from disadvantaged backgrounds 
that wanted to become self-employed;
• to build the capacity of communities for in terms of their ability to improve local 
social cohesion and more efficiently respond to, and collaborate with, mainstream 
policies targeting local issues of concern. These measures, for example, resulted 
in more confidence among communities to engage in planning and decision­
making processes, which led to the creation of local infrastructural projects such as 
community housing projects, transport initiatives (especially in rural areas) and 
other communal facilities and services (e.g. affordable childcare provision for lone 
parents);
• to pilot and engage in local measures targeted at preventing educational 
underachievement and related risks such as substance abuse and socially 
disruptive behaviour that, subsequently, can be ‘picked up’ (mainstreamed) by 
statutory institutions, such as the provision of meals in schools or the provision of 
home work support and special literacy programmes.
All these measures are not necessarily directly delivered by local APCs. APCs do not 
have the in-house expertise and financial capacity to research or deliver certain 
services that have been identified in their designated area. Therefore, they also 
outsource contracts to third parties, provide seed-funding to small-scale local projects 
and seek additional resources from private and public bodies to run larger schemes 
and projects such as the FÂS-sponsored Community Employment Scheme (CE) and 
Back-to-Work-Allowance-Scheme or government-supported Social Economy Projects. 
Another example is the utilisation of secured EU funding to run programmes for 
disadvantaged target groups such URBAN (funding for disadvantaged urban 
neighbourhoods), LEADER (funding for disadvantaged rural areas) or INTERREG IIC 
and III (funding for trans-national co-operation).
Strategies and projects of APCs are outlined in multi-annual area action plans that.
• are innovative in nature and work through pilots with a view to identifying models of 
good practice through trial and error;
• stay within contractually agreed parameters and eligibility criteria;
• are consensus-based and facilitate meaningful participation from the community 
and input from stakeholders represented at board level;
• are responsive to the concerns, needs and issues of local residents and interest 
groups;
• are based on a comprehensive socio-economic profile of the area taking into 
account local strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT-Analysis);
• identify and temporarily bridge gaps in statutory service delivery; and
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• need to demonstrate the capacity to measure comprehensively progress in plan 
implementation and produce tangible outcomes.
The allocation of funding to APCs follows the approval of their action plan by ADM. 
Monitoring and funding arrangements for APCs reflect key principles of public-sector 
reform outlined in the previous chapter. Table 2.1 below illustrates that the core 
funding for APCs under three succeeding local development programmes has been 
quite modest (Honohan 1997); particularly in relation to their increasing remit since 
their establishment (Central Review Committee 1991; ADM 1995, 2000).
Table 2.1: Core funding for Area Partnership Companies [million € / IRP]
Funding
period Programme
Core
funding State
Per
APC***
Per
Annum
1991-1993* PESP
€ 10.049 3.95 6.099 0.84 0.42 (2 ys)
IRP 8.039 3.16 4.879 0.67 0.34
1994-1999** OPLURD
€ 135.227 101.420 33.807 3.56 0.59 (6 ys)
IRP 106.500 79.875 26.625 2.80 0.47
2000-2006** LDSIP
€ 181.200 0 181.200 4.77 0.68 (7 ys)
IRP 142.707 0 142.707 3.76 0.54
Source: * Combat Poverty Agency (1994: 37) -  1 ECU = 0.8 IRP.
** Government of Ireland (1995) and Information from Area Development Management.
*** Average as funding dependent on degree of deprivation, population size and 
performance of individual APC (see Chapter 6, Section 6.3.2).
**** As a result of the n+2 rule, EU funding was available until 31.12.2001
Guidelines published by ADM accentuate APCs’ task to use funding primarily to focus 
on local economic development and employment generation through encouraging 
better co-ordination of local policies and collaboration between existing services. The 
Integrated Local Development Handbook (ADM 1995: 45) highlights the role of the 
then proposed County Strategy Group51 in securing “cohesion between the various 
local development initiatives” so as to maximise the local development potential and 
"ensure that scarce resources are used in the most effective manner for the benefit of 
the whole population of their area”.
The capacity of an APC to promote such an integrated approach based on lobbying 
and brokerage is measured against the quality of its administrative performance and 
financial control system (see Chapter 6, Section 6.3.1, Table 6.7). Proof for achieving 
value for money is captured by analysing tangible outputs, collaboration and linkages 
with state organisations, local employers and local organisations (representing the
51 The County Strategy Groups were established in 1995. The County Strategy Group included 
representatives from County/City Councils, LEADER companies, partnership companies, the Tourism 
Committees and the County/City Enterprise Board. They were replaced by County/City Development 
Boards in 2000 (see Chapter 6, Section 6.2.2).
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interests of disadvantaged individuals) and, moreover, assessing both leverage and 
use of additional resources (see Chapter 6, Section 6.3). It is a priority for APCs to 
maximise the resource allocation to ‘their’ area. In short, the success of APCs is 
determined by their capacity to induce institutional changes that, in the wider context, 
assist in reducing costs for social consumption and strengthening the competitiveness 
of the Irish economy.
2.3 Organisational structures of Area Partnership Companies
2.3.1 Introduction
The description of characteristic organisational elements serves to enhance the 
understanding of the modus operandi of Area Partnership Companies (APCs) in 
Dublin. This section outlines the composition of APCs, describes their key working 
mechanisms and points out the nature of their interaction with other players from 
statutory agencies and civil society that carry responsibility and/or are involved in local 
governance. It also highlights the complexity of relationships and accountability links 
involved in decision-making processes concerning the development and 
implementation of strategic action plans.
APCs have to pursue an integrated approach that facilitates joined-up thinking and 
collaboration between statutory services and local development initiatives “through 
both formal structural arrangements, and informal links and good working 
relationships” (ADM 1995: 45) as a basis for added value and demonstrating 
effectiveness of their activities. It is acknowledged that this can “only happen with the 
active support and co-operation of state agencies” (ADM 1995: 41). Therefore, APCs 
need to be highly aware of their external environment as they are reliant on support 
from all kinds of interest groups involved. They also have to maintain reasonably good 
relationships with local government and other statutory bodies that are represented on 
their boards or that have been identified as strategic partners. Overall, they operate in 
a highly sensitive political environment networking with stakeholders from different 
institutional and professional backgrounds.
Evidence suggests that the complex nature of the issues related to the work of APCs 
and the variety of institutional and personal backgrounds of individuals involved in the 
process poses a challenge to fostering collaboration. Often, however, participation 
from, for example, statutory key agencies does not go beyond informal support and 
patronage (Bartley and Saris 1999; Turok 2001).
2.3.2 Working models
The approaches of APCs in the implementation of area action plans and the 
achievement of targets differ considerably. Following the analysis of the first 
generation of APCs under the 1991-1993 PESP, three major working models were 
identified that characterise the approaches adopted (ADM 1995, 2000; Pobal 2006a):
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• A characteristic feature of the delivery approach is the piloting of projects by the 
APC with a view to addressing locally-identified gaps in service provision.
• In the agency approach, the pilot-based service provision is out-sourced under the 
aegis of the APC to the responsibility of a local group. However, the APC remains 
in a monitoring position.
• In contrast to the previous models, the brokerage approach highlights the 
networking capacity of APCs. Here, the key function is to assess locally and adjust 
existing mismatches and deficiencies concerning service provision and bring local 
and national delivery agencies and local communities together to jointly develop 
models of service delivery that are better tailored to meet the local needs.
The pursuit of the latter model is regarded as exemplary because “this approach is 
usually indicative of a partnership operating at a level of optimum impact” (Pobal 
2006a: 12). The brokerage model is an onerous approach because network building is 
considered a time-consuming process that, moreover, is largely unrecognised by the 
monitoring and performance system (Turok 2000). Acknowledging the limited capacity 
of existing models to capture efforts and resources invested into relationship building 
and forging alliances, ADM proposed a new framework for measuring “the extent to 
which partners collaborate with one another” (Pobal 2006a: 12; cf. Himmelman 2002). 
This new framework will be discussed in Chapter 6 (Section 6.4.1).
2.3.3 Company structure
2.3.3.1 Introduction
APCs are companies limited by guarantee; they do not have share capital. They 
usually operate on three distinct, though inextricably intertwined, functional levels: a 
board of directors, professional staff and a sub-group or working group system. The 
principal approach towards a local development strategy is based on the bottom-up 
principle, which allows for direct participation from groups from civil society in decision­
making processes. This is, first, reflected in the composition of the board as the key 
decision-making unit of APCs and, second, in the issue-oriented working groups or 
sub-committees (Central Review Committee 1991; ADM 1995; Turok 2001).
2.3.3.2 Staff
The implementation of the area action plan is facilitated by professional staff that co­
ordinates measures and activities. The staff of an APC usually comprises of a 
manager or chief executive officer (CEO), a company secretary, clerical staff (e.g., 
administrators, accountant and receptionist) and specialist co-ordinating staff. The 
CEO occupies a key position. They are responsible for developing linkages, being an 
advocate for the area (promoting the work of the APC), the implementation of the area 
action plan, the coordination of the staff and for reporting back to the board of directors 
on policy, operational and programme issues and -  maybe most importantly -  scope 
out the terrain for sourcing additional resources:
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A manager’s job is 80-90 per cent of the time spent accessing money elsewhere, 
bringing people together, negotiating agreements between local people and 
getting projects up and going. Then it's up to the project team to go and deliver 
that project with the community. That’s what they do. It’s a nightmare of a job 
going around all the time leveraging money in, leveraging money in, leveraging 
money in. That’s what they do (Borscheid 2001, interview with Planet Co-ordinator 
on 29/05/2000).
The co-ordinating staff (or project teams) are involved in outreach activities of the APC 
in so far as they pro-actively engage in the local community to network and collaborate 
with local activists, community groups, statutory agencies, schools and the private 
sector. They work in teams or sections, each of which progresses the implementation 
of certain parts of the APC’s action plan. These professionals are specialists on core 
topics that correspond with the key thrust of the multi-annual action plan, which 
revolves around the following areas: community development; education and youth; 
the environment; enterprise, employment and training; and corresponding research 
activities (ADM 1995, 1999, 2000). The co-ordinating staff also mediate between local 
stakeholders from within the community, the sub-committees of the board and the 
chief executive. In the main, their task is to ensure the optimal operation of the 
processes concerning the flow of communication among stakeholders and the 
coordination of activities towards the implementation of projects and measures of the 
area action plan. The company secretary manages the day-to-day issues concerning 
the internal functioning of the organisation, manages the secretarial and administrative 
work, provides support to the CEO and the Board on corporate governance issues and 
often functions as the personal assistant to the CEO. The role of the clerical staff 
typically revolves around operational technicalities such as administrative support of 
programmes, data base maintenance, external correspondence and financial 
controlling and accountancy.
2.3.3.3 Board
The board has responsibility for decisions-making, policy formulation and the strategic 
approach of the APC. It is the board’s responsibility to ensure that the resources 
available to the APC are used to the maximum benefit for the area and to sign off and 
oversee the implementation of the area action plan. APCs are meant to develop and 
implement their work plans in close collaboration with all interest groups involved at 
the board and its sub structures. This includes representatives at board level, 
members in issue-based sub committees and local stakeholders and residents in the 
community. The board of directors mirrors the stakeholders involved in national 
partnership agreements. Until 1999, boards typically consisted of a minimum of 18 
members from the social partners, the statutory agencies and representatives from the 
local community. In 1999, following recommendations made by the Interdepartmental 
Task Force (DoELG 1998), public representatives were invited to the boards as a 
fourth party to make up for a perceived democratic deficit52.
52 A forgone debate centred on a perceived democratic deficit of APC-type structures; it was argued 
that local politicians should be included as they have a democratic mandate from the local community
42
Even though the role of stakeholders from different sectors represented at board level 
is to complement one another’s resources and expertise to the benefit of the area, 
Turok (2001: 139) indicates that “agencies cannot be compelled to do anything they do 
not want to do since the partnerships lack formal authority” (cf. Haase and McKeown 
2003). Moreover, there have also been criticisms of contemporary APC structures for 
limiting the participatory potential for local people (CWC 2000; Bartley and Borscheid 
2003).
2.3.3.4 Sub Groups
The board is often supported by sub-committee structures that -  assisted by APC staff 
-  discuss and develop projects in accordance with the area action plan. Typically, sub 
committees are creatures of the board. That means that they usually have a delegated 
authority to address specific tasks that facilitate the day-to-day operation of the APC 
and increase overall efficiency at board level through, for example, the preparation of 
discussion papers or briefings as the basis for decision-making processes at board 
level53. These sub-committees are of pivotal importance to the process because they 
involve a variety of individuals from different institutional and professional 
backgrounds.
2.3.3.5 A simplified organisational model: a focus on bottom-up
Figure 1 below, illustrates a typical hierarchical organisational model of APCs in 
Ireland. It portrays the key structures of the organisation and how they are situated to 
each other. The arrows illustrate the flow of power or decision-making capacity 
between the different groupings involved in the generation and implementation of the 
action plans of APCs. The board, informed by the CEO and its work groups, is the 
ultimate decision-making body responsible for the policy, staff and operations of the 
company. The CEO and other professionals inform and support the work of the work 
groups. Whereas the work groups have a role in planning and overseeing the 
implementation of APC activities, the APC professionals (displayed as Staff) who fulfil 
an executive function and work with local groups towards the delivery of the local 
action plan.
The local people (displayed as Community), may or may not participate in local 
consultation and planning processes, local organisations or other forms of local civic 
engagement that are targeted at addressing issues of mutual concern or benefit. 
Among those who are organised in the local community and voluntary sector -  
consisting of a variety of groups such as residents associations, sport clubs, bingo 
clubs, pigeon clubs, community development projects, drug prevention initiatives and 
so forth -  a variety of groups and individuals are interested and have the capacity to
to represent them in decision-making structures affecting the community.
53 For example, the APC subject to this case study operates an executive sub-committee, which had 
been established under the 2000-2006 area action plan with a view to supporting the staff by carrying 
out executive and administrative tasks, to oversee the implementation of projects and monitor poverty 
and equality proofing targets and to promote mainstreaming of programme actions.
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participate in processes initiated by the local APC. There are other groups, however, 
that either have the capacity but are not interested in participating in APC-type local 
development initiatives, or have an interest in joining forces but do not have -  or feel 
that they do not have -  the skills necessary to make a contribution to local 
development initiatives.
The circular movements of arrows linking the board’s work group structure with the 
organised civic sphere (displayed as Local Groups) indicates the potential for 
involvement of all groupings (either ‘weak’ or 'strong) -  and even to represent 
community interests on the board of the APC54. The barriers represented by the dotted 
line in Figure 1 indicate the potential existence of blockages -  lack of resources, 
capacity or incentives -  that might prevent bottom-up participation within APC-type 
local development approaches. Depending on the nature of the barrier, a local APC 
can engage in activities that have the potential to increase local involvement in 
decision-making processes.
2.3.3.5 Collaboration in practice: an outlook
Juggling expectations from political sponsors and local communities, it is vital for 
APCs to find a balance between the requirement to guarantee opportunities for 
grassroots participation on the one hand and the contractual obligations within which 
they operate, on the other. The organisational structure of the APC suggests a 
democratic multi-stakeholder approach to addressing social exclusion in designated 
disadvantaged areas in a collaborative manner. Turok (2001: 137) points out, “there 
should be strong two-way relationships with the individual partner organisations, 
mediated through empowered representatives” in regard to the flow of information and 
the development of influence between the APC and its partners. There is evidence, 
however, that involvement from the community is not necessarily representative of the 
area (Bartley and Saris 1999; Saris et al. 2002) and that efficient decision making “can 
only occur when agencies are represented at senior management level, or where 
representatives are equipped with a clear mandate from their agency to support and 
resource the partnership process” (Pobal 2006a: 24).
In the absence of effective representation from either those with a capacity to devolve 
power or those to be empowered or both, partnership agenda comes to a stand still; 
under these circumstances there is evidence that decisions are left to local 
stakeholders with both a vested interest and the professional capacity in progressing 
individual agendas or by APC professionals who act (presumably in good faith) based 
on their interaction with those who became involved in partnership-initiated 
consultation processes, programmes and actions (Borscheid 2001).
54 Membership of the company and regulations for the election of community representatives are 
usually outlined in the constitution of the APC (i.e. in the Articles of association and the memorandum 
of the Partnership Company).
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Figure 1: Simplified organisational model of APCs
Board of Directors
Statutory Agencies 
Social Partners 
Community Representatives 
Public Representatives
APC
Structure
Sphere of local ( 
involvement, 
consultation, 
and actions
Barrier to participation, e.g. lack of concern / interest / capacity / information. 
Dominant lines of involvement
Source: Adapted from Borscheid (2001).
45
These issues also emerged in the interviews and are further investigated in the 
analysis of the empirical data with a view to assessing the effectiveness of partnership 
structures in facilitating the optimal use of resources according to their commissioned 
role (see Chapter 6):
• to operate a model that can mediate between participatory and representative 
democracy55;
• to be accountable to both funders and the community;
• to assist in local-governance re-structuring in accordance with political priorities 
under the LDSIP.
2.4 Proliferation and institutionalisation of APCs
Since their establishment, APCs have been addressing a wide range of issues related 
to structural deficits that manifest in social, economic, cultural and physical 
marginalisation of Irish society (OECD 1996; Walsh et al. 1998; Turok 2001; Haase 
and McKeown 2003). APCs are firmly embedded in the landscape of local 
development and have developed into prime movers in local development in Ireland 
(Walsh 1998). The following paragraphs illustrate the gradual institutionalisation of 
APCs under the 1995-1999 and 2000-2006 local development programmes.
The evaluation of the 1991-1993 PESP came to the conclusion that “the partnerships
have succeeded in starting a process of change” (CPA 1994: 124; cf. OECD 1996).
The 1994-1999 Community Support Framework (CSF) stated that “Support from the
global grant will continue for partnerships and communities which are satisfactorily
implementing plans approved under the global grant which was funded under the CSF
1989-93” (Government of Ireland 1994). As a result, the pilot was extended in the mid-
1990s and, thereby, became effectively institutionalised under the Operational
Programme for Local Urban and Rural Development (OPLURDJ of the 1994-1999
National Development Plan (hereafter NDP) (Government of Ireland 1995; ESF
Evaluation Unit 1999; Curley 2001). By the mid-1990s, 38 Area Partnership
Companies, 31 Community Groups and 2 Employment Pacts were in operation. The
26 new or ‘second generation’ APCs were selected on the basis of a competitive
bidding process: eligible areas had to demonstrate both their need and their capacity
to collaboratively implement the organisational structures and programmatic guidelines
required by the political sponsors (Bartley and Borscheid 2003). Even though the remit
of programmatic actions became wider than tackling unemployment and poverty,
fostering endogenous entrepreneurial potential and increasing labour-market
participation remained high on the agenda:
The Programme [the OPLURD] aims to accelerate local economic development 
and thereby increase employment and to tackle exclusion and marginalisation 
resulting from long-term unemployment, poor educational attainment, poverty and 
welfare dependency (ADM 1999: 1).
55 For an overview and discussion see Brackertz et al. (2005) and Wakeford and Hale (2003).
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Again, EU policy and incentives provided by their structural funding played a crucial
role in “encouraging the Irish Government to include local APCs as a feature of the
1994-99 National Plan” (McCarthy 1998: 48)56:
Local development initiatives were seen as providing a means of integrating 
enterprise with welfare and economic growth with redistribution. [...] This new 
welfare/enterprise nexus is given strongest expression in the Local Development 
Programme [the OPLURD], part of the Community Support Framework (Walsh 
1999: 286).
The following excerpt from a speech by the then Taoiseach John Bruton, T.D. (FG), at
the opening of the EU Poverty 3 Programme 25 April 1995, serves to illustrate the
rationale for establishing and, subsequently, institutionalising APCs:
In the way we administer programmes, we tend to think that people are like things. 
They're objects and you can move them around, when in fact they are people who 
are in poverty or people who have as many ideas and many more perhaps than 
we have ourselves. We need to approach a solution to their problems in such a
way that it engages their creativity. That very simply is what the partnership 
approach is all about. [...] You've got to, to some degree at least, remove the 
control features in your thinking and apply a different approach [that allows] people 
to master their own destiny, to make their own mistakes and learn from them. [...] 
Administrators have to be willing to give up some power so that those who are 
poor or who are in poverty and who need and want to develop can exercise some 
power (OECD 1996: 105).
According to this statement, the APC-type approach could also be interpreted as an
effort to shift responsibility for place-specific problems from wider society to those
inhabiting ‘poor places’, to those considered most distant from mainstream society. In
the context of measuring the impact of APCs, some analysts considered the
achievements of APCs under the OPLURD a success (e.g. Honohan 1997; Goodbody
Economic Consultants 1999) whereas the ESF Evaluation Report on the OPLURD
(1999) pointed towards imminent structural weaknesses that prevented strategic
progress such as the apparent lack of willingness among administrators to play a
enabling role and facilitate the delegation of power ‘downwards’:
There are no systematic routes through which these agencies [i.e. APCs] can 
influence policy and practice, no consensual statements available in relation to 
best practice that are broadly and objectively tested and no objectively verifiable 
data supporting a critical mass of activity across a number of sites through which 
broadly similar interventions have been tried and tested (ESF Evaluation Unit 
1999: viii)
Much of the strategic focus of the OPLURD had not been realised through the activity 
of APCs because of, first, “the negative attitudes of people and organisations to 
change coupled with a lack of flexibility on the part of the statutory agencies” and, 
second, “a lack of understanding of local development planning and short-terminism of 
the planning process coupled with uncertainty about the future” [ibid.] see also 
Chapter 6, Section 6.3.3.2). Critical voices feared an alignment of APC-type structures 
alongside a local-governance system with local authorities at its centre (CWC 2000) or
56 Under the OPLURD individual APCs received between 1 and 4 million IRP over a 5-year period, 75 
per cent of which was sponsored by the EU structural funds (i.e. the European Regional 
Development Fund and the European Social Fund) (see Table 2.1).
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reduced to service delivery-based functions (Turok 2000), or both. Already towards the
end of the OPLURD, the looming withdrawal of EU funding fuelled speculation that
APCs would lose influence vis-à-vis local government. An analysis of APC funding in
the transitional period between the 1994-1999 OPLURD and 2000-2006 LDSIP
suggested that “APCs are liable to be subsumed by local government” (Borscheid
2001) (see Chapter 6, Section 6.2, Figure 5 and Table 6.1). The overall objective of
the LDSIP reads as follows:
To counter disadvantage and to promote equality and social and economic 
inclusion through the provision of funding to support Partnerships, Community 
Groups and Employment Pacts that adopt a partnership approach to tackling local 
issues on the basis of comprehensive, integrated local development plans 
designed to counter social exclusion and to equally target the opportunities and 
benefits of development to the most disadvantaged individuals and groups within 
their areas (ADM 2000: 8).
The objectives of the local development programme remained centred around labour- 
market inclusion measures, fostering a culture of local self-help and adding value to 
statutory service delivery into disadvantaged areas (ADM 2000; Turok 2001). 
Reflecting on developments in European and Irish welfare, Bartley and Saris (1999: 
82) observe that “high cost universalist policies of the welfare state are being 
supplanted by selective Intervention measures which require fewer resources”. There 
is some evidence from a preliminary analysis of the data gathered for this study that 
funding dependencies after the discontinuation of EU funding for APCs in 2002 have 
been used as a mechanism to advance both the rationalisation and re-structuring of 
the local-development sector in Dublin and to bring APCs alongside the local 
government system (Borscheid 2005).
Towards the end of the LDSIP the focus moved away from the concept of targeting 
places towards the objective of transforming APCs into a nation-wide public service 
delivery instrument as “services will need to be designed around individuals and their 
requirements, rather than based on different administrative boundaries" (Ó Cuiv 
07/09/2006: no page numbers) (see Chapter 6, Sections 6.2.2 and 6.2.6). In other 
words, APCs are envisaged to be extending their sphere of activities beyond current 
designated disadvantaged areas and to be targeting individuals whose personal 
situations provides justification for receiving special supports through services 
provided by APCs.
2.5 Area-based targeting: advantages and drawbacks
Ó Riain and O’Connell (2000) conclude that under social partnership, welfare policies 
shifted “from passive income support to active labour-market policies with temporary 
employment and training programmes, and in reducing unemployment/poverty traps” 
(334), which “created some institutional spaces for experimentation” (338). This 
culminated in a plurality of co-existing networks and special-purpose bodies that 
supplement government decision making in social and economic matters such as 
APCs (see also Bartley and Borscheid 2003; Ó Broin 2003). APCs were developed as
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a new form of state interventionism that reflected “a shift from universalistic to spatially 
targeted and place-focused approaches” (Bartley and Saris 1999: 82). Walsh (1998: 
331) recognises APC-type initiatives as an inclusive public policy “embracing a new 
geographic focus around the twin themes of local coordination of services and local 
socio-economic development” (cf. CPA 1994; Walsh 1996; Walsh et al. 1998; ADM
2000).
There appears to be a negative correlation between the quality of the physical 
environment, public service provision and poverty (Pringle et al. 1999). In other words, 
the poorer the people are, the poorer is the quality of the physical and social 
infrastructure. The eligibility criteria that outline fundable capacity-building and 
developmental measures underscore limitations of APCs to contribute to a more 
sustainable betterment of poor places. Under the current local development 
programme, they can only meaningfully counter local disadvantage and promote anti­
poverty initiatives if (a) they are financially (and therefore ideologically) supported by 
statutory bodies and (b) they can exert influence on local structural processes that are 
causal to socio-spatial inequalities in the first place (cf. Pringle 1999: 275). The sheer 
scope of local disadvantage requires public investments into economic activities, 
quality infrastructure such as housing, transport, retail or education (Watson et al. 
2005).
The key potential of APCs has long been seen in the facilitation and development of 
local responses to ameliorate adverse effects of wider structural processes. The 
achievements of APCs in local development and, more specifically, increasing labour- 
market participation have been acknowledged in a number of publications and reports 
(e.g. Parkinson 1998; Turok 2000). The evaluation of the 1994-1999 Operational 
Programme for Local and Urban Development concluded that “within Ireland as a 
whole, areas that have partnerships recorded a larger decline in unemployment 
between 1991 and 1996 than areas without partnerships” (Goodbody Economic 
Consultants 1999: 88). McCarthy, however, is more careful in his assessment of 
APCs:
[...] it is hard to distinguish between what the Partnership companies are doing 
and what is happening in the wider economy. There is no doubt that had the Irish 
economy been in a recession for the last three years, it would have been more 
difficult for the Partnerships to achieve what they have achieved. This is not to say 
that I believe it is particularly easy just because the economy is doing well. There 
is a lot of pressure to generate material on and awareness of the value of what is 
being achieved (McCarthy 1998: 46-47).
Looking back at the OPLURD, the work of APCs has resulted in a wide range of local 
activities targeted at capacity building, providing educational opportunities, community 
development and reducing unemployment (Walsh et al. 1998; Goodbody Economic 
Consultants 1999). Despite the perceived success of APCs in implementing area- 
based development initiatives in Ireland, some structural weaknesses and institutional 
barriers seem to prevail (ESF Evaluation Unit 1999). Peck and Tickell (1994: 323)
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argue that APC-type initiatives “are just a handful of genuinely innovative local 
experiments and a raft of pale imitations” that, to a certain degree, only received 
recognition because of their “straightforward rarity“ (ibid.).
Table 2.2 sums up advantages and drawbacks of area-based development initiatives 
such as APCs. The comparison of merits and drawbacks of positive territorial 
discrimination indicates that the biggest advantages of APC-type initiatives lie in the 
utilisation of local know-how and social capital to develop services for disadvantaged 
members of society that live in areas that show symptoms of severe economic and 
social disadvantage. The potential development of innovative concepts through 
participatory approaches bears the potential of mainstreaming local models of best 
practice into the statutory service delivery -  such as the Local Employment Service 
(OECD 1996). However, it could equally result in the duplication of projects, which 
would run counter to the research and development brief of area-based approaches or 
run into systemic blockages within the statutory apparatus -  such as a lack of capacity 
of the state to pick up successful models and integrate them into the arsenal of 
statutory support/service delivery.
Perhaps the most relevant aspects for a discussion on the capacity of APC-type 
spatial interventions are those that are summarised under the heading Counteracting 
Spatial Processes. Whereas local initiatives have proven to ameliorate symptoms of 
disadvantage in areas with a high share of population that lives in poverty (e.g. 
Goodbody Economic Consultants 1999; cf. Haase and McKeown 2003), (state-funded) 
area-based approaches to local development, if at all, only have a limited capacity to 
challenge wider structural forces impacting on the wider social and economic well­
being of the state -  especially when such approaches are not high on the agenda of 
the state and, moreover, entirely depend on statutory funding.
2.6 The role of APCs in the Developmental Welfare State (DWS)
The Irish Times (The Irish Times 11/07/2006) reports that “Ireland is now the second 
wealthiest nation in the world with more than 30,000 millionaires living here” and that 
“Personal disposable income in the Republic has doubled over the past ten years, and 
is forecast to double again over the next decade”. At the same time Ireland 
experiences increasing social polarisation as, for example indicated in the United 
Nations 2005 Human Development Report (UNDP 2005) and publications of the 
Combat Poverty Agency (e.g. Watson et at. 2005). The Irish Independent (22/09/2005) 
highlights that “Ireland is among the Top 10 most developed nations in the world but 
has created one of the largest poverty gaps”57.
57 This refers to relative levels of poverty that have gone up from 19.8 per cent in 1999 to 22.7 per cent 
in 2003 (The Irish Independent 22/09/2005).
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Table 2.2: Advantages and drawbacks of APC-type spatial interventions
APCs Advantages Drawbacks
Area-based
Targeting
• Provision of additional resources to 
the most disadvantaged
• Utilisation of local know-how
• Addressing particular structural issues 
that can be linked to local processes
• Diversity of actions among APCs 
reflects the potential for locally 
developed interventions to address 
local manifestations of disadvantage
• Prevalence of cumulative 
disadvantage and neighbourhood
effects58
• Selection of disadvantaged areas 
follows an inverse-care law
• Considerable share of poor people 
also live outside designated 
disadvantaged areas
• Watering down of scarce resources 
as the majority of the total 
population lives in designated 
disadvantaged areas
Statutory
Service
Delivery
Identification of models of good practice:
• that can be mainstreamed
• that enhance efficiency in and 
increase potential for national service 
delivery
• that complement national welfare 
policies
• Limited potential to transfer good 
practice into national context as 
statutory bodies are too inflexible to 
respond to lessons learnt on the 
ground
• Turf wars and safe-guarding of 
territory prevent inter-departmental 
collaboration
• Duplication of successful projects 
among local areas
• Informality of links between local 
development initiatives and national 
policy development
• No local influence in negotiating 
priorities of approach
Participation
• Facilitate understanding of processes 
leading to spatial manifestations of 
marginalisation and socio-economic 
disadvantage through working with 
local groups
• Multi-stakeholder approach that can 
procure additional resources and 
create synergies in addressing local 
issues
• Participatory democracy enacted 
through legislation based on 
democratic decisions taken by the 
state
• APCs as gatekeepers as they 
operate as intermediate tier or local 
top-down mechanism that is run by 
professionals. So APCs act as 
buffer between the state and the 
locale
• Structures are not open to bottom- 
up because the ability to participate 
is dependent on the ‘professional 
capacity’ of individuals
• Not democratic as APCs work 
outside the system of 
representative democracy
Counteracting
Spatial
Processes
• Develop initiatives with strategic 
partners (e.g. employers and statutory 
partners) in areas affected by poverty
•  Potential to act as catalyst for 
sustainable change at local level
• Opportunities based on people- 
centred approach
• Limited to addressing local 
symptoms caused by wider 
structural causes
• Cosmetic planning and ‘gilding the 
ghetto’
• Ignorance of relationship between 
planning and people as 
concentrations of poverty are 
usually associated with physically 
less desirable areas
Source: Parkinson (1998); OECD (1996); Nolan et al. (1998); ESF Evaluation Unit (1999); Bartley 
and Saris (1999); Haase (1999); Walsh (1999); Pringle (1999); Turok (2000); Haase and 
McKeown (2003); Watson et al. (2005).
58 According to Haase and McKeon, neighbourhood effects “refer to those factors which affect the life 
chances of individuals over and above what could be predicted from their individual socio-economic 
circumstances” (Haase and McKeown 2003: 3).
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According to the Human Development Report 2005, among the twenty nations with the 
highest standard of living (as measured by the Human Development Index), Ireland's 
inequality in income or consumption (as indicated by a Gini index59 of 35.9) is only 
topped by the USA (Gini index of 40.8), the UK and Italy (both have a Gini index of 
36.0) (UNDP 2005).
In the light of a decade of glowing economic figures, with income and growth rates 
dwarfing other European countries (ESRI n.d.; OECD 2005b, 2005c), it seems 
surprising that the Irish social partnership model has become a dominant strategy as it 
had not managed to cater for a more balanced distribution of the fruits of growth 
across the country's population. This leads critical commentators to conclude that, 
over the last 15-20 years, successive national social partnership agreements reflect a 
neo-corporate Zeitgeist as they appear to be prioritising international economic 
competition and, simultaneously, enhancing a residual and targeted social partnership 
approach to welfare that increasingly supplements welfare policy in Ireland (Bartley 
and Saris 1999; O Riain and O'Connell 2000). Kirby (2002), for example, maintains 
that the nature of the Irish welfare system is still charity-based (cf. Gaetz 1997), and, 
despite social partnership, “proved ineffective in modifying in any significant way the 
inequalities generated by market forces and, indeed, may even have exacerbated 
them”.
Against the backdrop of Ireland’s economic transformation into one of Europe’s richest 
nations, it is noteworthy to look at research undertaken by Haase, which compares 
relative deprivation scores between 1991 and 2002. In a presentation given at a 
Combat Poverty Seminar on 11 May 2005, Haase demonstrates that within a time 
span of 11 years, “virtually no differences in the distribution of relative deprivation” 
could be observed (Haase 2005). Bartley and Shine (2003) draw parallels with neo­
liberal welfare regimes. They argue, “the 'success strategy' deployed in Ireland is a 
hybrid approach to policy and practice based on a mix of American Economics and EU 
principles of social democracy” (Bartley and Shine 2003: 145).
In anticipation of the interdependency between social cohesion and economic 
competitiveness, the NESC strongly argues for the Developmental Welfare State 
(hereafter referred to as DWS) that is capable of successfully marrying a pro-growth 
agenda with a welfare system that “enables people to embrace more change and take 
more risks than they would otherwise do” (2005: xiv). The foundation of the NESC’s 
vision of the DWS is based on three interconnected spheres of statutory support: the 
optimisation of access to basic services, the provision of income supports tailored to 
the lifecycle and circumstances of individuals and, finally, activist measures delivered
59 The Gini Coefficient is a measure of inequality. It is frequently used to indicate uneven distribution. It 
is a number between 0 and 1. Whilst a value of 0 represents the most equal distribution, a value of 1 
is the most unequal distribution possible. The Gini Index is arrived at by multiplying the Gini 
Coefficient by the factor 100.
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by APC-type special-purpose bodies60. The latter serve to “respond to unmet social 
needs, initially in a particular and once-off manner but with implications for mainstream 
service provision that are systematically identified” (NESC 2005: xx).
The principal features of activist measures within a new welfare regime indicates a 
focus for APCs on encouraging indigenous entrepreneurial development, supporting 
labour-market intervention policies, and providing services that are complementary to 
and integrated within statutory welfare provision that increasingly focuses on reducing 
the burden of social consumption vis-à-vis investments fostering economic 
competitiveness.
For example, despite relatively low overall welfare-related expenditures, absolute 
welfare spending between 1994 and 2004 increased by 120 per cent (The Irish 
Examiner 30/08/2004). Against this background, the Business and Finance Magazine 
(15/12/2004) criticises increases in welfare spending without significantly rationalising 
the administration of the benefits. The commentary in the magazine states that, 
between 1997 and 2004, income per capita rose by 44 per cent, unemployment 
benefits by 90 per cent and unemployment fell from 10.3 to 4.4 per cent. Highlighting 
the healthy demographic and economic conditions in Ireland, the article claims that the 
fruits of growth should have yielded higher quality services coupled with less costs and 
concludes:
The lesson to be learned from our fiscal activism is: any pro-cyclical increase in 
government expenditure, without exhaustive value-for-money assessment, will 
result in a proportional decline in service quality. Call it the law of diminishing 
returns to spending, or the law of increasing government waste. In the US, every 
dollar of Government expenditure results in a $ 1.30 contraction in the private 
economy. [...] Yet, Ireland has lower efficiency of fiscal spending than the US 
(Business and Finance Magazine 15/12/2004: no page numbers, emphasis 
added).
The Developmental Welfare State highlights that increasing expenditures in social 
consumption must be “a means to an end” (NESC, 2005: xvii) and also stresses the 
responsibility of the family and the community and voluntary sector in welfare 
provision. When comparing welfare expenditures with social outcomes achieved, the 
NESC report also advocates taking into consideration “established behavioural 
patterns” (xvii). As this comment is not further qualified in the report it is open to 
potentially varying interpretations. One reading of it could be, for example, that there is 
a complacent attitude among the citizenship towards welfare that needs tackling. It 
also could be regarded as a wake-up call for political decision-makers to stop ignoring 
so-called disincentives, poverty traps and policy blockages that prevent welfare 
recipients from taking up work, and taking action that facilitates their transition from 
welfare to work. It may relate -  especially in a period of full employment -  to a demand
60 The link between the church model of welfare and Catholic legacy of Irish welfare and alterations 
influenced by economic policy can not only be found in the foundations of the APC-type model but 
also in more recent state-led initiatives promoting volunteerism, building social capital and active 
citizenship (Government of Ireland 2000; National Committee on Volunteering 2002; NESF 2003; The 
Irish Times 03/09/2005; DoT 18/04/2006; Taskforce on Active Citizenship 2007).
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for the intensification of the search for new ways to integrate those individuals who are 
not considered employable and, hence, most distant from the labour-market through 
what the NESC describes as ‘tailored universalism’. Besides outsourcing responsibility 
for welfare from the state to the family and the community and voluntary sector, a key 
thrust of the NESC’s argument for the DWS is a focus on the development of 
measures that can be 'wrapped around’ individuals and target groups and replace 
costly means-tested measures to secure social protection (i.e. tailored universalism). 
The literature reviewed suggests that the demand for a ‘new’ outcome-oriented ethos 
will be influential in determining future Irish welfare policy and associated local 
development efforts such as APCs.
2.7 Conclusion
Under social partnership, in a period that has largely been characterised by continuing 
economic growth and low levels of unemployment as well as increasing social 
polarisation, it appears that APCs still have an important role to play in the welfare 
restructuring of a booming economy. Thus “Ireland’s welfare state relies to a high 
degree -  by international standards -  on the involvement of non-profit bodies” (NESC 
2005: xiv), such as APCs. APCs have been in existence for over 15 years. First, the 
persistence in spatially concentrated long-term unemployment, second, the prevalence 
of neighbourhood effects and, third, a widening gap between rich and poor seem to 
justify a two-pronged strategy that consists of (a) ongoing support of area-based 
intervention measures and (b) deeper structural interventions that cannot be tackled 
by means of relatively isolated special-purpose bodies. However, the NESC (2005), for 
example, sees APCs merely as part of welfare restructuring based on outsourcing 
statutory responsibility for welfare to third parties, which seems to be less costly than 
having state provision of such services. Accordingly, it is not surprising that new plans 
for APCs foresee a move away from selective area-based targeting under the LDSIP. 
The cohesion process61 (Chapter 6, Section 6.2.6) signals profound policy changes for 
APCs. Largely, the philosophy behind governance restructuring and the changing role 
of APCs mirrors:
• the new aims and objectives of Irish welfare policy (NESC 2005; Murphy 2006) and 
both Irish (Bissett 13/12/2005) and international trends (Peck 2001) towards 
increasingly contracting out to and utilising third parties and players from wider civil 
society in providing public and welfare-related functions traditionally delivered by 
the state;
• the application of outcome-oriented principles and performance-monitoring 
systems that make sure that outsourced responsibilities and sub-contracted tasks 
concerning public service delivery lead to an ‘integrated’ and streamlined 
(‘cohesed’62) local-governance system that complements and adds value to 
Ireland’s knowledge-based economy (cf. NESC 2005: xix-xxi);
61 Launched in 2003, the objective of the cohesion process is to promote the rationalisation and 
démocratisation of state-funded local development initiatives (cf. DoCRGA 18/02/2003, 18/06/2003).
62 This ‘verb’ has frequently been used to refer to the integration of APCs into a new governance 
framework through the cohesion process (see Chapter 6, Section 6.2.6).
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• plans to integrate local development structures into local government systems 
(DoELG 1998, 1999a, 1999b, 2000).
Taking into consideration wider institutional changes and practices associated with 
welfare restructuring, economic competitiveness and public-sector modernisation -  
such as the introduction of a Management Information Framework (MIF), the Public
Sen/ice Management Act 1997, the Local Government Act 2001, Value for Money
reports/audits (Comptroller and Auditor General 2000, 2007; Fitzpatrick Associates 
2007; DoCRGA 2007), expenditure reviews (cf. NESC 2002a: 77-78) -  this case study 
sets out to assess to what extent contemporary funding arrangements for APCs 
facilitate the local pursuit of the independent (cf. White 07/09/2006: 6-7), collaborative 
and inclusive development of robust participatory (pluralist) activist measures that:
• are innovative in nature;
• are responsive to local realities on the ground and allow local people to be the
driving force;
• promote decision-making structures that strengthen democratic accountability of all 
stakeholders around the partnership table;
• enhance transparency, co-ordination, effectiveness and improved control over 
funding; and
• can change the mindset of both service providers and welfare recipients and, 
therefore, facilitate vertical institutional learning.
It is argued that the move towards the Developmental Welfare State can be facilitated 
through a mix of new managerial practices -  such as the introduction of a 
management information framework (MIF), multi-annual budgeting and expenditure 
reviews (NESC 2002a) -  in the tradition of the New Public Managerialism (NPM) 
(Chapter 1, Section 1.4.1). It could be shown that the Strategic Management Initiative 
(SMI) promotes (a) the introduction of an increase in value-for-money for public 
spending through increasing professionalisation of practices across the public and not- 
for-profit welfare sectors and (b) a change in the mindset of both public and other 
service providers and welfare recipients (e.g. NESC 2002b, 2002a) (see Chapter 1, 
Section 1.4.2).
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3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
3.1 Introduction
This study focuses on the characteristic features of funding arrangements for Area 
Partnership Companies (APCs) in the context of public-sector modernisation and 
related changes concerning power relationships within Dublin’s institutional framework 
of governance. This chapter establishes the theoretical framework within which the 
empirical research is situated. It introduces three contemporary theories of urban 
governance that are widely applied by theorists, scholars and political analysts to 
describe and explain power configurations in governance in OECD countries: actor- 
network theory (ANT), urban regime theory (URT) and the regulation approach (RA). 
Theory-building results in normative assumptions “about the nature and meaning of 
power, and each [theory] claims to be correct in its conceptualisation and 
measurement of power” (Judge et al. 1995: 4). The application of theories to back up 
empirical case research and subsequent conclusions drawn are controversially 
discussed in the academic world. Contestation and refutation of theoretical claims 
through empirical case research have led to alterations and adjustments of theories. 
This resulted in a plethora of competing theories and standpoints -  even within a 
particular school of thought -  as, for example,
• outlined in Bob Jessop’s (1990), Adam Tickell’s and Jamie Peck's (1992), and 
Michel Aglietta’s (2000) account of the regulation approach,
• exemplified in the debate on urban regime theory between Clarence Stone (1998; 
2004a; 2004b), David Imbroscio (1998b; 1998a; 2004) and Jonathan Davies 
(2004) in The Journal o f Urban Affairs (Volume 20(3) and 26(1) respectively), or
• mirrored in the differing standpoints concerning actor-network theory between 
Bruno Latour (1991), Andrew Pickering (1993) and Jonathan Murdoch (1995;
1997).
Counter-responses from different theoretical currents have contributed to a 
fragmentation and modification of theories. Mickey Lauria’s Reconstructing Urban 
Regime Theory (1997b) illustrates efforts to make up for theoretical inconsistencies 
and/or weaknesses of a prominent theory or the explanation of power in cities: 
scholars try to marry URT’s meso-level analysis of the political economy with the 
broader conceptual framework of neo-Marxist regulation approaches (RAs). Whereas 
the former ascribe the nature of power structures to the machinations of (local) 
individual stakeholders, the latter explains local power relations within a superimposed 
framework of (global) external structural forces. Murdoch (1995: 731) argues for the 
merits of actor-network theory, which allows for pursuing processes shaping the 
construction of organisational networks from within “to the ‘bitter end’”. ANT opposes 
notions of any preconceived or historically produced structural framework as a point of 
departure or platform for the analysis of governance. Instead ANT focuses entirely on 
different forms of materiality (human and nonhuman) at the micro-level as they are 
woven into, or acting within, the governance network.
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Table 3.1: Views on power -  key principles of three competing theories
ANT:
View on power:
Principle of 
general 
symmetry:
Translation: 
Black boxing:
Relevance for 
study:
URT:
View on power:
Social production 
model:
Selective
incentives:
Systemic power 
(to):
Key question: HOW is power created?
Power is not captured in structures or led by a human-centred worldview. It emerges, 
is reproduced, negotiated and captured within networked interaction between humans 
and nonhumans (i.e. heterogeneous materials).
Refutation of distinct structural fram eworks -  such a s  hum an/nonhum an, local/global, 
p resen t/p as t -  a s  pre-given explanatory variables of power relations. Distinct categories and 
discernible structures are only a specific outcom e of network p ro c esse s  rather than  an 
explanatory m echanism .
P ro c e sse s  through which hum ans and things a re  aligned into a  network.
Translation of hum ans and things by network builders m erely on the  grounds of their 
perform ative (functional) qualities. In o ther words, the  inner workings and complexity that 
equips networked hum ans and things with the ability to do things that are  considered  crucial 
for their integration com e second  place. Only input and output count.
ANT’s m icroscopic focus is suitable to blind out perceived structural forces. It co ncen tra tes on 
m apping the interplay betw een a  variety of local and extra-local networked hum an and non- 
hum an entities within Dublin's governance framework and the deg ree  to which they influence 
or sh a p e  funding arrangem ents for APCs
Key question: WHO creates power?
Power is diffuse as its point of origin is the individuals’ or stakeholders' position in the 
local political economy. Fragmentation of interests among stakeholders leads to the 
necessity to engage in accumulating the capacity to govern through both formal and 
informal coalition-building with likeminded individuals or groups.
Pow er is b a sed  on the  ability to acquire the capacity to govern in a  fragm ented institutional 
environm ent that lacks an "overarching com m and structure or a  unifying system  of thought’’
(Stone, 1989: 227).
Stimuli that glue together a  wide range of s takeholders with different and at tim es opposing 
ag endas.
The capacity to act and exert influence on others that is b a se d  on a  favourable position in the 
governance network, A w areness of system ic power is a  pre-requisite to intentionally exert 
actions that are  strategically geared  tow ards achieving aim s and objectives.
Relevance for 
study:
The RA:
View on power:
Accumulation:
system:
Mode of social 
regulation:
Regime of 
Accumulation:
Relevance for 
study:
URT sh e d s  light on the strategic mobilisation of re so u rces am ong key players in Dublin that 
have a v ested  interest in governance restructuring and that are  considered instrum ental in 
influencing asso c ia ted  co n seq u en ces for APC funding. T he particular focus of URT on 
forming strategic alliances b a sed  on small incentives and informal relationships is considered 
crucial in a sse ss in g  relevant power flows betw een identified key stakeholders and the  sco p e  
of A PC s to participate in decision-m aking circles
Key question: WHAT determines power?
Power structures are negotiated between the state and capitalist Interest. Whereas the 
state is mainly concerned about balancing crisis-prone capitalism, maintaining 
acceptable standards of societal cohesion and economic well-being (national space), 
the chief interest of capital interest is to make profit (international space).
Predom inant m odes of production and consum ption of g oods and serv ices a s  th e  basis of 
societal well-being b ased  on the principle of econom ic growth.
Political and social relations, institutions and p ro cesses  directed at maintaining the 
accum ulation system .
M acroeconom ic principle resulting from the interplay betw een m odes of production and 
consum ption (i.e. the accum ulation system ) and ensu ing  regulatory interventions directed at 
maintaining it (i.e. the m ode of social regulation).
RA looks a t p ro c esse s  of governance restructuring and the  rote of A PC s therein. A PC s a re  a 
m anifestation of statutory regulatory intervention ta rg e ted  at sustaining the current m ode of 
accum ulation Focusing on APCs in Dublin allows identifying the potential of the locale in 
influencing funding arrangem ents and criteria vis-à-vis the  course  of national policies such  a s  
the  Strategic M anagem ent Initiative or plans to prom ote the Developm ental W elfare S tate.
Commonality: All theories try to explain durability o f power, i.e. they are all concerned with the issue
of maintaining the power to act from a strategic position.
Source: ANT -  Latour (1987, 2002), Law (1992) and Murdoch (1997); URT -  Stone (1989); 
the R A -Jessop  (1990), Lipietz (1992) and Tickell and Peck (1992).
57
The analytical frameworks provided by these three theories offer different insights that 
assist possible explanations for place-specific manifestations of governance and, in 
particular, the logic driving the funding arrangements and associated processes of 
APCs in Dublin. Table 3.1'above summarises key concerns and core principles of 
actor-network theory, urban regime theory and the regulation approach.
Part 1 of this chapter briefly discusses the origin and the main criticism of each theory 
(see Table 3.2 below). It also makes reference to the relevance of theoretical concepts 
in regard to their conceptual potential for explaining governance restructuring in Dublin 
and the role of APCs therein.
Table 3.2: Introducing the theoretical frameworks -  key aspects
• Background
Origins and chief concerns
• Key principles
Main themes and criticism
• Relevance
Contribution to the analysis of new forms of (urban) governance in Dublin
• Perspective on funding arrangements of APCs
Explanation of power relations concerning funding arrangements for APCs?
Source: Informed by approach chosen by McGuirk (2004), Hubbard, Kitchin et al. (2002) and Lauria 
(1997a).
Part 2 provides a more practical view on the theoretical perspectives provided by ANT, 
URT and the RA. It first elaborates on the discussion of the core strengths and 
weaknesses of each theory. Then, it highlights how these different theoretical 
concepts can facilitate the empirical analysis of power relations and practices that 
impact on governance restructuring in Dublin and that, subsequently, manifest in 
funding arrangements for APCs.
3.2 Context 1 : introducing the three theoretical frameworks
The following three sections briefly introduce ANT, URT and RA. Each section is 
organised under the following headings:
• Origins and concerns;
• Criticism; and
• Relevance for the case study.
3.2.1 Actor-Network Theory (ANT): the deconstruction of networks
3.2.1.1 Origins and concerns of ANT
ANT is anchored in post-structuralism and emerged from the sociology of science and 
technology. Conceptually formed by the work of Michael Serres and Bruno Latour
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(Bingham and Thrift 2000; Graham and Marvin 2001; Hubbard et al. 2002), the 
development of ANT is also associated with the writings of Michel Callon, and John 
Law (Pickering 1993; Murdoch 1997, 1998; Smith 2003). ANT rejects the idea of any 
pre-structured a-priori explanatory mechanism or “some pre-existing account of epoch­
like change” (Murdoch 1995: 732). Latour (1987: 65) argues that scientific knowledge 
is “the end result of a long process in the laboratory that we are now starting to 
observe” (cf. Bingham 1996). ANT is concerned with “heterogeneous engineering” 
(Thrift 2000a: 4) as it defines the world as a plethora of networked (engineered) 
relationships consisting of all kinds of materiality (heterogeneous): inanimate and 
animate matter, humans and ‘things’. Thereby, ANT challenges traditional 
epistemological, ontological and ethical constraints (Law 1992; Mol 1999; Davies 
2000; Latour 2002; Castree 2002). Law favours it because:
[...] it is a good idea not to take it for granted that there is a macrosocial system on 
the one hand, and bits and pieces of derivative microsocial detail on the other. If 
we do this we close off most of the interesting questions about the origins of power 
and organisation. Instead we should start with a clean slate (Law 1992: 2).
ANT applies a micro-sociological perspective and looks at power flows at the 
interfaces between all sorts of things, human and non-human (hereafter entities or 
intermediaries63) (Law 1992). It explores and describes how power is utilised to 
strategically situate individuals and inanimate matter into stable relationships (or 
exclude them, as the case may be, from those) that ensure the functioning of complex 
governance systems. In short, ANT tries to give answers as “it attempts to elide the 
why’ question with ‘how questions’” (Murdoch 1995: 747).
3.2.1.2 Criticism of ANT
What most distinctively differentiates ANT from traditional and post-modern 
sociological and geographical understandings of networks (e.g. Castells 1996; Thrift 
1996) is the principle of general symmetry (Pickering 1993; Murdoch 1997) which -  
according to Latour (2004) -  attributes the ability to modify intentional (i.e. human) 
decision making to both humans and nonhumans. Against this backdrop, the question 
arises whether intentionality, motivational behaviour or vested interest can function as 
surgical instruments dividing the allegedly artificially produced ‘Siamese twins’ named 
human and non-human (or material) agency. The core weakness of ANT seems to be 
the issue of intentionality understood as a problem of cause: “If nonhumans are 
actants64, then we need a way of determining their power” (Murdoch 1997: 745)65. In 
any case, ANT is struggling to resolve convincingly the issue as to whether or not 
intentionality is a pre-condition for action (cf. Pickering 1993). On the one hand, 
entities can be understood as embodiments of previous (i.e. historic) human-material 
interaction such as legislation, funding guidelines or evaluation procedures, all of
63 See Chapter 7, Section 7.2.1, Table 7.1.
64 Latour refers to things that act or speak on behalf of people or things as actants (see Latour 1987: 
83-84); in contrast, humans are referred to as actors.
65 Quoting from Collins and Yearley (1992: 322).
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which potentially animate human agency in existing networks66 in an unpredictable 
way. But how can the process of inscription, alignment, or being reeled in resisted by 
targeted entities, on the other hand?
It could be argued that, even though not endowed with conscious decision-making 
capacity, at least some form of action ability can be attributed to inanimate matter 
because it can ‘do things’ and, furthermore, ‘make a difference’ (cf. Pickering 1993; 
Latour 2004). For example, in Technology is Society Made Durable (Latour 1991), 
Latour discards any action that is solely based on a rationale on the grounds that a 
preferably full description of network space is sufficient to avoid searching for intra- 
motivational or extra-causal influences. In fact, in abandoning pre-conceived 
categorical boxes and normative goals, Latour’s cognitive interest seems to be 
satisfied with ‘thick’, i.e. detailed in-depth, descriptions of interactions in network space 
by means of empirical field work (i.e. ‘stepping in’ without interfering with the 
network67) observing where his actors and actants are leading him. This is a 
consequent application of the principle of symmetry, which does not privilege one 
entity over the other and, hence, must insist “that everything deserves explanation 
and, more particularly, that everything that you seek to explain or describe should be 
approached in the same way” (Law 1994: 9-10, original emphasis).
3.2.1.3 Relevance of ANT for the study
ANT promises a 'fresh perspective’ for the analysis of the embeddedness of APCs in a 
changing and negotiable institutional framework because it sets out to describe and 
de-construct the existence of complex ‘black-boxes’ such as governance networks. 
The urban governance system in Dublin consists of an amalgamation of both things -  
such as the built environment68, guidelines, funding mechanisms or institutions -  and 
humans -  such as politicians, civil servants, APC staff, community activists or 
entrepreneurs. ANT can trace movements of entities between centres of relative 
power and establish their role in, and influence on, shaping funding arrangements for 
APCs. In denying spatiality and time as being divided into discrete levels, networked 
entities in Dublin’s governance landscape can be pursued beyond the surface of 
relations and aspects that are immediately visible; the application of ANT allows us to 
seamlessly follow networked entities through space and time and ‘jump’ between the 
present and the past, the local and the global (Law 1986; Thrift 2000a).
66 Pickering (1993: 579) speaks of "a temporal and posthumanist interplay [...] between the emergence 
of material agency and the construction of human goals targeted at network progression”.
67 Observation may alter the behaviour of the research object and thereby lead to artificially constructed 
networks that result in a description of something that differs from what was originally intended to be 
observed. Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle may illustrate this element: according to quantum 
mechanics, the more precisely the position of a given particle is given, the less precisely one can say 
what its momentum is. This is clearly an analogy mirroring what Law and Hetherington (1999) define 
as relational materiality and performativity of networked entities. Going beyond description, i.e. 
becoming a part of the network, would alter the network behaviour through mutual interaction (see, 
for example, Star’s (1991) participatory observation in a fast food restaurant).
68 Most APCs in Dublin are situated in neighbourhoods with poor standards of social infrastructure, high 
share of social housing and low quality of the urban fabric (Pringle et al. 1999).
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3.2.2 Urban Regime Theory (URT): the business-policv nexus
3.2.2.1 Origins and concerns of URT
Urban regime theory (URT) is anchored in urban political studies in the USA. It 
emerged as a response to the concept of economic determinism inherent in elitist 
theories such as community power structures (Domhoff 2005) or growth coalition 
theory (Logan and Molotch 1996). In principle, these theories try to explain the 
domination of urban politics through either closed incestuous circles of power (Hunter 
1953; Mills 1956) or popular consensus (cf. Dahl 1961: 325). Emanating from Stephen 
L. Elkin’s (1987) City and Regime in the American Republic and Clarence N. Stone’s 
(1989) Regime Politics, urban regime theory became a prominent concept for the 
analysis of the sphere of local politics (Lauria 1997a; Imbroscio 1998b; Davies 1996,
2002)69. Both, Elkin’s and Stone’s work, build upon the normative assumption that the 
market society in liberal democracies is “the best possible social form” (Davies 2002: 
4) and that the orientation of city politics towards business interests is “a consequence 
of institutionally mediated structures” (Davies 1996: 694) that is likely to perpetuate 
social inequalities in U.S. society.
3.2.2.2 Criticism of URT
Stone (1989: 6) defines urban regimes as “the informal arrangements by which public
bodies and private interests function together in order to be able to make and carry out
governing decisions”. The framework within which the composition of urban regimes is
positioned is being determined by “two basic institutional principles of the American
economy: (1) popular control of the formal machinery of government and (2) private
ownership of business enterprise” (ibid.). Stone’s case study on Atlanta illustrates that
the nature of the political economy in Atlanta is conducive to making the business
interest indispensable in any meaningful coalition:
Public officials can govern with the grain of business cooperation, but cannot 
govern effectively against that grain. Incorporation into the business system of 
civic cooperation is thus empowering, and that makes alliance with the down-town 
elite strongly attractive to public officials and others in the community as well 
(Stone 1989: 196, original emphasis).
Despite notions of an overall increasing involvement of business interest in public- 
private partnership-type projects in Europe, critics of URT claim that the influence of 
business elites is “part of a national state project designed to restructure local 
government along neo-liberal lines” (Wood 2004: 2108). Peck (1995: 26) argues that 
the power of business interests in European governance stems “in part from the 
attribution by the state of ‘political status’, having less to do with the ‘energy and 
cunning’ of its individual members and more to do with effective ‘sponsorship’ by the 
state” (original emphasis). Once profitable informal relationships70 between local 
decision-makers and the business elite have been facilitated, the interesting question
69 Some authors (Lauria 1997a; Imbroscio 1998b) also highlight Susan and Norman Fainstein’s 
Restructuring the City (1983).
70 Throughout this study informal relationships refer to dealings between parties that are not based on 
protocol.
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to be asked is why and through what kind of formal state-initiated mechanism coalition
partners from either of the parties involved could be encouraged or forced to opt out.
State-initiated opportunities for public-private cooperation and strategising may have
opened up unprecedented opportunities for the forging of powerful links that may not
be controllable any more from the top -  even if threatened with withdrawal of
resources (cf. Davies 2004: 31). In short, interest-driven informal networks between
individuals on either side of the private-public spectrum may develop their own
complex and maybe independent dynamics that are beyond the control of those
interest groups that were instrumental in forging a coalition in the first place:
If it can be demonstrated that independence in overall political strategy is 
compromised in specific policy initiatives by dependence on business groups, then 
the central proposition in URT may theoretically be valid (Davies 1996: 696-697).
Some scholars that are sympathetic to URT acknowledge the potential of such 
empirical work as “a treasure trove of knowledge regarding contextual differences” 
(Mossberger and Stoker 2001: 816), “a useful tool in demonstrating how far the 
balance of power between local government and the private sector has changed in 
urban policy and providing a benchmark for comparison between cases” (Davies 1996: 
702), or “a model of local political success and failure outside of the regime concept 
itself (Dowding 2001: 17). Goodwin and Painter (1997), for example, argue that the 
symbiotic relationship between politics and business is not necessarily confined to the 
US as they observe an increasing involvement of the state in economic issues71. 
Whereas some authors stress that problems derive from poor translation, others 
highlight “the need for a more ‘careful’, ‘rigorous’ and ‘innovative’ deployment of US 
concepts” (Wood 2004: 2104) or maintain that fundamental differences in the political 
economy between the Unites States and Western European countries militate against 
carrying out meaningful comparative case studies using URT as an explanatory 
framework (Lawless 1994; Harding 1995; Peck and Tickell 1995; Davies 2003)72.
Apart from issues concerning systemic compatibility, it appears that URT is 
oversimplifying the problem of scale. Lauria (1997a) maintains that URT deals with 
localities as if they were somehow disconnected from wider structural processes. In a 
fixed setting consisting of the political economy of the city, the point of departure is the 
configuration of power at local level, which is ignoring developments beyond city 
boundaries that may have been the source for any local economic or political 
behaviour in the first place. Driven by epistemological priorities, the focus on ‘movers 
and shakers’ that operate within a particular urban regime bears the danger of 
neglecting relevant societal and economic forces situated outside the observed urban
71 Scharpf (2000: 370) underlines the necessity for democratically accountable office holders and 
unions in capitalist countries to legitimise their position through providing opportunities for footloose 
capital to allocate profit-making economic activities that provide “income opportunities of citizens [and 
union members] and voters, and which generates the tax revenues to finance public services and 
welfare spending".
72 The arguments advanced against the application of URT outside the US highlight differences 
concerning (a) the state form as mirrored in the institutional framework, (b) the income generation of 
local authorities, (c) the overall ideology driving the (re-)distribution of taxes or (d) the incentives for 
forming durable coalitions.
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framework of regime formation (e.g. Davies 2002). Ward (1996: 432) suggests that 
“regimes may appear ‘bottom-up’ because this is the way they have been studied“. He 
notes that a variety of pressures originating in the wider political economy that have 
led to changes in the public sector and its relationship towards business interests ’’may 
actually be driving regime formation (or at least institutional coalitions)” (Ward 1996: 
430, original emphasis).
Answering the criticism directed at the locally confined space within which URT seeks 
explanations, Stone (1998) acknowledges the impact on wider economic 
developments on cities and the actors therein73. Nevertheless, he maintains that 
caution is needed when theorising the relationship between the big picture and the 
locale: “It is one thing to see it [the global economy] as a source of policy changes. It is 
another to see it as dictating the local response” (Stone 1998: 254). Stone (1998; 
2004a; 2004b) argues that the locale is mediating any external stimulus through 
existing regime arrangements and feeding back a response with a potential to alter 
extra-local forces.
3.2.2.3 Relevance of URT for the study
Drawing on the work of Stone, one could argue that formal funding arrangements and 
related processes concerning APCs in Dublin are likely to be complemented by 
informal arrangements negotiated by key stakeholders positioned at the interface 
between statutory administration and the government-funded APC network. According 
to Stone (1989: 4), this coupling is a social production of power that is essential to 
form efficient regimes or coalitions because “informal understandings and 
arrangements provide needed flexibility to cope with nonroutine matters, they facilitate 
cooperation to a degree that formally defined relations do not.” In the light of URT, 
informal elements of inter-institutional relationships between APCs and their political 
sponsors would represent a form of civic cooperation that is empowering on the 
grounds that “it enables community actors to achieve cooperation beyond what could 
be formally commanded” (Stone 1989: 5). The forging of such a hypothetical form of 
cooperation in Dublin, however, would not necessarily have to be dependent on will 
but on resourcefulness. Stone argues that the ability intentionally to bring together 
both resources and institutional connections enables stakeholders either to maintain or 
alter existing power structures. This ability, in turn, is dependent on the existing 
arrangements and procedures in place that attribute power to stakeholders within the 
urban political economy through which selective incentives for cooperation can be 
created. As the formation of strategic alliances is typically based on small incentives 
and informal relationships, it is considered crucial to shed light on relevant power flows 
between identified key stakeholders and the scope of APCs to participate in decision­
making circles.
73 See discussion between Stone and Imbrosclio and the exchange between Stone, Imbrosclio and
Davies in the Journal o f Urban Affairs Vol. 20 (3) and Vol. 26 (1) respectively.
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3.2.3 The Regulation Approach (RAÌ: an agency-structure dilemma
3-2.3.1 Origins and concerns of the RA
The regulation approach has evolved from the work of a small group of French 
economists consisting of Michel Aglietta, Alain Lipietz, and Robert Boyer (the 
Parisienne School of thought) and consists of a variety of competing regulation 
schools (Jessop 1990; Collinge 1999; Rottger 2004)74. Regulation can be understood 
as an “umbrella term for an ongoing research programme within contemporary Marxist 
political economy” (Tickell and Peck 1992)75. Its principal ideas are based on the 
Marxist hypothesis that any form of capitalist accumulation triggers class struggle that 
requires stabilisation through intervention mechanisms. This is so because the 
capitalist production of goods and services “is characterised by certain fundamental 
contradictions (such as the collective tendency for capitalists to economize on 
workers’ wages, thus ultimately reducing the effective demand for manufactured 
goods)” (Gertler 2000: 681; cf. Jessop 1990: 188-189; Jessop 2001a: 9; Judge et al. 
1995: 11; Lauria 1997a: 6-7; Painter 1997b: 124). If the ratio of capital-revenues to 
capital invested falls below the marginal revenue required to produce commodities or 
services in a profitable way, accumulation is not possible under ceteris paribus 
conditions and, consequently, the production process needs adjusting retrospectively 
(Aglietta 1979, 2000; Lipietz 1992; Tickell and Peck 1992; Painter 1995). 
Accumulation is therefore dependent on a functional relationship between production 
and consumption, i.e. on a sustainable yield on investment (Harvey 2001; Smith
2003).
The principal objective of the regulation school of thought is to answer how and why
capitalist relations succeeded in overcoming such crisis situation over time and space
(Tickell and Peck 1992; Goodwin and Painter 1997). Regulationists argue that the
harmonisation of this crisis-prone relationship between consumption and production
over a prolonged period of time depends on the Mode o f Social Regulation (MSR)76:
Perhaps the principal contribution of the regulation approach lies in the integration 
of the role of political and social relations (state action and legislature, social 
institutions, behavioural norms and habits, political practices) -  the so-called 
‘mode of social regulation’ (MSR) -  into the conception of capitalist reproduction 
and crisis (Tickell and Peck 1992: 192)
74 The focal point for the formation of what became known as the Parisian regulation school was the 
dissertation of Michel Aglietta, Régulation et crises du capitalisme (1976), that had a groundbreaking 
effect concerning the analysis of economic phenomena (Aglietta 2000). According to Jessop (2001a) 
Aglietta’s and Lipietz’s work evolved from an Althusserian concept of structural causality. Louis 
Althusser (1918-1990) proclaimed that the configuration and interplay of practices that revolve around 
the production process constitute society.
75 Outlining the most prominent regulationist currents Jessop (1990) draws particular attention to the 
importance of competing theories that emerged over time and identifies seven different currents 
within the regulation approach.
76 Jessop (1994) prefers the term social mode o f economic regulation because it "highlights both the 
manner of regulation and its object" (36, notes, point 2). However, throughout this thesis the term 
mode o f social regulation (MSR) is used as defined by Tickell and Peck (1992) because -  by 
definition -  it already implies the economic issue embedded in the concept of the regulation 
approach.
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The different pace of change in different countries and regions has certainly 
demonstrated that the MSR “as a social creation” (Aglietta 1979: 19) can become an 
effective local instrument to buffer market forces with potentially radical territorial 
changes at various scales (Goodwin and Painter 1996, 1997; Powell and Barrientos
2004)77. According to Jessop (1990: 194), the MSR is “neither a fateful necessity nor a 
wilful contingency”. It emerges as a result of interplay between (place-specific) societal 
values, norms and institutions78, on the one hand, and characteristics of the 
predominant accumulation system, on the other (cf. Painter 1995). The 
macroeconomic framework described by the twin pillars of an accumulation system 
and the mode of social regulation is defined as the regime of accumulation (Lipietz 
1992; Tickell and Peck 1992; Murdoch 1995).
3.2.3.2 Criticism of the RA
The regulation approach (RA) has received both sympathetic interrogation and
criticism (e.g. Murdoch 1995; Painter 1995; Lauria 1997b; MacLeod and Goodwin
1999) and more direct criticism (Brenner and Glick 1991; Bonefeld 1993) for its
inadequacy in relation to explanatory loopholes and theoretical weaknesses. The
principal criticism is largely directed at the shaky position of the mode of social
regulation (MSR) as a central explanatory concept as it is based on circular reasoning
(Goodwin and Painter 1997; MacLeod and Goodwin 1999) and notions of essentialism
(Painter 1997a). Painter summarises the dilemma as follows:
Objects of regulation do not precede regulation, existing in some preregulatory 
limbo awaiting the emergence of a mode of regulation. Rather, processes and 
objects of regulation emerge together and are produced by one another [...]. 
Because modes of regulation are understood to be the product of the interaction of 
contingent phenomena, the concept of mode of regulation cannot explain the 
emergence of those phenomena in the first place (Painter 1997b: 127).
Some scholars argue that the regulation approach does not sufficiently take into 
account that there “are sites of resistance and disruption, as well as sites of regulation” 
(Goodwin and Painter 1997: 22; cf. Brenner and Glick 1991: 105; Murdoch 1995: 290- 
292; Painter 1995, 1997a). In relation to the RA’s potential to account for urban 
governance structures, Lauria (1997a: 8) points out that “regulation theory 
underestimates the importance of local actors and organizations and thus cannot 
explain the concrete construction of regulatory mechanisms” (cf. Brenner and Glick 
1991: 105; Bonefeld 1993; Murdoch 1995; Painter 1995, 1997a; MacLeod and 
Goodwin 1999). Despite epistemological, ontological and methodological peculiarities 
(MacLeod and Goodwin 1999; Rottger 2004; Davies 2002) efforts have been made to 
amalgamate the merits of URT and RA. Lauria (1997a) proposes a marriage between
77 Jessop (1990) points out that the key thrust of the RA is by no means limited to an analysis of crisis 
within Fordism or any other model of capitalist production through the lens of class struggle but that 
attention of the RA has shifted to address "questions of structural cohesion and neglected social 
agency". As a result RA is not only adjusting to increasingly complex organisation of the interface 
between ‘the economic’ and ‘the social’ but also capable of challenging the logic that governs neo­
liberal economic theory (cf. Aglietta 1979).
78 For example laws, trade unions, chambers of commerce, government departments, banks, the 
media, trade associations, the family, the administrative statutory apparatus, the education system, 
NGOs and citizen’s groups, clubs.
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the RA with URT to make up for 'explanatory loopholes’ concerning questions of scale. 
Others look at combining versions of the RA with ANT (Castree 2002; Murdoch 1995) 
or suggest viewing regulatory systems through the lens of neo-Gramscian state theory 
(Jessop 1997b; Hirsch 2002).
3.2.3.3 Relevance of the RA for the study
In the light of the regulation approach, the establishment and institutionalisation of 
locally operating unelected special-purpose bodies is an indicator for a new form of 
state-restructuring in the context of economic challenges. In the Irish scenario, the 
report The Developmental Welfare State (NESC 2005: ix) captures the importance of 
policy and institutional adaptation as a way to cope with “Ireland’s long-run economic 
and social development vulnerabilities”. The report argues that one of the key 
challenges is to devise a welfare system that, first, is tailored around the individual 
and, second, “not only addresses social risks, needs and inequalities more 
adequately, but also connects more fully with the dynamic of the economy” (ibid.).
Having identified APCs as key organisations to deliver local performance-based anti­
poverty programmes on a contractual basis, the envisaged alignment and integration 
of APCs into the landscape of urban governance can be interpreted as a state-driven 
response to the latent risk of the fragmentation of politico-economic spaces under the 
current neo-liberal capitalist system. In this context, the RA links funding arrangements 
of APCs to state-led restructuring processes, which are targeted at mediating between 
societal frictions and economic imperatives.
3.3 Context 2: practical implications for empirical research
3.3.1 Introduction
The analysis of empirical research often aims at mapping out power relations between 
interest groups and stakeholders involved in urban governance. The power flows 
within multi-stakeholder relationships have been described and analysed from different 
competing theoretical viewpoints such as actor-network theory (ANT) (e.g. Murdoch 
and Marsden 1995; McGuirk 2000), urban regime theory (URT) (e.g. Brown 1999; 
Stone 2001; Austin and McCaffrey 2002; Bassett et al. 2002; McGuirk 2003b), neo- 
Foulcauldian views (MacKinnon 2000), organisational theories (Raco 2002), 
perspectives of complexity (Medd 2001), the regulation approach (RA) (Peck and 
Ticked 1994; Le Galès 1998) and, related to the latter, neo-Gramscian state theory 
(e.g. MacLeod and Goodwin 1999; McGuirk 2004). These case studies typically map 
and explain power configurations within the urban governance system and illustrate 
how the application of competing theories can facilitate the analysis of empirical 
material.
Little empirical research could be found, however, that explains the position and of 
APCs in Ireland from a theoretical perspective: work led by Bartley and Saris focuses 
on exploring the relationship between the role of urban governance in addressing the
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systematic exclusion of marginalised communities from actively participating in urban 
development processes (Bartley and Saris 1999; Saris et al. 2000; Saris et al. 2002; 
Bartley and Borscheid 2003; Bartley and Shine 2003). Their key concerns are 
underlying political relationships and institutional processes that determine the” 
characteristic feature of governance coalitions involving participation from civil society 
and their potential to increase the scope for local democracy. Other case studies 
explicitly focus on the analysis of community-based partnership-type structures or 
other special-purpose bodies in Ireland -  such as public-private partnerships (PPPs) -  
from the theoretical viewpoints associated with actor-network theory (McGuirk 2000), 
urban regime theory (Hogan 2006) or the regulation approach (Punch 2005)79.
This study takes into account the complexity of the relationships between actors and 
institutions involved in the decision-making processes around planning, executing, 
monitoring and evaluating APCs. It investigates into the capacity of three 
contemporary theories of governance to explain changing funding arrangements for 
APCs within the current system of local governance in Dublin. ANT, URT and the RA 
are competing theories that were selected for this case study based on the following 
criteria:
• they are dominant theories in a series of studies analysing power relations in 
urban governance;
• they can account for interactions between economic and social processes and 
their socio-spatial impacts on the locale;
• they are capable of explaining the emergence and maintenance of power relations 
in the socio-institutional framework of urban governance and related economic 
developments;
• they emphasise different spatial dimensions and thereby provide distinct 
perspectives on the construction of power.
Even though the theoretical approaches generally revolve around the mechanisms in 
place that maintain or re-shape existing power relationships, each of them provides 
specific conceptual lenses through which the contemporary restructuring funding 
arrangements for APCs and associated procedures can be analysed. Against this 
backdrop, this empirical study sets out to describe and analyse the institutional 
embeddedness, functional reconfiguration and underlying funding arrangements of 
APCs in Dublin in regard to the three interrelated key indicators identified in the 
previous section: institutionalisation, accountability and value for money.
It is argued that the introduction and rolling out of new managerial practices facilitated 
APCs to be more efficient, effective and economic -  and hence contributed to greater 
value for money (VFM) (cf. Power 1997) from public investments into areas of
79 McGuirk (2000) applied actor-network theory (a Latourian concept of power) in analysing the 
exclusion of local authority planners from newly formed governance networks in Dublin. Punch (2004) 
takes a political economy perspective on the degree of involvement of communities in local urban 
regeneration plans.
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disadvantage and that these changes are reflected in the funding arrangements for 
APCs. The chief objective is to assess which theoretical framework provides the most 
powerful explanation for those processes that affect the funding arrangements for 
APCs:
• within the changing administrative framework under the LDSIP;
• against the backdrop of rolling out practices emanating from the Strategic 
Management Initiative (SMI) that put much emphasis on performance monitoring 
and fiscal accountability based on the principle of value-for-money.
It is intended to ascertain which theory is best situated to explain governance 
restructuring, the role of new managerial concepts in promoting both greater 
accountability and VFM and how these processes impact on the funding framework -  
and ultimately -  on the modus operandi of APCs. What is crucial for the analysis of 
APC-type structures under the current model of governance is that no dominant top- 
down or bottom-up flow of power is taken as given. Looking at contemporary models 
of multi-scalar governance it can be assumed that the spheres of influence between 
local, meso and macro level are inextricably intertwined and boundaries between the 
three spheres only refer to spatial scales (see Chapter 4.1, Figure 3); they do not 
suggest limitations to spheres of influence as the flux of power in-between is 
considered to happen more or less seamlessly.
The multiplicity of links connecting stakeholders both within and between various 
administrative, political and spatial scales reflects the composite nature of governance. 
As a result, there possibly exist options for a complex flow of input “from activities in 
many places rather than from a single centre” (Jessop 2003: 2) to take place. This 
assumption avoids the chicken-and-egg dilemma that finds expression in the 
discussion of whether power is generated top-down or bottom-up (Lauria, 1997).
The following sections elaborate on the theoretical discussion and ascertain the 
explanatory potential of each theory in regard to the explanations of power 
reconfigurations that affect funding arrangements of APCs in Dublin. Each section 
takes account of the theoretical weaknesses discussed further above (Section 3.2). It 
is attempted to suggest a practicable approach towards the utilisation of actor-network 
theory, urban regime theory and the regulation approach as an explanatory framework 
for the analysis of new approaches to governance and their impact on the promotion of 
local development initiatives in marginal and excluded spaces in Dublin.
3.3.2 ANT’s perspective on funding arrangements
3.3.2.1 Introduction
If ANT is strictly sticking to the principle of general symmetry (see above, Section 3.1, 
Table 3.1), Murdoch (1997: 750) asks whether ANT can “ever do anything more than 
describe, in a prosaic fashion, the dangerous imbroglios that enmesh us?” (original 
emphasis). Latour (1991) clearly indicates that in order to arrive at a conclusion, one
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has to have a description of networks that is saturated. If thick description is a means 
to an end, however, then the following questions arise: Where is the starting point of 
the observation? How is it defined? And at what stage and on what grounds does the 
observer decide to stop following how entities proceed within network space? 
Observation, if guided by a vested or epistemological interest, needs to end at some 
stage or, at least, needs to arrive at a point of evaluation in order to recapitulate as 
networks can only be reconstructed in hindsight because “it is impossible to follow 
actors everywhere (Murdoch, 1994, 22)” (Davies 2000: 542). But how can dead-ends 
and meaningless connections be identified and irrelevant entitles be let go if the 
observation is not guided by a more specific cognitive interest other than following 
network-builders? If Latour sticks to his point of view that -  no matter what happens -  
only changes induced by networked entities count (i.e. effects caused by their input), 
then how does one define at what stage it is time to leave the observatory position? 
Furthermore, taking a step back, one could ask what would be a legitimate driving 
force or reason for engaging in describing entities in the first place.
3.3.2.2 A case of first-order proximations and remote control?
Following Murdoch’s (1998) approach of ‘first-order proximations’, ANT can help to 
answer questions concerning the modernisation of the public sector and the ensuing 
utilisation of value for money-driven principles as a means to methodologically position 
and incorporate APCs into the dominant frame of governance; this means that a 
decision needs to be made on the scale and dimension of processes having a bearing 
on funding APCs. ANT is concerned with the question of how and by what means 
governance changes affecting APCs were implemented. It provides a contrasting view 
to urban regime theory (URT) and the regulation approach (RA) (see Section 3.1, 
Table 3.1). Case studies analysing urban governance from the perspective of URT 
and the RA tend to approach their research object ‘from the outside in’ (Lauria 1997b). 
These approaches are criticised for their pre-occupation with structural processes at 
work (the capitalist system of societal wealth production) that determine, first, the 
nature of social discourses and, second, the scope for influencing the logic of 
governance ‘from below’.
ANT analysts argue that, as a result, URT and the RA can only observe “end products 
of networks” (Murdoch 1995: 751) that restrict insights into the micro-processes 
responsible for the establishment of any structural framework in the first place and, 
therefore, are not able to meaningfully investigate the conservation and transformation 
of power therein. In contrast, ANT approaches the circulation of power from a micro- 
sociological point of view; it strives to explain through saturated description how and to 
what extent network builders manage to align other agents or entities -  i.e. things, 
organisations and individuals -  into a durable power configuration80. A key role is 
attributed to so-called intermediaries. These can be thought of as entities or agents
80 Durability is also at the heart of URT’s concept of selective incentives that is directed at consolidating 
urban coalitions over time (cf. Stone 1989: 186-189). Likewise, it is central to RA’s mode of 
accumulation (cf. Lipietz 1992).
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that have been utilised by network-builders with a view to influencing the behaviour or
status of other entities within the network:
In order for an actor to successfully enrol entities (human and non-human) within a 
network, their [sic] behaviour must be stabilized and channelled in the directions 
desired by the enrolling actor. This will entail redefining the roles of the actors and 
entities as they come into alignment, such that they come to gain new identities or 
attributes within the network. It is the intermediaries [...], which act to bind actors 
together, ‘cementing’ the links [...] (Murdoch 1995: 747; cf. Callon 1991).
The literature review highlighted that wider socio-political and economic processes 
influence the local manifestation of funding arrangements for APCs. Ignoring the 
scalar division of spaces, ANT can be utilised to describe relationships that seamlessly 
connect people, things and ideas across space and time (Latour 1993). The concept of 
translation (Latour 1987; Law 1996; Murdoch 1997), notions of post-humanist 
decentering (Pickering 1993), the achievement of remote control through the 
circulation immutable mobiles81 as intermediaries (Law 1986) and the phenomenon of 
black-boxing (Latour 1987, 2002) provide a unique angle for the analysis of funding 
arrangements concerning APCs in Dublin (Section 3.1 Table 3.1).
Taking, first, Dublin’s governance landscape as the institutional framework and, 
second, the City of Dublin as the 'spatial container’, ‘first-order proximation’ (Murdoch 
1998) or ‘envelope’ (Law 1986) within which APCs are embedded, then ANT offers an 
approach allowing one to pick up and seamlessly follow certain threads within 
geographically confined action spaces that link all kinds of agents that are considered 
relevant for changes in the funding framework. For example, from the perspective of 
ANT, power can be defined as the ability of an actor to modify and stabilise funding 
arrangements of APCs in Dublin by means of enrolling agents on their own terms and 
conditions over a meaningful period of time.
Law’s concept of remote control provides an explanation for the creation of a central- 
peripheral or top-down flow of power within Dublin’s governance landscape and the 
role of accountability and performance-monitoring systems therein (Law 1986). In this 
case study, ANT serves to cast light on ‘things’ or activities that make up what is 
discernible as the funding mechanism for APCs and, thereby, offers an approach to 
make assumptions on the construction of governance and the re-enforcement of 
power imbalances therein. What is regarded as the funding framework is a result of 
the (historically) negotiated or prescribed positioning of APCs as per se complex 
entities within the ‘meta-network’ of governance. From the viewpoint of ANT, 
accountability and performance monitoring are technologies that aim at maintaining or 
improving the delegation of power throughout the governance network. This is
81 Immutable mobiles can be understood as the embodiment of power in entities that can make others 
perform. Taking a lead from the Latourian concept of power as "a function of the capacity to muster a 
large number of allies at one spot” (ibid.), Law’s (1986) story on Portuguese efforts to maintain 
imperial long-distance relations with India. In Law’s example, the superiority of technology in form of 
means of transport (a vessel) and a monopoly on associated know-how is a guarantor for networked 
stability that can be maintained at a distance. Superior technology, combined with social control that 
is based on reliable automation of humans, represents a reliable form of power (see Law 1986: 13).
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achieved through the circulation of immutable mobiles as a material and social 
manifestation of power that holds local APCs in their attributed role within a prescribed 
social, economic and geographical envelope that is remote-controlled from a distance 
(e.g. Law 1986).
The literature provides stories of dominant network-builders successfully enrolling 
weaker agents (Law 1991, 1986; Latour 2002) and their failure thereof (Callon 1986; 
Murdoch and Marsden 1995). Failure can occur when the former do not manage to 
enrol weaker or peripheral agents as originally intended. It is conceivable that the latter 
have the capacity simply to resist incorporation, to re-negotiate the terms and 
conditions of the network space in their favour and exert power on, or even manage to 
dominate, the former. Murdoch and Marsden (1995) illustrate how ‘enrolees-to-be’ can 
resist integration into a network space through reeling in support from powerful agents 
that are in opposition to the objectives of self-proclaimed would-be enroller and de­
mask what network-builders consider immutable mobiles as double agents (Law 
1986). Tensions within the rank of network-builders that weaken their dominant 
position can be another cause of network disintegration or collapse (Callon 1986).
The key challenge to resist unwelcome efforts of alignment is to transform what from 
the outset seems to be a space of prescription into a space of contestation (Murdoch
1998). From an ANT perspective, the analysis of the interview material facilitates the 
mapping out of the relationship between neighbourhood-based APCs and their political 
masters in the context of governance restructuring and to draw conclusions on their 
capacity to construct and circulate power.
3.3.3 URT’s perspective on funding arrangements
3.3.3.1 Introduction
In the course of the literature review some reservations surfaced concerning the 
application of URT in the European and, in this case, the Irish context. When trying to 
apply URT in the context of integrated area-based approaches to development within 
Ireland one faces the challenge to work with a theoretical approach that has been 
formed in the American context. This makes it difficult to allow for an unmodified 
application of URT in a non-US American environment without concept stretching 
(Ward 1996; Davies 2002, 2003). In the light of URT’s development in the US context, 
this study has to ascertain whether URT can provide a satisfactory framework for an 
analysis of the processes leading to a re-structuring of the institutional framework of 
local governance in Dublin and a related shift of funding priorities for the APC-type 
approach to local development.
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3.3.3.2 A case of translation?
Taking a lead from Cox, Ward (1996: 434) argues that light needs to be shed on urban 
regime theory’s ability to challenge and react to changes in economic space and 
thereby become “a site from which change can be affected (cf. Cox, 1993b)” (original 
emphasis). Ward suggests removing urban regime theory out of its US-specific 
context, placing it into a broader theoretical context and trying “to obtain a clear idea of 
what the concept is and what it actually says about studying local elites” (Ward 1996: 
435). Based on the core assumption or the 'iron law’ of urban regime theory that 
mutual dependency on either monetary or political resources is the driving force for 
regime formation, the import of URT into the Irish context must be based on the 
assumption that there are similarities between the US and Ireland in the local political 
economy and the driving forces that enable regimes to form.
Despite a variety of crucial differences in relation to the nature of local government and 
the potential for business involvement in the political decision-making process, the 
manifestation of a state-led entrepreneurialism is reflected in new public management 
initiatives, deregulation, privatisation of services and local pro-growth coalitions that 
have narrowed the gap between Irish and the US social and economic policy (Bartley 
and Shine 1999). Moreover, national partnership agreements in tandem with business- 
friendly policies indicate that a mutually beneficial relationship between political 
decision-makers and business interests prevails in Ireland. This link between the world 
of politics and business could be regarded as a valid foundation for the application of 
URT in the context of governance changes in Dublin82.
On the one hand, changes in Dublin’s urban governance towards corporate structures 
involving representatives from the business sector and civil society are believed to be 
linked to a top-down policy that originated in an increasing neo-liberalisation of 
national government policy rather than being locally initiated (see below). On the other 
hand, it could be argued that these top-down policies may also be the reaction of 
demands from the private sector for a relaxation of statutory regulatory intervention 
(MacLaran and Williams 2003; Hogan 2006).
Against the increasing entrepreneurial nature of the Irish model of governance, with 
special-purpose bodies and local authorities competing for urban regeneration 
contracts in Dublin City, it is particularly interesting to test Stone’s concept of URT in 
the Irish situation83. Irish analysts observe that government and related institutions
82 Several tribunals that were set up to investigate deals between developers and politicians illustrate 
the existence of close ties between the spheres of business and policy-making. In the context of the 
growth-induced urban sprawl of Dublin, the Mahon and Flood Tribunals are examples for the creation 
of an artificial scarcity of land for residential and retail function through the manipulation of land 
rezoning.
83 Research from the UK suggests that -  even though the role of business involvement in area-based 
partnership approaches and public private partnerships is far less dominant than in the US (cf. Davies 
2003; Austin and McCaffrey 2002) -  the basic principle of motivation for participating in such 
structures may still hold true. Namely, the interest collectively to access resources, no single interest 
group could have accessed individually.
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have become more and more entrepreneurial and allow local authorities more 
flexibility and room to manoeuvre towards co-operation with other interest groups 
(Bartley and Shine 2003; Punch et al. 2004; Hogan 2005). Local authorities in Dublin 
adopted the public-private partnership model as a key vehicle to provide selective 
incentives for project-based collaboration in urban regeneration with businesses and 
other stakeholders. Besides engaging in relationships involving the business sector, 
Dublin City Council (DCC) (a) started liaising with interest groups from local 
communities in areas zoned for urban regeneration and (b) became involved in APCs. 
The relationships between DCC and the community sector, however, are less 
pronounced and often more conflict-laden than those between DCC and the private 
sector (cf. Bartley and Shine 2003; Hogan 2005).
Local partnership-type arrangements such as APCs represent multi-sectoral interest 
groups formed around an agreed agenda focussing on economic and social urban 
regeneration of severely disadvantaged areas in the country. In the context of this 
study, it is crucial to make an effort to discuss and elicit to what extent key concepts of 
urban regime theory can be used as an explanandum  for observed power- 
relationships in Dublin’s governance landscape that have a bearing on repositioning 
APCs therein. Can URT be applied as a tool to explain underlying incentives, 
components and practices concerning funding arrangements for APCs or is there a 
danger of overstretching the concept of URT and attempting to ‘fit a square peg into a 
round hole’?
3.3.4 The RA’s perspective on funding arrangements
3.3.4.1 Introduction
The RA highlights the role of the state in regulating the interests of capital and dealing 
with questions of redistribution. Against the backdrop of the increasing importance of 
cities as the key economic site of wealth production, the recognition of urban space as 
a scale of regulation highlights the importance of interactions between (a) local social 
and political actors, on the one hand, and (b) wider -  and more complex -  socio­
political and economic processes affecting the locale, on the other. Acknowledging the 
shortcomings of the RA in the field of explaining emerging forms of urban governance, 
Jessop (1995: 1623) concludes that “it needs to be supplanted through concepts and 
causal mechanisms associated with other theoretical perspectives”. Additions and 
refinements have been developed to explain the relationship between the emergence 
of urban governance structures and changes in accumulation across time and space. 
Perhaps the most promising approach that anticipates the multiple and complex 
relation between the sphere of the economic and the social and, at the same time, has 
the potential to avoid an essentialist logic of argumentation (cf. Painter 1997a: 102) is 
sketched out by Jessop (1997b) who outlines a neo-Gramscian reading of the 
regulation approach84. Aglietta (1979: 29) sees the Gramscian perspective as a way to
84 Whereas Gramsci had in mind the classical power struggle at the national level between workers and 
the bourgeoisie, Jessop (1997b) imports Gramscian ideas into the context of contemporary western
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“overcome the various traps of a structuralism of instances, a sovereign state 
manipulating macro-economic variables, or an instrumental state in the hands of the 
monopolies” (cf. Althusser and Balibar 1970; Hirsch 2002). The neo-Gramscian 
perspective can be utilised to explore the role of key individuals or organic intellectuals 
in mediating between different spatio-sectoral interest groups and influencing the 
development of local modes of social regulation (Brenner and Glick 1991; Collinge and 
Hall 1997; MacLeod and Goodwin 1999; Aglietta 2000; Rottger 2004).
3.3.4.2 A case of resolving the aqencv-structure dilemma?
Gramsci “explored how political, intellectual and moral leadership was mediated 
through a complex ensemble of institutions, organizations, and forces operating within, 
oriented toward, or located at a distance from the juridico-political state apparatus” 
(Jessop 1997b: 52). Gramscian state theory supplements the regulation approach’s 
emphasis on “the social embeddedness and social regulation of accumulation” 
(Jessop 1997b: 71) as it focuses on dynamic relations within the wider state system, 
including civil society, and the formation of hegemonic political regimes therein. 
Gramsci introduces the term hegemonic bloc as a concept that refers to the formation 
of durable power relations among societal interest groups. He attributes a key role in 
the socio-political production of power to organic intellectuals who are strategically 
placed deputies, entrepreneurs and bureaucrats (professionals) within the socio- 
institutional regulatory system that represent a particular vested interest on behalf of a 
particular class or entrepreneurial elite. They pursue strategies that can both maintain 
the existing power structures within a relatively united hegemonic bloc and hold In 
check countervailing forces that could undermine their dominant position and, thereby, 
exert control over “the ensemble of social relationships of production” (Gramsci 1971: 
366, original emphasis).
Contemporary analysts also highlight the function of organic intellectuals in designing 
various novel forms of sub-national governance mechanisms that emerged throughout 
the 1980s and 1990s as a result of ‘trial-and-error’ search processes for new forms of 
a regulatory fix for addressing adverse effects of capitalist accumulation on society 
(Peck and Tickell 1994; Jessop 1997b; Harvey 2001; Jayasuriya 2004). If necessary, 
short-term concessions concerning the economic and other priorities will be made (for 
example, through the search for the smallest common denominator) so that potentially 
counter-hegemonic parties can be co-opted or convinced to ‘buy in’ and, thereby, 
ensure longevity of the hegemonic project (cf. Collinge and Hall 1997: 131; Jessop 
1997b: 62)85. This interpretation of the Gramscian view is clearly related to Stone’s 
concept of pre-emptive power ('power to’) and also reflects both URT’s and ANT’s 
concerns about forming durable coalitions and networks respectively.
urban governance models (cf. McGuirk 2004).
85 Painter (1997b: 101), drawing on Harvey, mentions the potential of the existence of urban politics as 
a relatively autonomous sphere that “can involve alliances and coalitions between groups whose 
interests appear to be fundamentally opposed when the abstract features of the accumulation 
process are considered in isolation and without reference to their necessary spatial manifestation“.
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Acknowledging a certain degree of freedom of political decision making within a
hegemonic coalition that can even temporarily ignore or inadvertently work against the
logic of accumulation for the pursuit of aspects or ‘popular convictions’ that are
perceived more important, Gramsci equally notes that hegemonic projects must be
somehow rooted within the dominant societal mode of wealth creation:
It is worth recalling the frequent affirmation made by Marx on the “solidity of 
popular beliefs” as a necessary element of a specific situation. What he says more 
or less is “when this way of conceiving things has the force of popular beliefs”, etc. 
Another proposition of Marx is that a popular conviction often has the same energy 
as a material force or something of the kind, which is extremely significant. The 
analysis of these propositions tends, I think, to reinforce the conception of 
historical bloc in which precisely material forces are the content and ideologies are 
the form, though this distinction between form and content has purely didactic 
value, since the material forces would be inconceivable historically without form 
and the ideologies would be individual fancies without the material forces 
(Gramsci 1971: 377).
In a similar vein, Althusser and Balibar (1970) argue that the complexity of societal 
aspects cannot be simply explained by economic practice. They refute a simple one­
way causal relationship between accumulation and statutory regulatory mechanisms 
because a variety of individual social practices intercommunicate with one another and, 
as a result, have a bearing on one another that creates interdependencies with 
unpredictable outcomes; i.e. a regulatory mechanism that cannot be controlled by the 
economy alone. The key concern driving Althusser and Balibar’s (1970: 186) analysis 
of base-superstructure relations is to ascertain “by means of what concept or what set 
of concepts is it possible to think the determination of a subordinate structure by a 
dominant structure? In other words, how is it possible to define the concept of a 
structural causality?”
Althusser introduces the concept of overdetermination: he argues that there is no pre­
existing structure (Figure 2 below). Structure is a result of social negotiation and 
struggle among actors with different agendas; hence it is an embodiment of social 
agency that, in turn, exerts influence on the behaviour of its constituent parts (cf. 
Althusser 1970 for views on the role of the ideological state apparatus in shaping 
thought processes within social formations). This has repercussions on other actors 
who have knock-on effects on the characteristics of what is perceived as the overriding 
structure and so forth (cf. Glassman 2003).
Taking a philosophical stance on the characteristic features and dominance of a certain 
structure, Althusser and Balibar (1970: 189) posit “that the whole existence o f the 
structure consists o f its effects, in short that the structure, which is merely a specific 
combination of its peculiar elements, is nothing outside its effects” (original emphasis). 
On the contrary, resembling Gramsci’s concept of the social production of hegemonic 
blocs as a result of successful mediation of class struggles (Gramsci 1971), 
interferences between particular structures and their effects constitute what could be 
perceived as the dominant structure that seemingly determines ‘economic objects’.
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Althusser and Balibar’s (1970) and Gramsci’s (1971) views on the relations within the 
state and between “men on the one hand and the world of the economy or of 
production on the other” (Gramsci 1971: 263) is reminiscent of processes happening 
within the sphere of contemporary urban governance formations and the establishment 
of dominant regimes therein.
Figure 2: Illustration of Althusser’s problem of structural causality
Dominant Structure
Interactions:
1. Interactions in each of the competing structures
2. Influence of subordinated structure on dominant structure
3. Influence of dominant structure on subordinated structure
4. Transfer of subjects and penetration of ideas
Source: Adapted from Lewin (1999: 13)
It is argued, from the Gramscian perspective, that the establishment and successive 
implementation of seven national partnership agreements in Ireland since 1987 
represent an inclusive hegemonic regulatory model connecting various spheres of ‘the 
juridico-political state apparatus’ (Jessop 1997b). In the context of this study, local 
APCs -  understood as local imprint of social partnership (McCarthy 1998) -  have been 
identified as state-led measures that complement national policies targeted at re­
distributing the social product more efficiently through addressing issues related to 
increasing societal polarisation and poverty (e.g. Turok 2001), public-sector 
modernisation (DoT 1996, 2004; DoELG 1996) and the reformation of welfare delivery 
(e.g. NESC 2005).
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The report The Developmental Welfare State articulates a new hegemonic project. It 
highlights the importance of policy and institutional adaptation to cope with “Ireland’s 
long-run economic and social development vulnerabilities” and argues that one of the 
key challenges is to devise a welfare system which, first, is tailored around the 
individual and, second, “not only addresses social risks, needs and inequalities more 
adequately, but also connects more fully with the dynamic of the economy” (NESC 
2005: ix).
The case study on funding arrangements for APCs in the context of institutional 
reconfiguration of power in Dublin deploys the Gramscian concept of hegemony to 
unveil the construction of hegemonic projects through following links between multiple 
scales of governance. Moreover, it allows identifying whether and -  if so -  the extent 
to which organic intellectuals play a role in influencing the re-organisation of Dublin’s 
governance landscape. Dublin’s governance framework is cuurently in the process of 
restructuring, with open-ended outcomes. Against this backdrop, it is argued that an 
empirical case research provides the opportunity to investigate compromises that 
occur within the governance framework ‘as they happen’ -  as opposed to an analysis 
of static institutional landscapes, social norms and established habits that are the 
results of long-gone (previous) systemic battles and struggles between different 
societal groupings (e.g. Róttger 2004). Also, in the case of analysing the forces driving 
the repositioning of APCs within the governance apparatus, the empirical analysis of 
the institutional restructuring (by means of carrying out interviews) goes below the 
surface of what -  at first sight and, moreover, viewed 'from the outside’ -  appears to 
be merely driven by concerns about economic competitiveness and fiscal solvency.
3.3.5 Summary
The above sections make a case for utilising competing theoretical frameworks as a 
useful way to inform the generation and analysis of data produced by means of an 
empirical case-study research. The literature review suggests that international trends 
for modernising urban governance are driven by economic pressures which lead to 
increasing competition for economic activity among cities. This has been paralleled by 
modernisation of public administration, in the course of which traditional bureaucratic 
lines of authority and accountability have been challenged by entrepreneurial 
strategies and business-oriented accountability and performance-monitoring 
procedures. This, in turn, gave more power to city managers and bureaucrats at the 
expense of the decision-making capacity of politicians. The main objective of this 
section was to introduce three competing theories of governance by providing a glance 
at their ontological and epistemological assumptions, introducing their key concepts, 
outlining their main weaknesses and possible pitfalls and, finally, briefly pointing out 
their potential for contextualising funding arrangements of APCs in Dublin within the 
wider context of governance restructuring.
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Each theory has its particular merits in shedding light on processes associated with 
funding APCs. Also, each theory offers a distinctly different approach towards the 
methodological objectification of the research subject:
• “ Actor-network theory looks at the construction of power ‘from the inside out’. It
focuses on interactions between things and humans at the micro-level that are 
instrumental for holding spatio-temporally seamless networks together and 
analyses how these processes build up durable configurations of command and 
control. Viewed through the conceptual lens provided by actor-network theory, this 
allows for a thorough analysis of the functional interdependencies of its individual 
parts (Table 1.4). ANT is able to analyse the inner workings of governance, which, 
at first sight, resemble a ‘black-box’86 (i.e. something can only be fully understood 
through deconstruction). The key question for ANT is ‘How (does it work)?’
• Urban regime theory can be situated between the macro-level or 'big picture’ view 
provided by the regulation approach, on the one hand, and the microscopic focus 
on power relationships of actor-network theory, on the other. URT analyses the 
role of informal interpersonal relationships among ‘powerbrokers’ in the 
construction of power in cities. In principle, URT posits that political and economic 
power of actors and the intentional use of such a quality both determine the 
potential to achieve the power to govern; i.e. to form durable alliances with relevant 
stakeholders (a) who are dependent on the resources and/or (b) like-minded 
stakeholders that bring resources to the table that secure governability. The main 
question for URT is ‘Who (can secure governability)?
• In contrast to the socio-technological perspective provided by ANT, the regulation 
approach works ‘top-down’. It emphasises that systemic failure -  understood as 
endemic challenges within the ensemble of processes making up regimes of 
(capitalist) accumulation -  requires intentional responses directed at making 
adjustments to structural imbalances (re-regulation) from within the sphere of 
political power. Re-regulation aims at achieving the harmonisation of “the 
interaction of a number of separate elements of the system” (Hubbard et at. 2002: 
187). The central question for the RA is ‘What (keeps accumulation in balance)?’
Each theory provides a suitable platform for the analysis of funding arrangements of 
APCs against the backdrop of governance restructuring in Dublin. According to the 
review of the theoretical frameworks, the conceptual approaches provided by ANT and 
URT seem to be tailored to explore the inner workings of local relationships and 
interactions between local stakeholders respectively, whereas the RA seems to be 
more suitable for the analysis of wider structural forces that have a bearing on (the 
creation of) national regulatory responses to major economic questions.
66 According to Latour (1987: 2-3), “The word black box is used by cyberneticians whenever a piece of
machinery or a set of commands is too complex. In its place they draw a little box about which they
need to know nothing but its input and output“ (original emphasis).
78
This study focuses on the empirical research of processes shaping the interface 
between state-funded agencies operating at neighbourhood level in Dublin and the 
local public administrative system within which they are embedded. Based on previous 
research and the literature reviewed for this study, it is hypothesised that the forces 
driving the restructuring of governance at the local level can better be explained by the 
regulation approach (RA) rather than by principles provided by actor-network theory 
(ANT) or urban regime theory (URT).
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4. METHODOLOGY
4.1 Introduction
This research looks at the funding arrangements of Area Partnership Companies 
(APCs) and associated processes against the background of power-reconfigurations in 
Dublin’s governance landscape. Previous research identified funding as a control 
mechanism for enabling and guiding activities of APC-type agencies within the 
framework of centrally-devised local development programmes (Bartley and Borscheid
2003). It is argued that funding arrangements for APCs have been influenced by 
value-for-money principles that are associated with modernisation policies that were 
initiated by the SMI.
Against this backdrop, the aim of this study is to identify, illustrate and theorise the 
driving forces behind the restructuring of Dublin’s governance framework, that have a 
bearing on shaping the funding framework within which APCs are embedded. In 
addition, this study examines the arguments about the merits of business-like 
accountability and performance-monitoring criteria for improving the effectiveness, 
efficiency and economics of APCs in regard to their utilisation of core funding in 
tackling urban disadvantage through the development of local participatory 
approaches.
A variety of publications and policy documents were reviewed that contextualise and 
facilitate an understanding of, public sector modernisation in Ireland (Chapter 1). A 
number of these sources specifically address the envisaged re-alignment of plans and 
activities of APCs with the state’s new agenda for state-funded local development 
(Chapter 2). However, in order to further investigate to what extent the impact of 
funding arrangements on the plans and activities APCs is linked to a new ethos of 
governance concerning disadvantaged neighbourhoods in Dublin, the views and 
perceptions of key players involved at various levels of the APC-type approach to local 
development need to be elicited and compared.
In order to demonstrate the effects of governance restructuring and associated funding 
arrangements on the modus operandi of APCs, the empirical case research for this 
study is based on a three-pronged set of objectives:
• first, to examine the nature of governance modernisation and its impacts on APCs 
through a thorough analysis of published material;
• second, to establish views of individuals from different institutional, organisational 
and professional backgrounds that have been, or are, involved at different levels of 
the area-based approach to local development. The perspectives obtained from 
these individuals are hoped to contextualise and contribute to an informed 
understanding of (a) the political agenda underlying governance restructuring and 
the strategies driving the implementation of the restructuring, (b) key challenges in 
the pursuit of better governance and (c) the impact of a new governance concept
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on funding arrangements for APCs;
• third, to assess which of the three competing theoretical approaches can best 
explain the observed relationship between governance restructuring in Dublin and 
the funding mechanism designed for APCs.
Case studies can remain overly descriptive in nature if they do not delve deeply into 
the nature and origins of power relations that can help explaining observed 
manifestations of power in governance. Existing research on APCs has mainly 
focused on institutional relationships between key stakeholders involved in local 
development, questions of participatory democracy and partnership principles, their 
ability to bring about meaningful change, and their relationship with local government 
in a changing landscape of governance. This research has typically been carried out 
without explicitly seeking to relate research findings to theories that could reveal 
underlying causes for observed phenomena (e.g. Bartley and Borscheid 2003). This 
thesis addresses this lacuna by examining three theories, actor-network theory (ANT), 
urban regime theory (URT) and the regulation approach (RA), which purport to provide 
suitable theoretical frameworks for the explanation of governance restructuring in 
Dublin and its impact on funding arrangements of APCs (see Chapter 3).
The ultimate key objective of the research is to establish which of the three theories 
best explains the ensemble of forces and influences that shape funding arrangements 
of APCs in the context of governance restructuring in Dublin. As already outlined in the 
introduction of this study, it is hypothesised that the RA is the most promising 
theoretical framework. Following a null-hypothesis approach, this study thus explores 
the available evidence to ascertain if ANT and URT are better suited than the RA to 
explain funding arrangements for APCs in the context of local-governance 
restructuring. If the evidence does not confirm this null-hypothesis assertion, then the 
alternative situation is upheld. Namely, the original hypothesis -  that the RA is best -  
is acceptable as the default alternative.
The following sections outline how the methodological approach towards addressing 
the research objectives:
• allows for an in-depth exploration of processes and operational mechanisms that 
contribute to understanding the experience of APCs vis-à-vis forces propelling the 
ongoing restructuring of the local-development sector;
• informs the analysis of restructuring local governance and its implications for 
funding APCs in Dublin; and
• helps in assessing the relevance of the selected theories in terms of explaining 
observed changes in the logic of the funding mechanism and its associated 
processes.
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Figure 3: Putting the theoretical frameworks to the test
Figure 3 above attempts to illustrate the interlocking logic of the key objectives of this 
thesis as outlined in this section. Against the backdrop of an increasing emphasis in 
OECD countries (global context), it is attempted to explore -  through an examination 
of the funding mechanism of APCs -  the impact of an increasing utilisation of neo­
liberal managerial practices in Ireland (national context) on restructuring the 
governance of local APCs in Dublin.In a further step, it is planned to ascertain which of 
the conceptual framework of three contemporary theoretical approaches can be 
applied to best explain the empirical findings (observations) obtained by means of 
local case studies.
Detailed evidence on governance change collected from a local case study is 
examined (a) in a spatial context, (b) through the prism of a specific issue (APC 
funding as an aspect of transforming managerialism and (c) to determine which of the 
three selected theories (ANT, URT, the RA) best accounts for the observed evidence. 
It is anticipated (hypothesis) that the shaded theory (the RA; see Figure 3) is the best 
of the three theories. This is impossible to ‘prove’ absolutely. Therefore, a less strict 
(and less exhaustive) method is deployed. This only requires that the two competing 
theories (ANT and URT) be examined to determine if they are inferior to the RA with 
respect to the collected evidence. If they are not, then the RA is deduced to be the 
best theory.
4.2 Setting the parameters for a case study
This study focuses on re-scaling urban governance because of the leading role of 
cities as the focal point for economic activities (Oatley 1998b). A comparison of 
international case studies on APC-type urban regeneration agencies indicates that 
governance arrangements have been analysed with a focus on community 
participation in both neo-liberal and more traditional Keynesian settings of governance 
(e.g. Hoek 2000; Raco 2000; Ander and Ekman 2001; ECOTEC 2004; Brudell et al. 
2004; Maguire and Truscott 2006). A large number of case studies focus on the 
description of processes in one neighbourhood or city district that has been targeted 
by urban renewal initiatives. However, only a few studies could be located that 
pursued a theoretically grounded in-depth analysis of APC-type urban regeneration 
initiatives addressing socio-economic or physical transformation in designated areas 
(see examples given in Chapter 3, Section 3.3.1). It appears that the literature on 
socio-economic or physical urban regeneration and associated questions of 
governance takes a broad perspective rather than (a) focussing on detailed questions 
that address and scrutinise the driving forces for such developments, and/or (b) 
contextualising findings within a specified theoretical framework.
Against this backdrop, it was initially planned to carry out a comparative case study 
between two disadvantaged neighbourhoods in Vienna (Wien-Erdberg or Wien- 
Leopoldstadt) and Dublin (Dublin-Ballyfermot) respectively. Both cities operate 
comparable local development approaches. Moreover, the neighbourhoods chosen
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were all within an area targeted by the EU’s URBAN II Initiative87, which indicated 
similar levels of urban disadvantage. Visits to the case-study areas in Dublin and 
Vienna illustrated that considerable socio-economic disparities prevail within two 
economically successful European cities (both of which long had suffered from being 
at the geo-political and economic periphery of Europe). Both cities pursue area-based 
remedial policies to address socio-economic disparities within their territory. Thus, it 
was intended to assess the commonalities and differences of funding arrangements in 
the context of the re-alignment of APCs in Dublin, under a neo-liberal governance 
regime, with those of a similar area-based model in Vienna, under a more traditional 
welfare-state regime. This cross-country comparative approach, however, could not be 
pursued for practical reasons88. As result, the focus of the research became 
completely directed at Dublin, and, more specifically at the experience of actors in one 
APC-managed designated disadvantaged neighbourhood in west Dublin (Dublin- 
Ballyfermot).
Also, it emerged that local strategic partnerships, such as APCs in Dublin and 
Gratzelmanagement89 projects in Vienna, were, in themselves, embedded in complex 
governance arrangements and relationships with a multitude of stakeholders, the full 
understanding of which required in-depth investigation. For example, six preliminary 
interviews with actors from different institutional and professional backgrounds in 
Dublin were carried out to explore whether the interview approach chosen was 
suitable or needed ‘tweaking’ (see Section 4.4). These interviews suggested that a 
new local governance model was being forged, with substantial implications for the 
work of APCs -  such as increasing demands for reporting of progress to funders, 
changes concerning the allocation and monitoring of funding, a proliferation of Dublin 
City Council (DCC)-associated local development structures, and a reduced scope for 
the development of local strategies based on the bottom-up principle. The interviews 
also indicated that the state and local communities were equally affected by 
governance changes: however, whereas the state had to, and could, devise new 
technologies for monitoring activities of APCs and promote the integrating of APCs 
into the statutory apparatus, local actors in communities felt they had less scope for 
facilitating the participation of disadvantaged local people in decision-making 
processes affecting their communities.
67 The URBAN II programme aims at supporting community infrastructure. It emphasises enterprise
support and development within a broad based approach to urban regeneration (Dublin Corporation
2001).
88 Even though visits to Vienna resulted in 17 one-on-one interviews with individuals from local 
government, town planners, state agencies, the URBAN II Initiative, a district mayor and local area- 
based initiatives (e.g. Gratzelmanagement staff), further efforts that were required to either carry out 
more interviews or follow up on interviews proved to be beyond the scope and resources of this 
thesis.
89 Gratzelmanagement operates in the two EU Objective 2 areas within the city of Vienna (i.e. the 2nd
and the 20th district). In comparison to the Irish local partnership model, in Austria, the local 
authorities play a key role in running, overseeing and implementing the local projects (cf. 
Gratzelmanagement, Volkert- und Alliiertenviertel, at
http://www.araetzlmanaaement.at/20/documents/Proiektstruktur.Ddf. accessed on 24/09/2007).
84
The re-structuring of the governance model under which APCs operate affects, and 
involves the interaction of, a variety of different stakeholders at different institutional 
and spatial levels. Also, APCs are complex organisations, which is, for example 
mirrored in their broad range of activities, their organisational structure and their board 
composition (see Chapter 2). This range of interests is reflected in the empirical 
research, which includes eleven interviews with board members and professionals 
from Ballyfermot Partnership (see Section 4.4.2, Figure 4). However, this depth and 
range of exploration could only be achieved by restricting the research to a single 
state/site. In order to reflect the complexities of the local partnership model in the 
context of governance restructuring, a decision was taken to only focus on the 
relationship between governance transition and funding arrangements for APCs in the 
Irish context.
It can still be argued that a comparative empirical study between APCs in two or three 
urban areas in Dublin would provide a broader range of perspectives, experiences and 
practices and, thus, would yield a more representative picture of the relationship 
between governance re-structuring, its manifestation in the funding framework and its 
impact on local development strategies pursued by APCs. As a result, conclusions 
drawn from the empirical research would be more substantial and, therefore, would be 
more suitable to validate or falsify the research hypothesis. However, in order to more 
fully understand the implementation of a new regulatory framework for the governance 
of APCs and to get adequately detailed insights, through an analysis of the funding 
and monitoring arrangements, as to how this new framework impacts on the modus 
operandi of APCs in Dublin, it is argued that a restrictive, in-depth investigation is 
required. Such investigation needs to examine policies and processes that affect the 
characteristic features of the institutional and organisational interface between one 
local APC and the state and, moreover, how these affect the local development 
agenda of APCs.
In addition, the choice of ANT -  as one of three theoretical framework chosen to 
facilitate the understanding of the creation and flow of power that affects the state-APC 
relationship under an evolving regime of governance -  requires a thorough analysis of 
the impact of (state-initiated) governance modernisation on local plans and activities of 
APCs90. A detailed description of processes of governance re-structuring in Dublin was 
necessary to avoid falling into the trap of reductionism or “explanatory parsimony” 
(Law 1994: 12). An in-depth investigation of more than one APC, however, was not 
considered viable. It would have required additional samples of interviewees, which 
would not have been within the scope of this study -  mainly, time and resource 
constraints prohibited a comparative in-depth analysis between two or more APCs. In 
spite of this limitation, perceptions of APC professionals in the case-study area were
90 Also, it is common to utilise URT as a theoretical context to illustrate power relationships by means of 
focusing on individual projects within cities (e.g. Bassett etal. 2002; Hogan 2006).
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compared with the views expressed by CEOs from two other Dublin-based APCs (see 
Section 4.4).
Still, the results from this case study can only meaningfully highlight how one APC * 
area in Dublin is affected by impacts of governance restructuring. So, whereas the 
one-case-study approach pursued in this thesis can provide a detailed and 
theoretically informed analysis of implications of governance modernisation in one 
designated disadvantaged area, further research into the local partnership approach, 
involving more interviews with individuals from other APCs in Dublin, will be required 
to (a) check if the experience of Ballyfermot APC (hereafter Ballyfermot Partnership) is 
representative for developments in other areas and, thus, (b) enhance the general 
understanding of state-APC relationships and the changing model for local partnership 
arrangements under a new governance framework. In other words, this study, despite 
its limitations, can provide useful baseline data as a point of departure for additional 
research.
4.2.1 Choosing a case study: why Dublin?
Over the past 20 years, Dublin's geopolitical position within Europe's urban 
hierarchical system has changed considerably. Since the mid-1980s, Dublin has 
greatly benefited from the economic boom and experienced a rapid structural 
transition from a peripheral91 capital at the western fringe of Europe towards a post­
industrial, competition-oriented European gateway city (Bartley and Waddington 2001; 
Marshall 2002; MacLaran and Williams 2003; Punch et at. 2004; Punch 2004). The 
spatial concentration of foreign investments in the Greater Dublin Area (GDA) has 
been fuelling the economic boom that consolidated Dublin's dominant position in 
Ireland's urban hierarchical system and also strengthened its position in Europe's 
league of competitive cities (Punch 2004).
Dublin became an 'adaptive entrepreneurial city’ (Bartley and Shine 1999); i.e.
contemporary policies pursue boosterist urban development strategies as a means to
increase the city’s attractiveness for investments into economic activities (McGuirk
1994, 2000; McGuirk and MacLaran 2001; MacLaran and Williams 2003). The
approach leading to transformations of the landscape of urban governance was
influenced by government-initiated competitive bidding processes and public-private
coalitions. An excerpt from the local-authority website highlights Dublin's pivotal role
for Ireland and also indicates the pro-business policy of public agencies:
Dublin has been transformed during the 1990's [sic]. The economy has been 
liberalised and made more competitive. Dublin has prospered as a major focus for
It Is important to note that the term periphery is not only applied to describe how a place is 
geographically positioned in relation to other locations. In this paper, periphery is understood as a 
dynamic concept: spatial power structures -  or, in other words, the geo-political and/or geo-economic 
position of cities -  evolve and change within the historical context (Wood 2000). For example, in the 
post-iron curtain era, Vienna's geo-political position has changed tremendously. Over the last 10-15 
years Vienna developed from a capital at the eastern backwaters of capitalist Europe towards an EU 
gateway city and a hub to the new eastern market economies (see Schopper and Hansely 1999; Hatz
2002).
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foreign direct investment into Ireland, as well as an expanding centre of trade and 
tourism. The city has become a dominant national gateway. Dublin functions as 
the control centre of the economy and virtually all facets of Irish economic and 
social life. While being a comparatively small and peripheral city in European 
terms, Dublin dominates the Irish urban, economic and social landscape of Ireland 
[...] is a truly European City, a City of opportunity, a City for investment. Dublin is 
the world leader in software development [...] Dublin has been the engine of 
national economic growth [...] Attracting inward investment is a major challenge for 
Dublin City Council (Dublin City Council n.d.-a: no page numbers).
A Dublin-centric economic development strategy resulted in national spatial disparities 
in terms of job creation, quality and extent of service and infrastructure provision, costs 
of living and population concentration. A concentration of foreign investments in the 
capital led to an increase in back-office functions for global corporations in competitive 
services and technologies (Punch 2004)92. The pivotal role of Dublin and its hinterland 
for the Irish economy is illustrated by statistical data: in 2001, the figures for the 
disposable income per person and the gross value added (GVA)93 in the Dublin 
Region94 were the highest in the country, with 16.7 per cent and 29.6 per cent above 
national average respectively (CSO 2004).
Also, the scale of population concentrated in the Dublin Region has long been high in 
comparison to capitals other European countries (Bannon 1999). In 2003, about 30 
per cent of the Irish population was located in greater Dublin. Projections for the period 
between 2003 and 2031 indicate a substantial increase in population by more than half 
a million in the area, from 1.14 million in 2003 to 1.65 million in 2031 (IDA Ireland
2004). This would account for about 85 per cent of the estimated total increase in 
population in Ireland, implying, first, a tremendous concentration in future job growth 
and, second, substantial planning efforts for the years to come for the Dublin Region 
(Reid and O'Connor 13/06/2007). Economic opportunities are also mirrored in 
international migration patterns, which are the key driving force for population 
increase: for example, between April 2005 and April 2006 approximately 122,000 
individuals (98,392 non-Irish and 23,548 Irish) migrated into Ireland from abroad. More 
than one third of this group (35,020 non-Irish and 8,116 Irish) became residents in the 
GDA95 (Government of Ireland 2007a).
However, despite an overall improvement of quality of life and increasing job 
opportunities, some neighbourhoods in Dublin show symptoms indicating a systematic
92 This development was paralleled by a decline in the domestic manufacturing sector (Punch et al. 
2004).
93 The GVA measures the values of goods and services produced in a region, including the profits 
made by non-Irish companies (CSO 2004). For the differences between GDP (gross domestic 
product), household income and GVA see CSO (ibid.).
94 Dublin Region consists of four County Boroughs: Dublin City, Dun Laoghaire-Rathdown, Fingal and 
South Dublin. Even though the economic development of the Mid-East Region is increasingly 
intertwined with Dublin Region (CSO 2004), the statistics used only consider the latter geographical 
area in order to bring out clearly Dublin's exceptional position in Ireland.
95 The majority of non-Irish migrants were from the new EU accession states (most from Poland and 
Lithuania) and in the core working age cohorts aged 15-24 and aged 25-44 respectively (CSO 
12/09/2007). These numbers underpin the importance of the Greater Dublin Area for the Irish 
economy.
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exclusion from (a) benefits associated with economic progression and investments into 
urban development and social infrastructure and (b) the political agenda and, as a 
result, experience societal isolation (e.g. Bartley 1999; Bartley and Saris 1999; Punch 
"2005; Hogan 2006). According to McGuirk (2003a), such disparities manifest through 
different degrees of connectivity between valued and less-valued territories; 
technological opportunities, territorial segregation and quality of infrastructure, 
understood as a function of local income patterns, is what physically separates rich 
from poor. The fragmentation of space, increasing social polarisation and clustering of 
rich and poor segments of society has profound implications for policy solutions 
concerning the shape of the local-governance apparatus. The establishment of APCs 
in designated disadvantaged areas in Dublin illustrates that urban economic 
development in Dublin occurs “on a quasi-random field of opportunities” (Dear and 
Flusty 1998; 66), which enhances disparities between valued and less valued 
neighbourhoods.
A large body of literature addresses and describes urban development policies and 
governance restructuring in Dublin and their impacts on communities, state-funded 
local development projects -  such as APCs -  and the voluntary sector. Even though 
the role of APCs has almost been exhaustively analysed (OECD 1996; Parkinson 
1998; Walsh et al. 1998; Walsh 1998, 1999; Kirby and Jacobson 1998; Turok 2001; 
Bartley and Borscheid 2003; Haase and McKeown 2003; Ô Broin 2003), little empirical 
research could be found that investigates processes and relationships at the interface 
between APCs and their political sponsors and ensuing implications for both funding 
practices and the modus operandi of APCs in the local area. The changing role of 
APCs within the local-governance system, the key thrust of local development 
programmes, the operational procedures of APCs and funding and accountability 
arrangements are all defined, outlined and captured in legislation, policy documents, 
contractual agreements and guidelines. As the key objective of this study is to 
investigate the relationship between governance restructuring and funding 
arrangements of APCs, it is considered crucial to assess the views of individuals 
directly involved and/or affected by local-governance restructuring in Dublin.
4.2.2 Choosing a case study: why Ballyfermot?
Ballyfermot is a suburban neighbourhood in west Dublin that appears to be a ‘less 
valued area’ as it has not as much benefited from the new wealth as other places in 
Dublin. According to the Irish Index of Relative Affluence and Deprivation (Haase
1999), Ballyfermot is still among the most disadvantaged urban areas in Dublin96. It 
belongs to a chain of suburbs that were built as a safety valve for increasing 
population pressure that was coupled with a policy of reducing the residential function 
of Dublin’s inner city (Punch et al. 2004). Processes of suburbanisation produced 
relatively isolated residential environments lacking social infrastructure and soon 
developed symptoms now associated with urban deprivation (Pringle et al. 1999).
96 For a critical assessment of the Index see Bartley and Kelly (no date) and Pringle (2002).
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In 1995, in response to a strong visibility of forms of poverty and social disintegration, 
a local APC, Ballyfermot Partnership Company Ltd., was established as a ‘second- 
generation Partnership’ under the 1995-1999 local development programme (see 
Chapter 2, Section 2.4). The case-study area is one of seven geographical areas 
within Dublin City that has been targeted for social urban regeneration through the 
establishment of local APCs. Ballyfermot has a reputation for being among the most 
disadvantaged and stigmatised urban neighbourhoods in Ireland in terms of economic 
and social decay (e.g. Saris et at. 2000; Saris et at. 2002). This is particularly reflected 
in reports on the area in the national media that is usually focusing on incidents related 
to anti-social behaviour and drug-related crime -  mainly in Cherry Orchard, an even 
more isolated western neighbourhood of Ballyfermot -  and the interest in the area by 
social researchers (see below).
In 1999, Ballyfermot was also selected by the Irish government as the only area for
participation in the 2000-2006 URBAN II Initiative of the EU. Ballyfermot competed
with 9 other severely disadvantaged areas. Selection criteria that decided in favour of
Ballyfermot were the degree of disadvantage based on the Irish Index o f Relative
Affluence and Deprivation, the relatively sizeable population (21,437 in 1996), the
absence of regeneration investments, and the potential of the area to make the most
of the funding by generating suitable programmes (Dublin Corporation 2001). There is
some indication that the existence of the APC was favourably taken into consideration
in the selection process:
There is an effective structure in place in the area, which would allow a bottom-up 
dialogue so that any activity has the active support and co-operation of the local 
people (Dublin Corporation 2001: 6).
The selection of Ballyfermot for the URBAN II Initiative indicates the perceived urgency
to invest resources into the area based on the area’s low socio-economic status.
Between 2000 and 2006, Ballyfermot received € 11.42 million under URBAN II for the
promotion of local urban regeneration initiatives. URBAN II was managed by the local
authority that became increasingly involved in local development initiatives. As
URBAN II was coming to an end, the Minister for Community, Rural and Gaeltacht
Affairs, Eamon O Cuiv, announced the introduction of the local authority-led RAPID97
programme into Ballyfermot under the 2007-2013 National Development Plan:
The Minister intends to invite Pobal (formerly ADM Ltd.) to facilitate the 
establishment of an implementation group. Membership of this group will be drawn 
from key agencies and organisations involved in social inclusion work in 
Ballyfermot and will include representatives from the Statutory Agencies, Local 
Authority, Area Partnership and local development projects. The implementation 
group will be asked to prepare a list of priority projects to be funded from a € 
300,000 allocation for Ballyfermot from the Dormant Accounts Fund (0 Cuiv 2006: 
no page numbers).
Revitalising Areas by Planning, Investment and Development (RAPID) (see Chapter 6, Section 
6.2.5.1).
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Even though this more recent decision did not influence the choice of Ballyfermot as 
the case-study area for the empirical research, it illustrates that despite ongoing efforts 
to improve the living conditions for the population in the area the degree of social and 
economic disadvantage in neighbourhoods in Ballyfermot is still far below acceptable 
societal standards in Ireland. Previous analysis of local development processes and 
community issues in Ballyfermot provides detailed background information on the area 
that provides a good point of departure for the current study. Research papers and 
studies that focus on Ballyfermot address a variety of issues such as anti-social 
behaviour in local-authority estates (O'Sullivan 2003), the culture of protest (Saris et al. 
2000; Saris et al. 2002) and the role of males in excluded communities (McCormack 
n.d.), the issue of policing (Saris and Bartley 1999), institutional collaboration and 
ethnographic insights in the field of drug misuse (Saris and Bartley 1998; Lyons 2000) 
and the impact of EU and national funding policies on institutional actors (Saris et al.
2002). In particular, the local APC in Ballyfermot has already been subject to research 
that commented on the governance-funding nexus (Bartley and Saris 1999). More 
specifically, Bartley and Borscheid (2003) looked at indicators that have an influence 
on the allocation of resources to APCs in the transition period between the 1994-1999 
OPLURD and the 2000-2006 LDSIP. This makes Ballyfermot an optimal entry-point for 
an analysis of changes within the funding framework as a result of restructuring the 
governance system under the LDSIP. The existing trail of research in Ballyfermot 
offers an opportune platform to investigate further into the nature of contemporary 
funding-relationships against the backdrop of changing governance structures in 
Dublin and their impact on plans and activities of one local APC98. Chapter 5 provides 
a comprehensive socio-economic profile of the case-study area.
4.3 Key themes for the empirical case study
This study puts much emphasis on the introduction of governance practices in OECD 
countries that were informed by the ideology of the New Public Managerialism (NPM) 
(see Chapter 1, Section 1.4.1). The prominence of business management practices in 
the area of public administration, such as the launch of the Strategic Management 
Initiative (SMI) in Ireland in 1994, is rooted in the assumption that welfare-related 
expenditures undermine economic competitiveness. Welfare provision is thought to tie 
up resources that could be invested more productively in promoting economic 
activities that, in turn, would open up income opportunities for those currently relying 
on welfare. Calls for a greater focus of public agencies on best value and an 
increasing emphasis on maintaining fiscal solvency represent an effort to re-structure 
the management, and optimise the use, of public expenditures (‘taxpayer’s money') as 
a productive investment into welfare provision (e.g. Clarke et al. 2000a: 259). This 
logic implies that inequality and a corresponding demand for welfare services in
98 It could be argued that a comparative study between two or more APCs in Dublin would result in a 
more balanced picture as to what extent or whether or not, respectively, changes in the funding 
mechanism would influence and affect the modus operandi of APCs. By concentrating on one case 
study, however, it is intended to provide a more in-depth analysis that teases out in greater detail the 
interplay and operational weight of principles of accountability, effectiveness and efficiency within the 
funding relationship between an APC and their political paymasters.
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leading OECD countries can be buffered by means of the design and introduction of 
business-like management principles together with both financial and accounting 
procedures.
This study argues that the three sets of key criteria listed in Table 4.1 (see below) are 
associated with the implementation of business-inspired concepts into the Irish 
governance system. They function here as surrogate measures to assess 
systematically (a) the explanatory power of competing theories in regard to SMI- 
induced changes in contemporary funding arrangements for APCs and (b) state-led 
efforts to optimise the outcomes of APC-directed programmes and actions. The 
analysis of publications addressing developments in governance concerning public- 
sector modernisation reform, policy documents and publications by the Irish 
government and affiliated organisations -  such as the National Economic and Social 
Council (NESC) and the Institute of Public Administration (IPA) -  and empirical 
research on APCs in Dublin and their institutional environment (Bartley et al. 1999; 
Borscheid 2001; Bartley and Saris 1999; Saris et al. 2002; Bartley and Borscheid 
2003) facilitated the identification of key themes against which governance 
modernisation could be measured.
In particular, the analysis of policies concerning the re-structuring of Dublin’s 
governance landscape is informed by an exploration of written material and 
documentation such as:
• a succession of government publications originating in the Strategic Management 
Initiative (SMI) and related policy documents, contractual agreements and 
guidelines;
• evaluation reports;
• departmental press releases and circular letters;
• excerpts from debates in the Irish parliament and minutes of meetings, if publicly 
available.
Some of the most relevant sources consulted include the following:
• the Local Government Act 2001 (Government of Ireland 2001): under Section 129,
this piece of legislation calls for an establishment of City/County Development
Boards (CDBs) and outlines their envisaged role as a leading co-ordinating body
for the economic, social and cultural development within local authority
jurisdictions. CDBs are tasked to encourage a partnership between the local
authority, statutory agencies the social partners and state-funded local
development bodies “concerned with local enterprise, rural development or
community development” (103). One of the key objectives of the CDBs is:
“to encourage and promote on an ongoing basis the coordination of the activities 
of the bodies and interests represented on the Board and co-operation generally 
between such bodies and interests so as to optimise resources and combined 
effort for the common good of the community” (104);
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Table 4.1: Key criteria for the analysis of empirical data
Criteria Explanation
Institutionalisation: Processes associated with the transformation of APCs from pilot 
projects into permanent structures of the (local) governance system (cf. 
Parkinson 1998; Turok 2001; McCarthy 2007).
Partnership: Establishment of APC-type agencies outside mainstream statutory apparatus 
with a view to developing innovative potential (R & D function) in a less 
regulated space:
- promote democratic experimentalism
- equip them with negotiating power as the basis for forging 
alliances with other stakeholders and mainstreaming of pilots
Integration: Increasing funding dependency on the state that amplifies the influence of 
central managerial systems of control over APCs. This finds expression:
- in the prescription of their agenda and remit by the state
- in a focus on service delivery directed at supplanting public welfare provision
Professionalisation: Promotion of managerial practices and corporate governance principles in the 
statutory-funded local-development sector with a view to:
- making special-purpose bodies on the ground auditable
- enhancing the development of output-oriented measures
- promoting comparable standards for programme development and service 
provision
Accountability: APCs have a dual responsibility. They need to ensure that programmes 
and actions equally satisfy the expectations of the political sponsors 
(being held to account) and the population within the catchment area 
(giving an account) (cf. Boyle and Butler 2003: 25).
Political Paymasters: Prescribe the implementation of centrally designed guidelines, eligibility 
criteria, rules and regulations concerning:
- the allocation of resources
- the programme content (eligibility of actions)
Population in 
catchment area:
Development of innovative programmes and services:
- tailored to respond to local realities
- ensuring participation from local stakeholders in decision-making 
processes and programme implementation
Value for Money: Political paymasters develop auditing practices and evaluation modules 
against which the success of the individual APC in achieving desired 
objectives can be measured (cf. Power 1997; NESC 2002a; Boyle 2002b, 
2002a).
Fiscal efficiency 
(output):
Introduction of evidence-based principles (e.g. Belfiore, 2004) and standards 
focusing on promoting the cost-effective provision of tangible services through 
promoting the achievement of measurable short-term (annual) targets
Effectiveness
(outcome):
Evaluation of productive expenditure (outputs) against long-term aims and 
objectives of programmes and policies as previously defined by:
- the APCs, on the one hand, and
- their political paymasters, on the other hand
(Internal) Economies: Provision of best possible terms for receiving public resources as reflected in a 
professional organisational culture that is proving good practice in areas such 
as:
- Human resource management and staff selection
- Administration and financial controlling
- Use of technology
- Self evaluation
The recent introduction of the Q-mark and the Excellence Through People 
Award represent examples of standardised quality measurements indicating 
economic capacity of APCs to public funders
Source: Literature review and preliminary analysis of interviews.
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• evaluation reports carried out by consultants on behalf of the state (Goodbody 
Economic Consultants 1999; PA Consulting Group 2002; Indecon 2003; Fitzpatrick 
Associates and ERM Ireland 2003; Fitzpatrick Associates 2007) or statutory 
organisations (CPA 1994; ESF Evaluation Unit 1999; NDP/CSF Evaluation Unit 
2003; Comptroller and Auditor General 2000, 2007). These reports assess the 
achievements and performance of the state-initiated local development sector and 
make recommendations towards optimising the area-based approach to local 
development. Some reports emphasise the need for closer co-operation and 
collaboration between state-funded APCs and statutory bodies (e.g. Goodbody 
Economic Consultants 1999); others, more specifically, call for better value for the 
use of resources provided for local development initiatives (e.g. Comptroller and 
Auditor General 2000, 2007);
• programme guidelines and monitoring criteria of local development programmes 
for APCs (Central Review Committee 1991; ADM 1995, 2000; Pobal 2006a): these 
define the role and range of activities that lie within the remit of APCs and, 
moreover, propose working models and set parameters for the use of funding;
• government publications promoting public-sector reform (e.g. DoT 1996, 1998, 
2004; DoELG 1996; DoEHLG 18/01/2005): these documents generally call for the 
better management of public resources within the public sector to facilitate the 
provision of high quality public service-delivery to citizens at lower costs;
• reports of the (Interdepartmental) Task Force on the Integration of Local 
Development and Local Government Systems (DoELG 1998, 1999a, 1999b,
2000): these reports outline policies concerning local government reform and make 
recommendation towards the integration of state-funded local development 
initiatives into a local-government co-ordinated structure spearheaded by the 
CDBs;
• press releases, ministerial speeches and departmental circular letters and 
guidelines concerning local development issues and the 2003-2007 cohesion 
Process (e.g. DoCRGA n.d.-f, 18/02/2003, 18/06/2003, 04/02/2004, 13/09/2005, 
01/08/2007, 04/04/2007, 31/07/2007a, 31/07/2007b, 2007; Ô Cuiv 18/02/2003, 
18/06/2003, 24/11/2005, 07/09/2006; DoEHLG n.d.-b, n.d.-a, 2004, 18/01/2005): 
these sources document government policies, plans and measures regarding the 
integration of APCs into the apparatus of the state; in particular, these sources 
refer to the cohesion process (see Chapter 6, Section 6.2);
• previous research and publications on the case-study area (see Section 4.2.2).
The published material that was examined for this research stresses the important role 
that accountability mechanisms, value for money-orientation and processes of 
institutional streamlining play in contemporary governance that are portrayed in Table
4.1 and provide a ‘yardstick’ for comparing and validating the contributions obtained 
from the interviews. The development and classification of influences that are 
considered instrumental for the repositioning of APCs within Dublin’s governance 
framework inform and facilitate the design of the interview process. The development
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of a set of key criteria allows a focused investigation into the identification of a suitable 
theoretical explanatory framework for processes that influence and affect funding 
arrangements of APCs.
4.4 Data generation
4.4.1 Introduction
It is argued that a comparison of different perspectives on governance restructuring 
and associated implications for funding APCs will point out merits, challenges and 
possible tensions concerning the local implementation of area-based development 
initiatives in disadvantaged urban neighbourhoods. The compilation of a set of key 
questions the interviews is informed by (a) the three key themes that were identified 
through publications reviewed (see Section 4.3) and (b) the conceptual frameworks 
provided by the three theoretical approaches discussed in Chapter 3.
The following core issues were addressed in the course of the interviews:
• Key influences of governance restructuring in Dublin on APCs
• Main features of contemporary funding arrangements for APCs
• Key criteria determining the allocation of resources to APCs
• The institutional mechanism through which resources are allocated to APCs
• Changes that occurred between the 1994-1999 OPLURD and the 2000-2006 
LDSIP in regard to funding and monitoring arrangements for APCs
• Implications of the discontinuance of EU funding
• Characteristic features of what is considered good practice in the utilisation of 
resources by APCs
• The evaluation of APCs concerning the measurement of success and value added
• The relevance and definition of efficiency and effectiveness criteria
• The identification of obstacles to success in regard to multi-stakeholder 
collaboration, innovation, plan implementation and local participation
• The scope of APCs to influence decision making and to negotiate changes 
concerning governance restructuring
• The perceived status of co-operation between APCs and other organisations
• The scope for promoting participatory democracy
• The anticipated future role of APCs
Six preliminary interviews were carried out in January 2003 (Table 4.2); these 
interviews served as a pre-test. The key thrust of those interviews was targeted at 
finding out any problems in content and organisation of the key issues which were 
considered suitable to test the research hypothesises: (a) to find out -  through 
focussing on the funding arrangements for APCs as an entry point -  how the 
restructuring of state-led governance structures in Dublin has contributed to stepping 
up accountability procedures, effectiveness and efficiency of APCs and (b) to carry out 
a comparative analysis as to which of the three theories can best explain the evolving
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funding and expenditure control arrangements for APCs. A thorough analysis of those 
preliminary interviews suggested that the approach and the array of questions were 
adequately tailored to meet the requirements underlying the research agenda. As no 
alterations to the design of the interview process had to be made, the preliminary 
interviews were included in the empirical analysis.
Table 4.2: Preliminary interviews
Code Role Date
DCC 1 Senior Official of Dublin City Council (South Central) and 
Senior Official of URBAN
January 2003
ADM 1 LDSIP Staff January 2003
APC 1 Board Member of Area Partnership Company 
in case-study area
January 2003
APC 2a Senior Staff Member of Area Partnership Company 
in case-study area
January 2003
APC 3a Board Member of Area Partnership Company 
in case-study area
January 2003
APC 4a Senior Staff Member of Area Partnership Company 
in Dublin
January 2003
4.4.2 Interview sample
By means of carrying out interviews with individuals involved in integrated local urban 
development processes in Dublin such as government departments, the local 
authority, statutory agencies, professionals from APCs and community activists, it is 
intended (a) to map out the power linkages between key interest groups involved in 
restructuring Dublin’s governance landscape and (b) to identify institutional changes in 
governance and (c) to explore how existing power configurations influence funding 
arrangements and the modus operandi of APCs.
The empirical research sets out to investigate how governance changes and related 
consequences for funding arrangements are experienced, perceived and explained by 
stakeholders involved at various institutional levels and spatial scales of the APC-type 
approach to local development in Dublin. These data are then examined against the 
backdrop of the three sets of surrogate measures described in Section 4.3.
The majority of the interviewees were selected from APCs and organisations with a 
clear focus on those collaborating and/or networking with Ballyfermot Partnership (see 
Table 4.3 below).
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Table 4.3: List of interviewees (1)
Code Role (number of interviews) Date
NE National Experts (10)
NE 1a County Development Board in Co. Dublin March 2003
NE 1b County Development Board in Co. Dublin May 2004
NE 1c County Development Board in Co. Dublin November 2004
NE 2 Department of Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs May 2003
NE 3 NDP/ESF Evaluation Unit May 2003
NE 4 Department of Finance May 2003
NE 5a Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local 
Government
March 2004
NE 5b Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local 
Government
November 2004
NE 6 Department of the Taoiseach May 2004
NE 7 Combat Poverty Agency November 2004
DCC Dublin City Council & Affiliated Organisations (9)
DCC1 Senior Official of Dublin City Council (South Central) and 
Senior Official of the URBAN II Initaitive
January 2003
DCC 2 Senior Official of Dublin City Council (Central Offices) May 2003
DCC 3a Senior Official of Dublin City Council (South Central) May 2003
DCC 3b Senior Official of Dublin City Council (South Central) May 2004
DCC 4 Senior Staff Member of the Dublin City Enterprise Board May 2003
DCC 5 Staff Member of the Dublin City Development Board March 2004
DCC 6 Senior Official of the URBAN II Initiative May 2004
DCC 7 Senior Official of Dublin City Council (Central Offices) November 2004
DCC 8 Senior Staff Member of Dublin City Council (former CDB) November 2004
ADM Area Development Management (5)
ADM 1 LDSIP Staff January 2003
ADM 2 LDSIP Staff (Liaison Officer) May 2003
ADM 3 LDSIP Staff (Liaison Officer) May 2004
ADM 4 RAPID Staff May 2004
ADM 5 Senior Staff Member November 2004
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Table 4.3: List of interviews (2)
Code Role Date
APC Area Partnership Companies (17)
APC 1 Board Member of Ballyfermot Partnership January 2003
APC 2a Senior Staff Member of Ballyfermot Partnership January 2003
APC 2b Senior Staff Member of Ballyfermot Partnership May 2004
APC 3a Board Member of Ballyfermot Partnership January 2003
APC 3b Board Member of Ballyfermot Partnership May 2004
APC 4a Senior Staff Member of an Area Partnership Company 
in Dublin
January 2003
APC 4b Senior Staff Member of an Area Partnership Company 
in Dublin
November 2004
APC 5 Senior Staff Member of Ballyfermot Partnership May 2003
APC 6 Board Member of Ballyfermot Partnership May 2003
APC 7a Board Member of Ballyfermot Partnership May 2003
APC 7b Board Member of Ballyfermot Partnership May 2004
APC 8 Focus group with Staff Members of Ballyfermot Partnership March 2004
APC 9a PLANET March 2004
APC 9b PLANET November 2004
APC 10 Board Member of Ballyfermot Partnership May 2004
APC 11 Area Partnership Manager in Dublin and Staff Member November 2004
APC 12 Two Senior Staff Members of an Area Partnership Company 
in Dublin
November 2004
LV Local Views (5)
LV 1 Co-ordinator of a local organisation in Ballyfermot May 2003
LV 2 Co-ordinator of a local development project In Ballyfermot May 2003
LV 3 Local Employer in Ballyfermot May 2003
LV 4 Local resident who is a Community Representative on the 
board of a local development initiative in Ballyfermot
March 2004
LV 5 Co-ordinator of a local development project in Ballyfermot November 2004
As numerous contacts had already been established in a previous research project, 
the selection of interview partners could already take place at an early stage of the 
research process. In 2000, 31 interviews were carried out that focused on the review 
of funding-related aspects concerning APCs (Borscheid 2001). Then, the objective 
was to identify the impact of the funding mechanism on plans and activities of the 
Ballyfermot Partnership and the consequences for the allocation of resources locally.
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Figure 4: Institutional background of respondents and their relationship with the APC
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The investigation pays particular attention to processes that occur at the interface 
between APCs and their immediate superordinated institutional authorities (i.e. ADM 
and DCC-led structures). In this study, based on the literature review and previous 
research findings, three ‘main parties’ could be identified as suitable sources of 
information:
• local APCs and affiliated organisations (e.g. other APCs, PLANET99);
• ADM that had been contracted by the government to support and monitor the
implementation of local development programmes;
• Dublin City Council (DCC) and affiliated organisations (e.g. the City Development 
Board) and initiatives (RAPID, URBAN 2) involved in local development (see 
Chapter 6, Section 6.2).
In addition, the views of two ‘minor parties’ had to be established:
• on the one hand, relevant government officials from various departments involved 
in governance restructuring100;
• on the other hand, local community workers/activists that were involved in and/or
supported projects in designated disadvantaged neighbourhoods within the
catchment area of APCs.
Whereas interviews with government officials were expected to elicit insights into 
political processes and priorities that drive the contemporary repositioning of APCs 
within Dublin’s governance landscape, community workers/activists were interviewed 
to tease out local Impacts of restructuring the institutional governance system. These 
interviews can also be considered a ‘check’ to compare, contrast and contextualise 
data generated in interviews conducted with the three main parties. Interviews with 
individuals involved from different professional and institutional backgrounds were 
Included in the research design to ensure a balanced view including different 
perceptions and viewpoints of governance changes that are relevant to funding 
arrangements concerning APCs. Figure 4 (see above) below illustrates that the key 
focus rests on the intermediate institutional level between the ‘top’, as represented by 
government departments and related institutions (and partly by those board members 
of Ballyfermot Partnership who represent institutions at the ‘top’), and the ‘bottom’, 
represented by professionals actively involved in the local community. In other words, 
the research concentrates on those structures ‘sandwiched’ between central 
government and state-funded groups from civil society that operate in the local arena. 
On the one hand, the exclusion of ordinary local citizens that are not involved in local 
development could be arguably criticised as a weak point of this study because it
99 PLANET was established in 1997 as an umbrella organisation for the 38 APCs. PLANET represents 
the network of 38 APCs in Ireland in the wider political arena, provides information on policy 
developments and a range of support services to its members. It is an independent company 
financed by the APCs (Planet no date).
100 The Department of the Taoiseach (involved in the establishing and piloting APCs), the Department of 
the Environment, Heritage and Local Government (responsible for the local authorities), the 
Department of Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs (responsible for overseeing the work of ADM) 
and the Department of Finance (allocation of resources to individual government departments).
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omits the grassroots perspective; i.e. the view of those individuals considered the 
beneficiaries of measures and actions initiated by funding funnelled into the area. On 
the other hand, previous research led by Bartley and Saris (see Section 4.2.2) already 
provides a profound overview of issues and concerns relating to the involvement of the 
community in local urban regeneration projects. Moreover, a detailed study on the 
views of local residents and volunteers would be beyond the scope of this study as the 
key objective is to look at the interface between the statutory sector and the local APC 
in terms of governance-led changes that affect the funding mechanism of APCs. The 
inclusion of a few views from those working in the community that are professionally or 
otherwise linked to the Ballyfermot Partnership serves to establish whether and to 
what extent those working in the community observe or experience changes on the 
ground induced by the re-modelling of the governance framework.
Originally, it was intended to take those interviews as a starting point for elaborating on 
the issue of governance-induced changes to the funding framework. The initial plan for 
this study was to conduct additional 15-20 interviews with selected key stakeholders 
with a view to identifying links between changes in governance that occurred since 
2000 and their impact on funding arrangements for APCs. As the research proceeded, 
however, new connections became available that afforded new opportunities to 
investigate further into the issue. In total 46 interviews were carried out between 
January 2003 and November 2004 (see Table 4.3). This number includes follow-up 
interviews so that some respondents were interviewed on up to three occasions. Apart 
from one focus group interview with staff members of the APC in the case-study area 
and four interviews involving two respondents, the majority of interviews were one-on- 
one encounters. Furthermore, taking into account new developments that occurred 
between 2005 and June 2007, additional informal follow-up conversations took place 
with APC professionals from different APCs in Dublin.
The focus of the study is directed at the interactions between the statutory sector and 
APCs as an integral part of the state-funded, not-for-profit, local-development sector. 
Therefore, the selection of interviewees concentrated on individuals positioned at the 
‘intermediate level’, i.e. on those working within the institutional apparatus that 
functions as a transmission belt to implement centrally-devised area-based initiatives 
into the local arena. Given the wider remit of APCs that extends beyond the locale, 
however, links to the ‘top’ -  the institutional level on behalf of which the programmes 
are to be implemented -  ‘sideways’ -  with other Dublin-based APCs, partner 
organisations and agencies involved inside and outside the catchment area of 
Ballyfermot Partnership -  and the ‘bottom’ -  the receiving end of any programme- 
related measures -  were established in order to allow for the inclusion of a wider 
spectrum of expertise and experience to be included. Links with other APCs were 
particularly considered relevant to ascertain whether developments in the case-study 
area would be similar to both strategies applied and experiences in other designated 
disadvantaged areas in Dublin.
100
The selection of respondents for the empirical research is considered suitable to elicit 
first-hand views of governance restructuring in Dublin and its felt effects on:
• interaction at the institutional interface between APCs (as quasi-independent state- 
funded local development initiatives) and the statutory governance apparatus
• the relationship between APCs and the local-development sector in their
catchment area;
• the design and implementation of funding arrangements of APCs and the
underlying control mechanisms;
• the achievement of success and value for money;
•  the integration of local development and local government systems.
4.4.3 Interview approach
The different organisational and professional backgrounds of the interviewees called 
for specific approaches to conducting the interviews. Explicitly considering the role of 
the individual interviewee in the local development process (e.g. member of the local 
authority, local community group, public representative, board member or professional 
of an APC) specific issues and questions had to be included into the former-identified 
set of core issues, which were specifically tailored to the individuals’ involvement in 
local governance and its professional and/or organisational background101. Interviews 
were based on a checklist of key issues that focused on aspects related to the drivers 
behind restructuring the governance system, underlying funding mechanisms, 
programme-related priorities and, finally, concerns and practices in decision making 
and programme implementation.
Most of the interviews took the form issue-oriented semi-structured face-to-face 
interviews (Diekmann 1995; Kvale 1996). According to the terminology used by 
(Kitchin and Tate 2000), the main interview technique applied would also classify as 
an interview-guide approach. At times the interview developed into a more narrative 
style (Diekmann 1995) and, on some occasions, even developed into an expert 
interview with both parties asking and responding to questions (cf. Kitchin and Tate 
2000: 219). It was felt that a certain degree of freedom and flexibility in terms of the 
interview style was conducive to accessing information and clarifying issues.
Each interviewee had previously been informed about the research project, the area of 
interest, and the estimated duration of the interview of about 45 to 60 minutes through 
a personal encounter, by telephone or by email. This was followed by the submission 
of the research agenda if requested by the interviewee. The circulation of the research 
proposal was offered at first contact. The clarification on the subject of the research 
and the key thrust of issues that were intended to be addressed in the course of an 
interview turned out to be crucial because it provided the respondent with the 
opportunity to prepare for the meeting; it also signalled that the researcher is familiar
101 For example some respondents were involved, mainly by means of board membership, in more than 
one of the agencies depicted in Figure 4.
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with the institutional context, terminology and developments concerning the 
governance system in Dublin. It was generally felt that interviewees were more 
comfortably addressing issues when they knew they could use their professional 
jargon. As a result, the time granted for the interview could ’be used more effectively. 
This especially held true for those individuals that had already been interviewed in a 
previous project addressing similar issues in 2000 (Borscheid 2001).
The duration of the interviews varied considerably102. Whilst some interviews took up 
to 90 minutes and more the majority of interviews lasted around 45-60 minutes. The 
coding and the analysis of the qualitative data was facilitated by using QRS NUD*IST, 
a computer programme developed to facilitate handling non-numerical and 
unstructured data in qualitative analysis. Taking into account both the benefits and 
dangers associated with qualitative data analysis (QDA) software (Weitzman 2000; 
Kitchin and Tate 2000), combined with previous experience in analysing qualitative 
data in a similar setting (Borscheid 2001), the application of NUD*IST computer-aided 
analysis was considered an appropriate tool to, first, identify key responses, second, 
develop a categorisation of responses according to content; and finally, compare these 
categories against (a) the role or position of the individual in the process of 
governance restructuring and (b) the key criteria identified in Section 4.2 that function 
as a surrogate measure for the modernisation of local governance in Ireland.
The empirical data generated is utilised to contextualise, and reflect on, documented 
policies, reports and guidelines and, moreover, tease out challenges concerning 
contemporary practices in urban governance and their bearing on funding 
arrangements for APCs. When analysing and, subsequently, interpreting the data 
derived, the point of views expressed by the respondents were treated as personal 
opinions, and not necessarily as representing the official viewpoint or the priorities of 
the organisation or interest group they work with. If used and cited here, any 
quotations from the data, therefore, should be seen only as indicative support for 
arguments emerging from analysis of both the literature reviewed and empirical data 
gathered.
The production of empirical data by means of an in-depth case study facilitates 
assessment of the relative utility of the three theoretical approaches (ANT, URT and 
the RA), which is the ultimate objective of this thesis. The interview material is the 
foundation for a systematic investigation of contemporary funding arrangements of 
APCs and associated policies and practices of re-structuring the local partnership 
model in Dublin’s changing governance landscape. The analysis of perceptions, 
experiences and views of individuals from different institutional and professional 
backgrounds who are, or have been, instrumental at different levels of restructuring, 
implementing and/or interacting with the local partnership model serves to test the 
principal research question. Namely, if the conceptual framework provided by the
102 Ranging from 25 minutes to 110 minutes.
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regulation approach (RA) is better suited than both actor-network theory (ANT) and 
urban regime theory (URT) to explain the driving forces for the re-configuration of 
funding and performance control arrangements for APCs in the context of the neo­
liberal, New Public Managerial (NPM)-inspired, realignment of Dublin’s local 
governance landscape.
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5. A PROFILE OF THE CASE-STUDY AREA
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5.1 Introduction: general description of Ballvfermot
Despite a period of unprecedented economic growth in Ireland, some areas remain 
‘poor places’ in terms of the absence of economic development opportunities, the lack 
of social infrastructure and low-quality public service provision for local individuals. 
This section illustrates that the case-study area is in many regards a socially and 
economically disadvantaged area at the margins of Irish society. Previous research 
(Saris et at. 2002: 176) describes parts of the case-study area as “squalid, drug- 
infested, anti-authority, welfare-dependent and crime-ridden”, which, according to 
views of individuals working and/or living in Ballyfermot, also seems to be reflected in 
the ‘collective psyche’ of the community.
In the late 1940s, the local authority in Dublin built the first housing estate in 
Ballyfermot (Lower Ballyfermot). Subsequently, Ballyfermot was further developed in 
stages and became one of the largest local-authority housing estates of its time. It was 
developed as a response to an increase in population in Dublin City. Ballyfermot is a 
suburban neighbourhood located at the western fringe of Dublin City with a population 
of 21,027 in 2006 (Government of Ireland 2006). The area covered by the local Area 
Partnership Company, Ballyfermot Partnership, consists of the following seven 
Electoral Divisions (EDs): Cherry Orchard A, Carna (formerly Cherry Orchard B), 
Cherry Orchard C, Decies, Drumfinn, Kilmainham A and Kylemore. The area is 
positioned between the Liffey River in the North and the Grand Canal in the South.
Picture 1 : Aerial view of Ballyfermot
Source: Google Earth
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The Motorway 50 (M 50) marks the western boundary of Ballyfermot. The Inchicore
neighbourhood is bordering in the east. A look at the surrounding main road arteries
illustrates the physical isolation of Ballyfermot (Maps 1 and 2). Ballyfermot Road -
which expands from near the M 50 in the east, crosses the R 112 and, then, runs
parallel to the N4 (see Picture 1 above) -  is the main road artery that functions as a
through road between the M 50 and the city centre. Residential areas are clustered
alongside Ballyfermot Road. Ballyfermot is a residential estate with relatively few
employment opportunities provided locally. Most companies in Ballyfermot are
engaged in retail and manufacturing. Park West is a nearby industrial estate occupying
the land South of Ballyfermot. It is located between the railway and the Grand Canal
and stretches from Kylemore Road in the east to the M 50 in the west (Picture 1).
Companies located in Park West mainly provide jobs that require specific qualifications
(e.g. in the communications and technology sector). However, based on the low levels
of educational attainment in the area (see Section 5.4), only limited job opportunities
exist for individuals from Ballyfermot to access well-paid jobs in Park West:
There is a whole generation of young people coming up in the retail sector, in 
restaurants, fast food, do you know what I mean? We’re still producing early 
school leavers. So do they live in Ballyfermot and work in Ballyfermot? I think 
Ballyfermot, traditionally, people from Ballyfermot have had to travel to work.
There are more opportunities for employment. But I don’t think, not for high-paid 
employment (...) Well Cherry Orchard. You see there is a railway track dividing 
Cherry Orchard from City, or Park West. I think the only people from Cherry 
Orchard who work in Park West are the van drivers or cleaners. Do you know 
what I mean (Interview LV 1)?
Large parts of Ballyfermot are characterised by poor access to public transport (bus 
routes only) and a lack of recreational facilities, retail services and social infrastructure. 
The design of Ballyfermot as a low-rise, low-density housing estate makes the 
residents in Ballyfermot dependent on individual transport, even for accessing basic 
services, which are concentrated along Ballyfermot Road. According to the 2006 
Census, 42.8 per cent of households in Ballyfermot did not own a car. This is nearly 
double the national average of 19.7 per cent (CSO 2007). The layout of the road 
network in Ballyfermot’s housing estates with a maze of cul-de-sacs, often with only 
one or two access roads (Picture 1), is an obstacle to the provision of efficient public 
transport services.
The design of Ballyfermot as a residential area with few investments into social 
infrastructure and economic development left large parts of the population physically 
disconnected from economic and social opportunities participation and contributed to 
the development of pockets of severe disadvantage. The heart of Ballyfermot is a 
dilapidated retail area on Ballyfermot Road, with a cluster of a variety of smaller shops 
(see Picture 2), a bank, a library, a college of further education, a school and a major 
retailer. Visits to the area at different times of the day indicated that concentration of 
services and amenities on the main road exerts a gravitational pull from all parts of 
Ballyfermot. Local people from remote parts of the community (e.g. in Cherry Orchard) 
refer to the area as ‘the manor’.
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Picture 2: Shops on Ballyfermot Road
Source: Picture taken by author in 2007.
Some areas have smaller clusters of shops, services and facilities (e.g. around the
Markievicz Community Centre on Decies Road). Irrespective of statistical indicators
that classify Ballyfermot as disadvantaged, some respondents remarked that
Ballyfermot “got many new facilities over the last years” and that it could become “the
new Foxrock [very affluent area on Dublin’s South side]” (Interview LV 4). A
respondent highlighted the advantages Ballyfermot has in comparison to other areas
and summarised his observations as follows:
Ballyfermot has the cheapest housing in Dublin. It’s ten minutes from the city 
centre, it’s got a railway line, it's got good bus routes, it’s got quite good 
amenities, it’s got certainly a good library, it’s got swimming pools, it’s got sports 
grounds. It’s not under-supplied with things. It got a new town hall. I live in an 
affluent area in Dublin and our town hall is collapsing. Ballyfermot's actually got a 
lot of things it doesn't appreciate. Areas become fashionable because they 
become affordable, and people with the right sort of energy move to those areas.
That isn’t happening in Ballyfermot. Perhaps it’s the reputation but I think it's the 
people; the people who wanna live in Ballyfermot want to live with the people in 
Ballyfermot (Interview LV 3).
The statement indicates that ‘something is wrong’ with the local community as it is ‘the 
people’ in Ballyfermot that are considered an obstacle to change towards the better. It 
is as if a mixture of certain area-specific values, life styles and desires manifests in a 
local culture that is somehow immune to what is perceived by the respondent as 
positive external influence that could contribute to positive change in terms of 
’upgrading’ the area. A closer look however, brings to light, that the social and public 
infrastructure mentioned by the respondents is located in the vicinity of the central 
area in Ballyfermot. Apart from the new civic centre that was built on Ballyfermot Road 
and the establishment of a multi-million equestrian centre in Cherry Orchard that 
serves the interest of a selected few (Bartley and Saris 1999; Saris et al. 2002), little 
investment had been directed at upgrading the areas at the margins (see below). A
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local-authority survey carried out in Ballyfermot in 2001 for the preparation of the
URBAN II Initiative of the EU comes to the following conclusion:
The accumulation of public housing over a period of 40 years combined with a 
lack of infrastructure development and little private sector investment, has created 
a disadvantaged urban environment where key issues identified by the community 
itself include:
• High levels of substance abuse
• High levels of drug related crime and anti social behaviour
• Early school leaving
• High unemployment levels throughout the 1990s
• High levels of economically dependent persons
• High levels of dependent elderly (Dublin Corporation 2001: 5).
Even though the situation among the different areas differs in terms of socio-economic
indicators such as social class, educational attainment, employment status, household
structure and demographic profile, the physical appearance of the whole area is
described as “drab and monotonous and in some estates this is combined with a
feeling of insecurity amongst residents” (ibid.). The area is not only geographically but
also socially and economically at the margins of society:
We got a presentation from welfare. Nothing substantial has changed in 
Ballyfermot over the last few years. Basically one in three, just under thirty per 
cent of all individuals in Ballyfermot, are on social welfare, of some description or 
another103. And that was not including those that were on any of the disability 
benefits. And we know there are even more people who would qualify and who are 
not claiming it. So if you actually think about that and break that down to who 
would actually qualify in terms of age group and in terms of other kind of benefits 
we are looking at 45 to 50 per cent of the population. How do you really 
characterise what's an improvement or what isn't an improvement in the area 
when you got those kind of figures? (Interview APC 2b).
Despite a relatively high degree of welfare recipients throughout the area, spatial 
differences in terms of the socio-economic profile and quality of life prevail. These, for 
example, manifest in visible indicators such as a different quality of the urban fabric, 
accessibility to social infrastructure, the general appearance of houses and front 
gardens and other indicators such as voter participation, labour-market participation 
and household composition.
Overall each ED within Ballyfermot is characterised as a severely disadvantaged 
urban area according to contemporary poverty indices such as the Irish Index of 
relative Affluence and Deprivation (Haase 1999) or the SAHRU Index (Small Area 
Health Research Unit 1997). It bears symptoms of urban decay such as low quality of 
the urban fabric and a high concentration of individuals traditionally associated to be 
part of the ‘urban underclass’ (Saris et at. 2002), symptoms that are characteristic of 
large suburban developments with a high share of local-authority housing stock. 
Ballyfermot Partnership was established in 1995 to address issues associated with 
local poverty and socio-economic disadvantage (see Chapter 4, Section 4.2.2).
103 In August 2003, 44.4 per cent of the population in Ballyfermot held a General Medical Services 
(GMS) card (Eastern Regional Health Authority 2004).
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5.2 Population
Between 1986 and 1996 the population in Ballyfermot dropped by 12.5 per cent to 
21,149 (Bartley and Kelly n.d.). Since then the population remained stagnant with 
21,027 people living in Ballyfermot in 2006. In comparison, in 2002, the population 
figure for Ballyfermot was 20,699 (Government of Ireland 2006). The increase in 
population by 1.6 per cent between 2002 and 2006 can be attributed to new residential 
developments in Cherry Orchard C (Cedarbrook) and the higher number of individuals 
in communal establishments in Cherry Orchard A (i.e. higher number of patients in the 
national hospital and a high share of young inmates in the prison). New developments 
at the western margins of Ballyfermot are expected to result in a substantial increase 
in the population over the next few years.
A comparison of the population profile between Ballyfermot and the city (including 
Ballyfermot) by age cohort (Table 5.1) reveals a distinct difference for the cohorts aged 
29 or younger. While the profile for Dublin illustrates an abrupt and significant 
reduction in population under 20 and an equally sharp increase in population aged 20- 
29, Ballyfermot’s population did not undergo similar demographic changes.
Possible reasons for these different developments are as follows:
• The changes in the overall Dublin demographic profile have been predominantly 
driven by inward migration and the location of this inward migration has been in a 
number of specific locations, of which Ballyfermot received few migrants.
• Ballyfermot was a settled community developed in the (1940s and 1950s) that 
demonstrated considerable growth over a 20 year period and is now showing a 
profile of a more aged community. The relatively young population profile of the 
newer parts of Ballyfermot (Cherry Orchard) ensures that the overall picture is only 
moderately skewed towards an older aged profile (communal facilities in Cherry 
Orchard, such as Wheatfield Prison, distort the age profile for the area 
considerably).
• Taking into account comparatively high fertility rates in Ireland (Fahey 2001), there 
is some indication that young families with children moved out into the wider 
commuter belt because they (a) cannot afford housing in Dublin and/or (b) 
consider Dublin as a suitable environment to raise children.
• An overall reduction in fertility since the 1980s (CSO 14/12/2006) took place as a 
result of the economic boom in the 1990s coupled with rising costs of childcare 
and/or a change in behavioural changes in lifestyle among those capable of 
benefiting from opportunities that arose in the period of unprecedented economic 
growth since the mid-1990s.
• A concentration of jobs and educational institutions in Dublin that, for example, 
attracts in first-time job seekers, foreign nationals (particularly from new EU 
accession states) and immigrants, students and post-graduates.
• Ballyfermot’s relative isolation from mainstream developments, a limited capacity 
of residents to avail of economic opportunities and little evidence of population
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exchange between the area and other parts of the city, as the area does not 
appear to have a significant rental housing sector.
Table 5.1: Population profile of Ballyfermot by age cohort 
a) Ballyfermot
b) Dublin
Source: CSO (2007).
5.3 Lone parents
The level of lone parents living in Ballyfermot with at least one child under the age of 
15 is far above the national average. Census data show that between 1996 and 2002 
the number of lone parent households has increased by 4 per cent. 24 per cent of 
households were led by lone parents in 2002 (the vast majority being mothers). This 
was more than twice the national average, which was at 11.7 per cent (Ballyfermot 
Partnership 2004). According the 2006 census, lone parents accounted for 19.6 per 
cent of all households in Ballyfermot whereas the national figure was 11 per cent. In 
Cherry Orchard A and C, the share of households headed by lone parents exceeded 
25 per cent. Local workers that know the area well stated that “a lot of them wouldn’t
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be working. And they would be at home” (Interview LV 2). Also it was indicated that as
low levels of educational attainment would limit life chances, self fulfilment and income
opportunities, early pregnancy was considered a way to escape the pressures in a
meritocratic society:
M otherhood gives status -  so a lot o f w om en would get pregnant fa irly  early, a t a 
very young age; I am talking 13, 14, 15 here. And if your educational opportunities 
are not g reat that’s going to happen sooner rather than later (Interview  LV 5).
Local workers who work with local families and lone parents identified a lack of local 
childcare provision as one of the key obstacles to labour-market participation for 
women living in Cherry Orchard. Ballyfermot Partnership identified “the lack of 
accessible, affordable and quality childcare provision” (Ballyfermot Partnership 2004: 
20) as one of the priority issues under their 2003-2006 area action plan.
5.4 Educational attainment and job opportunities
There is a strong link between educational qualifications and quality of life in terms of
health, income opportunities and place of residence (e.g. Burke 2001). Statistics show
low educational attainment levels for Ballyfermot. In 1996, 67.8 per cent of the
population in Ballyfermot had ceased education at the age of 15 or younger (Bartley
and Kelly n.d.); the average for Dublin City was at 38.5 per cent. Since then figures
have changed considerably. In 2006, these had come down to 18.2 per cent for
Ballyfermot and 9.6 per cent for Dublin City. The proportion of the population with third
level qualifications even more significantly illustrates the limited scope for high-paid
professional careers for residents in Ballyfermot. In 1996, only 3.5 per cent of the
population had received third level education whereas the average for Dublin City was
22.5 per cent (Dublin Corporation 2001). The 2006 census figures were 7.7 per cent
and 24.9 per cent respectively. The lack of educational opportunities is best illustrated
by the following excerpt from an interview with a local community worker and resident:
The education system here is producing the lowest percentage o f students m oving 
on to 3rd level education in the country, you know. There are more people in Trinity 
College from  Eritrea than there are from  Ballyfermot. Now tha t’s interesting 
because we have a bus that goes from  Ballyferm ot to Trin ity College. But we don ’t 
have one that goes from Eritrea to T rin ity College (Interview  LV 1).
Against the backdrop of relatively low levels of educational achievement, it is not 
surprising that the unemployment rate104 in Ballyfermot in 2006 is over 20 per cent, 
more that four times the national average of 4.6 per cent (cf. CSO 2007). The 
economic boom years have increased job chances for the population in Ballyfermot. 
However, labour-market indicators suggest that residents in Ballyfermot could not 
capitalize as strong as other areas from the new developments. A comparison of the 
labour-market participation rate, the rate of self-employment and unemployment 
figures with national numbers show that the area lags far behind (Ballyfermot
104 The unemployment rate in Ireland is defined as the total unemployed population (i.e. those registered 
unemployed and first time job seekers) expressed as a percentage of the total active labour force (i.e. 
those at work, unemployed and first time job seekers).
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Partnership 2004). Empirical data from the interview material underlines the statistical 
data:
The type of people that would be resident in Ballyfermot are not being attracted to 
self-employment in the areas I’m looking at. I think the way that you become an 
entrepreneur is by being in a job and moving [...]. Your environment for an 
entrepreneur to develop is going to be a middle-class educated, frustrated person;
frustrated with the job they are in, but not somebody who could become a semi­
skilled worker or even a skilled worker. And those don't live in Ballyfermot. And 
this is the other key problem. Every other area of Dublin that has, say a 
Partnership, has a significant private sector, home ownership. Ballyfermot doesn’t.
Every single house in Ballyfermot was built by the local authority (Interview LV 3).
The reported increase in self-employment between 1996 and 2002 by 89 per cent 
(from a low base of 207 individuals to 392) is ascribed to the Area Allowance 
Enterprise Programme (Ballyfermot Partnership 2004); this number has to be treated 
with caution because “many go bust in the first year” (Interview LV 3). In any case,
there exists an obvious mismatch between the job skills offered by the population in
Ballyfermot and the demands of the labour market. Whereas new opportunities were 
created in professional services such as communications, engineering and information 
technology residents in Ballyfermot are reported to be mainly employed in 
manufacturing, construction industry, commerce and retail services and transportation 
(Bartley and Kelly n.d.).
In relation to prevailing high levels of long-term unemployment in the area, Ballyfermot 
Partnership reports that even though “the number of people unemployed for over three 
years fell slightly from 107 to 82, the main increase in long-term unemployment was 
for persons unemployed between one and two years. Overall, the trend in 
unemployment indicates that while there is improvement relative to the mid-1990s, the 
recent trend indicates deterioration in this situation” (Ballyfermot Partnership 2004:
13). The statistical profile is complemented by respondents from the area who 
highlighted that despite an overall reduction of unemployment figures a substantial 
core of unemployed individuals exists who do not have the capacity to meet the basic 
requirements for finding a job.
Research into “very long-term unemployed men concluded that they all had a similar 
profile -  in short, not work ready and education or addiction issues added to them not 
being employable” (Interview APC 5). The respondent reported that the study shows 
that most of the men interviewed for the study left school at primary level; a lot of them 
were single or separated; some had families but were estranged from them; all had 
significant literacy problems and very few of them had any qualifications or 
certifications apart from the primary school certificate; some within the cohort of 
respondents work in the informal economy; also a few respondents admitted 
dependencies like alcohol or drugs, which prevented them from pursuing work.
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5.5 Social Class105
The 2006 census data reveal that the principal occupational profile of the population in 
Ballyfermot has not changed since 1996 (Bartley and Kelly n.d.). Economic 
opportunities in the Celtic Tiger years did not have a profound impact on the 
professional status of the majority of the labour force in Ballyfermot. Ballyfermot still 
bears signs of a particularly disadvantaged occupationally disadvantaged community 
(Bartley and Kelly n.d.). Table 5.2 displays the social class categorisation for 2006. 
The data indicates that the area has a considerably higher share of people in the lower 
social classes and an equally significant lower share of people in the higher social 
classes than corresponding figures for the city or the country. (The results for Cherry 
Orchard A can be explained by the influence of the low social class profile of the 
population of Wheatfield Prison.)
Table 5.2: Social Class
Area 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Cherry Orchard A 1.3 9.8 12.2 12.5 9.2 4.7 50.4
Carna 0.6 11.5 15.1 21.1 16.9 6.7 28.1
Cherry Orchard C 1.5 10.3 14.0 16.0 16.1 7.3 34.8
Decies 0.5 9.4 15.9 24.1 20.7 9.7 19.7
Drumfinn 0.8 11.9 17.3 23.3 16.4 8.3 22.0
Kilmainham A 2.3 13.5 15.2 20.7 16.0 7.2 25.1
Kylemore 0.8 9.3 14.5 21.0 14.9 9.6 29.9
Ballyfermot 1.1 10.8 14.9 19.7 15.7 7.7 30.1
Dublin 7.7 22.7 16.5 14.0 10.8 4.6 23.7
Ireland 6.5 26.4 17.0 17.1 11.1 4.3 17.6
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Social Class
Source: CSO Ireland 2007.
105 Social class ranks occupations of all persons aged 15 or over by the level of skill required on a social 
class scale ranging from 1 (highest) to 7 (lowest). Social class is based on an ordinal scale with V 
being the highest social class. The social class of family dependants is derived from the social class 
of the parent having the highest social class. The codes are as follows: 1 = Professional workers; 2 = 
Managerial and technical; 3 = Non-manual; 4 = Skilled manual; 5 = Semi-skilled; 6 = Unskilled; 7 = All 
others gainfully occupied (Government of Ireland 2007b)
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5.6 Local rivalry
Ballyfermot consists of seven electoral divisions (see above) and 4 distinct
neighbourhoods: Upper Ballyfermot, Middle Ballyfermot, Lower Ballyfermot and Cherry
Orchard106. Local rivalry between the four neighbourhoods in Ballyfermot is a recurring
theme that came up in interviews carried out in Ballyfermot. The interviews revealed
that Ballyfermot consists of four distinctively different neighbourhoods and that there is
“a great history of division between neighbourhoods” (Interview LV 3). Despite overall
rivalries between the four neighbourhoods, the biggest divide is without a doubt
between Cherry Orchard and the ‘rest’. Cherry Orchard is regarded as a dysfunctional
neighbourhood that “answers to the demographic profile of a neighbourhood in
trouble” (Saris et at. 2002). Local community workers think that the gap between
Cherry Orchard and the older parts of Ballyfermot is unbridgeable as even residents in
Cherry Orchard have ambitions to move out of the area if they could afford it:
People in Cherry Orchard see themselves as serving time until they get housed on 
the lower end of Ballyfermot. So this affects the sense of community. They see 
themselves as buying their time to be housed in Ballyfermot, to be housed near 
the lower end where the shops are, to be housed near the schools. So as long as 
we are proactive around Ballyfermot we sacrifice Cherry Orchard (Interview LV 5).
Even though the whole area is considered severely disadvantaged, this case study
concentrates on developments in Cherry Orchard, a community that -  despite being
on the radar of a plethora of local state-funded organisations -  feels neglected and
written off. The allocation of funding from either Ballyfermot Partnership or URBAN II
has always been a contentious issue:
Cherry Orchard residents felt nothing was being done for them. But hey, we noted 
that people in Lower Ballyfermot felt the same. All the money seemed to be 
concentrating in Middle Ballyfermot. It was like a blinkered view, ‘Everybody else 
is getting it. We’re not’. But money -  it is true -  wasn’t evenly spent in the area 
(Interview LV 4).
The following descriptive area profile illustrates the scope of poverty and exclusion in a 
local-authority housing estate that was completed less than 3 decades ago, but quickly 
developed into one of the most disadvantaged urban areas in the country. The 
designation of Cherry Orchard as a RAPID area in 2006 (see Chapter 4, Section 4.2.2) 
accentuates the degree of social and economic deprivation of the area.
5.7 Cherry Orchard: a stigmatised neighbourhood
Cherry Orchard is the most disadvantaged neighbourhood in Ballyfermot. Extending to 
the West, the development of Cherry Orchard was a response to an increase in 
demand for social housing. Cherry Orchard was built in four stages between 1976- 
and 1986 and is the newest part of Ballyfermot. Situated on the fringe of ‘the old’ 
Ballyfermot, Cherry Orchard can be described as a neighbourhood situated at the
106 Through the local Ballyfermot Area Action Coop, which facilitated the establishment of the Ballyfermot 
Partnership Ltd., each area is equally represented on the board of the partnership with two 
community directors. The Co-op is the main vehicle for the election of community representatives 
onto the board of Ballyfermot Partnership. Membership is open to all residents in Ballyfermot.
114
margins of an already disadvantaged area. The layout of the streets and the cul-de-
sacs further isolate the area so that only residents or visitors get into Cherry Orchard:
This area is isolated, no centre, no focus; there’s no focus to the estate. People 
are the heart of the area but there’s actually no focus. It is structural isolation. You 
come home, you go out collect your welfare or your wages, you buy your 
messages, you feed your family, you go home, you sit in front of your television for 
the week. You don’t go out again. There’s nothing you could do. You’d really have 
to be motivated (Interview LV 5).
The area lacks basic services and infrastructure such as shopping and leisure 
facilities, proper public transport services, a pub, or a post office -  not even a post box 
was to be found in the area:
There is one shop in Cherry Orchard for 6,000 people; and this is not good urban 
planning (Interview DCC 3b).
This is particularly a disadvantage for those without access to a car. Moreover, until
recently, the area did not have a primary school; and the public transport connection to
the nearest suitable primary school was poor107. There is strong evidence that the
community in Cherry Orchard experiences structural disadvantage and social
exclusion as the residents experience isolation from social, economic and cultural
development opportunities (Saris et al. 2002). Despite a plethora of state-funded
organisations or programmes that operate locally, such as Dublin City Council,
Ballyfermot URBAN 2, the Ballyfermot Drugs Task Force, the Ballyfermot Partnership,
LINK Community Development Project and the Cherry Orchard Developments
Council, local people in Cherry Orchard are not getting the services they want:
Funding is coming in for different things but people want something else: There is 
no shop up here, no post-box, no public telephone. It is a very isolated area. 
Tommy’s shop has been around for 30 years and it is the only shop in the area.
For years people up here are waiting for a shop. We were negotiating for this the 
last five years and now they are now putting the shop way over to the other side 
where the private houses are, near Wheatfield Prison. I mean private houses is a 
good change for the area but why can’t we have a shop up here? We’re told by 
Dublin City Council that private developers and the guys running the big 
supermarkets, the LIDLs and the ALDIs, want to be in a prime location with so 
many houses or whatever. Well, they are taking the railway station away from here 
and they could negotiate something to compensate for it. Now we’re trying to get a 
bus service up here (Interview LV 5).
Even Cherry Orchard consists of different neighbourhoods. Whilst exploring the area 
on foot, apart from a few streets, large areas of Cherry Orchard appeared generally as 
run down, as, for example, indicated by the poor finish of the urban fabric: sidewalks 
were poorly maintained with potholes provisionally filled with tar, and in some 
stretches, sidelined by collapsed walls. Moreover, public green spaces and front 
gardens were both littered and generally neglected.
107 After years of lobbying for a primary school in Cherry Orchards the Department of Education and 
Children built a school which was opened in 2006. The project is a pilot scheme for teaching facilities 
in severely deprived areas. It provides extra services for parents and children from disadvantaged 
backgrounds.
115
The area was not equipped with litter bins. Occasionally, remains of burned out cars
could be spotted on greens and in the side roads, which were skid-mark-studded.
Some streets however, appeared in a different light: houses were maintained and front
gardens were looked after; lawns appeared groomed and some gardens had well-kept
flowerbeds. Cars in the driveways were of a newer make as revealed by license
plates. The overall appearance of some streets in those 'pockets’ was less uniform
and suggested a concentration of middle class population:
Now people are buying their own homes. Here are houses up for sale and being 
bought, which is always a good sign for an area being on the up (Interview LV 5).
The transition between those pockets of relative affluence (or less deprivation), and
the dilapidated housing estates of Cherry Orchards was abrupt; these changes in the
urban landscape were best described by a local community worker:
When you go to a certain part of Cherry Orchard it’s like going over a border -  
people don’t want to be associated with that end of Ballyfermot and vice versa. 
Ballyfermot would probably see themselves as posher (Interview LV 2).
Picture 3: Footpath and open green space in Cherry Orchard
Source: Picture taken by the author in 2007.
Local community workers reported high levels of drug dealing, vandalism and
incidents of joyriding having an effect in the wider area. Even though the issue of
(narcotic) drugs dealing and usage is concentrated in Cherry Orchard, it has knock-on
effects on the entire Ballyfermot area:
You asked me about the situation in Cherry Orchard, OK. You mentioned that the 
people in Cherry Orchard are concerned about a primary school, a shop, or a post
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office. They probably are more concerned about that than about, for example, a 
litter problem. Yes, they probably are. But 50 per cent of them are probably more 
concerned about their methadone (Interview LV 3).
Besides the prevalent drug issue, respondents refer to low voter turnout asking, “So 
how representative are the local politicians?” (Interview LV 5); and voter participation 
levels in different neighbourhoods in Ballyfermot among the lowest in Dublin City 
(Kavanagh et a t 2004). Local workers and residents feel that the nature of the Irish 
clientelist political system (Komito 1984) aggravates the socio-political disadvantage of 
residents in poor neighbourhoods in Ballyfermot, as a low voter turnout leaves 
disadvantaged areas at the bottom of the agenda of politicians who prefer to focus 
their efforts on areas where voting patterns are higher108. In the most disadvantaged 
area of Ballyfermot a certain milieu109 has developed that is not conducive to the 
establishment of a local culture of participation in democratic decision-making and 
community issues.
Local community workers also referred to the stigmatisation of the area leading to a 
socio-psychological disadvantage of individuals from Cherry Orchard, which makes it 
difficult to develop a sense of community spirit. In this context (cf. Herlyn et a t 1991: 
23-24), stigmatisation either occurs:
• formally through the way the community is being dealt with by institutions or the
media (see Table 5.3):
The area here got a name in the newspapers and journalists ring up when 
something bad has happened in the area. They don’t want to know when we are 
actually doing something positive up here with young people and the childcare.
They want robbed cars and the riots. So the whole image was created. The 
newspapers, when reporting about crime-related incidents, sometimes even try to 
give somebody a Ballyfermot address even if they actually live in Inchicore. So 
they squeeze them into Ballyfermot. It’s like Fatima [i.e. Fatima Mansions]. It’s one 
of those areas here. I recently got a phone call from a newspaper. They heard that 
there were only so many real one-parent families in the country and they wanted 
me to arrange an interview for them with a genuine one-parent family. Jaysus, this 
is not a zoo! (Interview LV 5).
• or informally through the attitude of other individuals when interacting in social 
situations:
Cherry Orchard is an area at the periphery of Ballyfermot both physically and 
mentally. The teachers would have an attitude towards children from up here like,
‘Well you know they are from up there. It would not amount to much anyway’ 
(Interview LV 2).
According to Saris et al. (2002: 176), “Middle-class folks from up the country see in 
Cherry Orchard the prototype of the dark underbelly of urban life: squalid, drug- 
infested, anti-authority, welfare-dependent and crime-ridden”. The stigmatisation is 
also mirrored in the language as local people refer to Cherry Orchard as ‘up here’ and 
to Ballyfermot as ‘down there’ (e.g. Interview LV 2). Even though the terminology used 
certainly refers to the geography of the area as Cherry Orchard is slightly elevated vis-
108 See Kavanagh (2004) for patterns of voter turnout in Dublin.
109 Cf. Herlyn et al. (1991).
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à-vis the rest of Ballyfermot, it also symbolises the socio-spatial divide within 
Ballyfermot and, hence, is more than a mere topological description.
Table 5.3: Irish Times Headlines 2007
Man killed in Dublin knife attack 08 September 2007
A man (28) has been killed in a knife attack in Dublin. A second man is 
being treated in hospital with stab wounds after an incident at an 
apartment at Cedarwood Walk, Ballyfermot shortly after 6am (...)
Gardai seize cannabis worth €250,000 14 August 2007
(...) patrol as part of Operation Anvil, the Garda's crackdown on 
organised criminal gangs, on Kylemore Road, Ballyfermot, at around 
7.30pm. Both are being questioned at Ballyfermot Garda Station,
Dublin. (...)
Man killed by unknown gunman 19 July 2007
A man was approached from behind by a lone gunman who shot him 
in the buttock and again in the groin at Cherry Orchard Drive,
Ballyfermot, on March 7th, 2004, Dublin City Coroner's Court heard
(■■■)  _____________________________________________
Baby neglect trial for Circuit Court as judge refuses jurisdiction 02 June 2007
(...) ruled yesterday. The woman (37), who cannot be named to 
protect the child, was charged with neglecting the 16-month-old boy at 
the family home in Ballyfermot, Dublin, on December 16th, 2005, in a 
manner (...)
McDowell concerned over safety of gardai 28 April 2007
(...) anything when it was so obvious that this was building up. "Thank 
God, members of An Garda Siochbna have not been killed." But he 
was aware that a garda had been hit by gunfire in the Ballyfermot area 
(■■■)________________________
Woman injured in Dublin shooting incident 12 April 2007
(...) 10pm on Tuesday by residents of a house on O'Moore Road,
Ballyfermot. Detectives believe that the victim was taken to the house 
of a family she knew. Garda sources said they believed that the 
woman (...)
Gardai seize drugs worth €6.6m in Dublin operations 13 January 2007
(...) and are being detained under the provisions of Section 2, of the 
Criminal Justice Act. Last week, 3kgs of heroin was discovered by 
gardai in Ballyfermot. This brings the total amount of heroin seized to 
date (...)
Source: Irish Times
The negative public reputation of the area becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy as it
reflects back on the area as an undesirable place to live, which fuels notions of Cherry
Orchard as a ‘no-go’ area:
Cherry Orchard is the more criminal part of Ballyfermot. And nobody came to grips 
with Cherry Orchard. It is as if there’s some monster lurking behind every hall door 
up here. But people here have the same needs and wants and desires as people 
elsewhere (Interview LV 5).
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Residents who can afford to leave move out of the area. As a result, the area has 
developed a largely homogeneous social profile and extreme levels of poverty. This is, 
for example, indicated by a local culture of money lending, with local loan sharks being 
the last resort for many families, money clubs and the local shop owner operating a 
system where people can ‘put something on the slate’ illustrates the magnitude of 
income poverty in Cherry Orchard:
The local shop Is more expensive than LIDL or ALDI but the owner changes 
cheques for people and he gives credit. And he has a great system. He gives 
credit for a week. And if your bill is not clear on your pay day you won’t get credit 
the following week. It’s a week-to-week system and he doesn't ever, ever roll over, 
you know. He won’t roll over. So if you need to run up credit for a week, you know 
you can. But you’ll have to pay it back the Thursday when you get your money. Or 
you pay it back the week your children's allowance... and you pay back on 
children's allowance day. But your children’s allowance money is supposed to 
meet your children’s needs. But 9 out of 10 times it’s gone because you borrowed 
it. And you borrow on the strength of it. And there is some places where you 
borrow money where they will actually take your book, you know. And they’ll hold 
your books so that you can’t actually get it. They physically go with you. Now I am 
not talking about shops and places like that. But loan sharks will physically go with 
you to collect your books so that they get their payment, you know. You know, you 
physically have to give up your book. They hold your book against your debt. 
People also make their living too out of money clubs. If you have ten people who 
commit to giving ten Euro a week. That’s 100 Euro a week, which is a lot of money 
that is available to each of those ten people. So you put your name down on what 
week you want your 100 Euro, right. So that week it'll be yours. So you have the 
100 Euro to start it up front, you know. So you start it up front. So that 100 Euro 
goes that first week then to whomever. And then you charge maybe 12 Euro a 
week and you get that 2 Euro by ten people by ten weeks for doing the business, 
for the administration of it, working It out and that. There's loads, the ways people 
are making money is phenomenal. People see an opportunity for making money 
out of the misery of others. But it serves a purpose (Interview LV 5).
Picture 4: Corner shop in Cherry Orchard
Source: Picture taken by the author in 2007.
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Cherry Orchard is an area that, like other areas near Ballyfermot (e.g. Palmerstown), 
has little social infrastructure and that suffers from high levels of income poverty and 
social and physical isolation from mainstream society110.
5.8 New developments
A consultation process in preparation for the URBAN II Initiative initiated the planning 
process for a dedicated Youth Centre in Le Fanu Park at a cost of € 23 million, which 
will be developed alongside the Dublin City Council Swimming pool and Leisure 
Centre and is envisaged to open in Winter 2007 (Ballyfermot.ie n.d.). New residential 
developments take place at the margins of Cherry Orchard in public-private 
partnership between the City Council and private investors; i.e. those areas with 
development potential that face the main road or are easily accessible from the main 
road arteries. The development of a major action plan for Cherry Orchard outlines the 
development of the western fringe of Cherry Orchard for different housing schemes 
and the redevelopment of Cherry Orchard Park. For example, the affordable housing 
scheme in Cedarbrook with approximately 400 residential units (Picture 5) is described 
as a success by authorities (Eastern Regional Health Authority 2004). Local residents 
from ‘the hidden side of Cheery Orchard’ along the railway track do not noticeably 
benefit and even experienced further isolation with the relocation of the railway stop 
“which looks like something out of a ‘Post Nuclear Winter Horror Movie’” (Platform 11 
2006: no page numbers) -  and the new retail shops located west of the newly 
developed area.
Picture 5: New developments
Cherry Orchard Town Centre, Dublin 22:
“Cherry Orchard is a joint venture between Durkan 
New Homes, Dublin City Council and Bennett 
Construction. Durkan New Homes is proud to be 
associated with this major scheme to provide a 
new town centre” (Durkan Homes at 
http://www.durkan.ie/sh996x5557.html).
Source: Yahoo.com at http://maps.vahoo.com/#mvt=m&g1=Dublin&trf=0&lon-- 
6.250019&lat=53.342968&maa=6.
The neighbouring Park West, an industrial estate with new medium-rise residential 
developments serves as a surrogate for some residents in Cherry Orchard. Park West
110 In this context, it would be interesting to identify the reasons for re-naming the electoral ward Cherry 
Orchard B into Carna (Cherry Orchard B is closest located to the centre, the area with the shops or 
‘the mansion').
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is situated South of Cherry Orchard between the railway line and the Grand Canal
(Picture 6).
Picture 6: Cherry Orchard and Park West
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Source: Google Earth
Residents, potential buyers and workers commented on the area in a website forum 
(Askaboutmoney.com n.d.: no page numbers): One participant describes the area as 
“a bit slap bang in the middle of an industrial park but across at the Plaza there is a 
spar [a shop], bennigans [sic] pub, gym, O'brien's [fast food chain] and a Chinese 
restaurant. A Hotel is being built in the area also and more retail units are being 
incorporated into the apartments build” (ibid.). Other comments stated that they cannot 
see the scope for the development of a sense of community because it “lacks of any 
village feel”, is “the bleakest place I have ever been” and “could be bit dodgy at times 
due to some parts of the areas around Park West” (ibid.).
However, when an access road to the new developments was opened (via 
Cedarbrook Avenue and Park West Avenue), people from Cherry Orchard started 
using public spaces and social and retail infrastructure provided for the new residents 
in Park West:
Park West as you know is an industrial estate, a huge one. There is 5,000 new 
housing units going into the area between here at the top of Cherry Orchard and 
the Health Board field which is further down there. But just physically you can see 
that, the isolation has broken down, you can physically drive out. There’s shops 
and supermarkets up here, restaurants and so on. There’s a gym and people are 
beginning to use it, they are actually beginning to use the facilities. They actually
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drive up to Park West at night just to let the kids play at the plaza, you know, have 
an ice cream and let them play. We’re trying to give a sense of ownership -  there 
are a few of the housing units going up literally overnight. We’re trying to give a 
sense of ownership to the people in Cherry Orchard so that the area of 
disadvantage that was created will also benefit from these new developments 
(Interview LV 5).
Dublin City Council has plans to create a new town centre as part of a € 2 billion urban 
regeneration plan for the area, which will provide up to 5,000 residential units, a 
railway station and a civic plaza (Eastern Regional Health Authority 2004). The 
development is envisaged to consist of two town centres on the western boundary of 
Cherry Orchard, one 18 acre-site behind Cherry Orchard Hospital, the second 
between the M 50 and Cedarbrook Avenue, the railway line marking the southern 
boundary (Picture 6). The latter centre “will comprise 1,500 residential units, 30 per 
cent of which will be affordable and available in the early stages of the project" (The 
Irish Times 27/07/2004; cf. The Irish Times 28/07/2004). The master plan includes the 
construction of a 40-storey tower to give the area a new landmark (The Irish Times 
03/02/2005). A look at the map illustrates that these sites are located at the margins of 
Cherry Orchard and will probably cater for new population moving into the area; the 
dilapidated areas of Cherry Orchard remain untouched.
5.9 Conclusion
The profile of the area with a focus on Cherry Orchard serves to demonstrate the 
magnitude of societal issues that fall within the remit of the local APC and other groups 
and agencies. It also shows that social exclusion and poverty are linked with bad 
planning policies as there seems to be a correlation between an agglomeration of 
single-class housing, the quality of place in terms of social infrastructure and 
accessibility to job opportunities.
Awareness of wider developments and causal process for the emergence and 
persistence of urban deprivation in neighbourhoods like Ballyfermot is relevant to 
understanding the socio-economic and spatial context within which APCs operate. 
These wider issues require multi-agency co-operation on a larger scale as APCs. The 
description of the case-study area demonstrates that state-funded APCs work in an 
environment, where relationship-building and area-specific project development that is 
based on local participation from those groups considered being socially excluded 
from mainstream society, is a challenging task. Under the LDSIP, Ballyfermot 
Partnership started working together more closely with other local agencies and 
programmes to improve the co-ordination of actions addressing social exclusion and 
poverty. The respondents pointed out that Ballyfermot Partnership works with the 
Local Drugs Task Force and URBAN 2 as well as with neighbouring APCs (i.e. KWCD 
and Canal Communities APC). However, it requires thorough planning (and hence 
time) and both political and financial commitment of those statutory agencies with the 
responsibility for the provision of social infrastructure and public services for citizens. 
In short, these wider societal and structural issues require multi-agency co-operation
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on a larger scale. It remains to be seen to what extent, for example, plans for “a new 
town centre and a revitalisation of both the community and civic amenities” 
(Ballyfermot Partnership n.d.: no page numbers) will accommodate the views of local 
people in decision-making processes concerning developments affecting their 
community and contribute to an improvement of the quality of live in Cherry Orchard.
The analysis of the empirical data in the following chapter sheds light on contemporary 
policies and practices targeted at the integration of APC-delivered actions and 
services. This occurs under a state-controlled model of governance that is focused on 
maximising the impact of public resources channelled into the area of quasi-statutory 
welfare-related local development initiatives that, by default, pursue a bottom-up 
strategy towards ameliorating symptoms of poverty and deprivation. The case study 
serves to illustrate the extent to which the envisaged re-alignment of relations between 
formerly independent APCs and the state creates a more integrated, concerted and 
outcome-oriented approach towards addressing the nature and scope of local 
disadvantage in urban neighbourhoods.
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6. ANALYSIS OF THE EMPIRICAL DATA
6.1 Introduction
The New Zealand model of public management provided the template for a public- 
sector reform in Ireland that is embodied in the 1994 Strategic Management Initiative 
(SMI) (see Chapter 1, Section 1.4.2). Public-sector modernisation in Ireland aims at 
the re-structuring of the national governance model through focusing on cost-effective 
quality service delivery of public services to the taxpaying ‘customer’, more 
transparency and accountability in government and the establishment of better 
management structures in public administration (Government of Ireland 1997). The 
literature reviewed suggests that the characteristic features of existing performance 
and monitoring methods:
• are inextricably linked to plans for public-sector modernisation; and
• have been mainly designed to increase the capacity of statutory and state-funded 
companies to measure progress, to improve operational practices and, thereby, to 
achieve best value.
It is argued that current funding arrangements and associated processes of 
accountability and institutional re-arrangements that affect Area Partnership 
Companies (APCs) in Dublin contribute to the achievement of what -  from the 
perspective of the New Public Managerialism (NPM) -  is described as best value: the 
optimisation of intra-institutional economies, fiscal efficiency and outcome-oriented 
actions (Power 1997; Comptroller and Auditor General 2000; NESC 2002a; McCarthy 
2007). Roles and responsibilities of agents, key institutions and collectives within local- 
governance restructuring emerge as a result of complex negotiations between a 
variety of stakeholders that have different priorities (e.g. differences as to how social 
exclusion should be addressed), but that have partly overlapping remits (e.g. 
addressing optimisation of public service delivery). Depending on the balance of 
powers and the associated conversion or diversion of aims and objectives among all 
parties involved, governance systems can take the form of spaces of prescription, 
contestation or genuine consensus. This implies that an analysis of the funding 
arrangements for APCs must take into account the origin and direction of forces 
involved in the creation of the wider institutional environment, which has a bearing on 
the design of the funding mechanism.
This thesis investigates the institutional re-positioning of APCs in Dublin’s governance 
system under the 2000-2006 Local Development and Social Inclusion Programme 
(LDSIP) and explores interrelated changes in funding and accountability arrangements 
for APCs. Taking into consideration the complexity of the local governance system in 
terms of its immediate and wider socio-political surroundings, this study is only 
capable of reflecting on certain aspects of the relationship between governance 
restructuring in Dublin and its implications for funding arrangements for APCs.
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This chapter explores practices associated with the new managerial approach to local 
governance from the angle of three sets of key variables with reference to:
• the institutionalisation or incorporation of APCs into the statutory apparatus;
• the design and implementation of accountability procedures and guidelines 
regulating the allocation of funding; and
• the promotion of value for money-driven performance measures (see Chapter 4, 
Section 4.3, Table 4.1).
The analysis of the empirical material in this chapter deals with each theme under a 
separate main heading:
• Section 6.2: Institutional re-configuration of the governance framework:
• Section 6.3: Funding arrangements for Area Partnership Companies; and
• Section 6.4: Definitions of success and promotion of value-for-monev principles.
The empirical data presented here illustrate tensions and trade-offs between 
opportunities to promote participatory approaches to decision making, on the one 
hand, and the development of a governance model that is responsive to calls for fiscal 
efficiency in the context of challenges associated with economic globalisation, on the 
other. A preliminary analysis of the interview material gathered indicated that the 
funding mechanism of APCs mirrors institutional changes in Dublin’s governance 
system (Borscheid 2005). Also, research reports commissioned and policy documents 
released by the Irish government make ample reference to the influence of business­
like principles in restructuring governance (e.g. NESC 2002b, 2002a; DoT 2004; 
Government of Ireland 2003, 2005; NESC 2005). The proliferation of new managerial 
practices in Irish administration has been accompanied by “an increasing emphasis on 
the need to specify and identify what will be delivered in return for public money rather 
than simply handing over a grant” (Boyle and Butler 2003). APCs have been subject to 
measures directed at both stepping up their performance and strategically 
repositioning them in Dublin’s landscape governance. The interview material suggests 
that governance restructuring under the cohesion process facilitates a selective rolling 
back of the degree of political and financial autonomy of APCs. The empirical material 
highlights that the re-structuring of the institutional local development system in Dublin 
strategically increases the remit of the local authority through the work of the Dublin 
City Development Board (CDB) (Section 6.2.2) and its sub-structures (Section 6.2.5).
Against the background of contemporary efforts geared at restructuring the local- 
governance system in Ireland, this study sets out to carry out a comparative 
assessment of the extent to which actor-network theory (ANT), urban regime theory 
(URT) and the regulation approach (RA) can explain the nature of the relationship 
between observed changes of governance in Dublin and the design of funding 
arrangements for APCs. Chapter 3 outlined the conceptual strengths and weaknesses 
of each theoretical approach. The perspectives of ANT, URT and the RA on observed
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relationships between governance restructuring and funding arrangements of APCs 
will be explicitly discussed in the following chapter (Chapter 7).
6.2 Institutional re-configuration of the governance framework
This section provides an analysis and description of driving forces propelling forward:
• the restructuring of Dublin’s governance landscape; and
• the processes of (re-)positioning of Area Partnership Companies therein.
Figure 5: Institutional environment and power flows concerning APCs in Dublin
m  mm : Interface between (a) new structures (established between 1999 and 2003, indicated by
bold letters) that are driven by forces of managerial rationalisation and integration and
(b) formerly ‘quasi-independent’ (EU -  initiated) bottom-up structures.
: Main directions of political power.
Source: Borscheid (2005).
A variety of re-arrangements in Dublin’s governance landscape led to a new situation 
for APCs. In particular throughout the LDSIP, the introduction of new initiatives (e.g. 
RAPID) and additional structures situated under the umbrella of the local authorities 
(e.g. City/County Development Boards or Local Area Committees) led to the gradual 
institutionalisation of APCs (Figure 5 above). In this context, the term 
‘institutionalisation’ refers to processes promoting the transformation of APCs from 
pilot projects into permanent structures that are an integral part of the (local) state- 
controlled governance system (Walsh 1998; Parkinson 1998; Turok 2001; McCarthy 
2007).
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Table 6.1: Towards the institutionalisation of APCs
Process What happened? Timeline: Political Sponsoring and Monitoring
Piloting 
1991-1993 PESP
• 12 APCs were piloted
• Brief given to find new and innovative ways to 
tackle poverty and long-term unemployment in 
areas identified as 'unemployment blackspots’
• 1991: Approach jointly developed and sponsored by the EU and the Irish Government
• 1991: Department of the Taoiseach responsible for APCs
• 1991: Publication of guidelines by ADM: “The golden book” (Central Review Committee 1991)
• 1992: ADM Ltd. was set up as support and monitoring body
Systématisation
&
Proliferation
1994-1999 OPLURD
• 1994/5: 26 new APCs were established after the 
pilot was considered a success
• Selection of eligible areas for establishing APCs by 
means of a competitive bidding process based on:
a) a statistical analysis of census data stressing 
the degree of deprivation; and
b) perceived quality of the action plans submitted
• 1995: New lead Department-Tourism, Sport and Recreation
• 1995: Publication of new guidelines by ADM (2000): Integrated Local Development Handbook
• 1998: Creation of the Task Force for the Integration of Local Development and Local
Government Systems
• 1999: Invitation of local public representatives to Boards of APCs
• 1999: Value for Money Audit of the Local Development Programme by the Auditor and
Comptroller General (Comptroller and Auditor General 2000)
Incorporation
2000-2006 LDSIP*
• Concerns about the proliferation of non-statutory 
local development bodies and related inefficiencies
• Integration and co-ordination of local development 
initiatives became a priority
• Endorsement of APC plans by City/County 
Development Board
• Cohesion process as an efforts to streamline local 
development and strengthen the influence of the 
state
• Changing the board structure of APCs and 
increasing the influence of the public sector
• 2000: Local Government Bill
• 2000: Establishment of City/County Development Boards, Social Inclusion Measure Groups, 
Strategic Policy Committees and Local Area Committees (Figure 5)
• 2000: New guidelines (Local Development Social Inclusion Programme)
• 2001: Local Government Act 2001
• 2002: New Lead Department -  Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs 
.  2002: Launch of RAPID
• 2002: End of EU support
• 2003: Introduction of annual budgets and cutbacks in funding
• 2003: Launch of the cohesion process (Review of state-funded local development bodies)
• 2003: Creation of Social Inclusion Task Forces
• 2005: Announcing plans for alignment of area-based initiatives with local government
structures
• 2006: New performance Indicators emphasising the importance of collaboration (Pobal 2006a)
• 2007: Value for Money Audit commissioned by the Department of Community, Rural and
Gaeltacht Affairs
• 2007: Department of Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs circulates guidelines addressing
restructuring of APC Boards
Source: Empirical material and literature reviewed ( * As no guidelines for a follow-up local development programme were issued in 2006, 2007 became a transition year).
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The developmental trajectory of APCs since their establishment in the early 1990s 
consists of the following successive steps: piloting, systématisation and proliferation 
and, finally, incorporation (see Table 6.1 above; see also Chapter 2). Over time, APCs 
were gradually transformed. They were initially established as independent companies 
in disadvantaged areas to develop innovative approaches to tackle long-term 
unemployment and poverty in partnership with statutory agencies, to encourage 
vertical institutional learning within the public sector and to promote democratic 
experimentalism through involving local people in planning local actions and decision 
making (OECD 1996). This focus on bottom-up involvement and participatory 
democracy has shifted. Recent developments indicate that the future role of APCs will 
be in the area of contractual welfare-related service-delivery (NESC 2005). The 
following sections outline the re-organisation of Dublin's governance landscape and 
contextualise changes vis-à-vis empirical material gathered in the case study.
6.2.1 More involvement of Dublin City Council?
From the mid-1980s, a variety of bodies with pre-defined remits were established to 
deal with local economic and social urban regeneration issues (Adshead 2003). Area 
Development Management (ADM), the National Training and Employment Authority 
(FÂS111), the Vocational Education Committee (VEC) and local development initiatives 
such as Urban Development Corporations (UDCs) became an integral part of central 
government policy that curtailed potential local-authority powers. According to some 
Irish commentators, central government decided to place these agencies outside local 
government because the local authorities’ mode of operation was considered overly 
rigid and bureaucratic in nature (Walsh 1998; McCarthy 2007). Moreover, partly 
because of a limited budget, partly because of a limited interest in wider social and 
economic issues, partly because of a limited management capacity, local authorities’ 
main responsibility was restricted to mere service functions such as planning, social 
housing provision and estate management, waste disposal, water supply, sewerage 
and road maintenance (Adshead 2003; Ô Broin 2003). A government official explained 
the establishment of ADM as the national support and monitoring agency for APCs as 
follows:
In the early days the local authorities were not seen as the natural home for 
sponsorship of Partnerships and area-based interventions as they did not have a 
policy competence or even policy interest in that issue. They did not have a 
holistic sense of local development or community development as a core area of 
their business. Now, a broader policy competence could develop through new 
legislation and new structures. And there is probably competition for authority and 
leadership in that area (Interview NE 6).
APCs were given the brief to play a more proactive role as “social entrepreneurs” 
(Interview NE 6) and address social and employment-related issues that were outside 
the remit of local government (cf. Chapter 2). In the mid-1990s, however, the local 
authority in Dublin, Dublin City Council (DCC), ambitiously started to engage more pro­
111 Foras Aiseanna Saothair (FAS) was established under the Labour Services Act, 1987 and reports to 
the Department for Enterprise, Trade and Employment (DoETE).
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actively in local development initiatives and became an influential entrepreneurial
power broker with a much wider remit in urban policy and regeneration initiatives
(McGuirk 1994, 2000; McGuirk and MacLaran 2001; Ô Broin 2002; Bartley and Shine
2003; MacLaran and Williams 2003):
Dublin City Council is changing rapidly to cope with the pressures of the changing 
city. New political and organisational structures are being put in place to ensure 
that the city works well for people and business (Fitzgerald n.d.: no page 
numbers).
The development of an entrepreneurial role has been facilitated by a change in policy
at central government level. In addition, policy documents pointed out a need for a
greater démocratisation of local government structures. The 1994 Programme for
Government stressed the need for a multi-stakeholder governance model and also
acknowledged the local authority's role in local development:
The Local Authority must become the focus for working through partnerships 
involving local community-based groupings, voluntary bodies, the private sector, 
and public agencies. A particular focus must be to co-ordinate the efforts of 
existing groups such as County Enterprise Boards112, LEADER and ADM 
Partnerships [i.e. APCs] (Fine Gael et al. 1994: 43).
Another influential factor of change can be attributed to the European Union (EU). The
EU had long been a keen promoter for the utilisation of local expertise in policy
implementation of EU legislation through increasing the involvement of both regional
and local governments in policy making in Ireland (Boyle 2000; COM 2001; Callanan
2002; Marshall 2002; Adshead 2003; Ô Broin 2003). This local expertise, however,
could not develop in Ireland due to local government’s exclusive focus on managing
the physical environment. The interview material shows that government departments
and the local authorities pursued the idea of restructuring local government following
the European model:
In most European countries the local government system is the main channel of 
funding for everything that happens locally. And it has one department which 
provides its resources. So it is conceivable that you could have such a system 
here (Interview NE 6).
Dublin City Council is primarily involved in engineering and physical infrastructure.
We are not strong enough to do things local authorities do in other countries such 
as Germany. We are striving to move towards the European governance model 
where the local authorities are responsible for education, health, enterprise -  and 
all those little players on the ground in Ireland are causing confusion. If you had 
one local development structure that massively expanded its functions you would 
not end up with a myriad of structures. So the European governance model was 
an eye-opener to Irish civil servants that Irish parallel structures are a disaster 
(Interview NE 1b).
The political will to reform local government is stated in the White Paper Better Local 
Government (DoELG 1996), which was quite influential in instigating change in local
112 "The main objective of the City and County Enterprise Boards is to provide supports to facilitate the 
establishment, development and growth of micro-enterprises (small businesses employing less than 
10 people) in their city or county. They do this by providing business information and advice, 
counselling and mentoring support and by providing financial assistance in the form of capital grants, 
employment grants and feasibility studies” (Enterprise Ireland n.d.: no page numbers).
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governance (Callanan 2003; Ô Broin 2003). Apart from encouraging local authorities 
"to change the way of doing our business and go local development” (Interview DCC 
7), it also encouraged interdepartmental cooperation. The Department of the 
Environment and Local Government spearheaded the establishment of the 
interdepartmental Task Force on the Integration o f Local Government and Local 
Development Systems (hereafter Interdepartmental Task Force). The 
Interdepartmental Task Force produced a series of reports and recommendations that 
informed the Local Government Act 2001 (Chapter 1, Section 1.4.2). The act prepared 
the ground for a broader local development agenda for local authorities, which also set 
out to promote greater participation from the citizenry within local government-led 
structures (Ô Broin 2002). It facilitated ambitions of DCC to become the lead agency 
responsible for local development and gain influence and control In the development 
and provision of social and community services vis-à-vis state-funded special-purpose 
bodies such as APCs (e.g. Interviews DCC 7 and DCC 8).
In the context of contemporary state-initiated governance changes, it is important to 
keep in mind that APCs had initially been engaged in activities that challenged 
traditional state-led local development processes in Ireland (Walsh, 1998). DCC 
professionals felt, however, that "Partnerships took over issues they hadn’t intended to 
take on as they got involved in things like community development and things we 
should have been doing” and also admitted, “it took us a few years to get our act 
together” (Interview DCC 7). The process of ‘getting their act together’ consisted of a 
variety of actions that were aimed at increasing the relevance of DCC as a key player 
in local development and promoter of more local democracy in decision making:
• the decentralisation of local-authority structures by means of dividing the city into 
five distinct administrative units. (Local area managers became responsible for 
dealing with local issues and reporting back into city hall);
• the establishment of Local Area Committees (LACs) in each of the five new 
administrative council areas and the formation of six thematic Strategic Policy 
Committees113 (SPCs) (Department of the Environment and Local Government 
1999b);
• the establishment of an Economic Development Unit;
• a close affiliation with, and influence on, the City/County Development Boards 
(CDBs) and their substructures; and
• the piloting and extension of the RAPID programme as 'their extended arm’ in 
disadvantaged neighbourhoods.
For example, the increasing involvement of DCC employees in local development 
agencies, such as newly established CDBs and the RAPID programme (Sections 6.2.2
113 The Strategic Policy Committees provide advice to the city council on questions concerning 
engineering and planning, economic development, traffic management, finance, housing and culture. 
Dublin City Council operates six Strategic Policy Committees (SPC), each of which addresses a 
specific policy issue. Each of the committees has 15 members; ten councillors and five sectoral group 
members (Dublin City Council n.d.-c).
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and 6.2.5), illustrates the local authority’s determination to become a key player in
areas formerly being addressed by state-funded local development actors (O Broin
2003) (see also Section 6.2, Figure 5). A DCC professional working in the case-study
area (Dublin-Ballyfermot) made the following comment:
Dublin City Council decided last year that we would have to be representatives 
throughout the city at my grade rather than having lower staff involved because we 
consider ourselves as a big player in the area; and there are certain things we 
should have more involvement in [...] Despite the involvement in many 
organisations at board level -  I am on the URBAN board, I am on the partnership 
board and also on the Cherry Orchard Development Council and the board of the
Equine Centre -  we haven’t really touched base with other organisations in the
area. We know the buzz words but the implementation of our local development 
agenda is still a good bit away (Interview DCC 3a).
The change in policy and the new ‘can-do’ attitude officially professed by DCC is also
recognised by local community workers in Ballyfermot:
The corporation [i.e. DCC] changed radically in the 1990s. The change came with 
John Fitzgerald [then City Manager], They came from an authoritarian landlord- 
tenant model and moved towards a more social approach, which was a bit scary.
And they came through community groups, when they came, and began to work 
from our side of the table. But they have the power, they have the clout and they 
own the land and they can actually develop it in whatever way they want -  but 
people still want to be consulted, you know. And that they cannot come to grips 
with (Interview LV 5).
Dublin City Council have decentralised with all structures in place but are not 
perceived as being local because they operate a top-down local development 
model (Interview LV 1).
The involvement of local authorities is perceived by locals as ‘posing’ rather than being
a genuine effort to collaborate with local people. There is a fear that the new
developmental approach of DCC is an encroachment on territory and an effort, as one
respondent put, “to get some handle on the situation and how it develops and that type
of thing” (Interview APC 3b). In relation to the role of APCs, respondents from DCC
and officials from relevant government departments left no doubt about the intentions
of restructuring local governance: to create a vehicle through which APC-type
organisations can be brought alongside with the local government system (e.g.
Interviews DCC 2, DCC 7 and DCC 8; Interview NE 5b):
Partnership companies will be transformed into one structure. And that structure 
will be controlled by Dublin City Council. I am sure they won’t be happy. But that’s 
our language (Interview DCC 8).
DCC strives to exercise control over APCs’ budgets and, consequently, their agenda 
by means of subsuming them into the local government system. The interview material 
strongly suggests that (a) the process of institutional integration has been facilitated 
through the discontinuance of EU-funding under the LDSIP and (b) the establishment 
of a variety of DCC-affiliated local development structures that operate in the 
geographic and thematic area of APCs. Under the LDSIP, a variety of institutional 
changes substantially Influenced the re-configuration of power in Dublin’s local 
development arena. The increased institutional density finds expression in parallel
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structures that, from the view of DCC professionals, provide an opportunity to 
harmonise and integrate a two-tiered local development sector -  i.e. DoCRGA-funded 
APC-type agencies, on the one hand, and the DoEHLG-led local authorities, on the 
other -  under the leadership of DCC. This development mirrors political ambitions and 
processes associated with the SMI (Chapter 1). The following sections explore how 
local government reform, through a system of new local structures, gradually 
strengthened the position of local authorities to exert influence on state-funded local 
development structures that operate outside public administration.
6.2.2 More integration through Citv/Countv Development Boards?
In 2000, County Strategy Groups (CSGs)114 were replaced by County/City 
Development Boards (CDBs). CDBs were formally established through the Local 
Government Act 2001 (Government of Ireland 2001: 37, Part 13, Section 129). CDBs 
have been commissioned to promote the integration of activities and budgets of the 
plethora of publicly funded local development actors into a concerted urban 
development strategy (Dublin CDB 2002; Fitzpatrick Associates and ERM Ireland 
2003; NDP/CSF Evaluation Unit 2003; DoCRGA n.d.-a; DoEHLG n.d.-a, 2004). More 
specifically, they were given the following brief:
• to develop a broadly-based vision-led economic, social and cultural strategy 
covering all major services provided by various groups within their administrative 
area (DoELG 2000); and
• to ensure democratic legitimacy of, and ‘good governance’ within, state-funded 
local development initiatives (DoCRGA 31/07/2007a, 31/07/2007b, 2007).
CDBs were to “operate on the basis of real and meaningful partnership” (DoELG 1998:
14). Following the partnership model adopted under Partnership 2000115, the board of 
each CDB represented the dominant players and stakeholders involved in local 
economic, social and cultural development (see Table 6.2 below, cf. DoELG 1999a). 
The stated objectives are couched in a language of partnership that suggests a parity 
of esteem among parties represented on the CDBs. But the CDBs are by no means 
autonomous or neutral entities because they are closely associated with local 
authorities. They are led by the Director of Community and Enterprise. The key role of 
the Director is “to achieve a greater quality of service through the integration of the 
work and the budgets and the staffing and the structures of all of the actors who are on 
the ground, either directly as state agencies or funded by the state” (Interview NE 1a). 
In short, their key task is to facilitate the rationalisation process of the state-funded 
local-development sector.
114 County Strategy Groups were established in 1996 as a means to co-ordinate the activities of local 
development initiatives, i.e. APCs LEADER Groups, County Enterprise Boards and County Tourism 
Committees (DoELG 1996). These groups were actively involved in preparing the work of their 
successors, the CDBs.
115 In 1997, the voluntary and community sector became a formal partner in negotiating the national 
partnership agreement Partnership 2000.
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The vision of a democratic and lean local-development sector in Dublin was developed
in a 10-year strategy that is built around the core theme A City o f Neighbourhoods:
At the heart of the strategy is the concept of creating and sustaining self-sufficient 
neighbourhoods within the city. The Strategy is concerned with developing a 
sense of neighbourhood identity, vibrancy and spirit. It seeks to integrate services 
at neighbourhood level and develop bottom-up participative structures. Developing 
a City of Neighbourhoods is critical to achieving the rest of the strategy (Dublin 
CDB 2002: 7).
Instead of utilising existing structures that were experienced in building up community 
involvement from the grassroots, Social Inclusion Measure (SIM) Groups were set up 
as a local sub-structure of the CDB (NDP/CSF Evaluation Unit 2003). SIM Groups are 
entrusted with the following tasks (DoELG n.d.-b):
• to report on progress to both the CDBs and the Interdepartmental Task Force;
• to draw attention to the wider remit of forthcoming CDB strategies for the 2002- 
2012 period; and
• to locally co-ordinate social-inclusion measures116 outlined in the 2000-2006 NDP 
and the National Anti-Poverty Strategy117 (NAPS).
Their role in co-ordinating and implementing social-inclusion measures at the local 
level is formally acknowledged in the 2000-2006 NDP (Government of Ireland 1999: 
Sections 10.38 and 10.39). The NDP/ESF Evaluation Unit (2003) highlights the 
capacity of SIM Groups to provide a forum for actors from the local development arena 
and underlines their role in enhancing the position of local authorities. At the same 
time, it identified serious challenges that cast doubt on the capacity of both CDBs and 
SIM Groups to accomplish the ambitious task given to them (cf. Fitzpatrick Associates 
and ERM Ireland 2003). One of these was the co-ordination of “thirty-eight measures 
in the NDP, with eight government departments involved and over thirteen 
implementing delivery bodies” (NDP/CSF Evaluation Unit 2003: 64).
116 Social Inclusion Policy in Dublin is concerned with the societal re-distribution of benefits from 
economic growth among society. A particular focus rests on providing services and support structures 
for disadvantaged groups (Dublin CDB n.d.).
117 The National Anti-Poverty Strategy was launched in April 1997 as a means to ameliorate poverty by 
targeting five key areas that are of particular concern: income adequacy, unemployment educational 
disadvantage, urban concentrations of poverty and rural poverty. Over the period of the 10-year 
strategy it is envisaged to achieve a general reduction (i.e. a global target) in “numbers of those who 
are consistently poor from 9-15% to less than 5-10% (based on 1994 data) by 2007” (CPA 2000: 19). 
As a result of economic growth those numbers were already brought down to below 10% in the 
course of 1997. This development is part of the explanation for a shift of attention from the global 
target towards specific target groups under threat of poverty such as long-term unemployed, the 
elderly, low paid employees, large families and children, lone parents, people with disabilities and 
vulnerable groups (Travellers, homeless people, refugees, asylum seekers). The implementation of 
the NAPS received institutional backing through the establishment of a variety of support structures, 
the development and introduction of poverty-proofing and increasing collaboration with other EU 
member countries which is based on the amendments of the Amsterdam Treaty (cf. CPA 2000). 
Despite the NAPS, analysts observed a widening in relative income poverty and social polarisation in 
Ireland (e.g. Breathnach 1998, 2004; Allen 1999; Kirby 2002; Powell and Geoghegan 2004). The 
NAPS is complemented by National Action Plans on Social Inclusion (NAPs/incl). NAPs/inc. was 
developed by EU member states to counter trends that jeopardise growth and future social cohesion 
in the EU (CPA 2002).
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Table 6.2: Composition of the Dublin CDB as of June 2006
Sector Name Agency/Fu notion
Local Government
Brendan Kenny Assistant City Manager
Cllr Catherine Byrne Lord Mayor
Cllr Daithi Doolan Chair Economic Development and 
European Affairs
Cllr Paschal Donohoe Chair Environment and Engineering SPC
Cllr Brian Gillen Chair SPC
Cllr Mary Murphy Chair Housing, Social and Community 
Affairs
Cllr Michael Donelly Chair Finance and General SPC
Cllr Sean Kenny 
Cllr Michael Conaghan
Chair SPC
Local Development
Partnerships Joey Furlong Finglas Cabra Partnership
Brian Nugent KWCD Partnership
Des Bonass DICP Partnership
Tara Smith Rathmines Information and Community 
Services
City Enterprise Pat Lynch Chair
Board Greg Swift CEO
State Agencies
Jim Breslin/Fergal Black Health Service Executive
Frank Donelly FAS, Director
David Treacy Vocational Education Committee, 
Education Officer
Kevin Kavanagh Enterprise Ireland, Director
Brendan O’Sullivan IDA Ireland, Regional Manager 
-  East Region
Frank Magee Dublin Tourism, CEO
Anne Delaney Department of Social and Family Affairs, 
Regional Manager
Bill Donoghue Department of Justice, Equality and Law 
Reform, Chief Superintendent Pearse 
Street Garda Station
Stephen Falvey Department of Education and Science, 
Regional Manager
Social Partners
Employers Gina Quinn Chamber of Commerce, CEO Dublin
& Business Alec Drew Chamber of Commerce, Council 
Representative
Trade Unions Position Vacant
Community Úna UÍ Lachtnain Pobal, Chluain Tarbh
& Voluntary Brian Malone Chapelizod Residents Association
Brendan Dowding Irish Martial Arts Commission
Others
Carmel Brennan Dublin City Childcare Committee, Chair
Source: Dublin CDB (June 2006).
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In addition, the co-operation of other actors with SIM Groups is neither enacted by 
legislation nor formally regulated. Hence, the backing for SIM Groups is not 
mandatory. Evaluations find a lack of support from actors both at national and local 
level, mainly because (a) the absence of any rewarding system that encourages co­
operation and (b) the CDB’s institutional positioning outside the NDP and NAPS 
structures (NDP/CSF Evaluation Unit 2003). The lack of ‘buy-in’ from relevant players 
is an additional obstacle for SIM Groups to bring about greater collaboration among 
state-funded local development structures.
6.2.3 More streamlining through a new government department?
The Department of Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs (DoCRGA) was 
established after the general election in May 2002. It became the lead department for 
the local-development sector118 (Table 6.3 below).
Table 6.3: Overview of lead departments for APCs
Programme Period Lead Department Election year
PESP 1991-1993 Taoiseach 1992
OPLURD 1994-1999 Tourism, Sport and Recreation 1997
LDSIP 2000-2002 Tourism, Sport and Recreation 2002
2002-2007 Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs 2007
Source: DoCRGA (Pobail Press Office).
The department's role mirrors the philosophy of government renewal as outlined in
Better Local Government (DoELG 1996) and the Interdepartmental Task Force reports
(DoELG 1998, 1999a, 1999b, 2000):
There can be no doubt but that the establishment of the new Department of 
Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs offers tremendous opportunities to 
achieve greater integration and efficiency across the range of functions coming 
within its remit, thereby providing better delivery of services to our customers 
(DoCRGA n.d.-d: 22).
Prior to the establishment of the DoCRGA, the responsibility for local development 
was highly fragmented among various government departments with no central co­
ordinating mechanism (see Table 6.4). Among other roles, the department was given 
the remit to intensify links between the state and the local-development sector through 
tackling overlaps in remit, duplication of services and administrative dead-weight:
The Government is concerned at the multiplicity of structures and agencies 
through which local and community development schemes and programmes are 
delivered. There is an inherent danger of fragmentation and services and diffusion 
of resources. This can cause problems for communities in understanding and
118 In this process the responsibility for ADM, the national body responsible for administering APC-type 
structures, was transferred from the Department of Tourism, Sport and Recreation (DoTSR) to the 
Department of Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs (DoCRGA).
135
accessing funding and services on the ground (Ô Cuiv 18/06/2003: no page 
numbers).
Since the establishment of the DoCRGA, the most important forces of restructuring 
local development initiatives seem to have emerged from the tri-ministerial initiative 
(see Section 6.2.4) and the cohesion process (see Section 6.2.6). Table 6.4 below 
illustrates that a number of tasks concerning local or regional development issues 
were re-located from other government departments to the DoCRGA.
Table 6.4: Initiatives, programmes and strategies managed by DoCRGA
Initiatives, Programmes and Strategies Former lead department
- Local Development (POBAL, former ADM)
- National Drugs Strategy Team and the
- National Advisory Committee on Drugs (NACD)
Tourism, Sport and Recreation 
(now Arts, Sports and Tourism)
RAPID
Tourism Sport and Recreation, 
Environment and Local Government 
(now Environment, Heritage and Local 
Government)
LEADER, INTERREG, PEACE and C A R  
Western Development Commission_______
Agriculture, Food and Rural Development
Community and Voluntary groups 
• Functions under various charities legislation 
(including Commissioners of Charitable 
Donations and Bequests)
Dormant Accounts (Fund Disbursement) Board
Social Community and Family Affairs 
(now Social and Family Affairs)
■ Bord na Leabhar Gaeilge
■ Üdarâs na Gaeltachta120
■ An Foras Teanga121
■ Waterways Ireland
119
Arts Heritage Gaeltacht and the Islands
Source: Department of Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs (n.d.-d) (DoCRGA n.d.-d) and 
information provided in response to an enquiry by email from the press office (info@pobail.ieT
6.2.4 More cohesion through the tri-ministerial initiative?
A further step towards the integration of the local-development sector was the DoELG- 
initiated tri-ministerial initiative (Interview NE 5b). In 2003, the Ministers for 
Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs, Eamon O Cuiv, T.D. (FF), Environment, 
Heritage and Local Government, Martin Cullen, T.D. (FF) and Justice, Equality and 
Law Reform, Michael McDowell, T.D. (PG), came together to develop steps “bringing 
greater cohesion across local and community development programmes” (DoCRGA 
18/06/2003: no page numbers; cf. NDP/CSF Evaluation Unit 2003). The key objective 
of the initiative was to increase co-operation between government departments
119 The Irish Language Publishing Authority (Bord na Leabhar Gaeilge) supports publishers and authors 
to publish material in the Irish language.
120 The role of Udaras na Gaeltachta is “to preserve and strengthen the Gaeltacht and the Irish language 
so that strong, self-confident communities can emerge to achieve their full potential and enjoy a high 
quality of life” (Udaras na Gaeltachta no date).
121 “An Foras Teanga is engaged [...] in significant work relating to the promotion of the Irish language 
and of Ullans, as well as the promotion of Ulster-Scots culture” (DoCRGA n.d.-b).
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“whose work directly affects local and community development, so as to deliver the 
most practical and effective support possible to this sector” (ibid.). The tri-ministerial 
initiative resulted in a national review process of state-funded local development 
structures. The review consisted of three steps that were aimed at optimising the use 
of resources available for local development activities and strengthening democratic 
accountability of any service providers involved.
6.2.4.1 Step one: initiation of a national consultation process
In February 2003, a consultation process among various local service providers 
(statutory and non-statutory) was formally initiated by the DoCRGA in order to “attract 
an input from as wide as possible a range of bodies and agencies engaged in the 
delivery of services at a local and community level so as to inform the review process 
going forward” (DoCRGA 18/02/2003: no page numbers). In agreement with the social 
partners (DoCRGA 04/02/2004), the consultation process involved a dialogue with the 
actors in the field of local development operating under the umbrella of the Department 
of Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs (ADM-funded groups, the Community 
Development Programme, Local Drugs Task Forces, RAPID Groups, LEADER 
Groups), the Department of Environment, Heritage and Local Government 
(County/City Councils, County/City Development Boards) and the Department of 
Justice, Equality and Law Reform (County/City Childcare Committees).
As an integral part of the consultation process, a seminar was scheduled at the
Burlington Hotel in Dublin on 18 June 2003 (DoCRGA 18/06/2003). In the presence of
the three Ministers and representatives from groups involved and/or affected by the
consultation process, Michael McDowell, T.D. (PD), Minister of Justice, Equality and
Law Reform, in his opening address, placed the meeting into context by highlighting
the need for efficiency-orientated collaboration as the driving force for consultation:
Today's seminar is designed to bring everybody who is a stakeholder, by virtue of 
their participation or their position in this process to a common partnership, which 
is aimed at securing that our effort yields the maximum results for the societies 
and communities and the areas that we serve (DoCRGA 18/06/2003: no page 
numbers).
Minister Éamon Ó Cuív, T.D. (FF), highlighted the following objectives for the 
development of a strategy directed at streamlining state-funded local development 
structures (ibid.):
• strengthening the impact of current resources in terms of on the ground services, 
supports and benefits for local communities;
• streamlining structures to avoid overlaps, duplication and undue administrative 
overheads;
• bringing transparency, co-ordination and improved control to the funding of local- 
community development measures; and
• strengthening the democratic accountability of agencies and service providers in 
this area.
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The meeting was followed by the publication of a document that summarised the 
discussion at the consultation meeting. The document also outlined the next steps that 
were considered necessary to propel the reform of local development systems forward 
(DoCRGA 18/06/2003). It was proposed to review the status of ADM as the national 
monitoring body for APC-type local development structures. Another key 
recommendation was to enhance the collaboration between CDBs and APCs (Section 
6 .2.4.3).
6.2.4.2 Step two: review of Area Development Management
Area Development Management (ADM) was established as an independent
partnership company to administer funding for joint EU and national local development
activities on behalf of the Irish government (ADM 1994). Over time, ADM became a
channel for managing a variety of state-funded programmes. In 1994, ADM’s
responsibility was limited to administer the jointly-funded Global Grant for local social
and economic development. Since then, several national grants and programmes
have been added onto ADM’s agenda122. As a consequence, the amount of grants
channelled through ADM accounts has increased considerably123. Furthermore, the
government-driven transformation of ADM into a special-purpose body brought about
implications for the area-based local development programme (i.e. the LDSIP). As a
result, as one respondent remarked, APCs slipped out of focus:
It [ADM] has now become a very, very big organisation. The government has been 
using it for the last 4 or 5 years in particular. But even before that -  when they 
wanted to do something new in a socio-economic development area and the kind 
of idea didn't neatly fit into another state agency, be it the IDA [Industrial 
Development Agency] or FAS [National Training Agency] or Education 
[Department of Education and Science], they said, 'Sure. We have ADM. So we 
give it to them’. So ADM is now a bit of a catch-all organisation for new and 
innovative socio-economic programming that doesn't fit comfortably somewhere 
else. The thrust and the specialism and the emphasis on socio-economic 
integrated local development is only one of the many things it does. And that 
programme [the LDSIP] is now very much diluted because it is one of 7 or 8 major 
programmes. And therefore, there isn't the attention at senior management level 
and to give it the support it needs because senior management is spread across 
so many other programmes (Interview NE 1b).
As a result of ADM's increase in remit and budget, the government started to question 
(a) the performance of the independent special-purpose body and (b) the viability of 
sub-programmes administered by ADM such as area-based development agencies 
and community groups (Interview ADM 5). In the advent of the post-structural funds 
era, i.e. a period prior to 2006 that was characterised by decreasing share of EU
122 Apart from the EU-funded area-based approaches that were the raison d ’être for ADM’s existence 
(Bartley ef al. 1999), ADM's responsibility has been extended to administer the Special Support 
Programme for Peace and Reconciliation, the Equal Opportunities Childcare Programme, the Taxi 
Hardship Payments Scheme'22, the Dormant Accounts Fund'22, the Rural Transport Initiative 
Programme'2 , the Millennium Partnership Fund for Disadvantage'2, and the Revitalising Areas by 
Planning, Investment and Development (RAPID) programme (ADM 2004).
123 For example, in 2003 ADM received 134.15 million Euro as opposed to 7.150 million Irish Punt (9.08 
million Euro) in 1994, a nominal increase by the factor of 15 (cf. ADM, 1994, 2004). Within that period 
of time operating expenses increased from 0.18 million Irish Pound in 1993 (0.24 million Euro) to 7.39 
million Euro in 2003 representing a nominal increase by the factor of 31.
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resources to be managed by ADM, the Department (DoCRGA) commissioned 
economic consultants to review ADM. The consultants stated that their role was to 
assess “the appropriateness of the existing arrangements between ADM and 
-government departments and other stakeholders and the options for change having 
regard to accountability and cost effectiveness” (Indecon 2003: i). The report 
highlighted the changing context of programmes administered by ADM and expressed 
concerns about the organisation's quasi-autonomous status. The consultants claimed 
that ADM's modus operandi would not sufficiently reflect recent political developments, 
such as changes in management style, an increasing remit of the local authorities, a 
decline in long-term unemployment and a “deterioration in public finances” (Indecon 
2003: ii). In addition, several challenges and weaknesses within ADM structures were 
identified:
• the potential to improve cost effectiveness;
• the lack of formal alignments of ADM with government administration and national
policies;
• an accountability deficit with recipients of funding; and
• the duplication of services that interfere with recent efforts to achieve greater 
cohesion in the local government/local-development sector as mirrored in the 
establishment of CDBs.
Leading from there, the review suggests re-aligning ADM more closely under the 
umbrella of central government. The report outlines six possible scenarios for 
restructuring ADM each of which revolves around a perceived absence of (democratic 
and financial) accountability and sub-optimal systems regarding cost effectiveness. A 
clear affiliation is expressed for a strategy highlighting the necessity for ADM's special- 
purpose function “but to introduce a series of radical reforms to address the specific 
issues identified” (Indecon 2003: 42). In principle, the economic consultants proposed:
• to increase government involvement and control through organisational 
restructuring and tightening the reporting and performance-monitoring system;
• to introduce business principles through the development of contractual 
agreements with political sponsors of programmes and, taking into consideration 
the tendering for service supply (i.e. privatisation), to cut back on administrative 
costs; and
• to instigate knowledge transfer through a programme of selective secondments 
and “the possibility of the agency [i.e. ADM] providing specialist services to support 
the development of CDB's [sic] and the directors of CE’s124 [sic] and other local- 
authority programmes should be pursued" (ibid.).
The recommendations imply that ADM’s specialist knowledge and expertise is 
considered indispensable for central government in the restructuring of local 
governance. Minister 0  Cuiv, T.D. (FF), put it more reservedly in stating, “We know
124 The Director of Community and Enterprise (CEO of the City/County Development Board).
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and respect the critical value of the on-the-ground expertise that has been developed 
over the years” ( 6  Cuiv 18/06/2003). In comparison to the recommendations outlined 
in the Indecon Report, central government only moderately intervened by appointing 
three members to the board of ADM in 2004 (The Irish Times 10/03/2004). This could 
be interpreted as a step highlighting that both resources funnelled through ADM and 
decisions made by ADM are by no means by-passing financial or democratic 
accountability standards (The Irish Times 04/02/2004). From the perspective of APC 
professionals, however, the government-guided development of ADM is anticipated as 
just one step of a versatile approach to get the quasi-independent local development 
agencies closer to central control (Interviews APC 2a, APC 2b, APC 3a, APC 3b, APC 
4a, APC 4b, APC 7b and APC 9a).
6 .2.4.3 Step three: endorsement of APC plans
The third element of the cohesion reform is to align APC plans and activities to the 10- 
year social-inclusion strategies developed by City/County Development Boards 
(CDBs). The latter proposition requires an approval of APC’s mission-driven multi­
annual action plans by the CDB. Endorsement should be dependent on the 
compatibility of APC plans with the CDB’s 2002-2012 social-inclusion strategy. The 
objective is to support CDBs in their task to bring about greater cohesion in the 
delivery of local development services within their constituency (DoEHLG n.d.-a) and 
“to increase the democratic accountability of service delivery agencies and bodies” 
(DoCRGA 04/04/2007: no page numbers). Even though the endorsement initiative had 
been launched in 2003, when most agencies were already implementing previously 
agreed plans, local development agencies were asked to inform CDBs on how their 
plans would link to support actions outlined in the 10-year CDB strategy.
On 31 July 2003 guidelines were issued that provided a template for the endorsement 
process. A circular letter sent to the directors of the CDBs on behalf of the Minister of 
the Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government outlined steps 
towards adjusting local and community development structures and programmes in 
accordance with the findings and recommendations of the review process (Appendix 
2, Correspondence A-2.1). Even though the circular highlighted “that these are 
guidelines, not a straightjacket” (DoEHLG 06/02/2004: no page numbers), it cannot be 
ignored that the process of having APCs sent in their plans for the remainder of the 
LDSIP to the CDBs for appraisal125 as such was not subject to discussion. In spite of 
the absence of any legally-binding link between APCs and the Dublin CDB it is 
understood that resistance to co-operation would have come at a high cost:
All projects are expected to co-operate with this process. In keeping with existing
procedures, any project which refuses to submit a workplan to the Department or
CDB will inevitably prevent the issuing of its new contract, and will inevitably
125 Groups expected to comply with the endorsement process are: Area Partnership Companies, ADM- 
funded Community Groups, LEADER Groups, Community Development Projects, Core-funded 
Groups, City/County Childcare Committees and Local Drugs Task Forces (DoEHLG n.d.-a). 
City/County Childcare Committees have effectively been transformed into working groups that were 
subsumed into the CDB structures as a working group.
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prevent any prospect of budget increase to its community (DoCRGA n.d.-a: no 
page numbers).
A discussion document published by the DoCRGA reflects that the endorsement 
process met opposition at the local level:
It is evident from the contributions that there is a level of concern, even 
resentment, at the involvement, as part of the triministerial initiative, of the County 
and City Development Boards in the endorsing of agencies [sic] annual plans 
(DoCRGA n.d.-f: no page numbers).
The resistance is mainly based on the argument of existing co-ordination advanced by
local agencies. They argued that interagency co-ordination would already be practised
and would not be -  as indicated by central government-issued policy documents -  the
exception to the rule. For example, voices from within the local-development sector
responded “that there was already substantial cohesion and considerable inter-agency
collaboration in the implementation of social-inclusion measures by community
development and local development bodies” (Regan 2003: 1). This view has also been
expressed in the interviews:
But one of the things that's interesting is that in fact there's not a lot duplication on 
the ground. People talk about duplication. And what I do is trying to get the people 
to define what they mean by duplication, what they mean by overlap. Because 
everybody has a different perception of it. Everybody in the Dail says, "Oh, 
duplication everywhere!" [...] In fact when you get down to it, there is not so much 
duplication (Interview NE 3).
A review of the endorsement process in Dublin by Cowman (2004: 13) states that 
“there is no review at all of how the local development agencies are 
cooperating/duplicating each other, at city or local level, or how effective they are in 
addressing social inclusion”. He highlights that, from the perspective of APCs, the 
objective of the CDB-led process is unlikely to be achieved under existing conditions. 
In acknowledging the potential and benefits of promoting co-operation between actors 
involved, Cowman suggests to build “a framework of clarity and agreement on certain 
principles” (2004: 8). This could be a first step towards effectively addressing existing 
discrepancies between political rhetoric and institutional reality concerning various 
aspects such as:
• the geographical focus of collaboration between statutory stakeholders and APCs;
• the compatibility of targeted measures between agencies on the basis of their 
mission statements/given brief;
• the demarcation of responsibility between political forces driving ADM and the 
CDB; and
• the need for a harmonisation and reconciliation between participatory democracy 
and representative democracy (Powell and Geoghegan 2004; Lee 2006).
It appears that a powerful ‘narrative of duplication’ has been created as an effective 
policy tool to justify intervention into what is perceived as not being in conformity with 
the dominant political agenda. In this context, Smith (2004) underscores the effect of 
‘cognitive filters’ and belief systems that have a role to play in facilitating both the
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emergence and longevity of grand narratives and paradigms that determine the scope 
and thrust of political actions:
After all, the way in which actors behave is informed by the ideas they hold about 
the context in which they find themselves rather than the context in itself (Hay and 
Rosamund, 2002). It might therefore be argued that politics is not so much the ‘art 
of the possible’ but the art of what is perceived to be possible (Smith 2004: 510, 
emphasis added).
Such complex processes of ideation have a role to play in creating local realities that
appear to be unique at first sight and, hence, seem to contradict voices
overemphasising the effect of economic externalities for restructuring of national
economic and social policies (e.g. Blythe 1997). In the context of this study, it is
equally interesting to note that the proclaimed need for further steps towards cohesion
and streamlining among local development bodies is rather based on assumptions that
are not underpinned by 'hard facts':
While many of the contributions received from the agencies and bodies involved in 
the delivery of services claim a high level of co-ordination at local level, the feeling 
persists that there is considerable room for improvement. Of themselves, the 
structures that are in existence do not seem to provide a basis for formal coherent 
linkages or a common consistent approach across the range of problems that 
might beset any one particular community (DoCRGA n.d.-f, Point 8, emphasis 
added).
This raises the question as to whether or not analytical evidence exists that -  apart 
from feelings or perceptions -  could underscore the need for reformatory powers in 
local development systems targeted at increasing inter-agency co-operation and value 
for money-oriented delivery of LDSIP-funded social-inclusion measures. If such 
evidence is available, why is it not used in DoCRGA’s Discussion Document as the 
basis for arguing in favour of restructuring local governance? According to a special 
Value for Money Report (56) published in June 2007, Improving Performance -  Public 
Service Case Studies (Comptroller and Auditor General 2007), the institutionalisation 
of APCs under the 2000-2006 took heed of previous calls for measures addressing 
duplication of in the local-development sector (Comptroller and Auditor General 2000).
The thrust and direction of the re-organisation of the state-funded local-development 
sector in Dublin indicates that the initiative for tri-ministerial co-operation in regard to 
social-inclusion measures came from the lead department of the local authority, the 
Department for the Environment, Heritage and Local Government (Interview NE 5b). 
The introduction of DCC-affiliated local structures provides further evidence for the 
intensification of pressure on APCs to become integrated into state-led institutional 
reformatory processes (Figure 5).
6.2.5 Better value through new structures?
Despite the rhetoric of cohesion, which highlights the necessity for a better use of 
resources through streamlining local governance, even more players have been 
introduced into the institutional landscape of local development in the course of the 
LDSIP. Apart from institutional changes at the interface between local development
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initiatives and central government, additional structures were introduced at local level 
(Section 6.2, Figure 5). In accordance with the philosophy of public sector 
modernisation that is promoted by Irish government. Local Area Committees (LACs), 
Social Inclusion Task Forces (SITFs) and the RAPID programme have been 
established126:
• to step up the efficiency in local service provision;
• to improve the targeting of resources towards groups experiencing disadvantage; 
and
• to increase the overall effectiveness of social-inclusion measures.
These structures are associated with Dublin City Council and mirror strategic aims and 
objectives of the modernisation of public service management. This is so because, 
first, the Dublin CDB and RAPID work under the umbrella of DCC and, second, the 
CDB and their sub-structures not only include City Councillors and senior 
management team members of DCC but also operate in the same administrative 
boundaries. The membership of the CDB, RAPID and SITFs demonstrates strong links 
between the new structures and Dublin City Council (see Table 6.2 for the CDB, Table 
6.5 for RAPID and Table 6.6  for the SITF).
6.2.5.1 Better targeting through RAPID?
In the preparation of a new national partnership agreement, the 2000-2003 
Programme for Prosperity and Fairness, the community and voluntary sector 
suggested addressing high levels of multiple deprivation in disadvantaged housing 
estates and isolated rural areas (CWC 2000a). Eventually, twenty-five areas were 
identified and designated as the most disadvantaged areas in the state. Under the 
name Targeted Investments in Disadvantaged Areas (TIDA) the objective was 
envisaged to prioritise expenditures under social-inclusion measures of the 2000-2006 
NDP for locally tackling cumulative disadvantage. Finally, ideas and discussions 
around TIDA evolved into the establishment of 25 urban RAPID areas (Revitalising 
Areas by Planning, Investment and Development -  Strand 1), which was followed by 
the designation of 20 CLAR areas (Ceantair Laga Ârd Riachtanais 127 -  Strand 2).
RAPID was launched in areas that had already been targeted by APC-led actions. 
This move caused considerable confusion among both local communities and ADM- 
funded local development structures (e.g. Interview ADM 4; Interview APC 7a). In the 
context of restructuring governance, the focus of RAPID on extremely disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods aimed at improving the effectiveness of public funding allocations 
through better area-based targeting. It was suggested to utilise existing structures 
such as ADM-funded APCs and Community Groups to administer the RAPID 
programme because they could draw on issue-based expertise and local know-how
126 Throughout the interviews, the Strategic Policy Committees (DoELG 1999b) have not been 
mentioned as relevant players in regards to processes influencing the role of APCs.
127 Whereas RAPID targets urban areas, CLÂR targets disadvantaged provincial towns (DoCRGA n.d.- 
f).
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(cf. CWC 2000a). Instead, RAPID Area Implementation Teams (hereafter AITs) were 
established as yet another player into the institutional arena (Tables 6.1 and 6 .6). 
According to the empirical data, APCs were considered as a possible home for the 
RAPID initiative but, as one respondent put it, “the Department of the Environment 
went ballistic when Partnerships were discussed as possible candidates for RAPID” 
(Interview NE 3, emphasis added; also Interview ADM 4). Respondents from different 
backgrounds interpret the RAPID initiative as pilot aimed at testing the waters for a 
local authority-led approach for local development initiatives in poverty-stricken areas 
(Interview DCC 8). A local-authority official summarised the RAPID programme as 
follows:
RAPID is dying a death. It’s a complete mess. They wouldn’t use Partnerships.
Dublin City Council would not have allowed them to use Partnerships. But this has 
now created another layer and I believe it’s dying a death on the ground in terms 
of the Area Implementation Teams being dysfunctional -  they have now created a 
monster (Interview DCC 3b).
As a basis for withdrawing funding from statutory bodies, AITs were asked to draft a 
strategic plan based on a local needs analysis. This was announced “some months 
after the area partnerships had completed the same process for the same areas” (O 
Broin 2003: 46). Led by co-ordinators appointed by the local authority, representatives 
on the AIT were largely recruited from agencies already represented on boards of 
APCs (Table 6.5).
Table 6.5: Composition of RAPID Area Implementation Teams in Dublin
Area DCC* StateSector**
C&V
NFP*** 1
Community
Representative Other****
Finglas 2 5 4 1
Ballymun 2 7 3 1 2
Northside 3 6 4 2
North West Inner City 2 6 2 4
North East Inner City 4 3 7 4 2
Ballyfermot 2 2 3 4
South West Dublin City 2 4 2 1
South Inner City 2 5 3 5 2
South East Inner City 3 5 3 2 2
Total 22 43 31 24 8
Per cent 17.2 33.6 24.2 18.8 6.2
* Dublin City Council: AIT Co-ordinator, Councillors
** FAS, Health Service Executive (HSE), An Garda Siochana, Department of Social and 
Family Affairs (DoSFA), Education institutions, City of Dublin Youth Services Board 
(CDYSB),
*** Community &Voluntary Sector/Not-for-profit: Usually APCs, Local Drugs Task Forces 
and Community Development Projects 
**** Independent or unspecified
Source: Information provided by AIT Co-ordinators by telephone or email.
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Assuming that central government does know the operational mode of government 
departments in terms of work organisation and budgeting the following question arises: 
how, and under what circumstances, was the marriage between the idea of flexible 
mission-driven budgeting -  that would have allowed for front-loading monies from 
subsequent budgets for RAPID areas -  and the realities of the annual funding line 
budgets of government departments and statutory bodies conceived manageable? 
The interview material also suggests that the absence of (a) legally-binding contractual 
agreements, (b) an explicit legislative mandate or (c) other -  non-enforceable but 
profound -  incentives, reduces the potential for the development of an integrative anti­
poverty strategy for disadvantaged neighbourhoods because statutory support for 
RAPID areas depends entirely on good will.
6.2.5.2 Going local through SITFs and LACs?
In the case of Dublin, the division of the city into five administrative areas was followed 
by the introduction of Local Area Committees (hereafter LACs) and Social Inclusion 
Task Forces (hereafter SITFs) (Figure 5). LACs were introduced as part and parcel of 
local government renewal (Government of Ireland 2001), which resulted in a 
decentralisation of local-authority operations throughout the city. LACs allow 
councillors to have an increased influence within their constituency and represent a 
relaxation of central powers. Monthly meetings with the respective local authority’s 
area manager serve as a forum to discuss a wide range of issues such as planning, 
traffic, service provision and housing estate management (Dublin City Council n.d.-b). 
A DCC official speculated that LACs might take over functions from CDBs in the 
medium term:
The ideal situation is just to have 5 area committees and having them do 
everything. So I would see in a few years time that the area committee would 
subsume the Social Inclusion Task Force. I see the Local Area Committees 
subsuming a few structures on the ground (Interview DCC 7).
Whereas LACs are directly operating under the aegis of Dublin City Council, SITFs 
can be understood as the local outreach body of the Dublin CDB (Section 6.2.2). They 
were established as sub-divisions of the Social Inclusion Measure (SIM) Groups of the 
Dublin CDB (see Section 6.2: Figure 5). The SITFs were set up in each of Dublin's five 
administrative areas in order to “provide a more local application of both the National 
Anti-Poverty Strategy (NAPS) and the City Anti-Poverty Strategy128 (CAPS) by 
preparing an area-based anti-poverty plan” (DoELG n.d.-a: no page numbers). It was 
envisaged that members of SITFs would consist of “senior staff of statutory agencies 
that have a major input into social inclusion measures” (Dublin CDB 2004) and 
government-funded agencies that are considered to have “primary responsibility for 
the delivery of social inclusion measures into the city” (DoELG n.d.-a: no page 
numbers).
128 A strategy prepared by the SIM Groups. It is based on the assumption that government-funded 
community and statutory agencies can deliver thematic, target-group related and area-based social 
inclusion measures and, thereby, complement the overall development strategy for Dubln city (cf. 
DoEHLG n.d.-b).
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Avoiding administrative overlaps, the area covered by each SITF is consistent with the 
jurisdiction of DCC's new LACs. Looking at membership representation at the SITF, it 
becomes evident that the links between Dublin City Council and the Dublin CDB come 
full circle. Table 6.6 indicates that the representation at SITF level is somehow ‘top 
heavy’ in the sense that local authority is the biggest single body represented. The 
operational boundaries of the SITFs match DCC's division of Dublin into five 
administrative areas. This process of decentralisation did not take into consideration 
the existing boundaries of partnership neighbourhoods or catchment areas of statutory 
agencies.
Before the establishment of SITFs, APCs were already engaged in a plethora of
administrative activities. These include performance monitoring and other legally-
binding contractual proceedings with their political paymasters (usually via ADM), the
new CDB-led endorsement process and relationships with a variety of sponsors, local
groups and agencies they interact with (e.g. FAS, Local Drugs Task Forces,
Vocational Education Committees, the Gardai, RAPID, collaboration with the
business/private sector etc.). Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that SITFs are
regarded by APCs as yet another layer of administration that requires engagement of
scarce internal resources of APCs, for example, in form of maintaining new inter-
organisational linkages and the provision of staff for reporting, proof of networking and
co-ordination (Interviews APC 2b, APC 9a and APC 11). There is evidence that the
SITFs did not manage to engage successfully with relevant stakeholders. The lack of
collaboration from both statutory bodies (‘primary partners’) and local development
agencies (‘secondary partners’) is illustrated with the dominance of DCC’s influence in
shaping the agenda of SITFs. APC-type agencies maintain that local authorities in
Dublin have not developed the expertise that would justify taking a dominant position
in playing a leading role in social local development:
Dublin City Council is using the language of local development but they don’t 
understand the concept. No skill, no expertise, no understanding. Dublin City 
Council is the killer. Social Inclusion Task Forces need to be outside the City 
Council agenda. All people attending the meetings are of a low order. They are not 
committed at all. The Social Inclusion Task Force is not working (Interview APC 
11).
At the grassroots level, the introduction of SITFs and RAPID is perceived as an 
additional bureaucratic layer that, first, has contributed to institutional fragmentation 
and, second, in combination with a general feeling of dissatisfaction regarding 
previous involvement, has resulted in a general sense of “meeting fatigue” (e.g. 
Interview LV 5). Moreover, the establishment of new structures increased the 
competition among local development bodies for commitment from ‘the big players’, in 
particular competition for senior board representation from statutory agencies (see, for 
example, Tables 6.2, 6.5 and 6 .6). In this context, APC professionals expressed 
concerns that influential and resourceful statutory agencies have become increasingly 
reluctant to commit themselves to proactively supporting local committees in 
disadvantaged areas (e.g. Interviews APC 2b and APC 11).
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There is speculation among DCC professionals that the position currently occupied by
SITFs might be usurped by other players in the field of urban governance. One
respondent, for example, feels that APCs could take over the role of SITFs:
If Dublin City Council decided that Partnerships are well-placed to deal with social 
exclusion, then there is no reason why a service-level agreement could not be 
entered between Dublin City Council and the Partnerships. Partnerships would 
then operate a social-inclusion agenda on behalf of Dublin City Council. So then 
you would not need Social Inclusion Task Forces as Partnerships could replace 
them (Interview DCC 8).
Even though the statements concerning the relationship between APCs and LACs or 
SITFs are mere speculations of DCC officials as to what might happen in the future, 
they illustrate that the thrust of governance changes is directed at controlling the 
resources and, ultimately, the agenda of APCs through the local authorities. Against 
this backdrop, the government-initiated cohesion process (see below) is a plausible 
step towards bringing the state-funded local-development sector under the remit of 
local authority-managed structures.
Table 6.6: Members of Social Inclusion Task Forces in Dublin
Area Members DCC RAPID* Statutory** APC Community
North Central 12 1 1 7 1 2
North West 12 1 2 5 2 -
Central 11 2 2 6 1 -
South Central 14 2 2 6 3 1
South East 13 4 1 6 - 2
TOTAL 62 10 8 30 7 5***
Per cent 100 16.2 12.9 48.4 11.3 8.1
* RAPID operates under the aegis of DCC. AIT Co-ordinators are on the payroll of Dublin City
Council (DCC)
** Majority are from the National Training and Employment Agency (FAS), the Vocational Educational
Committee (VEC) An Garda Siochana, the Health Service Executive (HSE), Probation and Welfare 
Service and the Department of Social and Family Affairs (DoSFA).
*** 4 are from the Dublin City Community Forum that operates under the umbrella of the Dublin City
Development Board (which is affiliated with DCC).
Note: In total 18 members (29.1 per cent) of SITFs represent organisations or groups that work under 
the umbrella of Dublin City Council; nearly 50 per cent are from the statutory sector.
Source; Dublin City Council, Press Office (August 2006).
6.2.6 The cohesion process: prelude or showdown?
The cohesion process is particularly suitable to illustrate and analyse the nature of 
statutory-led efforts towards re-centralising the state-funded local-development sector. 
In a chain of moves, formerly semi-autonomous APCs were effectively co-opted into 
the apparatus of the state (see Section 6.2, Figure 5 and Table 6.1). Changes in 
Dublin’s governance landscape that came to affect APCs under the LDSIP resemble a
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process of ‘creeping institutionalisation’ that was facilitated through the ethos of public-
sector reform (Government of Ireland 2001). The White Paper Better Local
Government published by the Department of the Environment in December 1996, and
reports by the Interdepartmental Task Force (see Chapter 1, Section 1.4.2) already
pointed towards aligning APCs closely to local government structures:
We were putting together a White Paper or a local policy reform paper, called 
'Better Local Government' which [...] saw the local development bodies, including 
area partnerships, very firmly rooted within local government, certainly very closely 
aligned to it, under the leadership of the local authority [...] What was needed was 
a vision of how all the public services would come together, at county and city 
level, operating under a number of principles, like partnership, and equity, and so 
on and so forth. And that the outcome would be a more seamless delivery, and 
cohesive delivery, of services for the citizen at the local level. And that the County 
and City Development Boards would be established to achieve that purpose 
(Interview NE 5a).
Against this backdrop, efforts to increase the influence of the local authorities on local 
APCs converged into the cohesion process, which started in 2003 with the review of 
local development structures that was initiated by the tri-ministerial initiative (see 
Section 6.2.4). On 27 September 2005, after the completion of the review of the state- 
funded local development sector, senior officials129 from the Department of 
Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs (hereafter DoCRGA) gave a briefing on the 
cohesion process in the Regency Hotel. Circular LG 16/05, which was issued to APCs 
on 13 September 2005, outlines the main objectives and goals of the cohesion 
process (DoCRGA 13/09/2005). According to Minister O Cuiv, T.D. (FF), the rationale 
for the cohesion reform was to find a response to social and economic challenges 
within a changing and more diverse Irish society (O Cuiv 07/09/2006). The Minister 
stated that state-funded services delivered through APCs and other players “have 
developed over time in a haphazard, uncoordinated way” and that the fact that 
individuals who live in pockets of disadvantage outside targeted areas and “who 
urgently need services from the State but who are not getting them [...] is absolute 
madness” ( 6  Cuiv 07/09/2006: no page numbers). According to Minister 0  Cuiv, the 
overall objectives of the cohesion process are:
• to improve local delivery of statutory and state-funded services;
• to streamline state-funded structures “so as to avoid overlaps, duplication and 
undue administrative overheads” {ibid.y,
• to optimise the funding and governance structures of local development 
organisations; and
• to strengthen the democratic accountability of state-funded local development 
organisations.
These objectives led to the extension of APC catchment areas to accommodate the 
needs of disadvantaged individuals and groups currently not qualifying for services 
offered because they live outside catchment areas of APCs (for example the Local
129 Brian Milan (Assistant Secretary General) and Susan Scally (Principal Officer: Review of Structures 
Committee/Dormant Accounts).
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Employment Service (LES) or the Millennium Fund operated by APCs130). Minister O
Cuiv requested -  where practicable -  a re-alignment of APC boundaries to match
City/County council areas so that country-wide overarching unified structures for the
delivery of state-initiated programmes are in place by 1 January 2007. This is to lead
“to a more cohesive approach to tackling the problems of disadvantage through social
and economic programmes” (DoCRGA 27/09/2005: no page numbers). On 31
December 2005 the DoCRGA issued a press release stating:
[...] These changes will make it much easier for communities who are tackling 
disadvantage to access a wide range of local and community development 
programmes. I am very happy to see that the organisations involved are 
embracing this process of streamlining and I have no doubt that the communities 
they serve will benefit greatly (DoCRGA 31/12/2005: no page numbers).
The provision of € 7 million once-off funding to support the local restructuring was 
made available in a competitive bidding process to LDSIP-funded community 
organisations. Applicants were tasked to develop plans as to how the objectives 
outlined by Minister O Cuiv, T.D. (FF), could be best implemented in their catchment 
area. However, in the case of Dublin the assessment of funding applications from 
APCs underwent a lengthy process, which slowed down the creation of country-wide 
overarching structures addressing symptoms of social and economic disadvantage131.
The cohesion-guided approach of a blanket delivery of social-inclusion work shifts the 
centre of attention from tackling distinct spatial disparities with a focus on addressing 
neighbourhood effects (Haase and McKeown 2003; Lambe 2007), to a more generalist 
approach of designing welfare-related activist measures for specific target groups. 
Overall, the cohesion process implies a move away from the area-based approach to 
local development towards a target-group oriented approach with a focus on the tailor- 
made support of services, which dovetails with the philosophy of promoting a more 
cost-effective bureaucratic logic in governance (DoT 2004; NESC 2005; McCarthy 
2007).
Centrally-driven efforts to change the mode of conduct of local development schemes 
in Dublin resulted in the creation of a complex institutional superstructure that operates 
at various spatial and institutional levels (see Section 6.2, Figure 5). As a new layer of 
public administration and special-purpose bodies propels the integration of local 
development systems (NDP/CSF Evaluation Unit 2003; O Broin 2003; Cowman 2004), 
there is some indication that “there has been considerable confusion and no little 
tension generated because of real and perceived overlaps of responsibility arising from 
this additional layer of social inclusion planning administration” (Regan 2003: 1). 
However, according to respondents from government departments or DCC, the idea of
130 Cf, FÀS (n.d.-b) and Pobal (n.d.-b).
131 Moreover, discussions around exceptions in regard to the exact re-alignment of APC boundaries with 
administrative boundaries of local authorities (e.g. Northside Partnership operated in Dublin North 
Central and County Fingal) and the co-existence of more than one APC-type agency in one local 
authority area (e.g. Ballyfermot Partnership, KWCD Partnership and Canal Communities Partnership 
being located in Dublin South Central) could not be resolved before the end of the LDSIP.
149
cohesion is clearly based on the assumption that there exists a lack of coordination of 
services on the ground:
At local level there is a myriad of semi-quangos tripping over themselves with no 
co-operation between them whatsoever (Interview DCC 8).
Interviewees were generally sympathetic towards the concept of cohesion. The idea 
for the creation of a forum that facilitates the collaboration between local development 
agencies and statutory bodies was welcomed by most respondents. More particularly, 
APC professionals originally saw the calls for cohesion as a possibility to create a 
neutral space where all parties with an interest in, or responsibility for, local 
development can meet and discuss the joint development of concerted measures that 
would use resources in a more effective way. However, especially respondents from 
ADM and the APCs held the view that the Dublin CDB cannot provide such an 
environment because it is considered to be overly controlled by DCC. The Director and 
staff members of the CDB were mainly recruited from public administration and are on 
the local authority’s payroll. Even though the CDB’s board representation is diverse, it 
is apparent that Dublin City Council dominates the Board (see Section 6.2.2, Table
6.2):
The leadership role of the CDB is expressed in a number of ways. It is expressed 
by the fact that the chief executive of the CDB is a senior official from the city or 
county council. The main staff and resources to support the work of the boards are 
located in the county and city council. The elected members, or a number of the 
elected members, known as the chairs of the strategic policy committee plus the 
chairman or mayor of the council sit on the board, as does the county manager.
So that’s the leadership role. Among a membership of thirty-odd, roughly one 
quarter of the membership are from the local authority. They are leaders, they are 
key influencers but it is not a dictatorship (Interview NE 5a).
Respondents from APCs felt that the close affiliation between the Dublin CDB and the 
city council kept APCs and statutory agencies from pro-actively engaging with the 
CDB (Interviews APC 3b, APC 4b, APC 7b and APC 11). They argued that the 
establishment of the CDB and its sub-structures, as well as the DCC-led RAPID 
programme, represent an imposition of parallel structures into the APC-type system. 
Moreover, the required representation from statutory bodies on new structures would 
lead to a competition among local groups for getting commitment from key 
stakeholders to join their boards. Together, the Dublin CDB, the 9 RAPID AITs and the 
5 SITFs have 82 individuals from the state sector represented on their boards (see 
Tables 6.2, 6.5 and 6 .6 ).
APC professionals found that the cohesion process has only been rhetorically 
promoting interagency collaboration and integration among local development 
agencies. Their experience has led them to assume that the cohesion process is a 
measure that paves the path for incorporating APCs into a local authority-dominated 
governance network. Some asked that if the CDB is about better coordination and 
integration between statutory service delivery and local development, then why are the 
statutory bodies that are represented on the CDB (see Table 6.2) not requested to
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have their plans approved? In contrast, when asked about the objectives of the 
cohesion process, some government officials and most DCC employees gave an 
account of how a lack of coordination among a plethora of state-funded local 
development agencies led to an under-utilisation of 'taxpayer’s money’. APCs were 
criticised for:
• duplicating services instead of developing innovative projects for mainstreaming;
• following cumbersome and undemocratic decision-making procedures; and
• for being overly process-oriented, which would result in a slow implementation of 
projects.
These views could not be substantiated by findings of the NDP/CSF Evaluation Unit
(NDP/CSF Evaluation Unit 2003):
[...] the lack of coordination is not necessarily among the local development 
bodies because in fact the Partnerships had a good level of co-operation with 
state agencies. But the co-operation between state bodies is not there -  the 
Department of Education is not talking to FAS, FAS is not talking to the Health 
Board and so on. And in those areas we have large sums of public money. There 
is a distinct lack of coordination and interagency collaboration there among them.
So it was decided that the [Interdepartmental] task force would then, as well as 
coordination, it would look at the issue of better public service delivery at the local 
level to the client by eliminating duplication, by ensuring coordination to a better 
public service delivery. And that’s a bigger task that integrating local government 
and local development, if you think about it. But in fact the focus seems to be on 
the Partnerships (Interview NE 3).
At first sight, CDB, SITFs and the RAPID programme appear to be an additional layer
of public administration that contradicts calls for greater integration, less confusion and
avoiding duplication, which were the very reasons for the introduction of CDBs
(DoELG 1998). A DCC professional, however, described the establishment of parallel
structures that were perceived by APC professionals as a duplication of the existing
state-funded local development system as a strategic prerequisite for the integration of
APCs into the public sector-administered governance network:
These additional layers of administration are required to allow the integration of 
Partnerships into the system to happen in a structured way (Interview DCC 8).
In this context, the realignment of APC boundaries with administrative areas of Dublin 
City Council re-enforces the notion expressed by some respondents that the cohesion 
process effectively aims at incorporating APCs into the local government system132. A
132 No such demands were made to statutory agencies with a stake in issues concerning local 
development such as the Health Service Executive (HSE), the Training and Employment Authority 
(FAS) or the Vocational Education Committee (VEC). Adshead (2003: 118) highlights that those 
special purpose agencies “with devolved powers and decentralised administrations all operate 
boundaries to suit themselves” and that these boundaries in fact do neither coincide with one another 
nor with the local authority boundaries. Chubb (1992: 263) describes this situation as “a jungle of 
administrative areas that is both impenetrable to the ordinary citizen and frequently inconvenient for 
any kind of business that involves more than one authority or regional organization”. It is interesting 
that statutory bodies with considerable resources are allowed to operate in administrative units that 
are suboptimal for multi-agency cooperation in important areas of public service provision whereas 
APC-type agencies operating in designated areas -  and on relatively meagre budgets -  are not 
allowed to cross council areas. It is not within the remit of this thesis, however, to investigate into 
these matters.
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senior DCC official provides a more detailed explanation for an authoritative 
implementation of the cohesion strategy:
See, there was a big push from the Partnerships. They wanted control over all the 
social-inclusion measures. And their boundaries don’t match with our boundaries 
at all. So there was a strong view that we took at that time that this all needs to 
come under the umbrella of the local authority. The best way of doing that is that it 
had to be the same areas as the City Council Area Committees but that it wouldn’t 
be subsumed into them because they wouldn’t have accepted that. So, you know, 
what’s happening is that in a very slow kind of process that we will get full 
integration in a few years time [...] the local government structure should be the 
main structure. It should be the structure for dealing with everything that moves in 
the city including social inclusion and local development issues. [...] I believe that 
we are being used by ADM and CRAGA [i.e. the DoCRGA] to make the decisions 
that they don’t have the guts to make. They are putting us in a situation here, “OK, 
you are complaining for years about the funding. Here! Make these hard decisions 
yourself now!”- And they can blame us for the decisions then because 
Government Departments are reluctant to be the bad guys. And in time I will see 
the CDB making those hard decisions (Interview DCC 7).
The cohesion process, from this perspective, is seen as an opportunity to facilitate the
integration of APCs into the sphere of local government. This is justified by means of a
perceived authority, or tacit consent, that allows DCC to take ‘hard decisions’ on behalf
of government departments. The agenda of DCC is illustrated by another statement
extracted from the same interview, which was carried out in late 2004:
The organisations that have been set up certainly don’t want to be subsumed.
They're afraid. And they feel threatened. So what we have to do is do it gradually 
over a number of years [...] We have the structures and we have the financial 
systems. So all the funding for local development should come through us. And 
we are better positioned to be held accountable for it and we are better positioned 
to account for it. Both sides. We are better positioned to make the organisations 
accountable. Some of the organisations that are out there are very useful and very 
welcome. They do some work out there that we will never be able to do. But there 
should be much more Integration. They should be doing work and getting paid for 
it. We would pay for it. We could pay for it. And that, in time, will change. It’s 
moving gradually and I think these organisations see the writing on the wall 
(Interview DCC 7).
Empirical evidence points out that partnership-type structures acquired an expertise in 
local development that is now sought to be mainstreamed into the statutory apparatus 
under the umbrella of the local authorities (cf. Government of Ireland 2001; Adshead 
2003; DoEHLG n.d.-a). The empirical material presented so far clearly indicates that 
APCs have been incorporated into a local-authority-administered governance system 
that has been re-designed to prioritise the development of (welfare-related) services to 
disadvantaged individuals and groups, rather than developing area-based strategies 
that support particularly marginalised neighbourhoods (Roche 26/11/2005).
Taking into account the weak position of APCs vis-à-vis their political masters -  as
they completely rely on statutory core funding -  it is extremely challenging for them to
elevate themselves into a position for negotiating their future role within the new
governance landscape:
Making Partnerships and other small players co-operate and having their plans 
endorsed by the CDB is a cheap shot by government because they are so
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dependent, have so few resources and such a small budget. They are the small 
guys. But government is not attempting to make the big hitters proving their plans 
with the CDB -  because they are the big boys and they can resist and cause 
trouble. Partnerships, however, can be kicked around; they area the small fry 
(Interview NE 1a).
How ‘being kicked around’ could manifest is illustrated by a letter from the DoCRGA 
circulated together with Guidelines on the Governance o f Integrated Local 
Development Companies and Urban Based Partnerships to APCs in April 2007. The 
cover letter outlines a joint proposal put forward by the DoCRGA and the DoEHLG. It 
suggests “revised arrangements in relation to the board membership and mandate of 
integrated companies and urban based partnerships and appointment by Government 
of the Chairs. This concludes the current phase of the cohesion process” (DoCRGA 
04/04/2007: no page numbers). The letter also states that APCs should pursue “a 
cohesive approach with other national and local agencies, including county and city 
development boards” (ibid.) and that this co-operation “must operate in harmony, and 
maintain close liaison, with all State agencies and local authorities and other official 
structures within its operational area and should avoid duplicating the activity of other 
bodies” (/b/'d.)133. More explicitly, APCs are expected to participate in CDB structures 
through board representation134. APCs had little scope to re-negotiate, or even resist, 
entering a relationship with the Dublin CDB (cf. also Finnegan 2005 - see Appendix 2, 
Correspondence A-2.3):
Is there a way Partnerships could get around the CDB?
No there is no alternative. Co-operation with the CBD is the only way forward for 
them. Do you know Star Trek?
Yes.
Do you know the Borg [Aggressive alien species half machine half human]?
Yes.
It’s [the Dublin CDB] like the Borg. Do you know what they say to their enemies?
No.
Resistance is futile (Interview DCC 8).
Even though APCs and other LDSIP-funded local development initiatives are 
independent companies limited by guarantee, the departmental guidelines circulated in 
April 2007 prescribe changes to the board structure that interfere with the company’s 
autonomy. In essence, it stipulates the size of the board, its composition by sector, the 
procedures and mechanisms through which board members are elected or appointed, 
and potentially limits the possibility to get senior members from statutory bodies on 
board. Whilst highlighting democratic principles and transparency in decision making 
and nominating community representation onto the board, the letter omits information 
on the criteria and reasons that were the basis for arriving at the proposed composition
133 In this context, it is worth noting that most respondents from APCs, APC-affiliated individuals, ADM 
and one senior civil servant at departmental level reported that a lack of initiative in regard to co­
operating and liaising is a characteristic feature of the Irish statutory apparatus (see Section 6.4.5). 
This implies that a harmonisation of relationships between APCs and the state can only be successful 
if both sides make an effort -  and, hence, consider it relevant -  to work towards a collaborative 
working model that is responsive to vertical institutional learning (cf. OECD 1996).
134 Dublin APCs have two CEOs as their representatives on the Dublin CDB.
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of the board135. According to the draft guidelines, representation from the social 
partners and members of the Oireachtas (Senators and T.D.s) on APC boards is 
envisaged to be curtailed. If these guidelines are agreed, this will undermine the long- 
established partnership principle of consensual decision making on APC boards, which 
was based on a parity of esteem and equal representation among social partners, 
community representatives, statutory agencies and public representatives.
Moreover, it is indicated that the selection procedures for community representatives 
require approval from the DoCRGA and -  if ministerial approval is denied -  also 
foresee a mediation role for the director of the CDB. As mentioned further above, 
APCs are de jure  private companies limited by guarantee. The draft guidelines, 
however, ignore the formal (de facto) independence of APCs. According to the draft 
guidelnes, the DoCRGA request to have the chairperson of APCs appointed by the 
Minister for Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs, Éamon Ô Cuiv, T.D. (FF). APCs 
have to change their constitution accordingly (i.e. their articles and memorandum of 
association). The guidelines highlight the importance of democratic legitimacy, public 
accountability and good governance, which requires a board to “have the appropriate 
balance of public expertise, experience and local involvement to oversee the executive 
functions of the Company” (DoCRGA 04/04/2007: no page numbers). The 
departmental guidelines also demand better internal evaluation and checks to be 
devised to ensure a governance model that can demonstrate transparency in financial 
transactions and that ensures “that the Company has appropriate robust controls and 
systems of risk management In place” (ibid.). The recommendations for restructuring 
APCs are similar to proposals made in the Indecon Report for restructuring ADM 
(Section 6 .2.4.2), which illustrates the more general move towards:
• a professionalisation of the state-funded local-development sector in accordance 
with business-like governance models; and
• bringing state-funded companies that target societal disadvantage based on a 
model of participatory democracy under government control.
The draft guidelines outline a scenario where the state-funded local-development 
sector ceases to exist as a local version of the national social partnership model with 
the four pillars -  trade unions, statutory bodies, community representation and public 
representatives -  being equally involved in decision making, which is at odds with the 
following aspects:
• local partnership arrangements have been identified as a recipe to address the local 
democratic deficit in Irish governance (OECD 1996; Walsh 1998);
135 For example, urban APCs are asked to have no more than 18 board members, limit board 
membership to 5 community representatives and a maximum of 3 representatives from the trade 
unions and employers and, moreover, reduce public representation to 3 city Councillors (this has 
implications for APCs that have national politicians on their boards). Moreover it is proposed to have 
5 board members from the statutory sector, 1 from the local authority and 1 from the County/City 
Enterprise Board (DoCRGA 04/04/2007).
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• APCs have received international recognition and were identified as a showcase to 
demonstrate innovative approaches to local development in disadvantaged areas 
(OECD 1996, 2001, 2005a, 2006, 2007); and
• a reported lack of joined-up thinking and co-ordination between government 
departments and related agencies, such as An Garda Siochana, FAS, the Health 
Service Executive (HSE), Vocational Education Committees (VECs) and the local 
authorities (Interview NE 1 and NE 3; Interviews APC 2a, 3b, 7a, 9b and 11).
Government departments are perceived to be driven by territorial thinking that prohibits 
reformatory or meaningful interdepartmental and, more generally, multilateral 
collaboration, which is experienced as an obstacle to constructive co-operation (e.g. 
Interviews APC 1a, APC 4b, APC 9a, APC 9b and APC 12; Interview LV 5) (cf. 
NDP/CSF Evaluation Unit 2003; Pobal 2006a). It remains to be seen whether and how 
an envisaged transfer of know-how from APC organisations into more effective forms of 
governance can be followed through in a concerted way that continues to allow APCs:
• to pursue their research and developmental brief of ‘trial and error’ as requested by 
their funders;
• to promote community empowerment based on principles of bottom-up 
participatory democracy;
• to realise their potential to make an innovative contribution to the Devolopmental 
Welfare State (DWS)-model (NESC 2005); and
• to encourage the mainstreaming of successful outcome-oriented projects into the 
statutory apparatus (ADM 2000; NESC 2005; Pobal 2006b).
6.2.7 More democracy in local governance?
Policy documents reviewed (see Chapter 4, Section 4.3) stress the importance of 
fostering participative approaches among APCs alongside with measures directed at 
maximising the impact of resource spending, reducing bureaucracy and creating more 
flexible programmes. Contemporary developments in the institutional environment of 
APCs, however, suggest that there is still no suitable mechanism that motivates 
constructive and meaningful co-operation and vertical learning between central 
government institutions, special-purpose bodies and state-funded local development 
organisations (Powell and Geoghegan 2004; Lee 2006). The integration of 
participatory approaches into decision-making processes is equally felt to be 
obstructed by traditional top-down thinking, inter-institutional/-departmental turf wars 
and personal power-struggles behind the scenes. So systemic resistance of various 
kinds has adverse effects on the planned re-structuring of governance within which 
APCs are firmly embedded (e.g. Interview ADM 4; Interview NE 1a; Interview APC 2a).
The piecemeal and fragmented progress of collaboration between APCs and statutory 
agencies and a lack of institutional learning from locally-developed innovative actions 
has long been identified as a problem that is thought to be rooted in the over-reliance
155
on the commitment of key individuals from within the statutory apparatus (Turok 2000;
Watters 12/04/2000):
I would argue [...] that the experience of Partnership Companies and Community 
groups over the last number of years has, in direct contradiction to the 
aforementioned rhetoric, demonstrated that in practice the commitment, input and 
resources necessarily required from the statutory sector at the local level in order 
to implement responsive and integrated projects varies considerably and is often 
dependent on the quality of, and commitment of senior management support given 
to, individual statutory representatives at the local level (Watters 12/04/2000: 5).
Interpersonal networking seems to be a characteristic feature of policy-making in 
Ireland at all levels (Komito 1984, 1992, 1993; Callanan 2002; Marshall 2002; Murphy 
2002; Adshead 2003). The research confirms that this is also evident for the work of 
APCs, which makes them dependent on their ability to form relationships with key 
decision-makers (see Sections 6.3 and 6.4). However common or unspectacular this 
accustomed attitude may be perceived among civil servants and politicians or even 
among citizens, it illustrates a friction between the rhetoric of representative 
democracy and public accountability, on the one hand, and political practice, on the 
other.
The OECD (1996), besides acknowledging the potential of APCs to encourage vertical
institutional learning throughout the statutory system, highlighted the capacity of APCs
to address a democratic deficit in Irish society through promoting participatory
democracy. The interview material indicates that recent efforts to align APCs with local
government structures have challenged the autonomy of APCs and, furthermore, that
the potential for participatory democracy as a complementary model to representative
democracy has also been undermined. Actors involved at central level generally stated
that APCs were initially envisaged to promote a needs-based approach to local
development with a view to enabling participation from below. However, there is
empirical evidence that the potential for such an approach is probably very limited and
unlikely to be tolerated because putting bottom-up principles into practice could
jeopardise vested interests of statutory stakeholders involved:
Partnerships [APCs] were set up to promote a bottom-up process -  but only if it 
suits us, not as an absolute. So is this now all being sacrificed? Or what parts 
would it be? We will only do bottom-up when and where we need it or where it 
makes sense for us. Because you will never get consensus with the local 
community on controversial issues. So we do it where it suits us to give people a 
sense of involvement, not as an absolute. Where it doesn’t suit us we ignore it and 
we live with that contradiction. In the end people have a short memory (Interview 
NE 1c).
The single biggest issue brought up by those respondents working within central or 
local government is the challenge participatory democracy poses to representative 
democracy. A few civil servants expressed the view that participatory democracy 
promoted by APCs undermines representative democracy; it bears the threat of local 
activists using their involvement in APCs as a way to compete with and/or bypass 
publicly elected politicians -  despite the fact that APCs invited public representatives
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onto their boards in 1999 (Interview DCC 8 ; Interview APC 7b)136. It sounds
somewhat hollow, however, if civil servants and public representatives argue for
representative democracy as the ultimate and sole form for decision making because
the re-structuring of governance seems to be shaped from within government
buildings rather than by democratically-elected representatives (and voters do not
elect the administration):
All this rationalisation process concerning local government and Partnerships is a 
movement from government -  and I don’t mean the government in power. I mean 
it is coming from the heads of departments, which are the real government. Never 
mind the politicians because they believe that there is the possibility of having two 
forms of democracy, which is universal suffrage and representative democracy on 
one side and then this other participatory democracy (Interview DCC 8).
A similar, almost cynical, attitude towards the mandate of democratically elected local
politicians seems to prevail within council offices in Dublin:
The public reps depend on papers prepared by the officials. The City Manager and 
his staff have concertedly written papers. But we are not elected in a strict sense.
And we would have certain preconceived ideas [...] Management in here is like 
the real government. [...] I think we will reduce the number of elected 
representatives at local level and professionalise it. That’s what you’re going to 
have if you want to see real democracy (Interview DCC 2).
Against this backdrop, it is no wonder that the best option considered by DCC to cope
with the concept of participatory democracy is to bypass local state-funded structures
involving community representation and pursue a strategy of co-option when
discussing local developments:
We need to get the community on board and get buy in from them through 
providing incentives -  and this happens at the expense of full economic value for 
money. But we still make a profit. The best option for us is to bypass the 
Partnerships and deal directly with the residents as the Partnerships can be a 
buffer and act against us; they just drag the process on and on. We may start 
inviting local reps onto the local area committees but we will have to look at who 
suits us (Interview DCC 7).
DCC’s ethos of seeking input from selected local actors torpedoes the bottom-up
principle of participatory decision making. The local authority in Dublin is inclined to
invite groups to the table that neither challenge their pro-growth agenda nor their
ambition for both authority and control over state-funded local development initiatives
(Bartley and Shine 2003). The interview material suggests that DCC may involve local
groups and individuals that are associated with the community. But participation
appears to be limited to those individuals and groups that are likely to become allies
and agree to the agenda pursued by the city council:
There are very powerful lobbies in Ballyfermot such as the Co-op [Ballyfermot 
Area Action Co-op] who see themselves as representing the community even 
though they don’t actually have a directly elected mandate. So you go beyond 
them and deal directly with local communities (Interview DCC 6).
Still, there is evidence that public representatives see community representation on APC boards as 
competitors (e.g. Interview APC 3a) (cf. Powell and Geoghegan 2004).
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In contrast, APCs are expected:
• to focus on outreach activities and developmental work with local groups and 
individuals that are worst affected by structural disadvantage;
• to facilitate a process through which local citizens from disadvantaged 
areas/backgrounds can -  on par with other stakeholders -  become involved in 
decision-making processes affecting the community.
Apparently, there exist two diametrically opposed practices of local participation that
need to be integrated into an overarching structure. Whereas APCs were given the
agenda to promote participation based on a parity of esteem in decision making
between those segments of civil society that usually do not engage in traditional
political processes, the local authority chooses the path of least resistance. The
cohesion process pursues the development of a more effective model of governance
through merging traditional forms of centralised public administration with more local
and innovative approaches to engage with civil society. An example was given by a
community worker in Ballyfermot who commented on observations made in regard to
the local development approach taken by the DCC-led URBAN II Initiative:
URBAN came here with a very set idea. And listening to their manager could 
make you believe he had a prototype in his head as to what the area needed; and 
I went to the consultation meetings and they would not respond to your ideas, you 
wouldn’t be listened to. Because in the end they decided to do things their way.
And we did not necessarily ask to be integrated into their decision-making 
structure in such an organised and bureaucratic way (Interview LV 4).
According to the interview material the key challenge is to agree on a kind of
participatory approach that can sustain the idea of an effective and inclusive
governance model for Dublin:
The City Development Board should bring people around the table from statutory 
agencies that can take decisions on funding and that can engage with local 
players but they cannot achieve it. And it is very important for the success of the 
City Development Board that that gets sorted out and that they involve themselves 
in participatory democracy. If they can do that then town hall is the right place for 
social-inclusion measures (Interview APC 2a).
Taking into account (a) the different ethos between public sector-administered 
approaches to involving actors from civil society in decision making (mainly through 
co-option and material incentives) and (b) strategies practiced by APCs (mainly 
through trust and voluntary commitment), it seems unlikely that common ground can 
be found without an external mediation mechanism that is accepted by all relevant 
actors involved in Dublin's governance landscape. Contemporary trends in 
governance suggest that APCs are part and parcel of what can be described factually 
as a localised top-down strategy (e.g. Storey 1999).
6.2.8 Summary
Under the LDSIP, a succession of steps was targeted at pulling APCs closer under the 
control of official statutory agencies. The empirical material reviewed and the 
interviews carried out indicate that these developments are based on a centrally
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designed strategy directed at aligning APCs with local authority-administered 
structures. Dublin City Council diversified from being a provider of basic infrastructure 
and was re-positioned to become a more influential player in both economic 
development and urban regeneration projects. Backed by the 2001 Government Act, 
the local authorities started claiming a stronger role for overseeing social-inclusion 
measures that had been managed by ADM. The reformation of local governance in 
Dublin is characterised by the political will to allow for an increasing influence of local- 
authority-led structures, which effectively is a demonstration of public authority to both 
APCs and their management and support agency, ADM.
Empirical data supports the view that the institutional restructuring pursued under the 
cohesion process resembles a glacial movement towards implementing the stated 
core objective of the Interdepartmental Task Force: to integrate local development and 
local government systems (see Chapter 1, Section 1.4.2). The analysis of Dublin’s 
changing governance system leads to the conclusion that state-funded local 
development approaches will probably be increasingly orchestrated from within the 
public sector. The findings from the case study suggest that the decentralisation of 
DCC-structures and the ‘colonisation of the urban governance system’ with DCC- 
affiliated and DCC-staffed local development structures at its centre represent 
government efforts to encourage a stronger affiliation between APCs and the local 
authority. In some of the interviews, in particular those with national experts, it 
transpired that the lead department of the local authority, the Department of the 
Environment, Heritage and Local Government, had considerable interest in the launch 
of the cohesion strategy.
Government statements and publications make ample reference to the SMI as a 
guiding principle for public-sector reform and for the envisaged alignment of APCs 
alongside newly established local structures associated with local government under 
the cohesion process (see Section 6.2, Figure 5). Respondents from government 
departments and DCC particularly stress their preference for a more accentuated role 
of APCs in supporting public service delivery. They also emphasise the necessity for 
tackling perceived deficiencies within the state-funded local-development sector that 
are at odds with key principles of public administration reform.
The establishment of a new government department in 2002 with a responsibility for 
state-funded local development initiatives and programmes facilitated the NPM- 
inspired rationalisation agenda propagated by the SMI. The Department of 
Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs was tasked to achieve a better coordination 
and quality of service delivery provided by state-funded local-development sector to 
citizens. It plays a central role in promoting the streamlining of local development 
structures under the cohesion process. Comments from government officials and 
senior DCC employees confirm that the cohesion process originated in the strategic 
approach to promote and implement a systemic compatibility and harmonisation of
159
local development and local government systems that culminated in the Local 
Government Act 2001. In other words, the cohesion process and its implications for 
funding arrangements of APCs has been informed by the business-like ethos of public- 
sector modernisation and, ultimately, the core principles of the SMI (see Chapter 1, 
Section 1.4.2).
Government-initiated reviews of ADM (Indecon 2003) and local-development 
structures (Comptroller and Auditor General 2000) concluded that the contemporary 
practice of funding and administering the state-funded local-development sector is not 
cost-effective. Both reports generally criticised the duplication of service provision and 
unsatisfactory procedures in terms of ensuring democratic and financial accountability. 
In other words, it was claimed that a multiplicity of largely un-coordinated structures 
operating with little government control results into a fragmentation of service delivery 
and, hence, an underutilisation of taxpayer’s money. These arguments were reinforced 
by government officials and professionals from the public sector. In contrast, 
respondents from APCs or those affiliated with APCs call into question the value of 
focusing on scrutinising the state-funded development sector. They, in turn, argue that 
a lack of inter-departmental co-ordination and joined-up thinking at government level 
and between statutory agencies are to blame for inefficiencies highlighted in 
government-initiated reports. Accordingly, professionals from APCs experience the 
cohesion process as a DoEHLG-led encroachment on APC’s institutional 
independence, which is considered detrimental to the development and 
implementation of innovative concepts addressing disadvantage through participatory 
models. Most respondents from APCs perceive new structures such as RAPID or the 
SITFs as a duplication of what is already there. This, however, emerges in a different 
light when seen from the perspective of the local authority or central government 
(Section 6.2.6).
In regard to the overall objectives for governance reform, views expressed by DCC 
professionals and government officials mirror the priorities outlined in the reports of the 
Interdepartmental Task Force. For example, DCC employees clearly stated that new 
structures were set up to prepare the ground for an institutional alignment of APCs 
with DCC and its sub-structures in order to increase the influence of DCC on both 
setting priorities for local development and controlling actions of APCs. Individuals who 
promote governance re-structuring from within the statutory apparatus justify the 
systemic alignment of APC with DCC-administered structures by spreading ‘narratives 
of duplication’ (see Section 6.2.6) and giving accounts of ‘over-colonisation’ of 
community space by state-funded local development agencies that ‘are tripping over 
themselves’. The same group of respondents argued that contemporary malpractice 
and procedural deficiencies in administering APCs would jeopardise good governance 
and, effectively, a cost-efficient use of taxpayer’s money (which implies adverse 
effects for the competitiveness of the Irish economy).
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The streamlining of multi-stakeholder local development programmes through a
government-initiated process is expected to bring about substantial challenges for the
operation of state-funded APCs. This can, for example, be illustrated by the
traditionally torn relationship between local communities in working-class areas and
the local authority. Community workers from the case-study area stated that any group
that is somehow associated with the local authority is looked upon as suspicious by
the locals and would find it difficult to build meaningful relationships with the
community (Interview LV 1). A DCC professional who works in the case-study area
observed that “local groups in Ballyfermot think that a lack of government and local
government involvement are partly responsible for deprivation. So they would have a
very close eye on me as well in terms of what they expect to come out of this”
(Interview DCC 1). One APC professional found that “Dublin City Council became an
aggressive and arrogant player that uses the language of local development but does
not understand the concept” (Interview APC 11) and it was felt that the Dublin CDB
operates in a similar fashion:
The City Development Board is looking at gaining control rather than achieving 
greater integration -  and in this order. The other way around might have brought 
along local players more easily [...] And I believe that they if they went through the 
integrative route the control would come with it. And I think it would come with a lot 
more people on board rather than the other way round (Interview APC 8).
Whereas respondents involved at departmental level or from DCC mainly see APCs 
as a vehicle to achieve the creation of local economies of scale through facilitating the 
alignment of local initiatives with local-authority structures, APC managers, board 
members and staff expressed a different view. Even though most APCs professionals 
generally acknowledged that the concept of cohesion was a good idea it was also 
stressed that the management of the cohesion process should have been delegated to 
a neutral clearing house; not to a structure staffed by and operating from within DCC 
offices because this stifles genuine co-operation from both statutory and community- 
based organisations (e.g. Interviews APC 4a and APC 11). APC professionals and 
board members voiced concerns:
• that the planning of the cohesion process took place without any consultative 
exercises involving APCs or other organisations affected by it, which calls into 
question the concept of participatory democracy;
• that DCC and affiliated structures lack the experience of social-inclusion work and, 
therefore, are not necessarily in a position to organise the cohesion process;
• that the obligatory endorsement of their plans by the Dublin CDB undermines the 
autonomy of APCs as independent companies limited by guarantee;
• that the cohesion process ignores the need to have parity of esteem between 
stakeholders involved in partnership arrangements (see Table 6.2 for the 
composition of the board of the Dublin CDB); and
• that the cohesion overly focuses on the institutional interface between formally 
independent state-funded local development initiatives and local government whilst
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we 11-resourced statutory bodies are not required to re-visit their modus operandi or 
to have their plans endorsed.
In the current situation APCs seem to be caught up in an institutionakmuddle which is 
characterised by efforts to locally implement the objectives of the current cohesion 
process and local authorities and affiliated official structures demanding more control 
over local development processes. This was reported to result in a distraction of 
energy and resources that endangers the achievements of APCs’ programmatic 
objectives. The following two main sections explore the degree to which (a) alterations 
concerning changes in accountability and monitoring arrangements and (b) the 
growing significance of business-inspired proliferation of value-for-money principles 
impact on the systemic compatibility between public administration and local APCs.
6.3 Accountability and monitoring arrangements for APCs
The purpose of this section is to de-construct the accountability practice that is part 
and parcel of funding arrangements designed for APCs. The allocation of funding to 
APCs follows a variety of contractually-agreed accountability procedures. These 
should ensure a certain degree of financial and public accountability of APCs. 
Accountability is a complex concept (Bunda 1979; Miller 2002; Considine 2002; 
Sullivan 2003). A useful working definition is provided by Lessinger who sees 
accountability as “the product of a process. At its most basic level, it means that an 
agent, public or private, entering into a contractual agreement to perform a service will 
be held answerable for performing according to the agreed-upon terms, within an 
established time period, and with a stipulated use of resources and performance 
standards (Lessinger, 1970: 21)” (Bunda 1979: 358).
A more specific description of accountability is offered by Considine (2002) who
observed that contemporary forms of public-sector modernisation led to the devolution
of political power to public administrations. He argues that performance-based budgets
and management regimes give “greater power to officials but do not increase the
institutional means to have them account for what they do” (Considine 2002: 27).
Considine purports that traditional forms of vertical accountability between parties that
are directly connected through top-down reporting structures are not designed to
capture the complexity of shared responsibilities within new governance structures
and, therefore, need to be coupled with a horizontal dimension of accountability to
make up for emerging accountability deficits:
This horizontal dimension raises questions about the nature of agency and thus 
the accountability of agencies not lined up under a vertical mandate. A diffusion of 
goals and interests complicates any assumption regarding the purpose of action 
itself. Such differences also call for different instruments to exact whatever 
accountability is deemed important. In this environment, contracts may become 
more important than commands, and performance is measured as output rather 
than process (Walsh) (Considine 2002: 27).
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An APC is typically answerable to political paymasters, local stakeholders represented 
at board level and the local community. APCs are situated at the interface between 
political paymasters and targeted communities (i.e. the designated beneficiaries of 
APC activities). This requires a two-way flow of reporting in terms of vertical 
accountability, ‘upwards’, to the funders; and ‘downwards’, to the local community. The 
main objectives of being answerable are as follows:
• ‘upwards’, to account for the orderly implementation of their programme of 
activities and monies received and spent; and
• ‘downwards’, to account for the establishment of an inclusive modus operandi.
The latter should, first, respect the importance of participatory principles that “support 
and enable the voice of the ‘real’ poor” (Lee 2006: 21) and, second, ensure the 
appropriate investment of resources according to the priorities identified by the local 
people. The ‘double-accountability’ of APCs suggests ownership of the process to both 
political sponsors and local stakeholders. In the context of this study, the ‘sideways’ or 
horizontal dimension of accountability refers to relationships between APCs and those 
parties that are responsible for supporting the work of APCs. These include, for 
example, stakeholders and interest groups that are represented at board level and 
other potential partners with a public or moral responsibility to make meaningful 
contribution to collaborative development of disadvantages areas. Considine’s view of 
accountability as the “core property of the systemic interactions between separated 
actors sharing responsibilities for outcomes” (Considine 2002: 23) succinctly captures 
the multi-dimensionality and complexity of accountability relationships within which 
APCs are embedded.
Changes in the wider institutional framework and public management reforms in 
Ireland led to the development of evidence-based policies that required a 
corresponding performance-oriented budgeting system (e.g. DoT 2004), which is 
mirrored in the sophisticated and complex auditing system of the LDSIP (see Table 6.7 
below). The following sections show that the pressures generated by existing 
accountability and monitoring practices overemphasise the assessment of quantifiable 
and tangible results at the expense of the pursuit of people-centred process-oriented 
activities. Previous research indicates that current accountability practices reduce the 
potential for genuine grassroots involvement and democratic accountability because 
APCs feel obliged to “focus on the requirements of formal networking and reporting in 
order to justify activities of funding” (Bartley and Borscheid 2003: 240).
6.3.1 Reporting requirements
Table 6.7 shows that the upward accountability mechanism of state-funded local 
development programmes consist of complex reporting and performance-monitoring 
requirements. An array of arrangements -  consisting of reports, eligibility criteria, 
guidelines for programme development and time frames -  monitor the implementation 
of contractually-agreed actions and corresponding expenditure of earmarked funding
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by APCs. The existing accountability mechanism is considered capable of, first, 
controlling the use of public resources within an agreed-upon funding period and, 
second, making sure that the outcome of programmes and actions implemented by 
APCs meet the expectations of both public funders and the designated beneficiaries of 
the local development programme (ADM 1995, 2000; Pobal 2006a).
But the local community also demands accountability from APCs. The community 
representatives on the board of APCs are mandated to influence policy and strategy of 
the company in a way that its programmes and actions are tailored to meet local 
realities on the ground and adhere to an anti-poverty and equality policy mirrored in 
the LDSIP (ADM 2000). This necessitates democratic processes of electing and 
choosing local representatives as equal partners onto the board of the APC, which 
requires the proactive local promotion of participatory approaches to engaging with 
local residents and groups. In order to avoid tokenistic or self-appointed representation 
on APC boards, it is pivotal to devise transparent procedures that yield appropriate 
and authentic stakeholder representation in decision-making structures.
In this context, ADM highlights the need for APCs to be accountable to their
communities and facilitate and promote appropriate participation from disadvantaged
individuals through inclusive procedures and other developmental support. Moreover,
poverty proofing is required to justify legitimacy of measures and actions outlined in
strategic plans of APCs (e.g. Lloyd and Kennedy 2003; Lloyd and Geraghty 2004).
According to guiding principles proposed by the Department of Community, Rural and
Gaeltacht Affairs (DoCRGA 04/04/2007, 31/07/2007a, 31/07/2007b), however,
participation from the community and voluntary sector137 on the board of APCs is to be
sought from established community organisations and networks with a social-inclusion
agenda. Only little reference is made to facilitating the involvement of those
considered the ‘targets’ of partnership action:
We have a community platform. And the community platform is meant to be 
represented of community people representing all the areas. But I think if you 
actually look at the make up of the community platform, there is a high proportion 
made up of sports clubs. It's not necessarily individuals representing communities 
(Interview APC 8).
ADM’s Integrated Local Development Handbook outlines criteria for board
representation from the community and voluntary sector as follows:
The community and voluntary sector will comprise organisations active in 
economic and social development in the area and which are able to contribute 
effectively to the local development initiative (ADM 1995: 12, emphasis added).
Apart from highlighting the importance of including interest groups addressing 
programme-related disadvantages and target groups, no elaborated process-oriented 
strategy is in place that attends to the task of securing appropriate representation of 
marginalised individuals in decision-making fora.
137 The term 'sector itself suggests a degree of organisational professionalism that is required for being 
included in decision-making.
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Table 6.7: Formal performance monitoring and reporting requirements for APCs
Measure T ools/Mechan isms What it consists of
SCOPE
APCs submit quarterly reports that are captured in an ADM-administered database called SCOPE (Systems for Co-ordinated 
Programme Evaluation) The database is an effort to capture both quantifiable and qualitative achievements of an APC. These 
data are used by POBAL to inform the lead department (DoCRGA), the Monitoring Authorities (i.e. one Monitoring Committee in 
the BMW Region and one in the S&E Region) and the Community Support Framework Unit in the Department of Finance 
(Appendix 3, Table A-3.1).
Financial Returns Quarterly financial report on all LDSIP-related expenditures.
Annual POA
The Programme of Activities (POA) outlines costs, targets, strategic partners, beneficiaries for each set of actions as a means to 
inform the appraisal process and the allocation of funding to the APC (Appendix, Table A-3.2),
Annual Target Sheet 
(ex ante targets)
Agreement on the number of clients, children, individuals, groups, initiatives and networks envisaged to support through 
programme actions across the three measures of the APC (see also SCOPE).
Performance
Monitoring
&
Evaluation
Annual Case Stud(y)ies
Participation of APCs in one research study per year to assess the qualitative dimension of the work outlined in their programme of 
activities.
Annual Report
Summary on activities and achievements names of board members (and the sectors they represent), staff and positions held, 
most recent audited accounts, recent publications and research projects, other programmes managed, case studies and annual 
financial allocation to each proqramme.
Strategic Plans
Submission of a long-term (6-year) and a short-term (3-year) strategic plan that entails a socio-economic profile and a SWOT 
analysis of the area (the latter outlines Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats). It also outlines the objectives and the 
strategies through which identified issues are envisaged to be achieved. The strategic plan is (a) bound to the life time of the 
National Development Plan and (b) must be compliant with the 2002-2012 strategy of the City Development Board as the
designated overarchinq body for coordinating local development initiatives in Dublin.
Budget Parameters
Prescription of bands for budget allocation under each of the following measures (excluding administration costs): 
Services for the Unemployed: 40 - 65 per cent 
Community Development: 25 - 40 per cent 
Community Based Youth Initiatives: 15 - 25 per cent
POBAL Liaison Officer Attends board meetings as ‘ex-officio’ (no voting right), provides developmental support, challenges, oversees progress and operations and assesses annual performance (appraisal report).
APC Board Receives progress report on operational matters and programme actions.
Matching Funding Amount of extra-resources levered is monitored by POBAL and positively acknowledged in future budgets (cf. ADM Handbook1995: 16).
Implementation
Approach
Delivery 
(frowned upon)
Direct provision of locally needed services to target groups in communities on a pilot-basis.
Agency (accepted) Subcontract others to provide services to target groups.
Brokerage (ideal) Engage in activities that encourage existing delivery agencies to tailor services to meet local demand of target groups.
Collaboration
Conciliatory 
(frowned upon)
Risk-avoidance with little visible commitments to pro-actively engage with others.
Take initiative and ownership of processes leading to positive change and challenging the status quo not high on agenda.
Model Co-operative (accepted) Issue- or project-based co-operation with others in order to facilitate the achievement of common objectives.
(Himmelman) Progressive (ideal) Outcome-oriented model based on a joined-up thinking and collaboration (partnership approach) that brings along other local stakeholders and programmes on an equal footing in a meaningful way.
Source: ADM (1995; 2000); Pobal (2006a); Interview material.
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In a simplified way, the extreme positions of political sponsors and local stakeholders 
in regard to their viewpoint on accountability can be reflected as follows:
• the former mainly focus on tangible services and actions funded or ‘purchased’ 
(financial efficiency) with a view to demonstrating good use of public resources to 
the voting taxpayer (Interviews NE 1b, NE 3, NE 4, NE 5b and NE 6); and
• the latter strive to somehow increase the decision-making capacity of 
disadvantaged communities with a view to producing relevant and long-lasting 
outcomes at the local level that are meaningful to those considered poor and 
marginalised (procedural effectiveness) (Interviews APC 1, APC 3a, APC 6 , APC 
8 , APC 10 and APC 11; Interviews LV 1 and LV 5)138.
In regard to changes in the area of public accountability, empirical evidence points out
that the state-funded local development programme tends to privilege financial
efficiency over procedural effectiveness, which undermines the concept of
participatory democracy:
There’s politics, there’s paperwork, and there’s people. And if we get tied into 
doing the politics and paperwork -  what happens to the people? There has to be 
equal respect for the people. But I need to be able to project and get trapped in 
bureaucracy and paperwork because we create so many layers of paperwork and 
so many layers of evaluation -  evaluate, evaluate, evaluate! (Interview LV 5).
In terms of financial accountability, one respondent commented that “we are not asked 
to produce more output locally but to be more accountable to our funders” (Interview 
APC 11). It is generally felt that the demands for financial control are at odds with the 
relatively small amount of funding allocated to APCs (see Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2, 
Table 2.1):
The amount of administration and paperwork Partnerships have to do is a farce if 
you look at the amount of money involved (Interview APC 9a).
Respondents also reported that the disproportionate increase in staff time being tied 
up in bureaucratic procedures such as financial control and programme evaluation 
procedures reduces the scope for pursuing bottom-up processes directed at 
developing actions addressing poverty and social marginalisation (cf. Lee 2006). Even 
in early 2003 an ADM professional commented that “ADM and Partnerships may well 
shift to a delivery agency for government programmes rather than being an 
experimental type of organisation” and that “it looks as if civil society and the 
community and voluntary sector is going to be dumped” (Interview ADM 1).
6.3.2 Outlining good practice: a case of being ‘ high-profile’
State-sponsored local development measures in Ireland operate in an institutional 
environment where the allocation of funding is increasingly based on compliance with 
bureaucratic accountability practices, the utilisation of competitive bidding processes 
and a business-like contract-culture (Bartley and Borscheid 2003). As a result, the
138 It is Interesting to note that, when asked about the development of accountability criteria, nearly all 
respondents exclusively referred to financial procedures in place.
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allocation of funding is only to a certain extent dependent on the actual degree of 
disadvantage of an area. Empirical evidence suggests that, when making decisions on 
the spatial disbursement of funding among APCs, two sets of indicators apply: a set of 
formal criteria that determine the allocation of funding operating in tandem with a 
variety of less tangible and rather unspecified ‘extra criteria’ that assess the 
performance of the individual APC on the basis of competitive indicators. The former 
set of indicators includes quantifiable indicators such as the population size and the 
degree of deprivation as measured by common statistical indicators (Small Area 
Health Research Unit 1997; Haase 1999; Pringle 2002). These indicators are 
complemented by a less straightforward qualitative assessment of the paperwork and 
case studies submitted (Pobal 2006b). The importance of promoting successful 
flagship projects is also emphasised because they generate public awareness and 
function as examples that justify the subsidies channelled into designated 
disadvantaged areas (Walsh et al. 1998; McCarthy 1998; Turok 2001). Therefore, 
even though not directly stated, the perceived marketing ability’ of APCs is considered 
a crucial indicator for the allocating resources (Bartley and Borscheid 2003).
Empirical research carried out under the LDSIP suggests that informal criteria function 
as a filter through which ‘good partnerships’ are intended to be identified and, 
subsequently, to be awarded by means of the resources funnelled into ‘their’ area: 
because “when they are high-profile [...] and their leaders are high-profile then it’s 
easier for them to go to the state and say, “We need money to do this and we need 
money to do that”. When they are not high-profile they have to explain who they are” 
(Borscheid 2001, quoted from interview with APC Staff on 08/06/2000).
The necessity to secure the commitment of senior officials and nationally prominent 
figures from influential organisations, statutory bodies and major employers on the 
board of APCs was highlighted by respondents from all quarters as a key variable for 
success. For example, the involvement of a powerful personality as leader on the 
board of an APC facilitates contacts with key decision-makers from potential funding 
organisations, statutory bodies and/or economic players. This is a crucial element in 
achieving the maximum for the area, be it for financial or other support. As a result, 
lobbying and informal networking on a personal basis -  thriving on a strong Irish 
tradition of lobbying and political brokerage (cf. Komito 1984, 1993, 1992) -  play a 
significant role in determining the potential of APCs to draw down funding and 
overcome perceived obstacles at the interface between statutory bodies and APCs on 
the other (cf. ADM 1995, 2000; Pobal 2006a).
In seeking to establish what makes for a successful APC, Turok’s (2001) report for the 
OECD supports the argument that it is the calibre of individuals that can be won from 
statutory bodies and partner organisations to actively participate in the local 
partnership structures that proves crucial in determining the strength of the individual 
APC. In other words, just like in the process of receiving core funding from ADM, the
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importance of being considered a ‘good organisation’ or ‘high-profile’ is instrumental 
for successful coalition-building, lobbying, canvassing and leveraging extra resources 
(Table 6 .8). As a consequence, the local community is potentially dependent on the 
quality of ‘their’ APC as perceived by political paymasters and other funders that invest 
into an area.
Table 6.8: Indicators for good performance and 'high profile’
Indicator What it tries to capture
Leverage funding •  The am ount o f additional funding levered (i.e. add itional to core 
funding)
•  The num ber o f partners supporting the APC financia lly
• The quality o f the plan “because money will fo llow  a good plan” 
(Interview  NE 3)
Public Relations •  The recognition o f an APC by the com m unity and by agents 
outside the loca l-developm ent sector
•  The num ber o f launches o f evaluations and reports
•  The m edia coverage such as the num ber o f occasions being 
quoted in local and -  even m ore im portant -  national newspapers
•  The reputation o f the com pany
Leadership •  The calibre or profile o f the Board; in particular the capacity o f both 
Chair person and the CEO
Perception • The com pliance w ith procedures and protocols based on the opinion 
and experience o f the ADM  Liaison O fficer
• The num ber and the profile o f governm ent agencies and strategic 
partners that w ork with an APC
•  The acknow ledgem ent given to statutory funders o f successful 
program m es developed by APCs
• The capacity to establish ‘F lagship Projects' and encourage 
m ainstream ing o f innovative projects
Governance •  Good m oney m anagem ent and reporting system s in place
•  Com m unity invo lvem ent -  especia lly from  target groups -  on board 
and sub groups
•  Good internal econom ies as indicated by HR practices and sta ff 
training (e.g. Excellence Through People Award and the introduction 
o f the Q-mark).
•  Q ualifications and capacity o f staff
•  E fficiency and transparency o f decision-m aking structures
Source: Bartley and Borscheid (2003) and empirical data.
All the above implies that -  as a precondition to acquiring action ability -  APCs must 
develop the institutional capacity to ‘build bridges’ and create multiple (interpersonal) 
ties at the interfaces between all kinds of relevant local and extra-local stakeholders. 
Therefore, local APCs are highly dependent on producing marketing, communication 
and leadership qualities (e.g. Stewart 1998). As first steps, local APCs typically strive 
to create a sphere of trust, find common denominators and, in due course, achieve
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shared understanding and to maximise consensus around key issues and workable
strategies as the foundation stone for collaboration (Interview APC 12). Trevillion
(2 0 0 1 : 2 2 ) underscores that:
[the] sharing of problems and collective working on those problems is a way of 
building a collective identity founded on flexibility. Partnership networks are 
therefore rooted in a positive valuation of different contributions rather than a 
desire to eradicate difference in order to build some false sense of oneness.
As trust building and the creation of round-table structures alone are not sufficient to 
induce commitment, success often hinges upon the ability to negotiate acceptable 
terms and conditions among all relevant stakeholders so that potential benefits, 
expected outcomes and costs of involvement are transparent.
Taking into consideration the relatively great importance attached to ‘extra-criteria’ in 
determining the intensity of support for APCs vis-à-vis the assessment of formal 
criteria, one could assume an ‘inverse-care principle’ in operation: i.e. aid is diverted 
from the most disadvantaged areas and individuals without the social capital to 
participate in partnership structures to those who can clearly demonstrate their 
strength although their level of social and economic marginalisation may be less 
pressing (Bartley 1999; Pringle and Walsh 1999).
The capacity of an APC to lever and make the most of core funding allocated is 
acknowledged favourably as an indicator symbolising success and “will be positively 
evaluated and will, other things being equal, merit a higher level of support under the 
programme” (ADM 1995: 16). In other words, local support in the form of matching 
funding and other contributions from third parties are key criteria indicating success to 
ADM. If the dissemination of funding-related know-how (e.g. the ability to get 
information on, and apply for, funding) is negatively correlated with the degree of 
deprivation of an area, the following question arises: should the assistance provided 
through funding area-based programmes be subject to a competitive bidding process 
that possibly results in the local manifestation of an inverse-care principle?
Empirical data support the assumption that the accountability and evaluation system 
results in a bias in the allocation of funding. ‘High-profile’ APCs are rewarded because 
they are perceived to operate efficiently and effectively within programmatic guidelines 
and regulations. Some APCs can mobilise the social capital necessary to deliver on 
the plans according to the requirements of the regulatory system and/or to cope 
efficiently with the perceived constraints of the regulatory framework. Those APCs are 
more likely to succeed in drawing down funding than others that are not being 
regarded as strong (i.e. efficient and outcome-oriented). This also implies that areas 
that already have favourable indigenous endowments139 are, from the very start, likely 
to benefit more then less favoured areas. The following section illustrates that new 
arrangements in allocating funding to APCs introduced under the LDSIP have
139 For example, a strong community and voluntary sector or employers that are engaged in local issues 
or opportunities for economic development.
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consolidated the existing (output-oriented) performance-based allocation of resources 
into designated disadvantaged areas.
6.3.3 Changes in funding arrangements
The transition from the jointly EU- and government-funded 1994-1999 OPLURD to the 
Exchequer-funded 2000-2006 LDSIP resulted in only minor programme changes. 
Also, the main objectives for the utilisation of core funding remained the same (ADM 
1995, 2000; Pobal 2006b), namely:
• to mobilise local resources (e.g. social capital and support from private sector);
• to lever directly additional resources from statutory bodies and other relevant 
sources; and
• to develop local best-practice models concerning service provision, environmental 
upgrading or employment opportunities that can be mainstreamed into the day-to- 
day practice of existing statutory agencies.
A comparison of the programme guidelines reveals a reduction of measures from the
1994-1999 OPLURD to the 2000-2006 LDSIP (ADM 1995, 2000). Overall, the
guidelines appear just to have undergone a formal procedure as they subsume eligible
actions and target groups under fewer headings without substantially altering the
overall thrust of the programme:
The OPLURD guidelines have not changed. They’ve been printed on glossier 
paper and a few words have been changed -  but they are still there (Interview 
ADM 2).
Despite little change in content, it is argued that the overall operational nature of the 
local development programme has been altered considerably because new funding 
arrangements and performance-monitoring procedures were introduced. These are 
discussed in the following sections.
6.3.3.1 The end of EU-fundinq
Changes in funding arrangements were facilitated by the phasing out of EU-funding for 
APCs after the 1994-1999 OPLURD140. The withdrawal of EU funding meant a shift in 
responsibility for core-funding APCs into the remit of national government. Whereas 
the EU and the Irish exchequer jointly funded APCs for the duration of the 1991-1993 
PESP and the 1994-1999 OPLURD, core funding for APCs under the 2000-2006 
LDSIP was provided by the exchequer only (see Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2, Table 2.1). 
Respondents stated that EU funding protected APCs from too much state intervention. 
State responsibility for funding was quite influential in reforming local-governance 
structures because it assisted bringing APCs closer under the control of central 
government (O Broin 2003). The transition period leading from the OPLURD towards
140 Ireland’s economic development that moved the GNP per capita above EU average led to a 
substantial reduction in entitlements of structural funds allocations. Due to the so-called n+2 rule the 
EU funding effectively ended on the 31sl of December 2001.
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the LDSIP was characterised by the uncertainty as to whether or not central 
government would continue funding APCs under the 2000-2006 NDP.
The blueprint for the government-led restructuring of state-funded local development 
initiatives had already been on the political agenda before the advent of the LDSIP. In 
1999, about six months before the end of the OPLURD, the issue of funding APCs 
was discussed in the Dail (Dail Eireann 01/07/1999). Mr. Deenihan, T.D. (FG)141, and 
Mr. Broughan, T.D. (LAB)142, questioned the then Minister responsible for the 
OPLURD, Mr. Flood, T.D. (FF)143, about the government’s commitment to the 
continuation of statutory support for APCs post-1999 and whether a financial bridging 
mechanism would be put in place to secure an operational budget for APCs in 2000. In 
his response, Mr. Flood, T.D. (FF), reinforced the government’s commitment to the 
area-based approach to local development in designated disadvantaged areas. But he 
made it conditional:
• first, on the creation of “a more sustainable framework” for the operation of area- 
based local development structures as proposed by the interdepartmental task 
force on the local government and local government systems; and,
• second, “on the financial envelopes available post-1999 under the new national 
development plan” (Dail Eireann 01/07/1999: no page numbers).
In short, the continuation of the area-based approach to local development and, 
hence, the existence of APCs, was dependent on sufficient tax income and the 
alignment of APCs with CDB structures (see Section 6.3.3.1). Following the shift in 
responsibility for funding from the EU to the exchequer, APCs experienced tighter 
parameters concerning the allocation of funding and, subsequently, less room to 
manoeuvre:
Funding became more institutionalised and regulated with a greater focus on 
accountability and performance ensuring a match between the overall goals of 
ADM, the programme, and what they want Partnerships [APCs] to do. So what 
happened is a loss of autonomy coupled with a stricter control of funding 
(Interview APC 9a).
Despite international recognition of APCs as a show case to establish more civil 
involvement in decision making through new forms of democratic experimentalism 
(OECD 1996; Parkinson 1998; Turok 2001), the political priorities concerning APCs’ 
bottom-up policies and their degree of independence, both of which had been 
conditional to receiving EU funding, came increasingly under scrutiny by the state. In 
accordance with the decline in public budgets following a downturn in the economy, 
APCs experienced a reduction in core funding by 6 % in 2003, varying between 4 and 7 
% for individual APCs (Dail Eireann 25/06/2003). The Irish government also introduced
141 Fine Gael spokesperson on the Office of Public Works 1997-2000.
142 Labour Party Spokesperson on Enterprise, Trade and Employment and on Social, Community and 
Family Affairs.
143 Minister for Tourism, Sport and Recreation. The Department of Tourism, Sport and Recreation was 
the lead department for ADM and APC-type agencies between 1997 and 2002 (Section 4.2.3, Table 
4.3).
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stricter auditing and performance procedures. The following comment illustrates that
APCs consider the current monitoring mechanism overly complicated:
In terms of accountability, I would firmly believe that we are under the most 
stringent monitoring processes that can be there for any organisation. Compared 
to the amount of money we get, the reporting mechanisms are actually quite 
complex. We underwent an audit from ADM. And the things they picked up and 
pointed out, I would see them as petty -  and I am an accountant myself (Interview 
APC 2b).
There is also some indication that the use of resources became more prescribed as
APCs were effectively incorporated into Irish public administration:
When it was European moneys, there was much more flexibility about how funding 
was used (Interview APC 4a).
The previous section pointed out that the amount of core funding for APCs only partly
depends on the actual degree of disadvantage; and that management skills and the
already existing indigenous potential of an area are positively taken into account by
ADM and other funding bodies that funnel resources into designated disadvantaged
areas. In contrast to the complexity of both, formalised and less tangible ‘extra’ criteria
that are used to measure success of APCs (see Section 6.3.1, Table 6.7), APC
professionals stated that they mainly have to report on crude numbers. Monitoring
systems for APCs are apparently geared towards evaluating the numbers of
individuals placed into training or education, the number of unemployed individuals
registered with support services and the number of local community organisations that
received developmental support:
They [ADM] would evaluate -  and to be quite honest with you -  I think they are 
really evaluating in terms of the numbers that I sent to them on a quarterly basis.
They would be much more interested in the financial procedures and that the 
money is being spent on time et cetera. And then they would judge really the 
performance of the Partnership according to the annual report (Borscheid 2001, 
quoted from interview with APC Staff on 12/06/2000).
This practice -  the above quotation is from an interview carried out in 2000 -  has not
changed under the LDSIP (Interviews APC 8 and APC 11; Interview ADM 3; Interview
LV 5). Even though it is evident and widely accepted (a) that social-inclusion measures
should do more than facilitate the placement of people into employment, education or
training and (b) that deprivation is not a one-dimensional concept (Curtin et at. 1996;
Pringle et at. 1999; Dixon and Macarov 2000; CPA n.d.), the performance-monitoring
system has a strong focus on output. APC professionals stated that the evaluation of
their activities is based on ‘headcounting’. As a result, it fails to capture the complexity
of processes and activities required to address poverty and deprivation:
The statutory agencies now get very territorial around funding and around having 
to tick boxes as to how many people you work with or how many are using your 
service. Because for funding purposes again, how do you quantify for really good 
community development? How do you quantify success in terms of developing an 
area? Against what do you measure progress? (Interview LV 5).
APCs are also expected to submit case studies in their annual report to illustrate 
qualitative aspects of their work (Section 6.3.1, Table 6.7). This practice can be
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understood as a kind of ‘satellite system’ that illustrates aspects of their work rather 
than being a reporting requirement that is on par with quantitative monitoring 
techniques. It is easier to devise a performance measurement system that captures 
changes in local employment or educational attainment over a period of time rather 
than assessing the value of APC activities geared at increasing participation, public 
accountability, networking and collaboration. Over the life span of the LDSIP, little 
progress has been made to adjust monitoring and evaluation procedures -  such as the 
SCOPE system -  to the realities within which APC-type agencies operate144.
6.3.3.2 The end of multi-annual budgets
Much confusion was caused by the re-organisation of the budget of APCs. Under EU
guidelines budgets were allocated on multi-annual basis, which allowed APCs to carry
over funding not spent into subsequent years. This was considered a flexible
mechanism that accounted for the different pace of various local development efforts,
depending on the nature of the project. According to respondents from APCs (e.g.
Interviews APC 6 and APC 11), in 2003, however, APCs’ multi-annual budgets that
enabled APCs to progress at the pace of ‘their’ communities started to be allocated on
an annual basis. As a result, funding that was not spent in year one or two in the life
span of an APC’s multi-annual area action plan (3-4 years) could not be carried over
into the subsequent year. The decision was presented at short notice and came as a
complete surprise to APCs (Interview APC 2a). Multi-annual funding for what was a
four-year action plan (2000-2003) within a seven-year strategy (2000-2006) was,
without any dialogue or consultation with stakeholders affected by changes, changed to
an annual budgeting system from 1st January 2003. The combined effect of budget cuts
and the changing practice of carryovers (i.e. budget being allowed to be carried into the
following year) were reported to have amounted to a loss of up to 28 per cent and more
of the 2003 budget for individual APCs (Interviews APC 2a and APC 4a). As a result,
APCs had to call off projects and, moreover, were forced to release staff:
For the period 2000-2003 funding was being sold to us as multi-annual funding. In 
March 2003 all Partnerships received a letter stating that funding would be on 
annual basis from now on. If you haven’t spent your money, tough luck; it was 
going to be deferred into 2004. They did not say it was a cutback; they termed it 
deferral. In total we’ve had a 28 per cent budget cutback between 2002 and 2003.
So we had to let staff go (Interview APC 8).
A board member of the APC in the case-study area criticised the sudden change from
multi-annual to annual budgets and the resulting loss of funding as a political decision
that did not have a positive effect, but a decision that hit those individuals considered
the key beneficiaries of funding in the first place:
We are not being rewarded for being frugal and not rushing into wasting money.
We lost a good few 100,000 because we did not waste it. We had plans to invest 
in local people, to skill them up in a way that suits them, not the bureaucracy 
(Interview APC 6 ).
144 The Himmelman Model, for example, has been utilised to measure degrees of collaboration between 
partnerships and stakeholders as a means of making up for a deficit in attributing value to 
developmental activities of partnerships that could not be captured by existing performance criteria
(see Section 6.4.1).
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The bureaucratic logic behind annual funding is particularly well illustrated in a Dail
debate where Minister 6  Cuiv, T.D. (FF), answering a question by Mr. Broughan, T.D.
(LAB), defends annual budgeting for APCs:
As I have repeatedly pointed out, there were underspends in previous years and, 
as every deputy knows, money not spent returns to the Exchequer [...] There are 
three-year plans with annualised budgets. Therefore, money cannot be carried 
forward because the financing system does not allow for it [...] I stress that it is 
much better discipline that those [Partnerships] given money in a given year 
should set about spending that money within the year. Some of the partnerships 
did that and they have no problem. It is only partnerships which did not go about 
their business, and were carrying the money forward because they were not 
getting on with things, which thought they would have a bonanza year in year 
three, not having spent the money (Ddil Firearm 25/06/2003: no page numbers).
The case study provides an example for what the Minister portrays as
underperformance or ‘not going about their business’. There is strong empirical
evidence pointing out that the APC in the case-study area had long been operating as
a grant giving body with “massive underspends” (Interview ADM 1); i.e. they mainly
drew down core funding from ADM and allocated resources on an ad hoc basis to
those groups with the information and the experience rather than looking at the
implications for the wider community. The data gathered reveals that this approach
fostered a competitive environment among different local interest groups which
prevented weak groups from accessing resources (Interviews ADM 1 and ADM 2;
Interviews APC 2a and APC 6 ; Interviews LV 5 and LV 4):
Insiders and those involved in the community would have knowledge around the 
funding and would be much aware of where money is coming from and where else 
they can draw funding down (Interview LV 4).
Through an intense restructuring process in 2002 that came along with a change in
management, Ballyfermot Partnership adopted a more strategic approach towards
budgeting and engaging with local stakeholders with a view to ending what was
perceived as a “minder’s activism” (Interview ADM 1) fostering a local dependency
culture (Interview ADM 2; Interviews APC 2a, APC 3a, APC 6 and APC 7b):
Ballyfermot has reasonably well-established projects. And the difficulty in this area 
is that a lot of them are actually seeking funding to maintain themselves, rather 
than to develop new ideas. We have to try overcoming that. And I think that we 
have done that through our programme for 2003. But I would find that we are 
going to get less and less involved in funding local groups from the LDSIP money.
I think that we’re getting more and more involved in trying to develop new groups, 
new projects, and policy; and trying to get things to develop at that level. I think 
that we've made a sea change in the last few months within that. But it takes time, 
you know (Interview APC 2a).
The developmental role of APCs requires addressing structural inequalities in 
designated disadvantaged areas through involving and empowering those who are 
worst affected by societal inequality. Therefore, a flexible working model needs to be in 
place that is based on the principle of parity of esteem and, moreover, that caters for 
the inclusion and participation of individuals that usually might not engage in decision­
making structures and might need to be brought along at a slower pace. Also, some 
local issues might require long-term strategic planning. It is questionable to what extent
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annual budgets145 could encourage APCs to ‘get on with things’ (see above) without 
overly compromising their core principles of ‘downward’ accountability and inclusive 
decision making.
In the light of APCs’ quest to find innovative and creative ways to elevate areas up 
through ‘trial and error’, the annual budgets are locally perceived as constraints that 
“increase the pressure to be innovative” (Interview APC 11). Already under the 1994- 
1999 OPLURD, when funding was based on a multi-annual budgeting system, APCs 
felt the pressure to spend funding, which had adverse effects on their potential to 
engage in mainstream policies (Turok, 2000). Moreover, a lack of support structures in 
some areas prevented meaningful engagement with statutory agencies. Still, in 1998, 
the Interdepartmental Task Force criticised APCs because they did not profoundly 
impact on mainstream programmes and national policy making processes; a criticism 
Turok (2000: 17) considers “slightly harsh”146.
When interviewed, most respondents from APCs, ADM and some national experts 
made reference to key factors they consider crucial for establishing fruitful working 
relationships and being successful:
• the indigenous local social capital that can be mobilised by an APC;
• the overall resourcefulness and creativity of APCs
• the professionalism understood as (a) a way to run the organisation following to
good practice and (b) a toolkit consisting of a variety of skills of core professionals
and committed board members such as political skills, interpersonal skills,
diplomacy, networking capacity and management skills;
• the ability to build up a ‘high profile’, a good reputation among relevant partners 
and to communicate success effectively; and
• the provision of tangible incentives for collaboration.
All this was reported to require quite complex and time-consuming steps (Section 4.4).
These include an ongoing analysis of developments affecting the area and subsequent
dialogue and co-operation with statutory agencies, local politicians, local partner
organisations and the wider community. As a result of annual budgeting, APCs
became subject to the same funding and budgetary constraints as government
agencies. The research suggests that the shift to annual budgeting was expected to
resolve what Minister 6  Cuiv, T.D. (FF) called ‘a bonanza year’ (Dail Eireann
25/06/2003: no page numbers), but bears the potential of spending monies unwisely:
Last year we lost a fortune that we had held to carry over from the previous year.
That will never happen again. But in doing so we probably end up buying
145 Area Partnership Companies negotiated indicative multi-annual budgets with ADM for the remainder 
of the LDSIP: “This gave APCs a funding security for planning over a 3-year period” (Interview APC 
11).
146 In the meantime, reports and evaluations were published that refer to, and outline, successes of 
APCs in influencing mainstream policy and statutory service delivery in Ireland (Goodbody Economic 
Consultants 1999; NESF 1999; Turok 2001; Pobal 2006b; Eustace Patterson Limited 2006).
175
equipment and stuff you don't need because you are trying to get rid of the money 
(Interview APC 3b).
From the vantage point of funding projects based on a target-oriented and equality- 
based perspective (cf. Lloyd and Geraghty 2004), it is surprising that the decision­
makers responsible for local development initiatives do not seem to take into account:
• international examples of efficiencies associated with successful mission-driven 
multi-annual funding in government (e.g. Osborne and Gaebler 1992);
• government statements concerning possibilities of introducing multi-annual
budgeting into the sphere of local development such as in the 2000 White Paper
on a Framework for Supporting Voluntary Activity and for Developing the
Relationship between the State and the Community and Voluntary Sector:
The Government has decided that multi-annual funding commitments should, in 
appropriate cases, be made available by all funding agencies to organisations 
providing services or undertaking development activities that are agreed to be 
priorities, with the budget for each specific year to which the agreement applies to 
be reviewed in the light of the resources available and taking into account the legal 
position that the D£il votes public monies on an annual basis (Government of 
Ireland 2000. 43);
• existing government practice in operating on multi-annual budgets in areas of
capital funding such as transport infrastructure or the water services programme:
In the water services programme, DOE [Department of the Environment] will aim 
at a more devolved approach to the funding of projects, with local authorities being 
allocated block grants on a rolling three-year basis. This will give them greater 
discretion in setting priorities (DoELG 1996: 50, Section 5.17).
One of the chief concerns of APCs is to identify, jointly plan and source match-funding 
for actions meaningfully addressing symptoms of structural deficiencies that manifest 
in areas being recognised as poor or deprived. Respondents from APCs perceived the 
introduction of annual budgets in 2003 as highly disadvantageous because it was felt 
they could not limit their capacity in regard to the pursuit of their core objectives. 
Taking into consideration the identified target groups and variety of outreach activities 
addressed by APCs under the current local development programme147, it is 
remarkable that arguments put forward in favour of the introduction of annual budgets 
for APCs do not take into consideration that:
• some statutory programmes and state-sponsored projects are allowed to operate 
on multi-annual funding; whereas
• under annualised budgets, targeted citizens and communities that are being 
labelled ‘the most disadvantaged in the country’ are being required to have the 
capacity to adjust their pace of development in accordance to what is the standard 
for professionals in public administration and the established corporatist community 
and voluntary sector.
147 The LDSIP specifies measures and key groups that can be targeted by APCs using core funding 
allocated to them (ADM 2000). Some key target groups identified by APCs are travellers, ex­
offenders, early school leavers, youth at risk, lone parents, the unemployed and the disabled.
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6.3.3.3 The endorsement process
Since 2003, APC plans are required to be endorsed by the Dublin CDB before funding 
can be allocated from ADM (DoCRGA n.d.-a, 18/06/2003). The endorsement caused 
some confusion as to whom APCs are accountable. On the one hand, ADM is the 
national managing body administering the APC-type approach to local development on 
behalf of the Department of Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs. On the other 
hand, it is within the remit of the Dublin CDB to endorse APC plans. Policy directives 
are also influenced by the Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local 
Government (DoEHLG n.d.-a).
The basis for plan appraisal is the compliance with the 2002-2012 strategy of the 
Dublin CDB (see Section 6.2.2): Dublin -  a city o f possibilities (Dublin CDB 2002). 
APCs are obliged to comply with the endorsement process. There is little doubt that 
they have limited scope to resist endorsement (see Section 6.2.6). APCs are already 
accountable to target groups in their catchment area and a variety of statutory 
stakeholders, such as FAS (one of the main funders of APCs through the Local 
Employment Service) for the delivery of contractually agreed bundles of customised 
services and initiatives. In addition, they had to get familiar with the changing situation 
of somehow being accountable to two masters: the CDB and -  via ADM -  the 
DoCRGA. Even though ADM sees themselves as the funding agency and, hence, the 
“ultimate master of Partnerships” (Interview ADM 5), the endorsement process 
delegates substantial decision-making capacity into the sphere of the CDB and local 
authorities. Policy documents reviewed and evidence gathered in the interviews 
manifest that changes in funding arrangements are part and parcel of integrative 
measures targeted at increasing control over funding and activities of state-funded 
APCs in Dublin with a view to aligning them closely with public administration via the 
CDB.
6.3.4 Summary
The provision of funding for APCs under the LDSIP was conditional on sufficient fiscal 
income of government and the compliance of APCs in regard to their incorporation into 
an overarching operational framework that put DCC-affiliated structures at its centre 
(see Section 6.2.3). APCs perceived the cutbacks that resulted from the change to an 
annual budgeting system in 2003 as a painful paradigmatic shift with profound 
implications for their future mode of operation. The new funding environment re­
ordered the established practice of money management and made it compatible with 
budgeting practice in public administration. It was also established that reporting 
requirements stress the achievement of quantitative targets (cost-efficiency) and 
overly focuses on the financial management of funding received; efforts directed at 
capturing qualitative aspects of APC work are underdeveloped.
Especially after the phasing out of EU funding for APCs, the application of centrally- 
driven performance-oriented management principles into the mode of operation was
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facilitated via a new funding dependency on the centre (Borscheid 2005). The change 
from multi-annual to annual budgeting made it more difficult for APCs to take risks, 
pursue innovative projects and tailor programmes and actions to meet the local 
realities that are characteristic of working with individuals and groups considered the 
most disadvantaged in Irish society. As a result APCs could fall into the trap of overly 
concentrating on delivering services -  be it directly or through sub-contracting or 
brokerage -  and becoming ‘procurement managers’ (cf. Oatley 1998b: 10).
Whilst state-funded APCs are contracted to ameliorate symptoms at local level of 
societal disintegration hand in hand with (or in partnership with) statutory service 
providers, no formal legislation, regulations or other incentives are in place that could 
foster a reciprocal working relationship. There is no enforceable arrangement in place 
that equally holds all relevant parties responsible for the success or failure of APCs. 
On the contrary, APCs are subject to a performance-oriented accountability and 
performance-monitoring system:
• that has been designed to measure success of individual APCs in achieving their 
targets in partnership with strategic partners from the public sector and civil 
society;
• that, in contrast, does not put into perspective the achievements of APCs (a) in 
comparison with (reciprocal) efforts, or commitments, made by relevant statutory 
stakeholders and strategic partners from civil society directed at collaborating with 
APCs or (b) in regard to different starting points such as quality of deprivation 
prevalent in the area, the availability of indigenous resources that can be utilised or 
the quality of the local networks and social infrastructure. (For example, the nature 
of deprivation and the scope to address certain issues considerably differs 
between inner-city areas, suburban neighbourhoods and rural areas.)
Contemporary monitoring and accountability practices struggle to mediate between 
promoting the ethos of social partnership and participative democracy, on the one 
hand, and the contemporary output-oriented contract culture with an emphasis on 
financial auditing and performance procedures, on the other. One example is the issue 
of double accountability of APCs. First, they are answerable to their funders. This is 
regulated through formal procedures that control the achievement of targets and 
assess the management of financial affairs. Second, they are accountable to the local 
community. The community, however, has relatively limited formal procedures at hand 
to hold APCs accountable, other than through board representation of elected 
representatives from the community. In relation to ensuring public accountability, the 
research findings suggest that little effort is directed at investigating how democratic 
representation ‘from below’ could be optimised in decision-making processes, whereas 
much attention is dedicated to service-delivery based output and financial 
accountability.
There is strong evidence that the design of accountability systems and reporting
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requirements facilitates the institutionalisation of APCs. Tighter funding parameters 
limit the capacity of APCs to adjust their plans and operational model to the local 
realities and challenges within which they are situated. The analysis of the empirical 
data gathered for this study suggests that current funding arrangements and (political 
and financial) accountability criteria limit the capacity of APCs:
• to establish a local system that elevates accountability of the local community at a 
level that is on par with the of political sponsors of APCs;
• to prevent inverse-care scenarios and optimal use of scarce resources in 
accordance with their developmental brief and to promote local participatory 
democracy; and
• to play an innovative role in contributing to the creation of a more pluralistic model 
of governance.
The allocation of money to APCs is not mainly determined by the degree of deprivation 
of a particular area. Qualities like management skills, the capacity to produce good 
plans, a high profile and successful piloting of projects are additional key factors for 
the amount of resources allocated to localities ‘managed’ by APCs. Moreover, the 
indigenous assets in the form of social and economic capital that can be utilised by 
APCs are positively evaluated by ADM. This is not necessarily a bad thing because 
the consideration of those factors is likely to guarantee a better value for money; and 
the pool of resources for local development is limited. It cannot be denied, however, 
that people’s need for support in different areas is independent of those factors. 
Therefore, the allocation of money according to informal ‘extra-criteria’ makes areas 
dependent on the quality of the APC as judged by the funding bodies. As a result, 
winning recognition is only marginally reliant on the demonstration of genuine and pro­
active input from individuals from the local community. It is rather dependent on the 
individual APC’s professional capacity to adhere to reporting requirements, to highlight 
and market the level of disadvantage of ‘their’ area and, thereby, mobilise additional 
allies and resources.
6.4 Value for money and interpretations of success
The primary focus of traditional accountability and monitoring systems in public 
administration typically rested on preventing recipients of statutory funding from 
activities that might endanger the public purse or interest. The previous section 
illustrated accountability and monitoring framework for APCs. In the national context of 
governance restructuring, the review of government publications suggests that the 
focus on the efficient use of publicly funded programmes and activities must be seen 
in the context of public-sector modernisation and, more specifically, the objectives of 
the SMI and the rhetoric of value for money148 (e.g. Clarke et al. 2000a; Boyle and 
Butler 2003; DoT 2004). Most respondents indicated that formal performance
148 Throughout this study, Power’s (1997) concept of value for money is deployed. In essence, according 
to Power, value for money consists of the triad of fiscal efficiency, outcome-oriented effectiveness 
and internal economies (see Chapter 1, Section 1.4.1, Table 1.1).
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assessment of APCs under the LDSIP reflects the output-oriented ethos of public
service delivery. When interviewed, public-sector officials and ADM professionals
highlighted the contractual nature of funding allocated to APCs:
Partnerships should have a clear prescription of what has to be-done and 
delivered. Partnerships should deliver a product, something that is tangible and 
that can be measured, and projects that can get mainstreamed (Interview DCC 
3b).
In other words, funding for APCs is considered an investment into society that:
• has to be processed and allocated at minimal administrative or operational costs;
• has to yield measurable returns over a certain period of time; and
• has to demonstrate the capacity to impact positively on society (i.e. it pays a
‘positive societal dividend’).
The output-oriented focus for public expenditure is mirrored in the objectives of the
Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General149 whose mission is “to provide
assurance that public money is properly administered and spent to good effect”
(Comptroller and Auditor General n.d.-a: no page numbers). For this purpose, the
Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General issues Value for Money Reports which:
[...] record the results of examinations into (a) the economy and efficiency with 
which State bodies acquire, use and dispose of resources (b) the systems, 
procedures and practices employed by State bodies for evaluating the 
effectiveness of their operations (Comptroller and Auditor General n.d.-b: no page 
numbers).
In the course of introducing these new managerial policies, the role of the citizen or, 
even more so, the ‘taxpaying voter’ as the end-user, client or customer of statutory 
services became re-defined. Government publications portray the taxpaying citizen as 
a stakeholder whose primary interest is to get better service delivery at lower costs 
(i.e. to minimise their tax burden) (DoT 2004). This interest is envisaged to be at least 
partly served by:
• creating a quality public service delivery that values a more approachable and 
receptive (or humane) relationship between the world of statutory administration 
and bureaucracy, on the one hand, and the citizen (often referred to as customer), 
on the other; and
• optimising the relationship between fiscal efficiency (output), effectiveness 
(outcomes) and good governance (economics) in the delivery of state-financed 
measures and services.
The introduction of business thinking into the public domain in Ireland has already 
been visible as an underlying theme in the re-structuring of the governance model in 
Dublin and its implications for funding arrangements for APCs (Section 6.3). Through 
the application of value-for-money principles, it is hoped to optimise the relationship
149 The first VFM audit was published in 1994 on the EU-funded LEADER Programme in Ireland. The 
report already highlighted issue of duplication and institutional overlap in remit and activities 
(Comptroller and Auditor General 1994: 8, Point 10).
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between input (money spent) and outcome (local impact assessment of services, 
programmes and/or actions implemented or initiated) of APC actions (see Chapter 1,
Section 1.4.1).
Table 6.9: Value for Money indicators for APCs under the 1994-1999 OPLURD
Indicator What it captures
Administrative If staffing levels, pay rates other administrative expenses are both
Efficiency reasonable and commensurate with the objectives and activities of a local
development agency (Comptroller and Auditor General 2000: 8).
Co-ordination of If arrangements prevent the duplication of activities of different local
Activities development bodies in a geographic area.
Operational If the resources are appropriately used for the achievement of reported
Efficiency output levels (Comptroller and Auditor General 2000: 30).
Assessment of If partnerships achieve their objectives and to what extent they make a
Impact made wider contribution to local economic and social development (Comptroller
and Auditor General 2000: 42); this is captured by means of qualitative
(e.g. case studies) and quantitative (e.g. SCOPE) indicators.
Source: Comptroller and Auditor General (2000; cf. Comptroller and Auditor General 1994).
Table 6.9 above shows the principal value-for-money indicators the Comptroller and 
Auditor General applied for the assessment of state-funded local development 
initiatives under the OPLURD. It is argued that the concept of value for money 
increasingly governs the funding allocation to APCs that is mirrored in:
• the shift from multi-annual to annual budgeting in 2003 (Section 6.3.3);
• the promotion of competitive bidding processes for state-funding as practised for
the selection process of new APCs under the (Chapter 2, Section 2.4) and the
2005 application process for cohesion funding provided by the Department for 
Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs (Section 6.2.6);
• the focus on a minimisation of duplication and encouragement of efforts to
increase the capacity for and the degree of collaboration with a variety of strategic
partners (cf. Pobal, 2006):
The potential for duplication arises because the bodies commenced independently 
of each other and started at different times, have similar objectives and target 
overlapping populations, have separate local administrative structures, report to 
different Departments and are funded by different operational programmes 
(Comptroller and Auditor General 2000: 17);
• the call for improving output-oriented impact assessments as a tool for measuring 
social and economic change (e.g. Comptroller and Auditor General 2000);
• the introduction of audits that promote cost-efficient management of internal 
operations and compliance with good practice in company policies; and
• the language used, for example, when referring to beneficiaries of APC 
programmes as ‘customers’ (Ô Cuiv 07/09/2006).
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A new emphasis on value for money is illustrated by attempts to measure the success 
of APCs in achieving multi-agency collaboration (Pobal 2006a) (Section 6.4.1). Two 
additional phenomena could be identified that represent efforts to complement the 
traditionally efficiency-oriented performance monitoring: first, the launch of a value for 
money audit commissioned by the Department for Community, Rural and Gaeltacht 
Affairs (DoCRGA 2007) (Section 6.4.2). and, second, the promotion of good 
governance and accredited quality standards such as Excellence Through People and 
the Q-mark (Section 6.4.3).
6.4.1 From brokerage to collaboration
In February 2006, an ADM-initiated review was carried out. It was targeted at 
“examining the dynamics of partnership processes in local settings” (Pobal 2006a: 3) 
by means of eight case studies involving area-based and community partnerships150. 
One looked at a project that aimed at developing agreeable guidelines of good 
practice between the state and the community sector with a view to facilitating 
collaboration. It concludes, however, “that the work has been hampered by key 
individuals. It would appear that this was due to people fearing the impact of such a 
process on relationships locally” (Pobal 2006a: 39). Another case study identified “a 
general lack of understanding and commitment to social-inclusion work amongst 
partner agencies” (ibid.: 38) as a blockage for an APC to establish a local employment 
services project.
The review identified good and bad practices that informed the development of three 
distinct models of collaboration: the progressive, the co-operative and the conciliatory 
model. The co-operative model represents the highest degree of collaboration, 
whereas the conciliatory model is ranked at the bottom of the scale (cf. Pobal 2006a: 
26-27).
• the progressive model is considered the best because it indicates multi- 
stakeholder participation, concerted planning strategies and a shared responsibility 
for resourcing activities based on trust;
• the co-operative model stands for working arrangements where relations among 
stakeholders lead to mutually-agreed and jointly-planned actions but where levels 
of commitment and trust are less pronounced than in the progressive model;
• the conciliatory model describes a scenario with low levels of trust among 
stakeholders. They co-exist, share only few commonalities and only -  if at all -  
interact sporadically and ad hoc.
Taking into account the variety of measures, activities and differences within 
designated areas and, furthermore, the variety of characteristics factored into the 
ranking of APC-type agencies, then it can be assumed that it is not likely that these 
distinct models do exist in their pure form (Pobal 2006a). Models that were developed
150 The LDSIP provides core funding for 38 APCs, 2 Territorial Employment Pacts and 31 Community 
Partnerships (DoCRGA n.d.-c).
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under previous local development programmes focus on the implementation-end of
programmes (see Chapter 2, Section 2.3.2). The new models put much more
emphasis on the capacity of state-funded APCs to build strong coalitions with partners
with a view to encouraging institutional learning and joint planning. The models were
developed within the framework of the Himmelman Model151:
The Himmelman Model [...] views collaboration as a process of exchanging 
information, altering activities, sharing resources, and enhancing the capacity of 
another for mutual benefit and to achieve a common purpose. It requires the 
application of sophisticated organisational linkages involving the sharing of risks, 
the development of shared visions, and the development of complex partnership 
relationships and processes (Pobal 2006a: 19).
The efficacy of strategic plans, operational procedures, policies and practices that 
mirror key principles of partnership, such as transparency in decision making, power- 
sharing and an outcome-orientation, are inextricably intertwined with the capacity of 
APCs to secure the involvement of committed senior (key) individuals and on other 
resource commitments from relevant stakeholders. The evidence from the empirical 
case study carried out in Dublin shows that the social capital of APCs (e.g. the degree 
of both seniority and commitment of their board members, the capacity of their staff 
and, more importantly, the skills of their CEO and chair person) plays a crucial role in 
determining the achievement of what McCarthy (1998: 46) described as one of the 
most important achievement of APCs: to exert “subtle influences on thinking and on 
the way in which mainstream programmes are delivered”. McCarthy concludes, “We 
have to be fairly imaginative in finding ways of capturing that and a lot of effort has 
gone into defining indicators to help in evaluating the work of the Partnerships” (ibid.).
In this context, the new approach based on the Himmelman Model represents a timely 
effort to provide a qualitative performance-monitoring tool that supplements the 
existing evaluation systems in place152. Himmelman (2002: 1) explicitly highlights that 
achieving collaboration is based on “a common vision and purpose, meaningful power 
sharing, mutual learning, and mutual accountability for results”. However, reflecting on 
the philosophy of the Himmelman Model, it seems somehow methodologically 
unsound to measure and rank the performance of APCs on a scale based on their 
capacity to forge collaborations without explicitly taking into account and accurately 
measuring the impact external variables have on success and failure. Changes in the 
local environment, at policy level, or within the institutional arrangements that are 
beyond the control of APC-type agencies are likely to impact on their capacity to 
adhere to what, according to the Himmelman Model, would be considered good 
practice.
151 The Himmelman Model is applied to measure the degree of collaboration between parties and 
stakeholders. It is based on a continuum indicating a growing intensity of working together beginning 
with networking, followed by co-ordination, co-operation and collaboration (Himmelman 2002).
152 ADM uses financial reports and case studies outlined in annual reports of APCs as well as a 
mechanism called SCOPE (quarterly throughput of achievements) to evaluate progress of APCs. 
Scope stands for Systems for Co-ordinated Programme Evaluation.
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Moreover, the intricacies associated with the informal nature of building alliances 
among a variety of stakeholders makes it generally difficult for APCs to get to a stage 
of achieving meaningful participation and collaboration (see Section 6.3.2). The 
interviews generally indicated that collaboration usually overly depends on the ability 
of APCs to convince key individuals from relevant stakeholders to commit themselves 
to a collaborative relationship with the APC. As argued, the performance of statutory 
agencies and other groupings with a responsibility for either welfare-related service 
delivery or social-inclusion work needs to be equally encouraged and assessed to 
seek collaborative engagement with APCs at local level in a pro-active fashion. If not, 
it is highly unlikely that the proposed approach of measuring working in partnership will 
make a meaningful contribution in regard to ranking or assessing APCs based on the 
extent to which they succeed in establishing collaborative relationships.
6.4.2 Another value for money audit: assessing value added?
In early 2007, the Department of Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs invited 
tender documents with a view to carrying out a value for money review of the LDSIP. 
The review is part of the Value for Money and Policy Review Process, which “is one of 
a range of modernisation initiatives aimed at moving public-sector management away 
from the traditional focus on inputs to concentrate more on the achievement of results” 
(DoCRGA 2007: 2). A proposed Expenditure Review Initiative was introduced in 1997 
and “has since undergone a number of reforms to enhance the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the process. Ongoing policy evaluation and value for money (VFM) 
assessment is essential to proper prioritisation of public resource allocations” (ibid.).
Expenditure reviews are enacted through legislation and focus on “the achievement of 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness” (ibid.). Interestingly -  like other publications 
published following the ethos of the SMI -  the terminology used in the document is not 
elucidated. For example, the term efficiency is not explicitly defined other than being 
somehow related to overall costs and staffing resources. In the terms of reference, 
effectiveness loosely refers to the way LDSIP objectives are achieved (cf. DoCRGA 
2007: 6). Moreover, consultants are asked to ascertain “the outputs, outcomes and 
impacts of the LDSIP and assess their contribution to the achievements of the 
Department’s objectives in respect to the LDSIP” (ibid.). This is a difficult task since 
the tender document does not make any reference as to how the terms 'outputs’, 
‘outcomes’ and ‘impacts’ are defined. The language and terminology is reminiscent of 
Power’s (1997) concept of VFM but does not set clear parameters for classifying 
effectiveness, efficiency and economics (see Chapter 1, Section 1.4.1, Table 1.1).
Policy documents and guidelines that address issues related to Better Local 
Government (DoELG 1996) or Regulating Better (DoT 2004) are usually garnished 
with expressions borrowed from business jargon, such as 'competitiveness', 'value for 
money', 'efficiency', 'effectiveness', 'innovation', 'quality services', 'customer' or 'client', 
often without any further explanation of how these terms are actually defined in the
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respective context. Furthermore, quite complex terms such as 'value for money', 
'effectiveness' and 'efficiency' seem to be regularly used interchangeably, as if any 
differences in content and relationships between those terms could be rendered 
unnecessary (DoELG 1996, 1998, 1999a, 2000; ADM 2000; Dublin CDB 2002; NESC 
2002a; DoT 2004; DoCRGA 2007).
Given the stated importance of VFM reviews it is surprising that the definition of 
concepts is not clarified in the terms and conditions outlining the task to consultants. In 
this light, the value of a VFM audit is questionable as the interpretation of terms and 
concepts appears to be left to the value system and/or imagination of the consultants. 
In other words, the evaluation as such will violate at least two criteria of empirical 
research (Diekmann 1995), namely:
• criteria of objectivity as different researchers will have different concepts of 
effectiveness, efficiency and economy; i.e. the evaluation cannot be validated by 
others as key indicators are open to interpretation;
• the principle of content validity because that, which is measured, is likely not to 
represent what is intended to be measured.
Therefore, the results of the VFM audit will not be reliable and, ironically, the audit will 
not represent value for money per se.
There seems to be a mismatch between the existing practice of measuring VFM 
according to pre-defined categories and individual perceptions concerning the 
activities that should be represented by, or included in, the former. For example, Table 
6.9 (see further above) highlights findings of the Value for Money Report 31: Local 
Development Initiatives (Comptroller and Auditor General 2000). The report suggests 
that performance measures and indicators that had been applied to monitor efficiency 
and effectiveness during the 1994-1999 Local Development Programme (i.e. the 
OPLURD) could not fully measure impacts made by local development initiatives {ibid/. 
3). Respondents’ explanations as to what they consider ‘added value’ underscore the 
difficulties in designing performance indicators for measuring a complex concept. One 
of the national experts, when interviewed, summarised the concept of value for money 
as follows:
There are three principle sources of value added. First, they [APCs] need to offer 
local knowledge and insight. They need to offer a perspective that is intelligible to 
official actors and social partners looking from the outside in. So they need to offer 
a resource for understanding for what works and what doesn't. Second, they need 
to have local legitimacy; that is support from within the community. And finally, it is 
important to have synergy. Synergy is defined as the capacity to nominally or 
formally separate services and link them together at the point of delivery in a way 
that is almost impossible for external bodies to do. They need to have a proper 
impact that is holistic, that is responsive to local needs, and that is likely to be 
more effective and cost-effective as well (Interview NE 6).
It was acknowledged among respondents that the value of APCs lies in their 
competitive advantage over traditional statutory approaches to addressing local 
disadvantage and social exclusion. Their strength lies in “offering a unique perspective
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or unique capacity that bureaucratic government bodies could not offer" (Interview NE 
6) or “coming up with new ideas that are not in the thought processes of public 
servants” (Interview LV 3).
6.4.3 Internal Economies: the professionalisation ofAPCs
Under the 2000-2006 local development programme (i.e. the LDSIP) a stronger 
emphasis on the optimisation of the internal economies of APCs can be observed153. 
In the context of this study the term ‘internal economies’ refers to operational 
mechanisms and procedures governing the work of an APC: to minimise bureaucracy 
and administrative deadweight and, ultimately, to avoid sub-optimal use of funding 
received.
The analysis of the interviews already pointed out that the performance evaluation of
APCs by their political sponsors is based on two sets of indicators: a set of formal
parameters and an additional set of extra-criteria, which, together, measure the
capacity of an APC to implement their programme of activities against contractually-
defined ex-ante targets (see Section 6.3.1, Table 6.7). The implicit categorisation of
‘good APCs’ as ‘high-profile’ organisations (see Section 6.3.2) indicates that it is
increasingly important to funders that APCs not only comply with guidelines and
reporting requirements (Interview ADM 3), but also professionalise their governance
structures (Interview ADM 2; Interview DCC 7) and build up an image of reliability and
social entrepreneurialism (Interview NE 6). More specifically, APC are required to
optimise their practice in areas such as human resource management, recruitment of
staff, administration and financial controlling, use of information technology and self-
evaluation mechanisms (Interview NE 1a; Interview APC 11 and APC 12):
Now we spend more and more time in reporting to different people and there is 
more need for self-analysis to demonstrate that we have proper structures in place 
and so on (Interview APC 11).
APCs are cognisant that they are subject to a value system that assesses their
operational capacity. One respondent from Ballyfermot Partnership referred to
managerial problems in the past that illustrate that the professional running of the
organisation is considered a precondition for being acknowledged as an eligible
recipient of funding:
We had everything that you would expect from an unorganised voluntary group 
but nothing you would not expect from a Partnership -  like our manager and the 
whole structure was reasonably well-paid and the people around the table were of 
reasonable seniority so that their time and their efforts was very valuable. And that 
valuable energy that they had was not being channelled into the right thing. It was 
all the time reaction, difficulties and problems as they arose and the difficulties 
arose from very, very poor management of the structure. You know, that couldn’t 
continue. You were on the slippery slope. People ain’t going to fund you then 
(Interview APC 3a).
153 The guidelines for the OPLURD already outline a procedure for self-evaluation (ADM 1995) such as 
the performance measurement of staff.
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When asked about the characteristics of what they would consider a successful APC,
most respondents mentioned managerial competencies -  such as money
management, strategic organisational development and effective leadership -  and a
professional attitude towards their funders -  such as compliance with contractual
criteria. The new managerial ethos and its implications for the allocation of funding
encourage APCs to acquire a business-like ‘professional structure’ and skills base,
which should signal credence to potential funders. Acknowledging the importance of
being perceived as ‘high-profile’ and, hence, professional organisation, APCs have
started to undergo assessments that were initially developed for the private sector,
such as the Excellence Through People Award, a national human resource
management standard (see Table 6.10 below):
Excellence Through People is the national human resource management 
standard. It has been welcomed and supported by employers, their staff, trade 
unions and government. All types of organisations are eligible for Excellence 
Through People including manufacturing and service companies, the Voluntary 
Sector and the Public Sector. In response to feedback from existing customers we 
have reviewed and updated the standard to accommodate the increasing pace of 
change within the Human Resources and Business Environment (FÂS n.d.: no 
page numbers);
and the Q-mark (a management tool to facilitate best business practice):
The Q-Mark is a well-known brand in Ireland, which shows both customers and 
suppliers that a business is serious about providing quality services and products.
The Q-Mark not only sends out the right signals to your market (enabling you to 
attract more customers) -  it also equips you with the skills, tools and management 
methodology to improve everything you do. The Q-Mark is a structured framework 
in management best practices relevant to all aspects of your business. From 
improving customer satisfaction levels, to setting and achieving goals and 
strategy, to managing your people -  the Q-Mark provides a structured framework 
for ensuring that you are managing what matters, and that will ensure that your 
business succeeds (EIQA n.d.: no page numbers).
The objective of these assessments is to increase organisational competitiveness 
through promoting investments in people skills. For example, the key objectives of 
Excellence Through People (ETP) are to, first, “act as a business improvement tool as 
well as being a driver for change and innovation” and, second, “to promote employee 
learning, development and involvement in line with the organisation’s goals” (FÂS n.d.: 
no page numbers). Table 6.10 outlines the application process. It is interesting to note 
that the community and voluntary sector is not represented on the Board (10 
members) assessing the applications from APCs and other organisations from the 
sector (see Appendix 1, Table A-1.5).
These performance standards indicate a shift from external to internal audit practices 
and a culture of self-evaluation that are controlled by external ‘independent’ experts 
(both measures are FÂS-accredited). Organisational performance monitoring follows 
procedures that usually consists of the following main elements: first, a diagnosis of 
the status quo through external independent checks that are facilitated by self­
monitoring; second, training in accordance with agreed standards to improve the 
performance in running the organisation; and, third, accreditation that signals a certain
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quality of internal economies to public funders. The latter possibly encouraged some 
APCs to apply for new quality assessments and organisational performance audits 
under the LDSIP, even though the time and resource commitment of these measures 
are perceived to be quite demanding.
Table 6.10: Process of accreditation for Excellence Through People
Organisation briefed by FÀS on the requirements of the standard
I
Organisation conducts self assessments
I
Organisation takes action to meet the standard
I
Application for accreditation
I
Assessment conducted by FÄS
I
Assessor reports to Approvals Board
I
Approvals Board decision and feedback*
Note: *There is no representation from the Community and Voluntary Sector on the Board
(10 members) that assesses the applications (Appendix 1, Table A-1.5).
Source: Adapted from FAS Website
(accessed on 17/02/2007 at http://www.fas.ie/etp/revised/index.html#whatisT
The establishment of corporate structures in the local-development sector reflects 
wider trends of reforming public administration (see Chapter 1, Section 1.4). The 
analysis of the empirical material suggests that the focus on internal economies -  as 
part of the triad making up the concept of value for money (Power 1997) -  encourages 
the introduction of a new professional ethos that is penetrating the practice of APC- 
type agencies and that requires an inculcation in staff of intra-organisational core 
values. The current accreditation processes for Excellence Through People and the Q- 
mark indicate that this is facilitated by an emerging cadre of specialists who are 
contracted to administer and enforce standards of accountability and, ultimately, to 
step up the performance of APCs.
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6.4.4 Measuring the measurable
Section 6.3 highlighted existing tensions and trade-offs between fiscal efficiency
(output) and effectiveness (outcome) in monitoring performance of APCs. The
interviews indicate that VFM-principles are increasingly relevant but do not seem to be
optimally tailored to capture what they have been designed for (Section 4.4.2). APC
professionals and local community workers felt that measurable outputs take priority
over qualitative aspects of their work. Even though the latter are considered equally
important, they are not necessarily captured by funders as value added and, therefore,
are not treated on par with quantitative aspects of local development and community
work. APC professionals would like to see more adequate measures of capturing their
performance that take into account procedural activities in a methodological way
(Interviews APC 2b and APC 11). Criticism of the existing accountability system in
terms of measuring value added is not limited to local practitioners or APC
professionals. One senior official interviewed got particularly upset about the existing
way of measuring value for money:
Efficiency is a cakewalk. So you spent a million last year and your books are in 
order? So bloody what? But how much value did you add? What did you achieve?
Who is better off? What was the impact of what you did? Negative, positive or 
neutral? Negative? OK. So what did we learn from that so we don’t make same 
mistakes again? Positive? All right, so how can we add value to the success? We 
spend money with evaluations. All these bloody consultants spend huge money on 
evaluation. But we are ultimately failing to achieve proper, decent management 
systems whereby good decision making is achieved. We should put it all through 
the tests in advance, get it right as can be, implement it effectively, and then 
evaluate. All the financial indicators or the output indicators tell you nothing -  I can 
double the output tomorrow morning but I will achieve that by reducing the quality.
But it needs quality, quality, quality! (Interview NE 1b).
Irrespective of efforts to capture qualitative aspects of social-inclusion work (Pobal 
2006a), performance monitoring is felt to be biased towards the measurement of short­
term actions and fiscal efficiency; i.e. it puts much emphasis on the investment of 
resources into actions that can quickly produce tangible and measurable output. 
Those who are subject to monitoring feel that the focus on output-orientation limits the 
possibility of achieving intended long-term objectives of actions that are rather 
complex, multi-dimensional and, hence, may be considered less quantifiable or 
measurable.
So far, evidence presented in this study suggests that the amount of funding allocated 
to an APC is not only dependent on the population size, the quality of the action plan 
or the degree of deprivation of an area (as measured by common statistical 
indicators); it is equally influenced by the capacity of an APC to deliver on contractual 
agreements, and to meet extra-criteria, considered relevant by their funders (Section
4.3.2). As a result of being subject to an output-oriented accountability culture that 
primarily assesses performance against certain standards (e.g. ex-ante targets), APCs 
can be tempted to adapt to monitoring practices by tailoring actions to meet the 
prevailing logic of evaluation, which effectively is based on a philosophy of measuring 
the measurable. In short, the empirical data indicates that the new funding mechanism
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for APCs bears the danger of risk-avoidance and playing it safe. As a result, APCs are
in a dilemma. They are overly drawn into administrative procedures and auditing
processes, thus undermining their capacity to experiment. As a result, APCs could
adopt risk-averse strategies:
It's like quality control in a factory. Very often one is happy when there’s no 
production going out the door because one knows there can be no faulty goods 
going out. The problem is that the production has stopped as well (Interview APC
7b).
One could imagine that despite efforts to capture qualitative work through case studies 
and annual reports, APCs could be easily seduced into developing a ‘tunnel vision’ of 
producing outputs for their paymasters because in managerial reporting requirements 
“less measurable qualitative objectives such as business confidence and community 
development are downgraded” (Hambleton 1998: 73). The information obtained in the 
course of the interviews confirms that the introduction of annual budgets for APCs -  
and the implicit threat of money being re-allocated if not spent in accordance with 
contractually agreed time frames and parameters -  has a profound impact on local 
policy implementation. The funding mechanism for APCs is structured in a way that 
gives preferential treatment to projects that are likely to have a quick pay-off (Bartley 
and Borscheid 2003) and can result in the transformation of local measures into ‘pet 
projects’154. In both cases, genuine bottom-up participation from within communities is 
potentially undermined.
6.4.5 Value for Money: interpretations
The analysis of the empirical material suggests that the value for money added by 
APCs is -  to a varying degree -  dependent on:
• their capacity to target what, according to the guidelines, are considered the most 
disadvantaged members of society (i.e. to ameliorate poverty -  mainly through 
facilitating the transition of individuals into work or training);
• their potential to be innovative and flexible in addressing issues. This implies a 
capacity to take risks (i.e. produce both success and failures and demonstrate 
reasons for why things worked and some did not);
• their ability to deliver tangible outputs in a cost-effective way (e.g. facilitate the 
progression of individuals into training, education or employment);
• the provision of a space for dialogue that encourages working in partnership with 
key stakeholders (facilitate co-operation and collaboration);
• their management capacity, first, to administer funding received according to the 
contractual agreement and, second, to comply with procedural monitoring and 
evaluation arrangements;
• the ‘calibre’ of their CEO, their staff and their chair person;
154 One respondent defined pet projects as projects that are both funded and entirely led by the local 
APC with little involvement from the community so they achieve the objectives originally set 
(Borscheid 2001, interview with APC Board Member on 26/07/2000).
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• the amount of matching funding levered (e.g. getting mainly statutory bodies to 
bring additional resources to the table that would have been invested elsewhere 
without the intervention of a Partnership); and
• the degree to which structures in place allow for genuine grassroots participation 
from the community.
The interviews also pointed out cross-sectoral variations in relation to the perception of 
success and the interpretation of the concept of VFM. The following sections serve to 
illustrate different viewpoints in relation to what respondents from different institutional 
and professional backgrounds consider a successful APC:
• Section 6.4.5.1 Expectations to become an agent of the state focuses on views of 
government officials and senior civil servants;
• Section 6.4.5.2 Expectations to be a ‘rebellious servant’ outlines priorities of ADM 
professionals;
• Section 6 .4.5.3 Expectations to become a catalyst for change focuses on 
reflections of APC professionals and board members on their role and potential; 
and
• Section 6.4.5.4 Expectations to be listened to addresses observations made by 
local activists and community workers.
6.4.5.1 Expectations to be an agent of the state
National experts (i.e. interviewees that are or have been involved in policy-making at 
central level) and some respondents from Dublin City Council (DCC) stress that APCs 
need to primarily remain meaningful to the political sponsors. A view frequently 
expressed within this group is that APCs should focus on their strengths of being 
flexible, innovative and creative. The key role for APCs is seen in:
• promoting economic development opportunities, progressing individuals into work 
and encouraging enterprise set-ups;
• the identification of gaps in statutory service delivery and their ability to develop 
innovative models for addressing those gaps;
• “empowering communities to engage in dialogue with local authorities and to build 
the capacity of people to help themselves getting back into the mainstream” 
(Interview DCC 8) 155;
• being a hub between communities and local government:
Communities are quite uncomfortable in cooperating with formal local government 
institutions whereas they work with Partnerships. And that’s added value 
(Interview NE 6);
• credible commitment from relevant statutory bodies and/or interest groups that, 
had it not been for the role of the APCs, would neither have channelled funding 
into designated disadvantaged areas nor agreed on co-operating with one another;
155 This implies that the lack of communication between the local authorities and the community and, 
moreover, it is the community that is somehow dysfunctional and needs to be facilitated to engage 
with local authorities and the Dublin CDB and not vice versa.
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• creating synergies between local stakeholders with a view to eliminating perceived 
duplication among state-funded local development programmes; and
• stimulating a professionalisation of state-funded local social-inclusion services 
provided by a variety of local groups.
Creativity and innovation in devising local interventions that address issues related to
social exclusion and poverty is regarded as the foundation stone for building working
relationships with both statutory funding partners and for mobilising support locally.
One respondent explained that APCs are expected to have “a strong entrepreneurial
dimension of social service provision [...] but not in a sense of greater viability or
financial security. It’s about being creative in addressing needs of communities across
the full circumference” (Interview NE 6 ). It was also acknowledged that APC’s potential
for success is dependent on their capacity to form an alliance with both stakeholders
from the community and with relevant statutory agencies:
You need the local individuals on board but if you do not have the government 
departments and agencies committed to it, then it’s an uphill struggle (Interview 
NE 5a).
The scope of APCs for developing innovative actions on the ground is largely 
perceived to be dependent on the support from statutory bodies with a stake in local 
development issues. Therefore, APCs are advised to ‘be smart’ (Interview NE 6 ; also 
Interview ADM 1). Since government departments and agencies are not mandated to 
collaborate with and/or financially support APCs, the latter are advised not to ‘rub them 
up the wrong way’ and, instead, to develop a diplomatic strategy towards engaging 
with their potential funders that facilitates the establishment of reciprocal relationships. 
For example, it transpired that government departments do not accept criticism from 
APCs directed at operational practices of the state. APCs that blame systemic 
blockages or government practice for preventing the timely implementation of projects 
are frowned upon and likely to get into the ‘black book’ of their funders.
Interviews with government officials revealed that APCs that do not meet the 
expectations of their funders usually are those considered lacking the management 
capacity for strategic planning. Effective management structures are considered a 
prerequisite for maximising the impact of resources in terms of “concentrating more on 
output in terms of getting the services delivered to the socially excluded” (Interview NE 
2). One government official argued that all APCs face similar challenges because they 
operate under the same administration and the same legal framework but that “some 
Partnerships are successful, some are not” (Interview NE 6). This implies that it is the 
limited capacity of individual APCs, rather than systemic blockages, that decide over 
success or failure in achieving objectives.
In the grand scheme of governance, public officials and senior civil servants see APCs 
as an instrument that should facilitate the government policy directed at improving 
efficient service delivery into designated disadvantaged areas. In this context,
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additional value of APCs is seen in their potential to act as an institutional vehicle that 
provides an acceptable local platform for addressing centrally-identified societal 
problems through interagency collaboration between statutory agencies, social 
partners, local public representatives and interest groups from the local community. 
So, besides playing a role in supplementing statutory efforts to deliver services into 
disadvantaged neighbourhoods, APCs also fulfil the function of providing a tolerable 
interface for dialogue between civil society and the state.
6.4.5.2 Expectations to be a ‘rebellious servant’
ADM professionals acknowledge that compliance with existing accountability and
monitoring procedures requires substantial efforts from APCs. It was remarked that
“we increasingly live in a compliance culture where audits and reporting is big time”
(Interview ADM 5). Compliance with obligatory reporting and monitoring mechanisms
and is positively acknowledged in future funding allocations (or cutbacks):
Because the overall budget was decreased substantially, it meant that the 
question was not, “Are we going to give more money to the good ones and less to 
the bad ones?” The question was, “Are we going to give less money of that cut to 
the good ones and more of the cut to the less successful ones?” And that’s what 
ADM did this year. So we took that into account where projects had performed 
very well. And they related the Partnerships and Community Groups on a scale.
And those who did better got less of a cut than those who did not perform very 
well (Interview ADM 3).
From a procedural perspective, interview responses from ADM staff highlight that
successful APCs must be first and foremost compliant with accountability criteria and,
furthermore, demonstrate their achievements against the objectives outlined in their
programme of activities:
Partnerships are good Partnerships if they can demonstrate the ability to co­
operate with us, to meet the needs of the funding body and deliver on the project 
so that it is a trouble-free and pleasant experience (Interview ADM 2).
APCs are expected to use the funding for intended purposes, to meet ex ante targets
of submitted action plans, to comply with contractual agreements in terms of reporting
and accountability processes and to develop projects that could improve the delivery
of statutory services in their area (see Section 6.3). At the same time ADM
professionals equally stress that reporting requirements must not prevent APCs (a)
from flexibly responding to opportunities and obstacles arising at different stages of
project development, (b) from focussing on their work with identified target groups and
(c) from taking risks:
If Partnerships become risk-adverse and make safe decisions the programme 
ceases to meet the objectives it was set up for and becomes less effective 
(Interview ADM 5).
Interviews with ADM professionals suggested that APCs tend to copy one another's 
approaches rather than investing efforts directed at developing their potential as 
advocates for social change. They suggested that ADM perceives a lack of innovation 
as a failure of APCs in fulfilling their role as catalysts for change. In this context, one
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respondent also critically reflected on the role and responsibility of ADM and 
acknowledged that the focus of ADM had long been on monitoring expenditure of 
APCs and on ensuring their compliance with the contractual agreements in place but 
remarked that “ADM actually never went in and said, ‘Could we provide you with some 
additional skills training because you might be able to think more strategically?’” 
(Interview ADM 1). This excerpt from the interview material indicates that the reason 
for failure of APCs is assumed to be rooted in lacking managerial capacity rather than 
in the nature of the institutional environment within which APCs operate. In the course 
of the LDSIP, ADM planned to adopt a more enabling role to facilitate the work of 
APCs and focused on the development of strategic supports for APCs. For example, 
ADM professionals156 pointed out that it is crucially important for APCs to have good 
governance structures in place. Accordingly, the role of the liaison officer became re­
defined towards facilitating ‘good governance’ within APCs so as to ensure that the 
costs of intra-institutional 'frictional loss’, which might negatively impact on the APC’s 
delivery of agreed programmes, is minimised (Lloyd and Kennedy 2003).
Another aspect that was regarded a crucially important determinant for recognition of
APCs as a ‘good organisation’ is their awareness of the following tacit agreement, that
they are well-advised to remain moderate in claiming responsibility for any successful
project. Even though it was reported that APCs are often instrumental in creating
reciprocal relationships with local statutory agencies, they are expected to be
extremely diplomatic. For example, APCs should not to claim responsibility for local
successes (no matter how important their input might have been) if that takes kudos
from the main financial sponsor of the initiative (no matter how little input -  apart from
funding -  the latter might have contributed to the project):
Partnerships need to give the credit to the funder, which is a very amenable and 
collaborative way of doing the business. So they have to be collaborative and 
meet the needs of the funding body and deliver on the project. FAS, for example, 
would be more interested in interacting with organisations -  and I’m a bit cynical 
now -  who are able to deliver projects for them in such a way that they are FAS ■ 
projects (Interview ADM 3).
As a result, APCs are in a dilemma. On the one hand, they are required to promote 
their achievements in order to build up a good reputation and, thereby, maximise the 
potential for utilisation of core funding to lever additional resources into the area and 
work through a multi-stakeholder model based on the principles of partnership and 
collaboration. On the other hand, they are in a difficult situation because they cannot 
openly claim due credit for achievements and actions. However, success could still be 
favourably registered as ‘value added’ -  even if it might not be appropriately captured 
by existing formal performance-monitoring systems. Following an analysis of the 
interviews conducted with ADM staff, successful APCs are required to:
• be diplomatic and strategic because APCs are expected constructively to 
challenge potential funders, whilst retaining a good working relationship;
156 See Table 6.7 and Table 6.8.
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• be able to get ‘buy in’ from local politicians and government on behalf of the local 
community in a way that balances interests and retains relationships;
• meet ex ante targets and ensure timely project delivery that ADM expects of APCs;
• free extra resources to match Core funding received; and
• retain a risk-friendly approach to project development, which is rooted in genuine 
grassroots involvement.
6 .4.5.3 Expectations to become a catalyst for change
When interviewed, ADM professionals criticised the performance of Ballyfermot
Partnership on the grounds of a perceived lack of a methodological approach in regard
to (a) plan implementation and (b) the absence of collaboration in their relationships
with other local agencies. Also, the core funding was not thought to be strategically
used to lever additional funding from other sources. Respondents from ADM and the
local community workers felt that the local APC largely acted as disbursement agency
that donated funding to small projects. Community workers claimed that the APC does
not focus on most disadvantaged areas and, instead, engaged with “people who knew
about Partnership and who had capacity to benefit from Partnership funding [...]” and
that it was perceived as a ‘closed shop’ of insiders because “[...] it’s so hard for other
people to get” in (Interview LV 2). In other words, particular interest from well-informed
individuals and established groups from the community took precedence over wider
developmental aspects. Ballyfermot Partnership was aware of its role as a local grant-
giving body and implicit adverse outcomes:
The Partnership is perceived as funding mechanism by community groups. At first 
we spent money as an extension of the dole. We handed out money to the groups. 
People who knew what was going on came for funding with a big spoon and the 
same people would be getting assistance all the time. People at the bottom of the 
pile who needed support more than anybody else were left behind. This has
changed. We are not handing money out anymore. So we have more control and
can make investments into capacity building of community groups to overcome the 
dependency culture. We are leaving skills behind (Interview APC 6).
In 2002, Ballyfermot Partnership, under a new leadership, initiated a review process
with a view to strengthening the company’s “overall capacity and effectiveness”
(Ballyfermot Partnership 2004: 2). APCs generally recognise the obligation of meeting
expectations in regard to their legal responsibilities that are associated with being
recipients of state funding for earmarked purposes. Issues concerning the
administration of the budget, staff management and the compliance with financial
control and reporting requirements are high on the agenda (see Section 6.4.3,
quotation from Interview APC 3a). Ballyfermot Partnership was also cognisant that
leveraging extra funding is pivotal in being perceived as successful and relevant
organisation by their funders:
Core funding must be matched. Some Partnerships can even get up to two to 
three times of the LDSIP core funding they get. And those would be considered 
good Partnerships (Interview APC 9b).
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The review that was carried out in response to perceived organisational weaknesses, 
stresses the company’s focus on keeping records of progress made through internal 
performance-monitoring procedures and was meant to “get the house in order” (APC 
Interview 4a):
This review culminated in a report by our current chairperson and has led 
subsequently to the establishment of new committees to review our strategies and 
programmes of activity, the development of new reporting procedures for 
recipients of funds from the Partnership, and the strengthening of our capacity to 
engage in monitoring and evaluation through the engagement of a monitoring and 
evaluation officer (Ballyfermot Partnership 2004: 2)
The implementation of changes towards a more strategic and concerted approach is 
largely attributed to the new leadership of the company. Respondents from ADM, local 
community workers and board members of the Ballyfermot Partnership praised the 
achievements of the new chair person and the new manager that came on board early 
into the LDSIP. Following the internal review of the organisational governance model, 
Ballyfermot Partnership started focusing on a more strategic, effective and needs- 
centred approach to addressing disadvantage in Ballyfermot.
The issue of directly funding third parties was re-assessed and a decision was made 
that core funding would not be utilised to core-fund established projects that “are 
actually seeking funding to maintain themselves rather than to develop new ideas” 
(Interview APC 2a). Under the new strategy, the provision of developmental support 
and a focus on assessing the potential for new ideas and projects became central to 
the work of the APC. During a focus group meeting with APC staff, it was reported that 
the development of closer relationships with statutory players and actors from the local 
community and voluntary sector is high on the agenda of the Ballyfermot Partnership. 
At the time of the empirical research, the Ballyfermot Partnership planned to set up an 
independent co-ordinating body. This community platform was envisaged to act on 
behalf of local organisations, groups and residents and to meet regularly and discuss 
developments and project ideas with a view to mediating between conflicting interests, 
encourage co-operation on mutual interests and identify development opportunities 
(Interview APC 8). This was considered a leap forward in relation to the potential for 
creating inter-agency synergies: it was hoped that a multi-stakeholder platform with an 
interest in the development of the community in Ballyfermot157 would induce 
collaborative work relationships and possibilities for a more effective use of resources 
(Interview APC 8).
157 The new strategic objectives were couched in the same language used in public-sector publications 
without elaborating on or clarifying on the jargon; for example the text makes reference to the 
company’s objective (Ballyfermot Partnership 2004):
• “to strengthen our overall capacity and effectiveness” (3);
• to develop more “collaborative working arrangements” (4);
• to move from “a funding and brokerage role to a more developmental role based on facilitating the
emergence and consolidation of inter-organisational structures in the form of networks and task 
forces that have the capacity to more strategically address each of these issues and to facilitate 
and support the sustainability of these structures” (16);
•  to put a “greater emphasis on facilitating the development of effective local structures and
processes to address the key priority issues” (17).
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Ballyfermot Partnership also focused on the co-operation between other APCs in 
Dublin South Central and the key agencies resourcing community initiatives. 
Interviews with APC professionals and local DCC professionals revealed that a variety 
of local agencies such as the Ballyfermot Partnership, the Drugs Task Force, Dublin 
City Council, URBAN 2 and Community Development Projects had established co­
operative relationships among one another with a view to creating local efficiencies in 
allocating funding into the community158. In addition, it was highlighted that good 
working relationship with key statutory agencies operating in Ballyfermot such as FAS, 
the Health Service Executive, the Department of Social and Family Affairs, the 
Department of Education and Children and -  at a different level -  the CDB already 
existed. Finally, the Ballyfermot Partnership had plans to invite four new community 
members from LDSIP target groups on their board, increasing the number of 
community representatives to 1 2159.
Generally, APC Ballyfermot was aware of the importance of delivering tangible results 
as it signals value to both political funders and the community. For example, when 
interviewed, professionals and board members of Ballyfermot Partnership stress that 
their task is to develop and test the waters for new groups, projects and policies with a 
view “to creating better services’’ (Interview APC 7a), “leaving good structures behind” 
(Interview APC 8)”, and “to prevent duplicating of what others are doing” (Interview 
APC 6). According to APC professionals, the change in strategy was considered 
pivotal in terms of:
• encouraging co-operation between schools to develop a coordinated approach to 
addressing educational underachievement;
• promoting a joint strategy on childcare involving neighbouring APCs;
• offering a more inclusive approach to community involvement in decision-making
procedures; and
• developing a reporting system that captures the work of the APC and that is 
complementary to the monitoring requirements of ADM (which was perceived as 
prioritised reporting on numbers and, consequently, not considered capable of 
adequately accounting for efforts invested into building coalitions with partners).
Against the backdrop of a new strategic agenda, professionals from Ballyfermot
Partnership and affiliated respondents see the biggest value of their work in creating 
informal relationships with various stakeholders that can bring ‘enabling’ resources to 
the table. The interview material underscores that the reporting system which is meant 
to capture ‘value added’ of APCs is geared towards measuring facts and figures (see 
Section 6.3.1, Table 6.7). It is criticised that value for money criteria completely ignore
158 The availability of URBAN 2 funding of € 11.42 million was reported a major incentive for the 
collaboration between the Ballyfermot Partnership and the URBAN 2 initiative (Interviews APC 4a and 
APC 3b; Interview DCC 6).
159 The Ballyfermot Area Action Co-op, a local community organisation that has been instrumental in 
establishing the Ballyfermot Partnership in the mid-1990, is allocated 8 seats (community 
representatives) on the APC board (2 for each of the 4 neighbourhoods: Lower Ballyfermot, Middle 
Ballyfermot, Upper Ballyfermot, Cherry Orchard).
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realities within which APCs have to operate. The Ballyfermot Partnership stated that 
they invest considerable time and resources into nurturing informal relationships with 
key individuals, without which certain projects would not be realisable. In the absence 
of a workable formal mechanism to get buy in’ from what are considered key players, 
the success of lobbying and networking is entirely dependent on the personal capacity 
of APC professionals and board members to identify and convince allies, mostly within 
statutory agencies, to engage with them at a strategic level.
This experience is reflected and confirmed by professionals’ views from other APCs in
Dublin. In regard to recruiting board members, for example, APC professionals felt that
board members from statutory agencies are often of low rank and, hence, not
equipped with decision-making capacity to sign off on proposals discussed at board
meetings. Even if there are individuals that could take decisions at board level, it is
reported that time and again limited commitment and/or understanding of the local
partnership process impedes further action on issues discussed at board level. APC
respondents (both professionals and board members) referred to those individuals as
'Bums on seats’ or ‘Passengers’ to indicate low levels of commitment. Therefore, the
degree to which meaningful feedback between appointed representatives and their
parent organisations can be practised is not necessarily optimal. Respondents working
for APCs report that relationships take priority over structure:
Actually relationships are the key of everything. You can make the most incredible, 
get the most incredible achievements working with an organisation if you’ve a 
good relationship with the key person in that organisation, or key people -  
anything is possible (Interview APC 12).
The reliance on individual good will was identified as a dilemma preventing proactive
collaboration at the interface between APCs and their strategic partners (e.g.
community representatives, local politicians, social partners and statutory agencies).
Furthermore, since participation from statutory agencies on APC boards is not
mandatory, only the provision of considerable incentives by APCs seem to be able to
foster the creation of constructive mechanisms that support communication, interaction
and, finally, mainstreaming of innovative projects (Interview APC 11). Even though
ADM considers networking and reeling in allies as crucially important for attributing
success to APCs (see previous section), it is not perceived to be appropriately
captured by their reporting system:
The facilitation of processes and activities enabling things to happen through 
bringing actors together are not captured by ADM. The system measures output. 
Bringing relevant bodies together, draft position papers and respond to and create 
opportunities is time-consuming -  but this is not measured. Who you work and 
consult with, for example, would be more appropriate as a performance indicator 
(Interview APC 12).
Under the current system, the reliance on cultivation and maintenance of informal 
networks and personal contacts seem to result in a support structure that is fragile 
because it is based on good will rather than on mandate or legislation. This 
dependency puts APCs in a position that complicates the concerted achievement of
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outcomes in partnership with other stakeholders because it overly depends on informal 
networking capacity as well as ‘the chemistry’ between individuals. This is especially 
relevant in forming alliances with statutory agencies as the latter provide the resources 
required to fund locally-developed programmes and initiatives. Conscious of the 
complexities that come with business-like funding arrangements, APC professionals 
and board members expressed strong views that APCs are obliged to deliver results 
but that the system for assessing the success in terms of value for money needs to be 
re-visited and tailored to account for systemic realities. Otherwise, APCs feel that 
engaging in activities that satisfy the monitoring mechanism might fall into the trap of 
playing it safe at the expense of missing out on opportunities to innovate, which would 
defeat their raison d'être.
The output-orientation of measuring success or failure is not optimally tailored to 
promote capacity-building and reach out to those groups that -  according to centrally- 
devised guidelines of the LDSIP -  are considered the key beneficiaries of APC 
activities. APC professionals feel that the output-oriented nature of the performance- 
monitoring and funding system makes it increasingly difficult to retain a practical- 
oriented, collaborative, local development approach that allows for involvement ‘from 
below’:
People forget that Partnerships are supposed to be innovative and hence produce 
quality and failure [...] But the current system of monitoring bears the danger of 
Partnerships getting caught in delivering services that are something tangible such 
as people trained et cetera (Interview APC 11).
Respondents from APCs generally acknowledge the role of APCs in identifying gaps in 
public service provision and in running services addressing the issue, but ideally only 
for a period of time. They maintain that APCs are not meant to be service providers 
per se and argue that it is within the responsibility of the government to pick up and 
integrate locally piloted models that create synergies and efficiencies into the statutory 
apparatus of public service provision. This perspective contrasts with views expressed 
by government officials and, to a greater degree, DCC professionals who see the 
greatest potential for APCs in facilitating the delivery of welfare-related core services 
to disadvantaged target groups and individuals. When asked about their experience in 
collaborating with statutory bodies, APC professionals indicated that the commitment 
of central government to bottom-up approaches, vertical learning and mainstreaming -  
with the latter being based on innovative development of successful local models -  is 
more rhetoric than reality. The NESC’s (2005) recommendation for a continuation of 
APC-type research and development activities stands in stark contrast to the systemic 
blockages in the governance system that impede outcome-oriented partnership and 
collaboration between state-funded activist measures and government institutions. It 
was highlighted by APC professionals that the best way (i.e. the most promising 
approach) to circumnavigate perceived bureaucratic constraints is through informal 
networking, which brings its own challenges.
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6.4.5.4 Expectations to be listened to
Local community workers in Ballyfermot acknowledged the inefficiencies that come
with working in a diverse and multi-layered local-development sector. They reported
that the number of state-funded agencies promoting local development confuses
residents and, in particular, people they work with. One respondent from this group of
professionals expressed frustration in regard to the time spent in different meetings
involving the same individuals:
It's crazy. It’s absolutely daft. Sometimes we get in our cars and drive to the civic 
centre and go to a meeting. Then we all get into our cars again and drive up the 
road to the local resource centre to go to another meeting (Interview LV 5).
Community workers interviewed are in favour of the idea to create a local community
network promoting interagency communication and the pooling of resources where
feasible160. One respondent gave an example to illustrate how local groups started
working together with a view to addressing a fragmentation of locally-provided services:
There is no good communication network between local groups and agencies. The 
same families are served by more than one group. So we set up a project as a link 
body involving relevant agencies and politicians -  and they initiated a Community 
Development Project (Interview LV 2).
This is in line with observations (a) that were made by professionals from DCC and 
those that are/have been involved in decision-making processes at government level 
and (b) that fuelled the ‘narrative of duplication’ (see Section 6.2.6). There is a 
difference, however, in explaining duplication and lack of collaboration among local 
organisations. Respondents from the local authorities, CDBs and government 
departments claim that the plethora of local organisations leads to the duplication of 
local services, which results in increasing costs for administration and overheads and, 
hence, effectively reduces value added by state-funded community-based 
organisations and groups.
Local community workers and APC professionals interviewed, however, maintain that:
• the state is responsible for the creation of a complex formalised local-development 
sector, in the first instance;
• second, a lack of interdepartmental coordination is leading to local families and 
disadvantaged individuals being served by a multitude of statutory agencies (e.g. 
Interview APC 11; Interview LV 1); and
• third, that the existing government policy of allocating funding through competitive 
bidding and related performance-monitoring system prevents coordination and 
leads to safe-guarding territories (e.g. Interviews APC 3 and APC 5; Interview LV 
5).
160 The main state-funded players in Ballyfermot (i.e. the URBAN Programme, Dublin City Council, the 
Drugs Task Force and the local APC) started working together. In addition, the local APC pursued the 
establishment of a local community platform with a view to increasing the scope for interaction and 
collaborative planning among local groups in the area (see Section 6 4.5.3 above).
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In the local area, one respondent felt that the competition culture for accessing
statutory funding, inappropriate time frames for implementing actions and, finally, the
measurement of success as quantifiable output are key obstacles that prevent more
effective collaboration among state-funded projects at the grassroots level:
Integration has become a buzzword in the last two years. The agencies get, as 
you would be aware of, they now get very territorial around funding and around 
centres and around possession and around having to tick boxes as to how many 
people between the agencies are using your service. Because for funding again, 
how do you quantify for really good community development? How do you quantify 
success in terms of developing an area? And I think the difficulty then around 
when you become funding orientated, you have to possess things because you 
have to spend your money within a certain time frame or you lose it (Interview LV 
5).
Local organisations consider themselves trapped in a scenario that is dictated by the
bureaucratic logic that drives funding arrangements. When asked about the
achievements of Ballyfermot Partnership, local community workers felt that Ballyfermot
Partnership does not pro-actively engage with local groups. They consider the
Partnership as a funder of people-centred initiatives, actions that are a response to
problems experienced by the socially excluded such as capacity building and other
services linked to increasing labour-market participation. They also remarked that
most of those initiatives only partly reflect local issues and often ignore structural
causes for social exclusion. Local community workers maintain that people-centred
activities need to be matched with investments into the built environment and basic
infrastructure because in some neighbourhoods in Ballyfermot “people are waiting for
a shop, a post office and a bus stop” (Interview LV 5). Generally, this group of
respondents strongly felt that the structural framework of statutory-led local
development initiatives has been landed on communities ‘from above’ and was
superimposed on existing ‘organic’ community networks. One respondent explained
that local community activists and residents often withdraw from formal processes if
they do not feel included and pursue own agendas:
The URBAN programme brought extra funding into Ballyfermot. And URBAN is 
obsessively controlled by Dublin City Council. They are obsessed with controlling 
the money and using it for what they want to do. Locals can see through that.
They know they’re not allowed to participate in a meaningful way and they don’t 
engage if nothing is going to be delivered that interests them. But Dublin City 
Council then thinks there is no active community sector in place (Interview LV 1).
In this context, professionals working for APCs and other state-funded local 
development projects and initiatives admit that local views “are often ignored and 
sacrificed to an approach informed by a bureaucratic agenda” (Interview LV 1; also 
Interviews APC 5 and APC 6). Local workers from Ballyfermot are cautious when 
engaging with ‘bigger’ state-funded interventionist measures (such as Ballyfermot 
Partnership or the Urban 2 Initiatve) because they are perceived as top-down 
organised local development initiatives that fail to connect and consult with the 
community and, hence, underutilise local knowledge.
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6.4.6 A synopsis of views
The views on value for money (VFM) that were expressed in the interviews differ 
considerably. The analysis of the interview material suggests that perceptions and 
standpoints of respondents are dependent on their organisational affiliation, their 
professional background and their hierarchical position in the governance network 
(see Chapter 4, Section 4.4.2, Figure 4). Respondents from different organisational, 
professional and operational backgrounds pointed out that a number of systemic 
obstacles prevent APCs from achieving their full potential, such as:
• the lack of a central interdepartmental coordination mechanism that gives 
directions and incentivises joined-up thinking among statutory service providers;
• the absence of a reporting system that adequately captures qualitative aspects of 
‘social-inclusion work’;
• the competitive bidding for resources, which fosters turf protection and, hence, 
torpedoes resource sharing and collaboration at local level;
• the tendency to emulate projects rather than encouraging the development of new 
initiatives and
• the focus of measures on welfare-related service-delivery;
• few activities promoting vertical institutional learning through constructively 
challenging relevant statutory agencies;
• the nature of contemporary funding arrangements that encourage short-term 
thinking and that potentially inhibit the full utilisation of local knowledge and 
development potential to achieve genuinely participatory models of community 
involvement;
• the absence of an incentive/sanction system that promotes partnership 
principles, interagency co-operation and constructive dialogue at board level of 
APCs:
State agencies do not take Partnerships seriously because there is no imperative 
on these agencies to take them seriously (Interview NE 1b);
• the government-orchestrated, highly institutionalised and professionalised nature 
of local development with little delegated decision-making capacity and 
accountability-checks in the hands of the designated beneficiaries of local 
development programmes;
• intra-organisational ’cumbersome’ governance structures and practices that 
prevent running the organisation in a professional manner (e.g. poor money 
management system, weak decision-making structures, questionable use of 
funding); and
• low levels of trust between government and communities.
Local professionals from APCs and local community workers and -  to a lesser extent -  
-  government officials and professionals from both ADM and DCC consider the current 
model of performance assessment and the application of value for money criteria as 
not optimally tailored to meet the realities within which APCs operate. However, the 
views expressed by government officials, senior civil servants from Dublin City Council
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and ADM professionals illustrate that APCs are expected to adapt to institutional 
restructuring in a way that retains their capacity to:
• address strategically relevant local issues that were identified by the local 
community;
• promote multi-stakeholder involvement with a view either to generate or channel 
resources into their area (with a focus on improving welfare-related service delivery 
and encourage labour-market participation) ; and
• pursue and establish pluralist and collaborative modes for decision making and 
promote democratic experimentalism (OECD 1996).
National experts and professionals from the local-development sector emphasise that 
formal inter-agency dialogue and collaboration are not part of the organisational 
culture of statutory organisations. The degree to which APCs achieve their objectives 
is largely dependent on their informal networking capacity, i.e. on qualities that cannot 
be accounted for by formal auditing procedures and VFM criteria. Irrespective of 
formal indicators employed by political funders of APCs, the key characteristic for 
successful APCs is their ability to forge relationships with key stakeholders. The 
networking potential of APCs can be defined as their capacity to provide incentives 
that can convince or otherwise motivate strategically relevant and/or resourceful allies 
and key individuals of a ‘high calibre’ to support their cause. There is general 
agreement that good intra-organisational governance structures, the availability of 
indigenous resources and the set of skills of APC professionals determine the capacity 
to win influential allies from different quarters and, hence, are essentially important as 
they indicate a ‘high-profile’ status to political sponsors of APCs (see also Section
6.3.2).
The degree of perceived and accredited professionalism of the local APC is a key 
marker for funders as to how likely they are going to see returns for resources 
invested, that outweighs the importance of formal VFM criteria. Here, professionalism 
can be understood as the capacity of the APC to (a) utilise core funding and lever 
additional resources, (b) manage organisational processes and administrative 
procedures and (c) generate local outcomes that are in line with the objectives of the 
LDSIP. According to the empirical evidence, APCs can be considered successful if 
they are professional and, moreover, can present themselves as an organisation that:
• provides a neutral space for bringing actors with different interests and agendas 
together and encourage multilateral collaboration among different stakeholders;
• has credibility within the local area and can mobilise local communities to 
participate within the operational framework provided by the APC;
• has the capacity to develop new ideas and create opportunities that cannot be 
provided from within the statutory apparatus; i.e. APCs must be considered 
relevant by potential partners that are expected to contribute resources (e.g. local 
knowledge, funding, know-how, political or economic influence) for the planning
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and implementation of local projects geared at ameliorating local symptoms of 
socio-economic disadvantage and poverty; and 
• that can deliver a social dividend for funding received.
The concept of VFM adds another dimension to governance restructuring and related 
changes that have an impact on funding arrangements for APCs. Following Power’s 
definition of VFM (Chapter 1, Section 1.4.1, Table 1.1), the case study reveals that 
contemporary performance-oriented monitoring and evaluation practices cannot 
adequately measure impacts of APC actions that are directed at the achievement of 
outcomes (Chapter 1, Section 1.4.3, Table 1.2). The research findings suggest that the 
concept of VFM, which has been informed by the output-oriented ethos of the private 
sector, is only partially suitable for assessing the performance of APCs.
Extracts from the interviews illustrated that the funding arrangements have been 
influenced by VFM principles. The empirical analysis pointed out that overly output- 
oriented funding arrangements impact on plans and activities of APC. The deployment 
of a plethora of relatively sophisticated accountability and performance measures such 
as SCOPE, the Himmelman Model, the Excellence Through People Award, VFM 
audits and case studies can only partially assess the capacity and success of APCs. It 
was found that the monitoring system does not adequately reflect that APCs largely 
rely on the informal and interpersonal world of networking, clientelism and tactical 
manoeuvring and, second, does not equally consider measuring the efforts made by 
relevant third parties that have a role to play in addressing local development issues in 
disadvantaged neighbourhoods. Another difficulty that was reported in this context is 
that the credit of successful projects always goes to the statutory (co-)funders whereas 
the responsibility for failures stays within the realm of APCs (Interview NE 3 and NE 6 ; 
Interview APC 12; Interview ADM 1). The findings of this study suggest that observed 
phenomena like risk-avoidance, inverse-care laws and project emulation among APCs 
are a direct result of poorly designed funding arrangements and an associated support 
framework that is not optimally tailored to address systemic obstacles preventing 
developmental work in severely disadvantaged neighbourhoods.
6.5 Conclusion
The evidence presented here illustrates how core principles embedded in the Strategic 
Management Initiative (SMI) and related policy documents informed and shaped 
contemporary governance restructuring in Dublin and associated funding (including 
performance-monitoring and auditing) arrangements for Area Partnership Companies 
(APCs) (Tables 6.7, 6 .8 , 6.9 and 6.10). The documents reviewed and the interview 
material analysed reveal that a succession of steps have been undertaken to create 
conditions that facilitated the incorporation of APCs into a new governance model in 
the area of local social and economic regeneration (see Section 6.2). The empirical 
material was analysed from the perspective of three sets of key indicators that were
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developed as surrogate measures to explore in a methodogical way the following 
funding aspects of APCs:
• processes related to institutional change;
• accountability, monitoring and performance mechanism; and
• notions of value for money and interpretations of success.
The analysis of the interview material confirmed previous research findings that the 
import of ideas from reform-minded countries such as New Zealand, the US, the UK 
and the EU has been instrumental in promoting public-sector reform and governance 
change in Ireland from the early-1990s. Bartley et al. (1999) consider the New Zealand 
model as key influence for public-sector modernisation in Ireland (see Chapter 1, 
Section 1.4.2). As a result of the introduction of ideas and models from abroad, local- 
governance and public-service delivery systems became subject to a new managerial 
or business-like rhetoric and practice, which has been working towards the 
achievement of a systemic harmonisation between local development and local 
government systems. It could be demonstrated that APCs were also made subject to 
reformatory priorities that had substantial consequences for their remit and modus 
operandi.
For APCs, the ongoing rationalisation and streamlining of local development structures 
finds expression in a growing emphasis on funding arrangements, performance- 
oriented evaluation and monitoring procedures and self-monitoring practices. 
Traditional bureaucratic styles of monitoring and evaluating public-sector performance 
overly focused on channelling funding into disadvantaged communities and checks if 
'the books are in order’. In contrast, the new performance-oriented accountability 
system is associated with the public-sector modernisation, which has been promoted 
through the SMI and Regulating Better (cf. DoT 2004).
The existing accountability framework consists of a plethora of auditing tools available 
to funders to assess progress made based on a reporting system that highlights 
quantitative data, written reports and financial reporting (see Section 6.3.2, Table. 6 .8). 
As a result, achievements of APCs in promoting local participation and capacity 
building are now increasingly evaluated against command economy-type targeting 
practices that, according to the interview material, are perceived as overly paper- 
oriented, focusing on short-term achievements and only marginally capturing value 
added in qualitative terms.
ADM-published guidelines stress the importance of equality objectives in developing 
strategies for participatory local development. APCs are advised to pursue activities 
that, first, enable the participation of disadvantaged communities and the community 
sector in decision making and that, second, address those individuals and groups 
most affected by social exclusion. The analysis of the empirical material, however, 
shows that the annual budgeting system and the emphasis on performance-based
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reporting torpedo the developmental role of APCs, as more qualitative aspects of their 
programme of activities take second place vis-à-vis the pursuit of output-oriented 
actions. Despite detailed indicators designed to assess the degree to which APCs’ 
programmes, for example, can tackle “the 'participation deficit’ and build the skills and 
organisational capacity of the community sector for a full partnership role” (Harvey 
2 0 0 2 : 1), the evaluation of success clearly focuses on quantitative achievements of 
APCs. Systematic procedures targeted at monitoring the quality of the APCs’ 
participatory inclusiveness and democratic accountability towards the community 
interest are in place (cf. ADM 2000), but are not being pursued with similar vigour as 
reporting requirements to the political funders. Output-focused funding guidelines, 
performance-monitoring criteria and value-for-money audits represent a process of 
state-initiated systemic standardisation at work (with a view to co-opting APCs into the 
apparatus of the state) that:
• does not appropriately accommodate for the social-inclusion work of APCs; and
• determines, to a considerable degree, how, and with whom, APCs engage in local 
disadvantaged neighbourhoods.
The comparison of interview material suggests that the single most divisive factor 
among respondents’ views on value for money-related issues and the restructuring of 
local governance in Dublin is their professional position and related experience within 
the governance network. The following clusters could be identified:
• National Experts (NE): individuals who are or have been involved at national, 
government and/or interdepartmental level in decision-making procedures shaping 
the design and implementation of the Area Partnership Company-based approach 
to local development.
• Dublin City Council (DCC): employees who are or have been involved in either 
management decisions concerning the city council approach to local development 
or implementing local development strategies on behalf of DCC or the Dublin CDB.
• Area Development Management (ADM): employees from different sections (senior 
management, liaison officers, programme co-ordinators) involved in programmes 
targeting designated disadvantaged areas.
• Area Partnership Company (APC): professionals and board members from the 
Area Partnership Company operating in the case-study area as well as (a) 
managers from other Dublin-based APCs and (b) PLANET.
• Local View (LV): one local employer, three community workers and one resident 
involved in state or EU-funded local development programmes in the case-study 
area.
In particular, interviews illustrate that respondents from APCs and local community 
workers felt that:
• the reconfiguration of funding arrangements under the LDSIP has been strongly 
biased towards emphasising the need for accountability to funders (at the expense 
of time available for the pursuit of local development measures);
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• changes concerning funding and operational arrangements of APCs are dictated 
top-down with little consultation (which, for example, stands in contrast to the 
regulatory principle of transparency outlined in Regulating Better (DoT 2004: 10) 
and the partnership ethos that had been promoted by the GDB);
• that local ‘professional’ organisations (e.g. local state-funded groups), and well- 
organised groups and individuals who are close to the local APC -  i.e. groups that 
know how the system works -  have been more likely to benefit from engaging with 
the local APC than those who mainly work on a voluntary basis or do not have the 
knowledge or capacity to become involved; and
• the independent grassroots sector withdraws if opportunities provided within the 
state-funded sector are not compatible with their agenda or if collaboration is 
perceived too bureaucratic (e.g. Interview APC 10; Interview LV 5).
Contemporary funding arrangements and performance-monitoring criteria do not 
necessarily encourage APCs to provide services and developmental support to those 
that are considered ‘hard to reach’ and pursue a strategy of targeted enrolment; i.e. de 
facto they are rewarded if they work with groups that show an interest in collaboration 
and that can contribute to making APC programmes succeed in the short run. The 
data gathered reveals that the dilemma with the contemporary reporting system: it is 
overly bureaucratic and geared towards measuring tangible outputs considered 
relevant by the engineers of contemporary auditing mechanisms, rather than being 
tailored to meet local realities faced by APCs and their ‘constituents’.
In the light of reporting requirements -  notwithstanding some room for capturing 
qualitative aspects of partnership work through case studies and review reports 
drafted by the ADM liaison officer (see Section 6.3.1, Table 6.7) -  respondents from 
APCs feel that monitoring overly focuses on countable outcomes of their work. They 
express concerns that, notwithstanding the officially propagated rhetoric of 
participatory democracy, monitoring and reporting mechanisms are indicative of the 
political will to focus on the production of numerical data and direct service delivery to 
the citizen instead of allowing for qualitative outcomes via developmental work, 
capacity building and participatory engagement in the communities. To put it bluntly, 
meeting the requirements of the funders is guaranteed by a sophisticated and complex 
accountability system, whereas local communities have limited means to hold APCs 
accountable.
Previous research (see Chapter 4, Section 4.2.2) and the interviews carried out for this 
case study show that those APCs that can maximise the use of resources, as defined 
by the criteria laid down by the political funders of APCs, are more likely to be among 
the winners in future rounds of funding allocation than those who are less successful in 
attracting additional resources into their area (be it in form of money or another type of 
support). The inclination of funders to support ‘high-profile’ APCs (see Section 6.3.2, 
Table. 6 .8), which are identified by a mix of formal and informal assessment criteria,
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illustrates that the funding arrangements reward (a) APCs toeing the line and (b) those 
with the social capital and/or power to reel in allies considered relevant by the political 
funders of APCs.
The competitive nature of contemporary funding practices and the reported positive 
correlation between financial rewards and success as measured by formal reporting 
requirements have implications for planning local actions in a way that is feared to run 
counter to the ‘developmental’ agenda of APCs. Obvious concerns are that the 
prevalence of an inverse-care principle that rewards ‘high-profile’ APCs based on their 
perceived success (a) would militate against the time-consuming promotion of 
participation in planning and decision making from the bottom up and (b) would 
minimise the incentives for the pursuit of process-oriented innovative strategies (risk- 
avoidance). Even though the capacity of an APC to mobilise local resources and key 
individuals adds kudos to their activities from the point of view of political sponsors and 
‘their’ constituents, it illustrates that local communities targeted by the LDSIP are 
reliant on local resources and APC’s professionals to make the best use of those.
Responses from government officials and senior civil servants point out that 'good 
APCs’ act as social entrepreneurs and that there is evidence where APCs 
demonstrated that perceived limitations within the funding framework can be 
successfully circumnavigated. Taking also into account (a) the degree of (technical) 
assistance and support available through ADM, (b) the establishment of PLANET and 
(c) the experience of the older pilot-APCs (set up under the 1991-1993 PESP), it could 
be argued that APCs should be adequately prepared for and adapt to the realities 
concerning both the funding arrangements and processes of institutional restructuring. 
At the same time, one has to bear in mind that, from the outset, designated areas are 
not at all supplied equally with the indigenous endowments and know-how necessary 
to successfully participate in the area-based approach. Besides, evidence suggests 
that changes in governance and its effects on the budgeting system and funding 
arrangements, the calibre of key individuals that can be accessed and mobilised and 
the quality of indigenous resources of the area play a big role in determining the scope 
of the APC to operate within flexible boundaries provided by the institutional rules and 
regulations in place.
The contemporary power configuration within governance structures prohibits mutual 
accountability and responsibility for effective collaboration between APCs and the 
state, on the one hand, and between APCs and a variety of local stakeholders from 
civil society, on the other. The dependency of APCs on multiple informal relationships 
with various statutory agencies and government departments has been identified as a 
key theme (e.g. Chapter 6 , Section 6.4.5): engaging in time-consuming lobbying 
processes has frequently been mentioned throughout the interviews as a major 
obstacle for APCs. In particular, APC professionals did not perceive formal 
mechanisms as optimally tailored to ensure an efficient coordination between the work
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of APCs and established public bodies. As a result, the world of informal criteria and 
interpersonal networking across sectoral boundaries appears to be considered a 
suitable retreat or parallel mechanism to circumnavigate perceived systemic 
inadequacies for pursuing own objectives. This happens, for example, through bi- or 
multilateral informal (re)-negotiations involving senior individuals from APCs and 
(mostly) public bodies that often lead to fruitful forms of collaboration that are not -  or 
only partially -  captured by performance and auditing systems in place (for examples 
see Pobal 2006a, 2006b).
More often than not, the success of locally-developed projects was reported to be 
overly dependent on the capacity of the APC to get access to, and convince, senior 
individuals from within the statutory apparatus to commit resources to, or alternatively 
support, locally developed projects aimed at improving symptoms of structural 
disadvantage. It appears that, so far, SMI-related measures introduced under the 
LDSIP have not benefited APCs in developing a more cost-efficient and outcome- 
oriented modus operandi that facilitates their envisaged role as catalysts for positive 
change in designated disadvantaged areas. The empirical findings presented in this 
chapter suggest that under the LDSIP three basic -  and partly overlapping -  
components are instrumental in determining the potential of the individual APC’s 
capacity to be considered a ‘good’ organisation by their political sponsors:
• Partnership based on principles o f bottom-up, collaboration and innovation: Are the 
priorities set consensus-based? Is the decision-making process democratic? Is the 
approach based on agreed community development concepts? Is the work 
highlighting equality and an anti-poverty agenda? Is the APC prepared to take 
risks, to avoid ‘backing winners’161, and to promote innovative principles?
• Social Capital (e.g. Grootaert 1998; Fukuyama 1999) and Professionalism: How is 
the APC informed about possible sources of funding? Is the local development 
approach taken based on a strategic plan informed by consultation? Are projects 
and actions tailored to the local situation? Can the APC win allies and exert 
influence on key decision-makers? (Can the community ‘punch above its weight’?) 
Do they make use of their potential to act as an innovative company? Can the 
catchment area be well-presented as a deprived community deserving further 
financial support? Are the internal governance structures of the company 
considered efficient? Can the APC effectively market and communicate its success 
as to create awareness about their activities?
• Indigenous assets: Is there already any social or economic potential that can be 
tapped into? Are there strong leader personalities that can facilitate the 
implementation of strategic action and local planning? Is there a strong feeling of 
community? Is the level of participation sufficient so that a burn-out syndrome 
among those actively involved can be avoided?
161 Another expression for avoiding challenging projects that on the one hand are addressing identified 
issues but that may not yield the expected outcomes on the other hand -  it is a form of ‘playing it 
safe' (cf. Elliott 2002)
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APCs that enjoy a good reputation because they either followed recommendations of 
the Minister and “did go about their business” (Dâil Éireann 25/06/2003: no page 
numbers), or the advice of their monitoring and support agency and "deliver on the 
project so that it is a trouble-free and pleasant experience” (Interview ADM 2; see also 
Section 6.4.5.2), are likely to be favourably considered in terms of the allocation of 
resources than less skilful APCs -  irrespective of the factual degree of deprivation 
prevalent within their area.
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7. REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL FINDINGS: ANT. URT OR THE RA?
7.1 Introduction
Previous chapters illustrated that perceived pressures associated with the concept of 
economic globalisation facilitated the communication of ideas that culminated into 
dominant narratives of duplication and the formulation of strategies for public-sector 
modernisation and local-governance restructuring in Dublin (see, for example, Chapter 
6 , Section 6 .2.4.3). The pursuit of better local governance under the 2000-2006 Local 
Development and Social Inclusion Programme (LDSIP) aims at co-opting Area 
Partnership Companies (APCs) into the public sector-administered governance 
network. This thesis seeks to identify an explanation for the contemporary design of 
existing funding arrangements for APCs in the context of governance restructuring. 
The pursuit of the research question led to the identification of key themes and 
procedures that are closely associated with funding arrangements for APCs (see 
Chapter 4, Section 4.3). This study has thus far:
• highlighted the role of key actors and processes that have been instrumental in 
shaping Dublin’s governance landscape (Chapter 6 , Section 6.2);
• revealed insights into the workings of the accountability and reporting
arrangements (as part and parcel of funding arrangements) for APCs (Chapter 6 , 
Section 6.3);
• analysed changing priorities in performance monitoring for APCs (Chapter 6 ,
Section 6.4) and potential impacts for programme development and
implementation; and
• provided an insight into perceived success criteria for APCs as indicated by 
interview responses (Chapter 6 , Section 6.4).
The interviews with individuals from different institutional and professional
backgrounds brought to light a variety of insights concerning the reconfiguration of 
institutional power and its impact on the strategic role of APCs within Dublin’s 
governance framework. Changes in funding arrangements for APCs facilitated the re­
positioning of APCs within local governance, and, moreover, their co-option into the 
apparatus of the state. The analysis of the interview material illustrates that the 
citywide decentralisation of functions and services provided by Dublin City Council 
(DCC) -  in tandem with legislative changes, the establishment of new structures and 
the cohesion strategy -  led to an increasing influence for DCC in local development 
issues. When interviewed, respondents from APCs frequently mentioned that the 
alignment of APCs with, and involvement in, DCC-affiliated structures is burdensome 
and curbed their ability to deliver on their own remit.
This study argues that actor-network theory (ANT), urban regime theory (URT) and the 
regulation approach (RA) offer useful strategic approaches to explain local- 
governance restructuring and associated impacts on funding arrangements for APCs. 
Each theoretical approach has different assumptions about influences that have a
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bearing on shaping urban governance and its underlying socio-institutional and 
politico-economic structures within which funding arrangements of APCs are 
embedded (see Chapter 3, Section 3.3). Therefore, they provide distinctly different 
perspectives for the analysis of interview data and published material (Chapter 4)162.
According to Murdoch and Marsden (1995: 372), a primary concern of studies 
addressing the relationship between causal forces that lead to place-specific social 
and economic features is “to understand how structures are continually reproduced 
through the process of interaction”. They conclude, “we must, therefore, look carefully 
at the processes that give rise to power as an effect’ (ibid., original emphasis) (cf. 
Lauria 1997b). Drawing on a Latourian concept of power, Murdoch and Marsden elicit 
the potential of ANT to assess components of structures and explain how structures 
emerge and are being held in shape by “those who are able to enrol, convince and 
enlist others into associations on terms which allow these initial actors to 'represent’ all 
the others” (ibid.). Critics maintain, however, that ANT can map power relations but 
does not sufficiently account for the role played by human agency (see Chapter 3, 
Section 3.2.1.2). Within limitations and based on conceptual ‘tweaking’, ANT, however, 
was shown to be a useful strategic tool for shedding light on interactions between 
networked heterogeneous entities (i.e. ‘things’, technologies or/and humans) (e.g. 
Pickering 1993).
Stone’s (1989) study of urban regimes is concerned with the question of how the 
capacity to govern a city can be achieved through local coalition-building activities in a 
scenario that is characterised by a fragmented disbursement of power among a variety 
of groupings with different (and at times diametrically opposed) vested interests. URT 
highlights the role of business involvement in the formation of a governing regime. The 
key ingredient for the capacity to govern is the ability to combine a critical mass of 
resources, mainly through informal networking activities among politicians, the 
business sector and other key interest groups from civil society.
The RA explores the relationship between the state, the sphere of production (as the 
basis for societal wealth creation) and labour. From the viewpoint of the RA, the 
promotion of governance modernisation, welfare restructuring and entrepreneurial 
urban policies are regulatory efforts of the state to impact on, respond to or overcome 
crises of capitalist modes of accumulation and, thereby, secure societal cohesion163.
162 However, some common ground could also be identified: in the context of local case studies, the 
commonality among ANT, URT and the neo-Gramscian interpretation of the RA lies in their ‘desire’ to 
explain the emergence and nature of durable power configurations (see also Chapter 3, Section 3.1, 
Table 3.1).
163 This aspect is captured in the definition of the mode of social regulation provide by Tickell and Peck 
(Chapter 3, Section 3.2.3.1). Tickell and Peck (1992: 201), however, argue that the influence of the 
mode of social regulation (MSR) on the sphere of economic activities and the sphere of capitalist 
production had been neglected in empirical work because of “a deep-stated but unacknowledged, 
theoretical subordination, of the MSR to the accumulation system” (original emphasis). This one­
sided perspective, i.e. the assumption that the characteristics of the MSR are tailored to meet the 
needs of capitalist accumulation, can be re-dressed through also focusing on the potential of socially 
constructed power -  for example in urban growth poles as sub-sections of “wider networks of capital
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According to Jessop (1990; 1997a; 1997b), concepts rooted in Gramscian thinking 
can facilitate an analysis of the interplay between local governance arrangements and 
societal modes of accumulation.
Against this backdrop, the following sections of this chapter reflect on observations 
discussed in Chapter 6 : first, from the viewpoint of ANT; second, from the perspective 
of URT; finally, using ideas rooted in Gramscian thinking. This thesis posits that 
governance modernisation, which is reflected in reconfigurations of the institutional 
landscape in Dublin, the intensification of centrally-devised accountability and 
monitoring procedures and VFM-guided approaches to performance measurement 
(see Chapter 6 , Section 6.3), is a complex system whose workings can be explored 
from the vantage point of all three theoretical frameworks: actor-network theory (ANT), 
urban regime theory (URT) and ideas associated with the regulation approach (RA).
The case-study approach provides a useful platform for a theory-guided analysis of 
forces and actors involved in re-positioning APCs in Dublin’s governance landscape. 
The empirical material indicates that social agency plays a crucial role in the re­
configuration of Dublin’s governance framework. The analysis of the interviews (see 
Chapter 6 ) identified a variety of core issues such as:
• the spreading of narratives that raised issues of duplication and institutional
deadweight;
• the placement of human agents into strategic positions overseeing APC structures;
• the establishment of the DoCRGA as a vehicle tasked to co-ordinate streamlining
state-funded local development initiatives at the national level;
• the formation of DCC-administered parallel institutional structures that operate in
the same geographic area as APCs (see Chapter 6 , Section 6.2, Figure 5) and,
moreover, that have a similar remit. This reduces the relative importance and 
power of APCs;
• the adept utilisation of policy papers, consultancy reports and legislation;
• the approach of DCC to include only selected allies from local communities in
decision-making fora who will not pose a risk to centrally-devised plans and 
strategies;
• the navigational capacity of senior officials of DCC to influence and bypass 
democratic processes;
• propositions to create dependencies through service-level agreements that legally 
bind APCs as contractors into the local government system;
• an increasing emphasis on VFM and the introduction of related monitoring and 
performance measures.
The following sections seek ultimately to ascertain which theoretical approach is suited 
best to explain the characteristic features of contemporary funding arrangements for
accumulation” (Amin and Thrift 1995: 91) -  to impact on the accumulation system.
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APCs against the backdrop of governance restructuring in Dublin: ANT, URT or the 
RA? In the context of this study, previous research findings and an analysis of the 
literature reviewed led to the assumption that ideas associated with the RA provide a 
superior theoretical framework to ANT. Following the falsification principle outlined in 
the methodology chapter (Chapter 4; see also Introduction), the key priority is to test if 
either ANT or URT provides a more powerful strategic approach to explain the 
characteristics of funding arrangements for APCs than the RA.
7.2 ANT
7.2.1 Introduction
ANT is conceptual approach that analyses the role of both humans and ‘things’ within 
power configurations or networks. Through the lens of ANT, the gradual progression of 
APCs into a city-wide, local-authority managed governance network under the 
cohesion process can be interpreted as a process of translation164: i.e. the controlled 
alignment of plans and activities of APCs into a city-wide governance network in a way 
that ensures that APCs retain the capacity to deliver locally what is wanted by the 
state (i.e. the main funder of APCs).
However, the existence of other competitive forces at work -  either from within or from 
outside the relevant network space -  could deflect, absorb or even hi-jack the 
performative power of APCs and, thereby, jeopardise successful translation. 
Therefore, it is fundamental that centrally placed network builders, operating from 
within government buildings, have the capacity to effectively utilise resources that 
‘cement the links’ between the state (the enroller) and APCs (the enroiee). Law (1986) 
demonstrates that such power requires the ability of the enroller to act at a distance 
through the circulation of immutable mobiles. Immutable mobiles can consist of all 
sorts of technologies, inanimate objects and humans (see Table 7.1. below). This 
study made reference to a wide variety of immutable mobiles such as:
• texts (e.g. legislation and directives shaping the institutional landscape, funding 
guidelines or contracts outlining an agreed programme of activities) and the 
semantic use of jargon therein (e.g. parameters couched in the language of value 
for money);
• monitoring and performance procedures (e.g. the submission of quarterly SCOPE 
reports, quarterly financial returns or case studies);
• money (e.g. core funding received under the LDSIP);
• drilled or ‘cyborged’ staff165 (e.g. the developmental role of ADM liaison officers on 
APC boards or the necessity of APC staff to work towards the implementation of
164 The key concepts of ANT are summarised in Table 7.1 below; see also Chapter 3, Section 3.1, Table 
3.1).
165 A cyborg is defined as a cybernetic organism which adds to or enhances its abilities by using 
technology (Haraway 1991; Thrift 2000b). Cybernetics is the “Science of regulation and control in 
animals (including humans), organizations, and machines when they are viewed as self-governing 
whole entities consisting of parts and their organization” (Encyclopaedia Britannica n.d.: no page 
numbers).
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new management standards such as the Q-Mark and the Excellence Through 
People Award; see Table 7.1 below); and 
• stories (e.g. the creation and communication of narratives of duplication; see 
Chapter 6 , Section 6.2.6).
According to ANT, immutable mobiles (i.e. both things and humans) have the capacity 
to act; i.e. they do more than simple carrying “the force that comes through them” 
(Latour 2004: no page numbers). Immutable mobiles are typically circulated from a 
privileged place within 'the centre’ (what Callon (1986) calls an obligatory point of 
passage); i.e. usually from actors situated within government buildings who are tasked 
to hold in check the behaviour of distant agents on ‘the periphery’ (i.e. APCs) (cf. Law 
and Hetherington 1999: 7). According to Law (1986: 1), “long-distance control depends 
on the creation of a network of passive agents (both human and non-human) which 
makes it possible for emissaries to circulate from the centre to the periphery in a way 
that maintains their durability, forcefulness and fidelity” (emphasis added). For 
effective remote control to take place, immutable mobiles must have the capacity to 
relay back information to the centre. Mobility, durability, the capacity to exert force and 
the ability to return are indispensable characteristics associated with the concept of 
remote control. Immutable mobiles can even be seen as specifications of a yet more 
general requirement: that there is no degeneration in communication between the 
centre and periphery. No ‘noise’ must be introduced into the circuit (cf. Law 1986: 5).
ANT emphasises that the planning for the enrolment of APCs is likely to be a dialectic 
process because the interaction between immutable mobile and the object targeted for 
enrolment (i.e. APCs) causes “a play of resistance and accommodation” (Pickering 
1993: 567). As a consequence -  irrespective of a power balance that is biased against 
the state-funded local-development sector and APCs -  the outcome of (a) the 
intentional creation of new institutional players that are affiliated with local authorities 
and (b) the sending out of agents to monitor, hold in place and, eventually, facilitate 
the repositioning of APCs within Dublin’s governance system, is theoretically open- 
ended (i.e. not predictable).
This implies that the reaction of APCs (a) to proposed and initiated changes 
concerning institutionalisation, (b) to accountability and monitoring requirements and 
(c) to the introduction of value-for-money principles, can potentially alter the dynamic 
of future actions initiated from the centre in a way that deviates from the outcomes that 
originally had been expected by policy makers. The perceived failure of RAPID is a 
prime example for the formation of resistance from powerful agents within the 
governance network that had not been anticipated by network builders (see Chapter 6 , 
Section 6 .2.5.1).
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Table 7.1: Entities networked in funding arrangements of APCs
Intermediaries:
Texts and 
images:
Technical
artefacts:
Skills:
Money:
Actors:
“Anything passing between actors, which defines the relationship 
between them” (Calion 1991).
Guidelines, policy documents, case studies, annual reports, area action 
plans, research reports, forms of media coverage, information material 
and websites.
Performance and evaluation systems (e.g. SCOPE), organisational 
quality assessments models/surveys/awards, consultation processes 
and other technology applied, funding arrangements (contracts).
staff management, report writing, research skills, administration, human 
resource management, writing of documents (e.g. minutes, reports, 
business plans, strategy papers), communication and negotiation skills, 
facilitation, mediation, decision making, coalition-building, social skills, 
parenting, learning, problem-solving, discipline, lateral thinking, financial 
controlling, IT skills etc.
EU monies, LDSIP funding, matching funding from strategic (statutory 
and civil) partners, dormant accounts and once-off opportunities.
Entity able to (a) “associate texts, humans, non-humans and 
money” and (b) “put other intermediaries into circulation” (Calion 
1991) .
Texts and images, technical artefacts, skills, money (see above).
Professionals and board members (statutory agencies, community 
representatives, social partners public representatives) of APCs, 
beneficiaries of programmes (eligible individuals and target groups), 
consultants, civil servants, politicians, community workers, local 
activists/residents.
Area Partnership Companies, PLANET, Pobal, City Development Board, 
Dublin City Council, statutory agencies (e.g. FÀS , HSE, VEC), 
government departments (e.g. DoCRGA, DoEHLG, DoJELR, DoF, DoT), 
political parties, not-for-profit organisations, community groups, trade 
unions and employer organisations, consultancy firms, universities, 
research bodies and think-tanks (e.g. OPEN, SIPTU, IBEC, NESC, 
__________________ NESF, CPA, NorDubCo, NIRSA etc.).____________
Networks: All the above listed organisations, actors and intermediaries as
they “identify and define other groups, actors, and intermediaries, 
together with the relationships that bring these together” (Calion 
1991).
Intermediaries:
Individuals:
Organisations:
Translation:
Convergence:
Boundaries:
Irreversibilation:
Inscription of a meaning into an entity as it is negotiated into the 
network.
Degree to which processes of alignment and co-ordination of 
intermediaries work towards/impede consensus.
- Alignment: generation of a shared space, equivalence and 
commensurability.
- Co-ordination: rules and conventions concerning translation and 
alignment.
Decisions as to whether or not and under what conditions entities shall 
or can be excluded from/included in the network.
Degree to which translation can be challenged, negotiated or reversed.
Source: Adapted from Callón (1991).
166 According to Calion (1991: 135) “an actor is an entity that takes the last generation of Intermediaries 
and transforms (combines, mixes, concatenates, degrades, computes, anticipates) these to create 
the next generation”.
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Following Murdoch’s (1998) reflections on ‘spaces of negotiation’ and ‘spaces of 
prescription’, the empirical evidence suggests that the envisaged integration of APCs 
and other local development agencies and local government largely occurs in the latter 
setting. This is because the potential for APCs to negotiate their position within the 
governance system appears to be delimited by immutable mobiles that have been 
recruited by network-builders to hold APCs in check (see Chapter 6 , Section 6.2.7).
The analysis of the interview material illustrated that both human and non-human 
agents -  such as professionals (see Chapter 6 , Section 6.2.1), review reports and 
accounting techniques (see Chapter 6 , Section 6.3.1) or administrative areas (see 
Chapter 6 , Section 6.2.6) -  capture and carry past experiences and intentions across 
time and space. Furthermore, these agents facilitate the stitching together of 
heterogeneous entities (see Chapter 3, Section 3.2.1.1) into a new local governance 
system in Dublin. The control over the creation and circulation of immutable mobiles 
and agents enables network builders to enrol desired objects, place them strategically 
within the network and act or perform through them. For example, it could be shown 
that funding arrangements for APCs have the status of immutable mobiles because 
they reliably communicate centrally-devised objectives to APCs. The analysis of the 
empirical data illustrates that systemic compatibility between APCs, as one of the key 
players of state-funded local development bodies (Walsh 1998), and local government 
was hoped to be facilitated through:
• the introduction of new government-affiliated institutions (Chapter 6 , Section 6.2.5);
• a tightening of guidelines and parameters prescribing output-oriented performance- 
monitoring and accountability systems (Chapter 6 , Section 6.3.1); and
• the pursuit of business-inspired governance practices (Chapter 6 , Section 6.4).
This study, however, reveals a dilemma endemic to the contemporary re-configuration 
of the governance system in Dublin: on the one hand, long-term objectives and 
developmental aspects of APC-work are acknowledged as something that is valuable 
to network-builders and, therefore, need to be translated into the system with a view to 
creating cohesion and cost-effectiveness; on the other hand, the contemporary 
mechanism created to facilitate the alignment of APCs into the governance system 
bears the risk that APCs, in the process of translation, lose those characteristics 
considered most relevant by their political funders as outlined in The Developmental 
Welfare State (NESC 2005) and portrayed by means of excerpts from the interview 
material in Chapter 6 (see, for example, quotes from interviews in Sections 6.4.5.1 and
6 .4.5.2). The empirical data also indicates that the alignment of APCs under the 
cohesion process comes at the cost of incomplete translation. In short, some 
characteristic elements of APCs will be transformed, some will be enhanced and some 
will be lost. Viewpoints expressed by government officials and DCC professionals 
suggest that a loss of certain local development features of APCs, for example as a 
result of the cohesion process, is expected to be compensated by an increasing 
capacity of APCs in complementing statutory service-delivery functions (see Chapter
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6 , Section 6.2.7). The following sections more specifically examine the potential of 
ANT to explain: first, the alignment of APCs with local government structures (Section
7.2.2); second, the accountability and monitoring requirements for APCs (Section
7.2.3); third, the role of value-for-money principles (Section 7.2.4).
7.2.2 Institutionalisation
A multiplicity of processes has contributed to what, in ANT-terms, can be described as 
domestication of APCs: the incorporation of APCs into the apparatus of the state. This 
decision was informed by the government-initiated review of local development 
structures (see Chapter 6 , Section 6.2.4). Before domestication happens though, the 
compatibility of APC structures with the governance system needs to be developed 
through processes of inscription or translation (see Table 7.1 further above). This 
means that APCs have been made part of the extended DCC-administered 
governance network in a way “that some of their key properties remain intact” 
(Murdoch 1997: 741). These domesticated key properties are those features that are 
considered relevant by the actors who propel forward the governance restructuring, in 
general, and the cohesion process, in particular (see also Chapter 6 , Section 6.2.6). A 
combination of policies resulted in the creation and circulation of immutable mobiles 
e.g.: the introduction of business-like terminology; new funding criteria; output-oriented 
performance measures; and new local development structures such as the CDB or 
RAPID (see Chapter 6 , Sections 6.2.2 and 6.2.5.1 respectively).
In this context, it needs mentioning that the circulation of ‘narratives of duplication’ and 
perceptions of “local organisations tripping over themselves” (Interview DCC 8) played 
the role of immutable mobiles as these perceptions became manifest in documents 
that were used for propagating the cohesion process (see Chapter 6 , Section 6.2.6). 
The analysis of the empirical data suggests that it is within the power of key individuals 
in government departments to communicate their political ideas through powerful 
narratives that not necessarily reflect the real situation on the ground167 (cf. NDP/CSF 
Evaluation Unit 2003). Nevertheless, key individuals still influence and shape the 
definition of core principles and priorities that, in turn, result in the circulation of 
intermediaries that impact on the local-governance system168.
ANT facilitates the de-construction of institutional restructuring in Dublin into a 
succession of inter-related steps of network-building. It was found that the re­
positioning of APCs within the governance system is controlled from within the sphere 
of governmental decision making. Central network builders utilise their power through 
the strategic circulation of intermediaries and immutable mobiles -  such as new 
agencies, legislation, review reports and individuals -  within the governance 
framework. A new legislative framework (e.g. Public Services Management Act, 1997; 
Local Government Act 2001) and related government programmes initiated the
167 This relates to Gramsci's thoughts on the role of the organic intellectual.
168 These processes are reminiscent of Althusser’s concept of overdetermination (see Chapter 3, 
Section 3.3.4.2).
218
establishment of a parallel local development network within the public sector that 
consisted of DCC-associated (LACs, RAPID) and -affiliated (the CDB and its sub 
structures) fora and structures (see Chapter 6 , Section 6.2, Figure 5).
The decisions for the establishment of the Dublin CDB, SITFs, LACs and RAPID 
meant that Dublin City Council was allowed to gain a foothold in a domain that had 
previously been managed by APCs. Tables 6.2 and 6.5 and 6.6 in Chapter 6 illustrate 
the organisational representation on these new structures. From the perspective of 
ANT, the staffing of these new structures -  and in particular the Dublin CDB -  with civil 
servants that are on the payroll of local authorities is a means to secure 'remote 
control’ from headquarters through the circulation of reliable agents (cf. Law 1986). All 
these committees, task forces and initiatives were positioned under the umbrella of the 
local authorities. They were expected (a) that they ‘can do things’ on the behalf of 
network builders and (b) not to turn into ‘double agents’. The appointment of DCC staff 
of a certain grade or level of seniority onto the board of APCs signals a political 
aspiration of the local authority to increase its influence in local development agencies 
operating in ‘their’ territory (see Chapter 6 , Section 6.2.1).
Another aspect of the institutionalisation of APCs is the re-alignment of their 
operational boundaries with DCC’s administrative districts. It is directed at increasing 
the systemic compatibility and, hence, the potential for co-operation between local- 
development sector and the local government system. Looking at the current 
restructuring of local governance, it is argued that the processes of institutionalisation, 
accountability and value for money work hand in hand with a more specific goal in 
mind: to facilitate the harmonisation between local development and local government 
systems through the cohesion process, which, from the viewpoint of ANT, serves as ‘a 
technology of ordering’ (Law 1994). The cohesion process illustrates that the 
approximation between APCs and public administration is not limited to physical 
changes concerning the institutional landscape and administrative boundaries.
Guidelines circulated to APCs make explicit and detailed recommendations for the 
operational restructuring of APCs (DoCRGA 04/04/2007, 31/07/2007a). The 
departmental guidelines that were circulated to APCs propose to change the 
composition of their board structure and, moreover, make a case for the appointment 
of a government-approved chair. These proposals are emblematic of government 
efforts to facilitate the integration of APCs into a governance system through 
measures dictated by priorities of those individuals responsible for the authorship of 
the guidelines. The following aspects were extracted from the guidelines. They serve 
to illustrate efforts to end the parity of esteem in terms of sectoral representation on 
APC boards (DoCRGA 04/04/2007). The guidelines propose:
• to increase local-authority representation on the APC board;
• to reduce membership from the social partners;
• to terminate board membership of T.D.s and Senators;
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• to appoint the chair person under supervision of the Minister for Community, Rural 
and Gaeltacht Affairs and/or the Director of the Dublin CDB;
• to prioritise the CDB over APCs in regard to the appointment of ‘high profile’ (i.e. 
senior) representatives from statutory bodies onto their board; and
• to increase the number of community representatives on the APC board169.
Plans to implement the proposed guidelines, understood as the embodiment o f 
intentional action, are another example to illustrate the power of 'things’ to act: i.e. to 
increase the bargaining power of local authority-affiliated individuals at board level, to 
prevent Oireachtas members from formal participation in APCs and to reduce the 
influence of the social partners. The DoCRGA-issued recommendations concerning 
the board composition of APCs curtail the action ability of APCs because their boards 
will effectively be less balanced in terms of sectoral composition.
In regard to the analysis of contemporary governance restructuring based on the 
empirical material, ANT is a particularly useful framework for:
• ‘thin-slicing’ complex processes into their constituent elements and scrutinise the 
role played by each of the elements;
• identifying nodal points of power relevant to the creation of immutable mobiles;
• following actors and entities as they move and interact within the governance 
network;
• a detailed description of networked’ interactions, which contributes to an 
understanding of how things and technologies can be mobilised as remote- 
controlled carriers of centrally-devised priorities.
7.2.3 Accountability and monitoring arrangements
The funding dependency of APCs on the state in the aftermath of the 1994-1999 
OPLURD is another pivotal element that facilitates the domestication of APCs (see 
Chapter 6 , Section 6.3.3.1): it limits the capacity of formerly quasi-autonomous APCs 
to negotiate their position vis-à-vis new government-initiated local development 
structures. APCs might be in a position marginally to influence the quality of their 
relationship with the state, but they cannot simply resist government plans of aligning 
state-funded APCs with local government systems or, in other words, to ‘bring them 
home’.
A typical example that illustrates ANT’s concept of general symmetry170 is the 
argument for the introduction of annual budgets advanced by Minister Ó Cuiv, T.D. 
(FF) (see Section 6 .3.3.2). The annual budgeting system that was introduced after the 
end of EU funding facilitated the governmental control over APCs (see Chapter 6 ,
169 Arrangements, however, are suggested to be open to accept nominations from members of the CBD- 
led (and hence DCC-affiliated) city-wide Community Forum.
170 Principle of general symmetry: ANT attributes the ability to exert agency to both humans and things. 
General symmetry also means that what appear to be fix structures are, in fact, outcomes of 
interactions between networked entities (see Chapter 3, Section 3.1, Table 3.1).
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Section 6.3.3.1). Irrespective of stated commitments to consider the introduction of
multi-annual budgeting as a basis for long-term planning in the community and
voluntary sector (Government of Ireland 2000), existing budgeting practice in the
public sector was depicted as ‘an immutable mobile’ that would prevent the
continuation of multi-annual budgets for APCs: in 2003, responding to a parliamentary
question, the Minister for Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs argued that "money
cannot be carried forward because the financing system does not allow for i f  (Dail
Eireann 25/06/2003: no page numbers, emphasis added) and that no exception was to
be made for APCs. This line of argument illustrates the role of things as actants:
If I want to have actors in my account, they have to do things, not to be place­
holders; if they do something they have to make a difference (Latour 2004).
The funding mechanism is either perceived or deliberately portrayed as something that 
broke free from its political creators and became an independent source of power that 
influences decisions within government circles. Formal reporting requirements and 
other composite elements of the funding mechanism are summarised in Table 6.7 (see 
Chapter 6 , Section 6.3.1). Other key actants that determine the characteristics of 
funding arrangements and associated reporting requirements are:
• the output-oriented nature of the SCOPE system, which has not undergone 
significant changes over the last few years;
• the authoritative nature of the endorsement process of APC plans through the 
CDBs; and
• the perceived rigidity of some eligibility criteria -  such as the definition of budget 
parameters.
The reporting mechanism illustrates that APCs are subject to an elaborate and highly 
standardised accountability and monitoring system that allows for little input 'from 
below’ (i.e. is mainly controlled by agents of the state with comparatively little formal 
accountability to the community). Respondents from APCs perceive the reporting 
duties -  such as the electronic transmission of SCOPE data, the submission of annual 
reports, case studies or quarterly financial returns -  as overly onerous and 
disproportionate if compared to the modest APC budget (see Chapter 6 , Section
6.3.1). Moreover, the quarterly SCOPE report is limited to capture quantitative 
information such as the number individuals progressed into employment or the number 
of community projects supported (see Appendix 3, Table A-3.1). Even though SCOPE 
was perceived by both APC and ADM professionals as a ‘number crunching exercise', 
it is still used as a performance standard that ensures a consistency in information flow 
and indicates comparative progress of APC to both ADM and political sponsors.
A combination of different methods assesses the performance of APCs in terms of 
money management and programme progression. Monitoring procedures consist of a 
plethora of complementary intermediaries or immutable mobiles that are designed to 
ensure compliance of APCs with the contractually agreed agenda and priorities 
outlined in their programme of activities (see Appendix 3, Table A-3.2). Annualised
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budgets and the characteristic features of SCOPE are not considered optimally 
tailored to meet the realities within which APCs operate. They are, however, perceived 
as constant factors or, in the words of ANT, immutable mobiles, rather than regarded 
as variables that can easily be altered or changed through political action. The 
analysis of the interviews confirmed that funding and accountability arrangements of 
APCs consist of complex formal and informal relationships: it seems as if both things 
and humans would complement one another and, together, would ‘negotiate’ a 
conclusion as to whether or not accountability and funding criteria have been met.
7.2.4 Value for money
The findings portrayed in Chapter 6 suggest that the pursuit of the cohesion strategy 
since 2003 promotes the co-option of APCs into local government-led structures. It 
also could be demonstrated that the cohesion process, as part of a wider strategy that 
is rooted in the Strategic Management Initiative (SMI), requires APCs to comply with 
value-for-money principles. The increasing importance of value for money had already 
been identified as a key theme in the re-configuration of Dublin’s governance 
framework (see Section 6.3). The intensification of external control and performance- 
monitoring systems for funding arrangements and associated accountability practices 
has also been accompanied by the introduction of self-auditing measures and 
certificates directed at encouraging better governance.
Respondents from APCs feel that more and more of their time goes into responding to 
the reporting and monitoring requirements laid out by their funders. Examples for 
elements of the technology of auditing are (see also Chapter 6 , Section, 6.3.1, Table
6.7):
• quantitative measures (such as the SCOPE system and Target Sheets);
• self-monitoring and -auditing practices -  such as Excellence Through People and 
the Q-mark;
• efforts to capture qualitative work of APCs (such as through case studies and the 
Himmelman Model).
The utilisation of VFM-related auditing and self-assessment protocols are expected to 
step up the performance of APCs in delivering services into their communities. The 
promotion of a new professionalism among APCs is facilitated through the circulation 
of immutable mobiles. From the perspective of ANT, VFM auditing techniques are 
immutable mobiles because they are ‘things’ that do not change their meaning, form or 
shape and, more importantly, can make a difference. In the end, they communicate 
political priorities that are hoped to induce behavioural changes among APCs. The 
Excellence Through People Award, the Q-mark, the assessment of collaborative 
practice (based on the Flimmelman Model) and VFM audits have been designed to 
optimise the internal economies and procedural effectiveness of APCs. They evaluate 
the status quo and point out the potential for improvements concerning the quality of
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management and professional work practices that are considered essential to achieve 
the overall purpose of any APC.
The empirical data exemplifies the relevance of principles associated with ANT to 
explain the role of VFM in funding and accountability procedures such as:
• the Latourian concept of power understood as the capacity of 'things’ to induce
behavioural changes that have not been anticipated prior to their creation or
circulation (Latour 2004); or
• Pickering’s notion of the mangle of practice and his argument that “the contours of
material agency are never decisively known in advance” (Pickering 1993: 564).
The measurement of collaboration based on the Himmelman Model, for example, has 
been proposed in acknowledgement of the diversity of activities pursued by APCs that 
cannot be captured by traditional performance-monitoring systems. According to ADM 
(Pobal 2006a: 12), the new model was “developed in the context of promoting 
integrated service delivery” with a view to accounting for qualitative aspects of APC 
work and measuring "the extent to which true collaboration takes place”. The import of 
a technology that measures integrative efforts by APCs complements quantitative 
monitoring tools and is hoped to lead to a more complete picture of APC performance.
The practical implications of existing and proposed accountability and monitoring 
practices re-enforce arguments and views from the empirical case research that were 
highlighted and discussed in the two previous sections: i.e. that, from the angle of 
ANT, the development of immutable mobiles such as accountability and performance- 
monitoring systems and the introduction of value for money standards are a 
manifestation of usually successful efforts to enrol, tame and domesticate APCs 
(understood as a remote-controlled peripheral unit of material and human entities) into 
a governance system that can be controlled from centrally-placed network builders.
7.2.5 Summary
What is regarded as the funding framework is a result of the (historically) negotiated or
prescribed positioning of APCs as per se complex entities within the 'meta-network’ of
governance. According to Murdoch’s notion of first-order proximations (see Chapter 3,
Section 3.3.2.2), the negotiations, and agreement, on the national partnership model in
1987 and more recent ambitions to move towards the DWS (NESC 2005) provide the
wider framework within which ANT looks at processes that aligns APCs (as
‘dependent’ stakeholders) into a structure that is tailored to communicate, translate,
complement and/or replicate the will of network builders:
Those who are powerful are not those who ‘hold’ power but are those able to 
enrol, convince, and enlist others into networks on terms which allow the initial 
actors to ‘represent’ the others. Powerful actors speak for all the enrolled entities 
and actors, and control the means of representation [...]. The controlling actor 
grows by borrowing the force of others; it can inflate to a larger size [...]. Power is, 
therefore, the composition of the network (Murdoch 1995: 748).
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Law’s (1986) concept of remote control provides a practical framework for mapping 
central-peripheral or top-down power flows within Dublin’s governance framework and 
the role of accountability and performance-monitoring systems therein. ANT can be 
utilised to cast light on ‘things’ or activities that make up what is discernible as the 
funding mechanism for APCs and, thereby, offers an approach to make assumptions 
on the construction of governance and the re-enforcement of power imbalances 
therein. From the viewpoint of ANT, accountability and performance monitoring are 
technologies that ensure the delegation of power throughout the governance network. 
This is achieved through the circulation of immutable mobiles (see Table 7.1 in 
previous section) as a material and social manifestation of power that holds local 
APCs firmly within a prescribed social, economic and ‘geographical envelope’ that is 
remote-controlled from within the political centre (see Chapter 3, Section 3.3.2.2). ANT 
can be deployed to scrutinise the functionality of immutable mobiles and break down 
their role in shifting power among networked entities.
This thesis illustrates that ANT is a conceptual tool that can be utilised to dismantle the 
complex governance system, funding and accountability procedures as well as 
performance-monitoring and auditing technologies into their constituent parts: humans 
and non-human entities such as:
• the placement of senior DCC staff on APC boards (Chapter 6 , Section 6.2.1);
• the establishment of RAPID outside APC structures and its perceived failure 
(Chapter 6 , Section 6.2.5.1): "They have now created a monster” (Interview DCC 
3b);
• the discontinuance of multi-annual funding (Chapter 6 , Section 6 .3.3.2);
• the decentralisation of DCC through legislative change and the establishment of 
the CDBs (Chapter 6 , Sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2);
• the semiotic use of language (Chapter 6 , Section 6.4.2);
• the creation and spread of narratives of duplication (Chapter 6 , Section 6.2.6); or
• the obligatory endorsement of APC plans by the Dublin CDB (Chapter 6 , Sections 
6 2.4.3 and 6.3.3.3).
So, usually, the circulation of institutional agents and immutable mobiles from strategic 
positions within the governance framework (the ‘enroller’) was hoped to prompt or 
induce a desired behavioural change of APCs (the ‘enrollee’). ANT emphasises the 
existence of an interplay between spaces of negotiation and prescription (Murdoch 
1998), which is overlapped by an interplay between collaboration and resistance as 
described by Pickering’s account of the ‘mangle of practice’ (Pickering 1993). In 
following circulated -  or observing strategically placed -  agents, immutable mobiles 
and/or intermediaries through the governance network, it was discovered that 
processes of enrolment resulted in interactions between networked entities that did not 
always yield the outcomes that had been expected. According to the account given by 
respondents from different backgrounds, a variety of influential forces that had initially
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not been considered relevant became quite influential in challenging the efficacy of 
circulated entities171 vis-à-vis their original objectives, namely:
• to boost the operational potential and capacity of APCs in ameliorating symptoms 
of poverty and deprivation in collaboration with the state, social partners, public 
representatives and local communities;
• to achieve an alignment of APCs with local government systems which has been 
facilitated by the Local Government Act 2001 and the cohesion process; and
• to prepare APCs for their more specific role within the statutory governance system 
as activist measures supporting the aims and objectives of the Developmental 
Welfare State (NESC 2005).
This study finds that the recruitment and circulation of immutable mobiles (e.g. the 
Dublin CDB, VFM audits and new guidelines for APC boards) by dominant network 
builders (e.g. the DoCRGA) comes at the cost of simplification. The focus on qualities 
concerning the performance of APCs are reduced to black boxes (see Chapter 3, 
Section 3.1, Table 3.1), which obscure innate complexities and characteristic features 
of actions and activities that lead to desired outcomes:
• The cohesion process could be regarded as a black box-type mechanism: it aims 
at minimising the internal frictional resistance of APCs to the transformation of 
input (i.e. funding) into desired output (i.e. reduced poverty and less fiscal 
expenditure for social consumption).
• The set of performance-monitoring procedures is another prime example for black- 
boxing: the SCOPE system is designed to measure output of an APC and, thereby, 
to indicate value for money to political decision-makers. It solely records 
achievements in form of quantitative data that masks both qualitative aspects 
(outcomes) and the complexity of activities that had to be invested to implement 
actions and progress projects in the first place (see Chapter 6 , Section 6 .4.5.3);
• In a similar vein, government-approved certificates and standards fulfil a semiotic 
function as they are the embodiment of a variety of internal measures, processes 
and standards, which indicate ‘professionalism’, ‘good governance’, ‘value for 
money’ and a ‘can-do attitude’ to relevant strategic partners that could resource the 
work of APCs.
Bearing in mind, however, that the exact outcomes of a systematic enrolment of 
entities, black-boxing and/or the circulation of intermediaries cannot be predicted 
owing to the complexity and heterogeneity of ‘networked material’. Accidental 
interactions or undesired side-effects could result in unpredicted blockages and 
resistance that may jeopardise the intended outcomes of network builders. The RAPID 
programme is an example for the perceived failure of statutory efforts to optimise the 
investment of earmarked resources into severely disadvantaged areas (see Chapter 6 , 
Section 6.2.5.1). Thus, the anticipated and ‘real’ impact of enrolment can differ. In the
171 An analogy is provided by Glaser’s efforts to construct the bubble chamber (Pickering 1993: 568-574; 
for more info on the Glaser's invention, see Science Matters 2005).
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end, agents at both ends of the power spectrum, such as forces within government, on 
the one hand, and APCs, on the other hand, could turn into double agents. Taking into 
account the descriptive nature of ANT, it follows that prescriptions or directives that are 
intended to control the behaviour of networked entities (such as APCs) can only be 
identified in hindsight -  when roles and behaviour between ‘enroller’ (as the emitter of 
power) and the ‘enrolee’ (as the envisaged subject to it) has already been negotiated, 
and, more importantly, when they are not camouflaged, but are clearly identifiable to 
the observer.
In ANT terms, the circulation of agents and agencies under the LDSIP represents a 
colonisation of the governance network in a way that is conducive to the priorities 
pursued by the network builders. For example, senior DCC-employees and national 
experts expressed a desire:
• to progress public-sector modernisation;
• to emulate the European model of local government;
• to increase DCC’s levels of competency in local development; and
• to set priorities for local development policy and practice.
Based on its micro-sociological approach to analysing the circulation of power within 
networks, ANT is particularly suitable to identify, describe and follow actors and 
immutable mobiles as they get enrolled into, interact within, or pass through Dublin’s 
governance framework. ANT can tell a story about how APCs became gradually 
incorporated into a new local-governance system. It can assess the performative 
power and sphere of activity of guidelines, governance standards, reporting 
requirements and individuals in creating or altering the power balance in Dublin’s 
governance network. It can ascertain the degree to which the circulation of things (e.g. 
circular letters) and humans (e.g. staffing of new structures) fulfil their role as remote- 
controlled entities that are hoped to obediently embody political will and perform 
accordingly.
In all, ANT emerges as an approach that is suitable to map out and profile the 
'mechanics’ of re-positioning APCs within Dublin’s landscape of urban governance. 
ANT is particularly suitable for highlighting the instrumental role of relatively static 
monitoring tools designed, first, to assess the handling of funding and programmatic 
progress and, in addition, to give guidance in regard to the eligibility of potential 
actions in regard to the parameters set out in the LDSIP -  such as the SCOPE 
system, the annual target sheet and relevant guidelines and budget parameters. 
Following heterogeneous materials such as funding guidelines, HR standards and 
value-for-money principles throughout the governance system proved useful for 
understanding how APCs ‘became negotiated’ into a new position within the network 
space or governance. However, this study also identified weaknesses of ANT. These 
are discussed in the following section.
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7.2.6 ANT and intentionality: the sore sp ot- case closed?
This thesis attempts to assess the gravitational pull of different actors and entities in 
relation to their influence to exert, to negotiate or to resist power. Strong evidence 
could be presented, suggesting that the re-positioning of APCs within Dublin’s 
governance network took place under the dictate of state-defined terms and 
conditions; mainly through the circulation of (quasi-)immutable intermediaries and 
agents. Then again, respondents from different quarters acknowledged that sites of 
contestation between all kinds of networked entities emerged, which, at times, altered 
the centrally-devised agenda for restructuring governance. Examples for the latter 
case are the perceived failure of RAPID (see Chapter 6 , Section 6.2.5.1) and the 
ability of APCs to ‘twist arms’ through informal networking and, thereby, undermining 
the immutability of circulated intermediaries (see Chapter 6 , Section 6 .4.5.2). 
However, by and large, the scope of APCs to resist unwanted change is limited. This 
thesis showed that the evolution towards new governance structures in Dublin and 
related policy directives have long-lasting and almost irremediable effects: once 
created through intentional human action, legislation and institutional structures stand 
for longevity, immutability and will continue to carry power of their intellectual fathers 
but, as indicated in the case study, only if, and as long as, it suits those within, or with 
meaningful access to, the political decision-making arenas in government buildings.
The exploration of the empirical material identified a strong ideological drive for 
governance restructuring from within and through the structures provided by the state. 
This impetus was not found to be meaningfully resisted or considerably altered by 
APCs and other relevant actors operating in the sphere of local governance. Even 
though the evidence presented suggests that ‘things’ have a capacity to act, it was 
found not to be a capacity per se. According to the views elicited from interviews with 
key individuals from a variety of different institutional and professional backgrounds, it 
became clear that processes of ideation and worldviews of certain network builders 
have been instrumental in shaping the structural frame of governance restructuring 
within which struggles involving ‘things’ and humans might develop.
ANT provides a useful strategic approach for studying processes at the interfaces 
between and within heterogeneous networked entities that result in new outcomes. But 
if the principle of general symmetry is strictly applied, ANT has probably to remain 
silent on explaining funding arrangements. ANT cannot sufficiently account for factors 
influencing perceptions, motivations and the professional ‘psyche’ of key individuals 
that have been identified as instrumental in defining the order of priorities (a) that gave 
rise to the formation of structures that shape the governance network in Dublin and (b) 
that are behind the new formation of governance and the design of interrelated funding 
arrangements for APCs. The following two main sections will ascertain if some of 
these explanatory gaps can be addressed by Stone’s concept of socially produced 
power in urban regimes (Section 7.3) or ideas that are rooted in Gramscian thinking 
(Section 7.4).
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7.3 URT
7.3.1 Introduction
According to URT, access to well-resourced and powerful decision-making circles in 
Dublin is dependent on the capacity of individuals, groups or organisations to make a 
meaningful contribution -  be it political power, know-how or money -  to the 
implementation of an agenda prioritised by those who are in power. In the context of 
this thesis, URT needs to identify resource dependencies between a variety of 
interests that are involved in, or affected by, re-structuring governance. URT can 
possibly be utilised to examine the (informal) influence of alliances between key 
stakeholders involved in restructuring Dublin’s governance landscape and its 
implications for plans and activities of APCs. A particular challenge is to elicit the role 
that business interests play in the integration of APCs into a DCC-led institutional 
ensemble of agencies that are tasked to streamline local development initiatives in the 
city.
The analysis of the empirical material gathered in the case study shows that the 
formation of informal relationships is instrumental for APCs’ capacity to forge a 
meaningful coalition among a variety of stakeholders involved in Dublin’s landscape of 
local governance (see Chapter 6). At first sight, URT seems to offer a satisfactory 
approach to explaining the empirical findings of the case study because it specifically 
revolves around “the informal arrangements that surround and complement the formal 
workings of governmental authority” (Stone 1989: 3, original emphasis).
In the context of this thesis, the application of URT is based on the presupposition that 
the achievement of governmental authority and successful civic cooperation across 
institutional and sectoral boundaries is dependent on resources provided by the 
private sector. Stone (1989: 7) defines an urban regime “as the informal arrangements 
through which public bodies and private interests function together to make and carry 
out governing decisions”. He acknowledges that, first, the term private interest is not 
confined to the business elite and, indeed, refers to other sectors from civil society 
such as the trade unions, political parties or not-for-profit organisations. In fact, these 
are the sectors involved in decision-making processes concerning the national and 
local partnership model in Ireland (see Chapter 2, Section 2.2).
But Stone equally highlights that even though business interests may not be overt, 
they are always part of the regime, either in a passive role or represented through 
intermediaries. Despite disagreements among scholars as to whether or not URT is an 
approach that can be applied in the European context, there is general agreement that 
successful urban regime formation -  understood as the ability to create an alliance 
equipped with the power to govern -  is dependent on resources provided by the 
private sector.
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7.3.2 URT on the test bench: a case of fitting square pegs into round holes?
In the case of Dublin, analysts highlight the involvement of private capital in land 
development and draw attention to increasingly entrepreneurial strategies and urban 
boosterism which is targeted at maximising investments into economic activities into 
the city (McGuirk 1994; Bartley and Shine 1999, 2003; McGuirk and MacLaran 2001; 
MacLaran and Williams 2003; Punch et al. 2004; Punch 2004; Hogan 2006). Case 
studies in Dublin illustrate that in the mid-1980s urban planning and development 
policies became dominated by an entrepreneurial ethos. This is mirrored in policies 
promoting tax incentives, property-based regeneration initiatives and forms of 
corporate ventures such as public-private partnerships and special-purpose 
development agencies (MacLaran and Williams 2003). At the same time, the 
notoriously under-resourced local authority in Dublin started pursuing a new 
managerial ethos that embraced a market-led approach to urban development (see 
Chapter 6 , Section 6.2.1).
Throughout the interviews with DCC professionals, it emerged that the role of APCs 
and community participation in profit-oriented urban development or regeneration 
projects is systematically excluded as participatory models of regeneration based on 
consultation 'slow things down’, which, effectively, negatively impacts on profitability 
(see Chapter 6 , Section 6.2.7). If regeneration projects allow for community 
involvement, then, in the words of a respondent from DCC, only 'those who suit us’ are 
invited to participate (Interview DCC 7). In these instances the URT concept of small 
incentives can explain how little concessions are made by powerbrokers as a way to 
get support from those factions within the community that could jeopardise the 
success of lucrative property-based regeneration projects such as Residents 
Associations Community Development Projects, APCs, Community Activists or local 
bottom-up regeneration initiatives (e.g. St. Michael’s Estate Regeneration Team or 
Tenants First). URT can explain the utilisation of small incentives as a means to get 
buy-in from or discipline those residents and community groups whose opposition 
could torpedo urban regeneration projects. Even though making concessions in form 
of material and other promises might reduce profit maximisation, it guarantees the 
overall success of the project. Reaching agreement based on the control over 
selective interests that capacitates interest groups with the power to make ‘side 
payments’ is undoubtedly a tokenistic form of inclusion which sits well with URT 
principles:
A group or governing coalition that has a capacity to further small opportunities on 
go-along-to-get-along terms is in a strong position to attract allies rather than 
activate opponents (Stone 1989: 193).
A few case studies illustrate how powerful alliances of developers and local authorities 
apply small opportunities in a strategic way to appease potential opposition from 
residents, local community activists and not-for-profit agencies (Saris et al. 2000; Saris 
et al. 2002; Hogan 2005; Punch 2005). Acknowledging the importance business 
interests play in urban development policy in Dublin, the analysis of the interview
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material suggests that the restructuring of the local-governance model concerning 
social urban regeneration processes involving APCs appears to be driven from within 
government buildings; i.e. no influence from economic elites could be identified. 
According to the views expressed by government officials and senior DCC staff, the 
envisaged role of APCs under an integrated governance model could cement links 
between local development and local government which will improve cost- 
effectiveness of state-funded social-inclusion measures. Professional expertise and 
experience gathered under the umbrella of APCs makes them an attractive coalition 
partner under a re-shuffled regime of managerial governance in Dublin.
Respondents from DCC could foresee APCs as a vehicle that can be used to address 
issues of social exclusion under the auspices of DCC, operating as a form of sub­
contractor under negotiated or prescribed service-level agreements (see Chapter 6 , 
Section 6.2.6). Whereas local development agencies are either excluded from 
involvement in profit-oriented regeneration schemes or invited under terms and 
conditions dictated by those in control of selective interests, they are welcome to deal 
with the adverse effects of unbalanced economic development opportunities. 
Contemporary practice in urban policy in Dublin illustrates that a sharp line exists 
between the sphere of economic-driven urban development and social urban 
regeneration.
Taking a lead from those analysts who argue in favour of an application of URT in a 
non-US urban context (see Chapter 3, Section 3.2.2.2), URT can probably explain 
economically driven urban development projects in Dublin and the exclusion of APCs 
and not-for-profit community interests from decision-making processes. The link 
between the factual exclusion of APCs from influencing wider processes concerning 
the physical urban regeneration and planning policies is remarkable because the 
phenomenon of urban deprivation and social exclusion is inextricably linked to the 
quality of the built environment: the profile of the case-study area and other 'poor 
places’ (cf. Pringle et al. 1999) leads to the assumption that there exists a strong 
negative correlation between poverty and the availability and accessibility of statutory 
services, social infrastructure and amenities (Watson et al. 2005).
URT could be used as an approach to investigate the power relationships in urban 
economic development initiatives and property-based regeneration projects and the 
role of community interests therein. Perhaps this provides an entry point for additional 
research but lies not within the remit and scope of this case study. In fact, private 
sector capital has played a huge role in urban regeneration projects such as the 
development of the Dublin docklands through the Dublin Docklands Development 
Authority (DDDA) (Bartley and Shine 2003; Hogan 2005, 2006) or the urban renewal 
of the Temple Bar area through Temple Bar Properties Ltd. (Bartley et al. 1999; Payne 
and Stafford 2004). In the context of this study, it would be too far-fetched to use URT 
as an explanation for processes driving urban governance reform targeted at
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promoting the integration between state-funded local development and local 
government as this process has been conceptualised and carried out from within 
government buildings (see Chapter 6 , Section 6.2).
Some key principles of URT -  such as informal networking and political clientelism -  
can be clearly identified as central features of power formation and relationships in 
urban governance in regard to the integration of local development and local 
government and its repercussions on funding arrangements. At the same time, 
however, the restructuring of the governance framework is portrayed as a 
consequence of neo-liberal managerial policies and their effective promulgation based 
on the influential workings of the interdepartmental Task Force on the Integration o f 
Local Government and Local Development Systems. It appears that no private-sector 
business interest has been involved in the development of objectives for governance 
reform, neither directly or through representatives (Appendix 1, Table A-1.4).
The analysis of the empirical data revealed that URT is not a suitable theoretical 
concept to explicate the funding arrangements for APCs in the context of local- 
governance restructuring in Dublin, mainly because no relevant resource 
dependencies from the private sector could be identified172. The development of new 
local governance structures in Ireland and the design of funding arrangements for 
APCs have been conceptually devised from within government buildings; i.e. no 
business interest could be identified that was involved in shaping funding 
arrangements for APCs. APCs are based on an entirely different governance model 
than those pursued through profit-oriented urban regeneration projects (see examples 
above). Between their establishment in the early 1990s and the end of the LDSIP, 
APCs have always pursued a needs-based approach to local development, which 
mainly focused on complementing, or making up for gaps, in statutory welfare delivery 
-  such as the development and implementation of labour-market related actions and 
activities that supported capacity-building and local self-help in disadvantaged areas 
(Chapter 2).
Apparently, in Dublin, little incentives exist for private sector involvement in shaping 
APC-type state-funded local development initiatives. Some involvement of the local 
business sector is probably to be found at the implementation stage of programmes as 
some of the APC actions involve local employers -  mainly as possible partner in 
placing individuals from disadvantaged backgrounds into employment (e.g. Pobal 
2006b: 36). In the case of exploring the causal forces shaping funding arrangements 
of APCs in Dublin, it is argued that the lack of discernable involvement from both 
business interest and private resources in repositioning APCs through institutional 
restructuring justifies to decline URT as a suitable tool to be applied in the context 
explaining processes at the interface between APCs and their political paymasters.
172 This does not imply that URT cannot be applied in the Irish context per se. Hogan (2006), for 
example, deploys growth machine theory, a concept that is based on the influence of powerful elites 
in pursuing their growth agenda, to explain urban developments in the Dublin Docklands.
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Whereas the Irish government and the authorities in Dublin City pursue an (urban) 
economic development strategy based on public-private ventures, there is no 
indication that private sector involvement is required to attain governmental decision­
making capacity in urban governance restructuring -  as mirrored in the re-alignment of 
local development agencies with local government.
7.4 The RA
7.4.1 Introduction
From the regulationist perspective, national partnership agreements, the emergence of
APCs, the SMI (which was particularly influenced by the New Zealand model for
public-sector modernisation) and contemporary restructuring of urban governance in
Dublin can be regarded as part and parcel of state-driven responses to an economic
and, hence, fiscal crisis of the state. Jessop highlights the interdependency between
fiscal solvency and economic growth:
“[...] the state is not only responsible for securing certain key conditions for the 
valorisation of capital and the social reproduction of labour power as a fictitious 
commodity but- also has overall political responsibility for maintaining social 
cohesion in a socially divided, pluralistic social formation. In turn, taxes are both 
an unproductive deduction from private revenues (profits of enterprise, wages, 
interest, rents) and a means of financing collective investment and consumption to 
compensate for so-called 'market failures'" (Jessop 2001a: 10).
Taking a Gramscian stance, it can be argued that for ideas to become meaningful, 
they must be articulated within a hegemonic project; i.e. a project that stems from the 
economic sphere, but which is broad enough to incorporate diverse and even partly 
antagonistic ideas. According to McGuirk, Gramscian ideas can shed light on “the 
practices of political construction by which the elements of a hegemonic project are 
shaped” (McGuirk 2004: 1024). In Ireland, national partnership agreements represent 
such a hegemonic regulatory model (see Chapter 2, Section 2.2). State-initiated 
measures under the umbrella of the national partnership model generally pursued the 
creation of a business-friendly environment, coupled with policies addressing 
increasing societal polarisation and poverty through area-based responses (e.g. Turok 
2001), public-sector modernisation (e.g. DoELG 1996) and the reformation of 
statutory welfare provision (e.g. NESC 2005).
The focus of APCs rests on the development of labour-market inclusion programmes 
and the promotion of social-inclusion policies. This was a response to perceived 
structural contradictions within the national frame of the contemporary accumulation 
regime (Fine Gael et al. 1994). The modifications and changes in Dublin's governance 
landscape over the last few years173 and the re-positioning of APCs therein also reflect 
the objectives of the SMI (see Chapter 1, Section 1.4.2; Chapter 6 , Section 6.4). 
Launched in 1994, the SMI became the foundation for public-sector reform in Ireland.
173 This study focused on changes that occurred under the 2000-2006 LDSIP
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In 1997, Eric Embleton, then Assistant Secretary at the Department of Finance,
described the reasons for developing the SMI in Ireland as follows:
A period of budget crisis forced downsizing and staff reductions in the civil service.
As fiscal pressures and public constraints grew, a group of senior officials 
(Assistant Secretaries) began meeting informally to discuss what they could do to 
improve the functioning of the administration. Later, building on this effort, they 
formally launched the Strategic Management Initiative, a non ideological approach 
aiming strictly at improving management (OECD 1997: no page numbers, 
emphasis added).
In contrast to the above statement made by Mr. Embleton, the analysis of policy
documents and recent institutional developments in Ireland suggests that the
ambitions of the SMI, supposedly from the very outset, first, went far beyond a mere
internal organisational reform of the public sector and, second, were anything but non-
ideological. Mr. Embleton made reference to the power of senior officials to forge
paradigmatic shifts in government practice and, thereby, shape the architecture of a
new regulatory regime. This study identified a variety of other influences on shaping
governance in Ireland such as economic development experiences and government
systems from other cities in the US, the UK or mainland Europe (Bartley et at. 1999)
that were ‘brought home’. For example, 'educational field trips' of government
representatives and officials that were encouraged by city-twinnings possibly induced
substantial consequences for urban development policy in Dublin:
The system we had at local government up to 1999 had changed very little over a 
hundred years. This is the problem. We are unusual here. I have been in some of 
the European cities, I’ve been in the States, and there, in the States, basically it’s 
smaller councils. You’d have a council, I mean San Jose [California, USA], we’re 
twinned with San Jose, and I've been over there and looked at their system of 
government. There you have the mayor in complete charge, who has complete 
authority, and [...] only ten councillors. [...] So I think we are top heavy. I think we 
will be better to look at reducing the number of elected politicians (Interview DCC 
2).
This is a phenomenon described by Peck (2003: 228), emphasising the hegemonic
influence of the US, as 'new channels of cross-border policy' and 'serial emulation'174:
[...] American policies and programs have for years been generating a steady 
traffic of policy-makers and politicians from overseas, just as they have inspired 
countless imitators in other jurisdictions.
Following a neo-liberal governance model, the establishment of new institutional 
arrangements alongside existing local development agencies represents a 
paradigmatic change in urban governance. In Dublin, a variety of DCC-affiliated 
players was introduced into the governance system, most of which have a similar remit 
and agenda as state-funded APC-type local development agencies (e.g. RAPID; see 
Chapter 6 , Section 6.2.5). The Developmental Welfare State articulates yet another, 
more recent, hegemonic project within the broader social partnership framework 
(NESC 2005). The NESC report highlights a strategy of policy and institutional 
adaptation as an appropriate and necessary response to “Ireland’s long-run economic
174 In this context, it is interesting to note that the New Zealand system, which was the template for Irish 
public reform, was informed by US management theories (Bartley and Shine 2003).
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and social development vulnerabilities” (NESC 2005: ix). The NESC strongly
recommends the development of a welfare system that, first, is tailored around the
individual and, second, “not only addresses social risks, needs and inequalities more
adequately, but also connects more fully with the dynamic of the economy” (ibid.).
APCs are considered an integral part of proposed activist measures that, in a society
with low unemployment, should complement labour inclusion policies. The report
described the future role of APCs as follows:
Their mission today can be expressed as seeking to improve the inclusiveness of 
Ireland’s labour market by appropriately supplementing or influencing active labour 
market policies at the national level so that more of their clients in deprived areas 
can access Ireland’s stronger economy (NESC 2005: 189).
The status of APCs has been considerably modified under the cohesion strategy (see 
Chapter 6 , Section 6.2.6). The analysis of the empirical material in Chapter 6 revealed 
that APCs are expected to play a stronger role as a delivery agent for local 
performance-oriented anti-poverty programmes, with a particular focus on labour- 
market inclusion measures. The analysis of published material and interview data 
leads to the assumption that the envisaged alignment and integration of APCs into the 
urban governance landscape is a state-driven regulatory response to the latent risk of 
unwanted societal consequences that are associated with the fragmentation of 
politico-economic spaces and its repercussions on Ireland’s economic 
competitiveness.
The views expressed throughout the interviews indicate that a neo-Gramscian 
perspective adds an ethico-political dimension to economic discourses that, according 
to Jessop, had long been neglected by the regulation approach (Jessop 1997b). The 
Gramscian concepts of hegemony and the organic intellectual (see Chapter 3, Section
3.3.4) can both contextualise and explain changes in Dublin’s institutional governance 
framework and the forces driving the repositioning of APCs therein -  including the role 
of funding arrangements. The analysis also reveals that Althusser’s views on the 
nature of ideology and his concept of overdetermination provides scope for explaining 
non-economistic influence of the governance restructuring in Dublin as a responses to 
perceived contradictions within the contemporary features of the political economy175 
(see Chapter 3, Section 3.3.4.2, Figure 2) (cf. Goonewardena 2005).
This study explored processes that are below the surface of what, from the outside, 
appears to be merely driven by concerns about economic competitiveness and fiscal 
solvency. It also illustrates that social and political agency play a crucial role in the 
design of local governance in Ireland, which is part and parcel of the mode of social 
regulation (cf. Aglietta 1979: 19; Jessop 1990: 194; Tickell and Peck 1992: 192). The
175 In essence, Althusser attempts to resolve the structure-agency dilemma by asking: “with what 
concept are we to think the determination of either an element or a structure by a structure?’’ 
(Althusser and Balibar 1970: 187).
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interviews revealed that perceptions and views of senior government officials have
been instrumental in designing the plans for a new architecture of governance176:
I was wondering if you knew where the idea was coming from to do that? To 
establish the Task Force [i.e. the Interdepartmental Task Force on the Integration 
of Local Government and Local Development Systems] and to produce these 
reports?
It evolved from the thinking of a number of individuals who were around the ADM 
process. Not necessarily from within ADM, although Tony Crooks and myself 
would have an influence on it. But it would have come from a series of individuals 
-  the only one of whom I can think of is still at a very senior level of government, a 
guy called Dermot McCarty, he’s now secretary to the government. Paddy Teahon 
who is his predecessor would have been probably the originator of it. A woman 
called Sylda Langford who is an assistant secretary in, I think in Justice, Equality 
and Law Reform, would have been a supporter of it. A woman called Julie O'Neill 
[then Assistant Secretary to the Tanaiste] would have been a major supporter. So 
it is a coming together of a number of key senior civil servants, a couple of key 
agencies, working around what ADM was, who in conversation persuaded their 
political masters of this need (Interview NE 1b, emphasis added; see also 
Appendix 1, Table A-1.2).
Even though processes of institutionalisation, funding arrangements and value for 
money that were observed in the case study are probably informed by economic 
challenges in the last instance, empirical evidence could be presented suggesting that 
the re-design of local governance (which represents a prescriptive framework for the 
modus operandi of APCs), is based on the existence of a collective ideology 
influenced by (a) systemic power of organic intellectuals and (b) their perceptions of 
challenges to what was considered a societal and economic reality. The findings 
indicate that the conceptual ideas for statutory regulatory approaches such as national 
partnership agreements, the Strategic Management Initiative, the Developmental 
Welfare State and the cohesion process have been developed and successfully 
promoted by a number of organic intellectuals. These approaches are interconnected 
and must be seen in the wider context of regulatory responses of the state, which are 
ultimately directed at securing fiscal solvency and economic competitiveness.
7.4.2 Institutionalisation
In the case of the Greater Dublin Area (GDA), phenomena associated with social and 
economic challenges have been documented in detail elsewhere (Killen and MacLaran 
1999; McGuirk and MacLaran 2001; Bartley and Shine 2003; MacLaran and Williams 
2003; Punch 2004; Punch et at. 2004). The adverse effects of uneven economic 
development manifest in spatial segregation as expressed in “the creation of a city 
with ‘accessibly rich' and ‘accessibly poor spaces” (Bartley and Saris 1999: 82). The 
area-based approach to local development and the establishment of APCs was a 
response to socio-spatial disparities that became manifest in the emergence of
17b This finding corresponds with Jayasuriya’s (2004: 490) finding that “the ‘core executive’ of the state 
takes on a pivotal role as the coordinator of metagovernance” as they are not only influential in 
shaping the nature of the governance network but also are instrumental in creating rules for the 
coordination of regulatory resources.
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unemployment blackspots, areas liable to social unrest177 and economic dependency 
(see Chapter 2, Section 2.2.1).
The concept of meta-regulation178 provides an explanatory framework for the
introduction of APCs as part and parcel of sub-systems of governance that are driven
by super-regulatory policies. Collinge (1999: 559) describes meta-regulation as “the
systemic process of restructuring the corrective regulatory mechanisms when these
begin to fail, and when normal crises become ‘structural’”. Morgan (2003) provides a
definition of meta-regulation that is suitable to illustrate the hegemonic role of
business-inspired governance models In Dublin:
In essence, meta-regulation manages the tensions between the ‘social’ and 
‘economic’ goals of regulatory politics, tensions that enflame passionate and 
highly wrought political conflict over the ethical limits of global capitalism [...] Meta­
regulation excludes competing ways of understanding regulatory policy choices, 
causing bureaucrats to ‘translate’ aspects of social welfare that previously may 
have been expressed in the language of need, vulnerability or harm into the 
language of market failures or market distortion (Morgan 2003: 491).
In the context of this study, the concept of meta-regulation also highlights a dialectical 
relationship between economic imperatives of governance restructuring demanding 
fiscal-efficient and legitimate resource utilisation by APCs, on the one hand, and the 
pursuit of participatory models of community involvement in shaping new local 
regulatory processes, on the other. The SMI-initiated modernisation of public 
administration led to a paradigmatic shift in local governance that had considerable 
implications for the modus operandi of APCs. The workings of the Interdepartmental 
Task Force, the DWS report (NESC 2005) and, hence, the question of ideologically 
motivated driving forces for restructuring governance -  and the re-positioning of local 
bottom-up initiatives therein -  come into play when discussing the process of 
institutionalisation from the vantage point of the RA. Under the cohesion process they 
gradually became subject to processes directed at facilitating their alignment and 
integration into a local authority-administered local development structure.
The views elicited from the interviews and literature review show how the utilisation of 
values that are dominant in centres of command impact on shaping new institutional 
regulatory arrangements and a complementary support framework that works through 
the instigation of new dependencies for APCs. From the viewpoint of RA, the creation 
of new local modes of meta-regulation that influence how APCs prioritise actions and 
with whom they engage could be ideologically traced back to (a) the new managerial 
ethos of public-sector reform and (b) processes of ideological coercion prescribed 
through ‘structural restructuring’ of the institutional framework, new performance 
standards and the re-figuration of the funding framework.
177 See Bartley and Saris (1999) on the 1995 Gallanstown riot (Cherry Orchard) in the case study area.
178 Meta-regulation refers to the design of actions that work towards ensuring the re-productivity of social 
processes exerting control over the accumulation process (Tickell and Peck 1992).
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The interview material clearly suggests that the gradual co-option of APCs into a state-
controlled local-governance system prioritises questions of service delivery and
efficiency (output) over questions of participatory democracy and process-orientation
(outcome). APCs have been established to complement national regulatory strategies
by means of developing local responses that help to resolve contradictions within the
contemporary regime of accumulation. Irrespective of their broader anti-poverty
agenda and their remit to improve governance practice in co-operation with the public
sector, the social partners, local politicians and groups from civil society (Turok 2001),
the role of APCs has been somehow limited to the development and implementation of
local labour-market inclusion strategies, work activation measures and bridging gaps
in statutory service delivery179:
Its [the APC’s] purpose is to produce and implement a plan with objectives to 
accelerate local economic development and thereby increase employment and to 
tackle exclusion and marginalisation resulting from long-term unemployment, poor 
educational attainment, poverty and demographic dependency [...] Partnerships 
also provide a service to encourage entrepreneurship (Crooks 1998: 34-35; cf.
Pobal 2006b).
Reviews also highlight the innovative capacity of APCs to develop and deliver 
programmes addressing disadvantage as a strength that led to their proliferation 
(Goodbody Economic Consultants 1999; Turok 2001; NESC 2005). APCs are 
acknowledged as a valuable resource base because they fulfil a specific 
complementary role within the statutory regulatory framework (cf. NESC 2005: 190), 
namely:
• to ameliorate a mismatch “between transformations in production conditions and in 
the use of social output (household consumption, investment, public expenditures, 
international trade and so on)” (Lipietz 1992: 311); and
• to facilitate processes of governance restructuring directed at maximising the use 
of statutory resources180.
The analysis of the interview material indicates that, from the viewpoint of agents of the 
state, the merits of APCs in facilitating regulation are:
• their know-how about the terrain of struggle; and
• their added value to governance based on a capacity to bridge an ‘ideological gap’ 
between groups from civil society and statutory bodies (see Chapter 6 , Section 
6 .4.5.1);
• their potential to develop programmes addressing “the perceived challenges to the 
role and effectiveness of the state (and indeed other public authorities) in the face 
of forces such as globalisation” (McCarthy 2007: 14).
179 The term work activation describes policies directed at moving social welfare recipients (of working 
age) into paid employment.
180 DoCRGA guidelines suggest including representation from the City Enterprise Board (CEB), which, 
according the Auditor and Comptroller General, “are now an important part of the enterprise 
development strategy being promoted by the Department [of Enterprise, Trade and Employment] and 
the contribution they make to economic development is significant and represents value for money 
(Comptroller and Auditor General 2007: 140). This indicates relevance attributed to APCs in 
supporting local economic development.
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The cohesion process was identified as a determined effort to close a regulatory and 
ideological gap between the local-development sector and local government systems 
(cf. DoCRGA 04/04/2007, 31/07/2007b) through 're-positioning’ of APCs vis-à-vis ADM 
and DCC (see Chapter 6 , Section 6.2, Figure 5). This was accompanied by a 
corresponding authoritative alignment of accountability practices, funding 
arrangements and auditing procedures for APCs, which left relatively little scope for 
APCs to make a contribution for the design of new lines of command (see Chapter 6 , 
Section 6.3).
In this context, views expressed by Gramsci (1971) and Althusser (Althusser and 
Balibar 1970) stress the importance of ideology and class in shaping structural 
regulatory practices and relationships within which individuals are embedded (see 
Chapter 3, Section 3.3.4.2). The analysis of the empirical data suggests that a variety 
of actors are involved in implementing government-led policy changes concerning 
restructuring urban governance in Dublin. The analysis of interview material presented 
in Chapter 6 accentuates the importance of key individuals who strategically operate 
from specific institutional platforms that are associated with statutory power; such as 
the influential role of senior civil servants in shaping and drafting trend-setting 
government documents, which were instrumental in initiating the SMI and propelling 
forward observed manifestations of governance reform and related institutional re­
configurations in Dublin (see Chapter 6 , Section 6.2).
According to the views and perceptions elicited from the individuals interviewed for this
study, it is argued that Gramsci’s account of hegemonic projects, and the role of
organic intellectuals in instigating ideational change, can explain observed governance
changes in Dublin and associated implications for the funding arrangements of APCs.
Gramsci (1971) describes organic intellectuals as follows:
The mode of being of the new intellectual can no longer consist in eloquence, 
which is an exterior and momentary mover of feelings and passions, but in active 
participation in practical life, as constructor, organiser, "permanent persuader” and 
not just a simple orator (but superior at the same time to the abstract mathematical 
spirit); from technique-as-work one proceeds to technique-as-science and to the 
humanistic conception of history, without which one remains “specialised” and 
does not become directive (specialised and political) (Gramsci 1971: 10).
Hence, organic intellectuals do not differ from other ‘traditional’ intellectuals181 by their 
occupation but in terms of their social function in propagating the worldview and 
ambitions of the class to which they ‘organically’ belong. Morgan (2003: 490) purports 
that “it is in the welter of technical decisions occurring day by day in the backstage 
committee rooms of political arenas that the real power to shape the ultimate ends of 
governance lies. And meta-regulation is a crucial forum of such power”.
181 According to Gramsci (1971: 7-8) traditional intellectuals are those who "put themselves forward as 
autonomous and independent of the dominant social group”. He, however, questions their 
independency as “social utopia” (ibid.).
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The case-study material underscores that the guiding principles of meta-regulation that 
became manifest in Dublin’s governance framework are not necessarily designed on 
the basis of democratic legitimacy but are based on perceptions of senior civil servants 
(cf. OECD 1997; Jayasuriya 2004). For example, the institutional restructuring of the 
local-governance system was influenced by:
• informal meetings between senior civil servants in response to perceived fiscal and 
economic crisis (OECD 1997), which culminated into the work of the Co-ordinating 
Group o f Secretaries and the development of the SMI (see Chapter 1, Section
1.4.2);
• the involvement of senior civil servants in drafting policy documents (see Chapter 
6 . Section 6.2.7); and
• the incorporation of ideas from abroad (Bartley et at. 1999).
The interview material indicates that DCC managers are jockeying for political power, 
or what Considine (2002) refers to as ‘navigational competence’, whereas service 
delivery or ‘rowing’ functions are increasingly out-sourced or delegated to subordinate 
special-purpose bodies such as the CDB and its substructures, RAPID or LACs and 
APCs (see Chapter 6 , Section 6.2). There is clearly a perception among senior DCC 
officials -  understood as an (organic) elite -  that they are ‘the real government’ and 
DCC headquarters remains in control of steering and policy-making which is tolerated 
by central government and ministers because DCC is not afraid to ‘make hard 
decisions’ (see Chapter 6 , Section 6.2.6). Whereas stated departmental objectives and 
programmatic guidelines indicate that APCs should facilitate the development of pro­
active and empowered communities that have some delegated responsibility in 
implementation of urban policies affecting their life, empirical evidence suggests that 
the implementation of value for money-driven, output-oriented, performance- 
monitoring systems prevents the systematic pursuit of such participatory approaches.
7.4.3 Accountability and monitoring arrangements
Previous sections documented the relationship between the development of regulatory 
mechanisms in response to the formulation of politico-economic priorities such as 
national partnership agreements, public-sector reform, welfare restructuring and the 
cohesion process. In this context, the RA and, more specifically, Gramscian concepts 
of hegemonic power and the organic intellectual can account for observed changes in 
regard to the funding mechanism of APCs in the context of stated priorities:
• to promote the approximation of governance models, accountability and budgetary 
systems between APCs and the public sector;
• to focus and enhance the service delivery role of APCs; and
• to maximise the use of resources in the local-development sector.
In this situation, the tightening of control over APC budgets and the concentration of 
efforts to monitor accountability procedures at the interface between APCs and the 
public sector are steps towards achieving the integration of APCs into a local-
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governance system that pursues centrally-defined policy objectives (see Section
6.2.4). In addition, the absence of formal guidelines or a lack of mutually agreed 
principles of collaboration between statutory bodies, APCs and local communities 
creates dependencies on interpersonal relationships among one another that require 
skilful political manoeuvring and diplomacy -  particularly from resource-dependent 
APCs. The reliance of APCs on informal personal relations with key individuals from 
different quarters was reported as extremely relevant for levering additional resources, 
getting 'buy-in' for ideas and concepts, lobbying politicians, recruiting senior board 
members and implementing their local development strategies.
APCs felt they are in a vulnerable position. Even though they acknowledged the merits 
of a certain degree of informality, which they found useful in terms of bypassing the 
‘mills of bureaucracy’ (e.g. Interview APC 11), they criticised the lack of responsibility 
and commitment from the public sector, which was considered as limiting their 
potential in relation to:
• forging durable alliances;
• influence the public political debate on the role of local development in society; or
• constructively challenging potential partners and government agencies and, 
moreover, holding them accountable.
The empirical analysis of the interview data provides evidence that the concepts and 
objectives of the SMI, which are mirrored in government publications -  in particular 
Better Local Government (DoELG 1996), Regulating Better (DoT 2004) and the work 
of the Interdepartmental Task Force (DoELG 1998, 1999a, 1999b, 2000) -  were the 
ideological foundation for the institutional integration of APCs into a hierarchical, local 
authority-administered local-governance framework that emulated business-like 
practices. The exploration of experiences of, and views expressed by, professionals 
from APCs and the public sector demonstrate that the central-peripheral flow of power 
identified in governance restructuring is mirrored in the design of funding and 
accountability procedures (see Chapter 6 , Section 6.3).
Contemporary accountability procedures require APCs to adhere to complex reporting 
requirements towards their political sponsors (Chapter 6 , Section 6.3.2; also Table 6.7) 
(‘upwards’), whereas the quality of their formal obligation to report to ‘their’ community 
(‘downwards’) is largely left to the role played by community representatives on the 
APC board (see Chapter 2, Figure 1). Also, accountability and performance criteria 
were found not to be reciprocal in so far as the onus of reporting and demonstrating 
success is on APCs. No formal provisions could be identified that require a similar 
responsibility for exercising accountability duties from their strategic partners (e.g. the 
sectors represented on their boards). The obligatory endorsement of APC plans by the 
Dublin CDB was frequently referred to as a prime example of the lopsided nature of 
accountability. APC professionals and board members criticised that other parties 
represented on the Dublin CDB (see Chapter 6 , Section 6.2.2, Table 6.2) have not
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been made answerable in a comparable manner (see Chapter 6 , Section 6 .2.4.3) (cf. 
Pobal 2006a: 33). The data suggests that the allocation of funding to APCs and 
related auditing practices:
• are subject to ideologically-driven changes based proposals developed by senior 
civil servants with an advisory capacity to government (see Chapter 6 , Section
6.2.7);
• have been aligned with the budgetary practice of the public sector (see Chapter 6 , 
Section 6 .2.4.3)
• are tightly controlled and monitored by means of governmental directives, 
guidelines and accountability and performance-monitoring arrangements (see 
Chapter 6 , Section 6.3.1, Table 6.7);
• are based on two sets of indicators: a set of formal guidelines and procedures and 
informal criteria that reward ‘high-profile’ APCs (see Chapter 6 , Section 6.2.2).
APCs are in a vulnerable position in regard to reacting to or negotiating terms and
conditions of national policies and directives concerning their work remit and priorities.
This vulnerability manifests in, first, the dependency of APCs on core funding provided
by the state and, second, the non-collaborative nature of the institutional environment
within which APCs are situated. The latter aspect forces APCs to rely on informal and
therefore fragile relationships182 with influential allies from within the statutory system.
The application of ‘extra criteria’ and informal information in assessing the success of
an APC illustrates the necessity for APCs to mobilise and win allies considered ‘high-
profile’ by their political paymasters. The data, however, shows that this ability hinges
upon the indigenous resources (including social capital) within the area that can be
mobilised and, moreover, the professional capacity of the individual APC (see Chapter
6 , Section 6.3.2). The following quotation from an interview with APC staff carried out
in a previous case study illustrates the difficult role of an APC in influencing their
positioning within urban governance model as a “subtending system and structure”
(Collinge 1999: 562) of the national regulatory framework:
Respondent 2: I would say that it would suit the state very well if partnership 
meant the community or local side delivering centrally-defined ideas, you know.
But it hasn’t been like that. It’s about you pushing out the boundaries and testing 
how far it will go. And you are right, it is about self-confidence.
Respondent 1: At its very best there are allies within the state who want to hear 
this kind of stuff, who know it.
Interviewer: But you have to check who they are?
Respondent 1: Of course, of course.
Respondent 2: It requires pragmatism and a lot of skills, a lot of political skills and 
how you operate by the thinking.
Respondent 1: Yes, and respecting those constraints. Nobody is without 
constraint. We have to be able to respect them. You need to respect the 
constraints without accepting them (Borscheid 2001, quoted from interview with 
APC Staff on 31/05/2000).
182 One respondent experienced that in crisis situations APCs can only to a certain degree rely on 
support and loyalty from senior decision-makers as “allies within the statutory system will not put 
their head on the line but will follow their pension” (Interview APC 11).
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In all, a variety of aspects point out trade-offs between the pursuit of equality-based 
principles and the hegemonic dominance of economic rationality in policy making and 
public-sector modernisation. The increasing importance of business-like regulatory 
practice is reflected in the funding arrangements for APCs: first, in the different nature 
of accountability requirements for APCs towards their political funders, on the one 
hand, and local communities, on the other; and second, in the subordination of 
developmental aspects of APCs to the delivery of measurable, welfare-related 
services.
7.4.4 Value for money
From the regulationist perspective, the launch of the SMI and the subsequent increase 
of business-like accountability practices in the public sector are part and parcel of the 
new regulatory approach that underlies governance restructuring in Ireland. The 
systematic prioritisation of fiscal efficiency and managerial auditing procedures 
facilitated the introduction of new standards of managerial accountability of 
entrepreneurial city governance (see Chapter 1, Section 1.2). The proliferation and 
tightening of fiscal accountability criteria has been driven by an increasing emphasis 
on value-for-money principles within the public administration. New managerial 
practices observed in Dublin reflect international trends which are driven by “the 
demands of entrepreneurship and output-based performance” (Considine 2002: 22).
The SCOPE system, the Q-mark and Excellence Through People are forms of
centrally-controlled self-regulatory practices that facilitate the integration of APCs into
a public-sector-controlled governance framework (see Chapter 6 , Section 6.4). APC
professionals felt that contemporary evidence-based performance-monitoring and
value-for-money standards are not optimally designed to capture qualitative aspects of
their work (see Chapter 6 , Section 6.4.5.3). In addition, it was stated that VFM
principles and extensive auditing procedures are overly strictly applied to APCs,
whereas statutory partners of APCs are not perceived to be audited in terms of their
co-operative efforts and commitment in regard to supporting or funding projects they
have been involved in (see Chapter 6 , Section 6.3):
We underwent a three day audit from FAS for a spend of 11,000 Euro. If this is not 
over the top, what is? This level of scrutiny is not applied to statutory agencies. 
(Interview APC 11)
In relation to VFM, the interviews also identified discrepancies between:
• formal monitoring and auditing systems designed to capture achievements of 
APCs in terms of value for money;
• and interpretations as to what respondents from different backgrounds considered 
indicators of success.
Irrespective of formal criteria applied to assess the achievements of APCs, successful 
APCs must have the capacity to create a sphere of collaboration that is tailored to 
meet the expectations of their funders, their political paymasters and the local
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community and voluntary sector. So, APCs need to demonstrate that they are able to 
provide an environment that caters for a variety of actors with different interests and 
agendas. Political sponsors of APCs stated that ‘good APCs’, first, use their core 
funding to lever considerable additional resources from statutory agencies to improve 
the delivery of services to target groups and, second, get ‘buy in’ from local groups 
that would usually not engage in dialogue with the state or statutory programmes (see 
Chapter 6 , Section 6.4.6). In combination with the empirical findings outlined in 
Chapter 6 , all the above indicates that reporting systems and monitoring procedures 
have been designed to exert tight control over plans and activities of APCs in 
accordance with the ethos of value for money.
The VFM framework and interpretations of success of APCs (see Chapter 6 , Section
6.4.5) suggests that ideas rooted in Gramscian or Althusserian thinking provide a 
useful strategic framework for rationalising the contemporary practice of assessing the 
success of APCs based on VFM principles. Previous sections already referred to the 
instrumental role of government officials and key individuals in initiating paradigmatic 
shifts in regulatory practice through promotion of new ideas. The formulation of new 
ideas resulted in what, in Gramscian terms, became hegemonic projects such as the 
national social partnership model (MacSharry and White 2000), the piloting of APCs 
and the SMI (Bartley et al. 1999). Looking at what makes for a successful APC, 
respondents frequently reported that APCs depend on winning ‘high-profile’ allies from 
resourceful183 quarters. Gaining support from key individuals is considered essential 
for APCs because this is one of the key ingredients for building up recognisable action 
ability as a basis for effectively pursuing their plans. In Ireland this course of action is 
well-established throughout the public sector (cf. Clancy and Murphy 2006) and, by no 
means, is unique to state-funded APCs.
This generally accepted practice can be explained through (see Chapter 3, Section 
3.3.42):
• the Gramscian concept of organic intellectuals who fulfil a societal elitist role in 
representing groups of stakeholders with vested interest in capitalising on 
structural (social, political, economic and cultural) imbalances within societal 
settings; and
• Althusserian thoughts on
1 . overdetermination: which can be described as the search for those forces that 
regulate ‘inter-performative’ relations between structures and determine which 
structure is dominant and which one is subordinate;
2 . the role of the ideological state apparatus in shaping the 'collective conscious’ 
and (a) the resulting perception of individuals about societal realities within 
which they are embedded (as subjects to ideology) and (b) their abilities to act
183 This could be of diverse nature such as information and expertise, ideological support or solidarity 
leading to issue-based alliances, political decision-making capacity or the provision of economic 
opportunities or financial means.
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or resist within same (Althusser 1970). According to Althusser, the emergence 
of hegemonic human agency is based on the ability of elitist groups or 
individuals to use material, professional and/or intellectual privileges to access 
institutionalised power from where controlled influence can be exerted through 
ideological communication (e.g. the communication of governance 
restructuring is couched in the language of the market place and VFM).
A comparison between stated (theoretical) objectives and practical implementation of 
VFM principles, on the one hand, and perceptions or views expressed by the 
individuals interviewed as to what they consider a successful APC, on the other, helps 
reveal how the introduction of VFM criteria into the sphere of funding arrangements of 
APCs cannot be dissociated from the ideologically-driven agenda of key actors that 
operate from within the (ideological) state apparatus (Althusser 1970). In the context of 
this study, national social partnership, the SMI, the cohesion process and the 
Developmental Welfare State are integral ideological building blocks of a new local- 
governance framework whose relevance for governance restructuring and 
repositioning APCs has already been portrayed in Chapters 1 and 2. They are part 
and parcel of national regulatory efforts directed at optimising the use of public monies 
with a view to minimising social consumption and maximise the social dividend of 
welfare-related expenditures as to not put at risk the use of fiscal income for 
alternative means directed at securing economic competitiveness.
7.4.5 Summary
A core group of senior civil servants played a key role in the planning, development 
and implementation of public-sector reform. The launch of the SMI -  and 
consequential structural changes in the landscape of local governance -  has 
considerably altered the power configuration in the field of local development. The 
case study illustrates that cross-departmental and cross-sectoral informal 
collaboration among public officials and other key individuals are instrumental in 
shaping the architecture for local-governance restructuring. The exploration of views 
of national experts and professionals stressed the importance of key individuals and 
committees (see Appendix 1) as instrumental for the promotion of new ideas for 
governance restructuring that, for example, resulted in the SMI and subsequent 
measures promoting public-sector reform with strong local government at its centre. 
The import of ideas from other government systems has been identified as 
instrumental in modelling public-sector restructuring in Ireland.
In the field of local-governance restructuring and the cohesion process, the re­
configuration of APC board structures, funding arrangements and performance 
auditing practices and other efforts to bring APCs alongside DCC-affiliated local 
development bodies, such as the Dublin CDB and its sub-structures (see Chapter 6 , 
Section 6.2.2), emerge as new regulatory activities “that secure a more viable fiscal 
and political base” (Collinge 1999: 567). The re-organisation of governance reflects the
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ethos of value-for-money driven modernisation processes throughout the entire 
governance system -  from running of central government departments to the 
organisation of APCs.
The design of funding arrangements has facilitated the institutional restructuring which 
enabled a systemic integration of APCs into the DCC-led governance model but has 
not fully anticipated the implications for the overall operational effectiveness of APCs 
in regard to their complex agenda. The introduction of performance indicators targeted 
at optimising internal economies of APCs illustrates a systemic approximation between 
the managerial ethos of public-sector reform and the bottom-up agenda of state- 
funded APCs: the same technology of money management, reporting and auditing 
systems has permeated every layer of the institutional framework of meta-regulation in 
Dublin to ensure fiscal efficiency, cost-effectiveness and good practice in running the 
organisation (i.e. value for money).
This study indicates that senior government officials and other key individuals in the 
public sector play a crucial role in governance restructuring. Acting in the interest of 
the entrepreneurial state (Teahon 1997; OECD 1997), these individuals become more 
managerial and have a certain degree of navigational freedom that comes with limited 
accountability requirements to both politicians and the electorate (see Chapter 6 , 
Section 6.2.6). The empirical data illustrates that institutional restructuring in Dublin is 
part and parcel of the government-driven search for a spatio-temporal institutional fix 
coping with perceived economic pressures and fiscal calculations (cf. Peck and Tickell 
1994; Jessop 2001b).
Notwithstanding a rhetoric of partnership that suggests multi-stakeholder participation 
within a governance framework that is portrayed as inclusive, the capacity of APCs to 
negotiate agendas, to challenge funding policies and to put forward alternative routes 
for enhancing the collaboration between local development and local governments 
systems has been found overly dependent on their ability to mobilise 'high calibre’ or 
organic intellectuals among their partners across institutional boundaries. If interest 
groups or individuals from local communities184 want to be part of decision-making 
structures provided by the state-funded local development framework, they are 
dependent on their capacity to participate in structures that are dominated by the 
philosophy of managerial governance. Urban communities depicted as disadvantaged 
are dependent on their capacity to identify routes to strategically place 'their' organic 
intellectuals as a form of ‘professionalised’ representation within local-governance 
structures or withdraw and pursue alternative routes to achieve their agenda.
184 In the context of this study, the term community is not meant to suggest traditional views of an 
organic system that suggests the presence of ‘functional’ neighbourhoods where there exists 
solidarity among individuals or a shared sense of place or a common history. It rather refers to 
individuals that interact within the geographically confined urban territory that is covered by the 
jurisdiction of an APC.
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7.5.1 Introduction
This chapter reviews the research findings from the views of ANT, URT and the RA. 
After a comparative analysis of each theory’s explanatory potential vis-à-vis the 
empirical data, an informed decision can now be made as to which theoretical 
framework is suited best to explain observed governance changes in Dublin and their 
impact on funding arrangements for Area Partnership Companies (APCs). A review of 
the potential of actor-network theory (ANT), urban regime theory (URT) and the 
regulation approach (RA) as explanatory frameworks for the repositioning of APCs 
within Dublin’s governance landscape, and the consequential implications for their 
funding arrangements, led to the elimination of URT as a suitable theory for the in- 
depth analysis of the empirical material. The empirical research could not identify any 
hints that suggest resource-dependency on private sector involvement in processes 
driving governance restructuring and associated funding arrangements for APCs. 
Therefore, URT appears to be the least relevant theoretical framework in the research 
context of this study. In contrast, Murdoch’s concept of ‘first-order proximations’ 
(Murdoch 1998) or the Latourian concept of power (Latour 2004), in the case of ANT, 
and an ‘Althusserian’ (Althusser 1970; Althusser and Balibar 1970) or 'neo-Gramscian 
reading’ of the RA (Jessop 1997b) appear to be better suited to explain observed 
patterns and processes affecting funding arrangements for APCs
7.5.2 ANT or the RA?
ANT and RA were found to be relevant in terms of their potential to explain 
characteristic features of funding arrangements for APCs in the context of governance 
restructuring. It is hypothesised that concepts associated with the RA provide a 
theoretical explanation for the observed relationship between funding arrangements 
for APCs and governance restructuring in Dublin that is superior to those provided by 
ANT and URT. It was decided that -  for the purpose of a comparative assessment of 
the remaining two theories by means of a case study -  a null-hypothesis approach 
would be deployed. Following the inverse logic of the null-hypothesis approach, this 
thesis set out to ascertain whether URT or ANT are better suited to account for the 
role of APCs in the governance system than ideas and concepts that are rooted in the 
RA. However, URT has been eliminated in the course of this dissertation as a suitable 
theoretical framework to explain the logic of funding arrangements for APCs in the 
context of state-led (and state-financed) governance restructuring in Dublin. With URT 
already discounted only ANT, therefore, remains to be tested in comparison with the 
RA. In short, the purpose of this section is to test the null hypothesis; i.e. to test 
whether ANT is superior to RA. Before ultimately testing if ANT is more powerful than 
RA, this section will briefly reflect on the explanatory potential of ANT and RA 
discussed in this chapter in relation to observed linkages between the processes 
propelling forward institutional reform and the characteristic features of funding 
arrangements for APCs.
7.5 Review of the empirical findings in the light of ANT, URT and the RA
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7.5.2.1 ANT
The value of ANT lies in the description of the mechanisms through which new 
governance structures have been developed. It was also considered helpful in 
dissecting the role played by all networked agents and entities that have been 
identified as being influential in promoting and implementing structural changes in the 
governance system. Furthermore, ANT highlighted interactions at the interface 
between APCs and those structures and agents that have been introduced into the 
governance system. The application of ANT could explore and illustrate how  funding 
arrangements have facilitated the co-option of APCs into a new local-governance 
framework. The concepts offered by ANT, however, cannot theoretically explicate 
processes of ideation and the pivotal role of key individuals in instigating a paradigm 
shift in thinking -  such as the establishment of national partnership agreements, the 
development of the SMI or the launch of the cohesion process -  that became manifest 
in local-governance restructuring and corresponding funding arrangements for APCs.
A fundamental limitation of ANT is the neglect of the ‘Why?’ question: ANT cannot 
explain why certain actors have the capacity to act and why they enlist or enrol other 
entities the way they do. According to the empirical material, however, it is 
fundamentally important to understand why certain actors, first, are in an elevated 
position vis-à-vis others and, second, have the power even to induce paradigmatic 
shifts in political thinking. In short, the important role of ideational change (i.e. 
intentional and, hence, human action) that, according to both the literature reviewed 
and the interviews, has been central to governance restructuring can probably not 
satisfactorily be explained by ANT. The research could not identify a parity of esteem 
between individuals and inhuman entities. Asking ‘Why?’ questions points towards the 
influential role of key individuals in promoting the re-configuration of local governance.
In regard to the potential of ANT to account for the relationship between funding 
arrangements for APCs and local-governance restructuring, it can be said that ANT is 
an appropriate methodology to describe how the regulatory mechanism works in 
detail. But, reflecting back on the empirical findings from an ANT’s perspective 
(Section 7.2), ANT is not conceptually designed to link these observations to 
processes of ideation or the supremacy of human agency in instigating and controlling 
(ideological) change. The remaining sections explore the re-positioning of APCs within 
the institutional framework of local governance through the conceptual lens of the RA.
7.5.2.2. The RA
In comparison with ANT and URT, the regulationist perspective adds another 
dimension to the analysis of observed patterns because it views the relationship 
between local governance restructuring and funding arrangements of APCs as a result 
of wider forces and machinations operating within the statutory apparatus. For 
example, ideas that inspired the launch of the SMI and public-sector reform can be 
traced back to economic imperatives and stated political priorities to re-design
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governance systems in a way that does not run counter to economic priorities, VFM 
principles and the customer-friendly design of statutory services.
The RA provides an agency-focused view in the search for plausible explanations for 
characteristic features of the accountability systems and funding arrangements for 
APCs because it highlights the role of forces behind their creation. It can help answer 
the question as to why one should follow certain actors through the network space 
described by ANT and can, therefore, account for the part played by different key 
individuals by means of analysing their professional (and/or ideological) position, 
related responsibilities and the passions and interests they pursue within the 
governance system (Hirschman 1987). In contrast to ANT, the perspective provided by 
the RA is able to contextualise the behaviour and decisions of powerful agents 
(organic intellectuals) against the backdrop of their worldview. The RA points out 
processes of ‘ideation’ (e.g. paradigm shift in the way of thinking) and ideological 
motivation as instrumental for the design of both contemporary governance 
restructuring and its implications for funding arrangements for APC, which can be 
linked to the perception of wider politico-economical processes affecting the Irish 
regime of accumulation.
The arguments and aspects raised above in the context of ANT also bring ideas and 
concepts into play that highlight the potential of the RA as an appropriate strategic 
framework for explaining the relationship between governance restructuring and the 
design of funding arrangements for APCs. Althusser’s concept of overdetermination 
and his advancements in regard to the role and nature of elites and the ideological 
state apparatus in influencing systemic performativity of less privileged strata of 
society (which mirrors Gramcsian ideas of hegemony and organic intellectuals) appear 
to be more suited to accounting for the observed relationship between governance 
restructuring, funding arrangements and the thrust of plans and activities of APCs than 
ANT.
It is argued that, in the context of this research, the conceptual ideas associated with 
RA, which uses a different language and terminology to that of ANT, could also better 
explain the complexities of interactions between relevant actors (including the use of 
power in acts of legislation, regulation, or funding criteria) and between organisations 
within the institutional ensemble of the wider statutory apparatus.
7.5.3 Wrapping it up: the verdict
Processes of institutionalisation, accountability practices and value-for-money 
principles were identified as the three most relevant key themes for the analysis of the 
empirical findings. In the context of Dublin’s changing governance framework, ANT 
and the RA both have merit in identifying influences on processes of institutional re­
ordering, refining performance-oriented methods and associated funding practices for 
APCs. The analysis of the material reviewed and data suggests that the RA is possibly
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more suitable for explaining the design of funding arrangements for APCs and 
associated implications for plans and activities than ideas rooted in ANT. The RA 
emerges as an appropriate and theoretically ‘grounded’ conceptual framework for 
explaining interrelated issues among (a) economic policy reformulation under social 
partnership, (b) public-sector reform and its impacts on local-governance systems. 
Accordingly, it is well placed to account for governance changes such such as the 
observed and stated impact of the SMI on political priorities responsible for the 
cohesion process and for the design of funding arrangements for APCs.
It is argued that ANT’s concepts of translation, immutable mobiles, inscription and 
agency describe processes can also be explained from the perspective of the RA. The 
RA provided a strategic approach to analyse the role played by guidelines, criteria, 
reporting requirements and managerial performance standards in the wider context of 
events that initiated governance restructuring in the first place. Moreover, from the 
viewpoint of RA, the cohesion process facilitates the transition towards a new local 
mode of meta-regulation that aims at addressing social and economic challenges and 
redefines, accordingly, the envisaged modus operandi for APCs. Funding 
arrangements for APCs have been designed in a way that facilitates the integration of 
APCs into a new state-controlled model of local governance.
The analysis of the empirical material suggests that key individuals were instrumental 
in the negotiation and development of local meta-regulatory responses to perceived 
societal and economic challenges. A Gramscian view helped explain the role of 
powerful agents who, based on their privileged position vis-à-vis power, were able to 
benefit from their systemic advantage and convince individuals with decision-making 
capacity as to how successful mediation of national priorities concerning social 
consumption and economic goals could be implemented. The research also found 
evidence that the articulation and generation of such projects is not necessarily 
informed by realities on the ground, but by perceptions and existing worldviews of 
those organic individuals that have access to sites of political power. The discussion 
on instrumentalisation of ‘narratives of duplication’ for inducing political change (see 
Chapter 6, Section 6.2.4.3) illustrates the ideological power of strategically positioned 
key individuals185 in a convincing manner (i.e. so that decision-makers act upon it) (cf. 
Smith 2004).
APCs are subject to this ideology but, in contrast, have no easy formal direct access to 
relevant decision-making circles. The interviews highlighted ‘counter-narratives’ as the 
most promising way for APCs (a) to somehow negotiate their position within a new 
governance framework and (b) rectify misconceptions about realities on the ground 
that have informed the revision of APCs within governance. Success can be achieved 
through placing 'counter-narratives’ into decision-making circles that (a) defuse notions
185 The term ‘strategically positioned’ implies that these individuals -  in their professional role -  act 
according to the ideological view of those who placed them into their positions and who equally might 
have the power to remove them from a privileged position.
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of duplication and (b) highlight the relevance and value-added of APCs to political 
decision-makers. In this context, Althusser’s concept of overdetermination, for 
example, helps to illustrate how new local-governance structures emerge as a result of 
interactions between its constituent elements. ANT cannot see cohesion as a 
strategically constructed programme. The Althusserian notions on the formation of 
ideology make it possible to analyse and explain funding arrangements for APCs in 
the context of local and national governance restructuring as a socially negotiated 
action that is directly linked to contemporary global economic challenges.
In contrast to ANT (see Section 7.5.2.1. above), the RA can explain why certain actors 
have the capacity to act and why they act the way they do. The important role of 
ideational change that, according to both literature reviewed and the interviews 
undertaken, has been central to governance restructuring can probably not 
satisfactorily be explained by ANT. The research could not identify a parity of esteem 
between individuals and inhuman entities. Asking ‘Why?’ questions points towards the 
influential role of key individuals in promoting the re-configuration of local governance.
The employment of the Gramscian concept of the organic intellectual explains both 
interactions and power differentials between relevant actors. Gramsci’s ideas, 
embedded in Althusser’s concept of ideology and overdetermination, can explicate the 
enabling role strategically placed individuals fulfil as mediators between economic 
interest and social obligations of the state and also why they have the power to even 
induce paradigmatic shifts in political thinking. Althusser’s concept of 
overdetermination and his notions on the ideological state apparatus -  both of which 
provide an explanation for the systemic subordination of less privileged strata of 
society vis-à-vis more powerful societal groups (which mirrors Gramcsian ideas of 
hegemony and organic intellectuals) -  are better suited than ANT to account for the 
observed relationship between governance restructuring, funding arrangements and 
the thrust of plans and activities of APCs.
The RA regards funding arrangements of APCs as part and parcel of processes of 
state restructuring that occur at various spatial scales and institutional levels. By 
means of a case study, this thesis explored if regulationist principles can explain local- 
governance restructuring and its implications for funding arrangements for APCs. 
Based on the case-study investigation, it is concluded that the regulationist 
perspective can account for ideologically driven actions, which are systemically 
blinded out by ANT (see Section 7.2.6).
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8. CONCLUSION
8.1 Introduction
This thesis illustrated that growing international economic competition among nation 
states and between cities increasingly requires tailor-made strategies and governance 
models that are capable of securing the foundations for societal functioning under 
economic and political systems that have a bearing on the locale (see Chapter 1, 
Section 1.2). In Dublin, issues concerning political marginalisation and socio-economic 
disadvantage of individuals that live in “ill-equipped and isolated residential 
environments produced on the edge” (Punch 2005: 754) are mainly addressed by 
Area Partnership Companies (APCs) and a variety of smaller, state-funded localised 
programmes. These provide a range of education and learning services, support 
labour-market participation and create economic opportunities for those segments of 
society that are considered most distant from mainstream society (cf. Pobal n.d.; 
DoSFA n.d.; DoCRGA n.d.-e). In other words, APC-type special-purpose bodies and 
other urban regeneration partnerships can be regarded as an outcome of both 
economically and socially motivated ideologies “which agents use to restructure 
domestic institutions, shift political boundaries and alter patterns of distribution” (Blythe 
1997: 232). Views expressed by professionals from APCs, ADM and the public sector 
indicate that APCs are expected to play a greater role:
• as an extended arm of the statutory welfare-related service delivery system (e.g. 
NESC 2005);
• as an overarching intermediary or facilitator for the integration of local development 
and local government systems (DoCRGA 31/07/2007b, 01/08/2007).
The empirical case study in Dublin investigated funding arrangements of APCs under 
the 2000-2006 Local Development and Social Inclusion Programme (LDSIP) in the 
context of local-governance restructuring. The research explored associated written 
material and elicited views from individuals from a variety of different professional 
backgrounds and who were involved at different institutional levels of the governance 
network. The analysis of data gathered suggests that funding arrangements for APCs 
mirror priorities of ideologically-driven public-sector modernisation in Ireland, which is 
directed at achieving better value for the utilisation of public resources (see Chapter 1, 
Section 1.4.2). Institutional and procedural changes in local governance undoubtedly 
had an impact on the modus operandi of APCs, but the participatory model of local 
development pursued by APCs was reported to be diametrically opposed to the 
business-like service delivery oriented model prioritised in public administration. The 
state-funded community-based development sector and the public sector differ in 
terms of organisational remit and operational culture. The empirical data indicates that 
these discrepancies cannot be bridged through contemporary efforts of governance 
restructuring that are based on the ethos of the neo-liberal model of the Strategic 
Management Initiative (SMI). The study also sought to ascertain to what extent 
contemporary governance restructuring processes enhanced APCs’ capacity to add
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value to the development of plans and activities addressing issues of poverty and 
socio-spatial marginalisation of groups from society ‘from the bottom up’. Moreover, it 
was argued that the characteristic features of funding arrangements and their impact 
on plans and activities of APCs can be meaningfully analysed through the conceptual 
lenses of three competing theoretical frameworks, each of which offers a specific entry 
point and explanatory value: actor-network theory (ANT), urban regime theory (URT) 
and the regulation approach (RA).
The chief objective of this study was to identify which of the three theories provides the 
best explanation for the design of the funding framework for APCs vis-à-vis changes in 
the sphere of local governance. The study specified three sets of key criteria as 
surrogate measures against which the explanatory value of the three theoretical 
frameworks were comparatively assessed:
• institutionalisation: a process of transforming APCs from pilot projects into 
permanent structures of the (local) governance system;
• accountability and monitoring practices: reporting requirements and measures to 
ascertain if APCs meet the expectations of their funders and the people in the 
designated disadvantaged area;
• value for money: the measurement of success and good operational practice 
against pre-defined or/and agreed objectives.
8.2 Domestication: towards utilising the competitive advantage of APCs
Between 1991 and 2007, the operational model of APCs underwent a metamorphosis 
(see Chapter 2). This study shows that a number of successive steps (see Chapter 6, 
Section 6.2, Table 6.1) led to a domestication of local APCs. Gradually, through 
processes of 'creeping institutionalisation’ and intense statutory regulatory efforts, 
APCs underwent a transformation: on their developmental trajectory, APCs moved 
from semi-autonomous, de jure  independent, private companies towards the role of 
state-controlled contractors. This went hand in hand with a shift in focus from area- 
based interventions -  targeted at ameliorating local manifestations of poverty and 
exclusion through experimental innovation and partnership in poverty black spots -  
towards a model of general service delivery. This thesis focused on the analysis of 
stages of governance transition under the LDSIP. Three parallel, but interconnected, 
developments could be identified that are strongly associated with governance 
restructuring in Ireland.
• Preparing the ground for the integration of APCs into the apparatus of the state 
through the objectives pursued by the Interdepartmental Task Force and, 
ultimately, the Local Government Act, 2001 (see Chapter 1, Section 1.4). This has 
been addressed under the theme of institutionalisation, which has been 
implemented through the cohesion process (Chapter 6, Section 6.2).
• A tightening of accountability practices, after the discontinuance of EU funding in 
2003 (Chapter 6, Section 6.3).
• Introduction of VFM-policies and practices (Chapter 6, Section 6.4).
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The empirical material and data analysed in this study suggests that through creating 
and strategically utilising resource dependencies, a successful domestication of APCs 
could be achieved that fits into contemporary plans to streamline the Irish approach to 
statutory welfare as, for example, outlined in The Developmental Welfare State (NESC 
2005). The empirical data indicate that, through domestication, the state strives to 
incorporate, and more strategically utilise, the know-how of APCs in areas that are 
alien to traditional statutory approaches to deliver welfare-related services. Figure 8.1 
illustrates stages in the route to the domestication of APCs, which was facilitated 
through an increasing control over resources:
Table 8.1: Domestication of APCs
1991 EXPERIMENTATION
Programmes
1991-1993 PESP
1994-1999 OPLURD
2000-2006 LDSIP
Money
E
U
F
U
N
D
I
N
G
E
X
C
H
E
Q
U
E
R
Characteristic Stages and Key Events
Experimental
1991: 12 pilot APCs 
1992: Setting up ADM
Proliferation of APCs
1994: Launch of the SMI
Mid-1990s: Establishment of 26 ‘second generation’ 
APCs
1996: Delivering Better Government (DoT 1996)
1996: Better Local Government (DoELG 1996)
1998: Creation of the Task Force for the Integration of 
Local Development and Local Government Systems
1999: Value for Money Audit of the Local Development 
Programme (Comptroller and Auditor General 2000)
2001 : Local Government Act 2001
2002: Establishment of DoCRGA
Tightening the grip on APCs
2002: End of EU support
2003: Introduction of annual budgets and cutbacks in 
funding
2003: Launch of the cohesion process
End of area-based approach
2005: Announcing plans for alignment of area-based 
initiatives with local government structures
Alignment into statutory apparatus
2007: Department of Community, Rural and Gaeltacht 
Affairs circulates guidelines addressing restructuring of 
APC Boards
T 1
2007 DOMESTICATION
Pilot = Developmental = Standardisation = Domestication = |
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The following sections take up the three key themes that were identified as surrogate 
measures for governance restructuring: institutionalisation, accountability and 
monitoring, and value for money. They summarise and partly refine the main 
observations made in Chapter 6 in regard to the SMI-induced rationalisation of local 
governance -  such as the cohesion process -  and related consequences for the 
funding arrangements of APCs.
8.2.1 Institutionalisation
Governance restructuring in Dublin is rooted in the SMI. The SMI provides the 
hegemonic ideological framework for the modernisation process of the statutory 
apparatus that led to an intensification of measures targeted at increasing better value 
for the utilisation of funding provided by the Irish state (see Chapter 1, Section 1.4). 
Evidence presented in Chapter 6 of this study illustrates that the desire to enhance 
economic competitiveness was instrumental in promoting state-led governance 
changes Ireland. The gradual institutionalisation and professionalisation of APCs that 
occurred under the LDSIP was identified as just one of such measures that -  
alongside the proliferation of public-private partnerships and plans to implement the 
Developmental Welfare State -  serves to minimise social consumption as to optimise 
investments in economic activities. Government publications and government-initiated 
reviews, evaluations and audits indicated that the diverse state-funded local- 
development sector represented a challenge to the optimal use of public monies and, 
consequently, recommended a rationalisation of the state-funded local-development 
sector. Views expressed by government officials and civil servants generally highlight 
the perceived need for more stringent financial and democratic accountability and 
more direct government influence in decision-making processes.
Already in 1999, towards the end of the 1994-1999 OPLURD, it was made clear by 
central government that a continuation of the area-based approach was conditional on, 
first, fiscal solvency of the state and, second, the agreement of Dublin-based APCs to 
become part of an overarching operational framework that put DCC-affiliated 
structures at its centre (see Chapter 6, Section 6.2, Figure 5). Under the 2000-2006 
LDSIP, government-initiated efforts targeted at streamlining local development 
structures culminated in the creation of the DoCRGA and the launch of the cohesion 
process, which brought about profound operational changes for APCs (see Chapter 6, 
Section 6.2.6). The description of processes of institutionalisation in this study serves 
to illustrate how APCs have been co-opted into ‘collaborative’ arrangements with local 
authority-affiliated structures at their centre. These have been developed on the basis 
of a business-like governance model that has been promoted with a view to:
• maximising the utilisation of resources;
• increasing financial and democratic accountability; and
• improving the quality of statutory service delivery to citizens.
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This thesis illustrated how funding dependencies were utilised to bring APCs alongside 
policies prescribed by their political paymasters (see Chapter 6, Section 6.3.1). Most 
significantly, the institutionalisation of APCs became manifest (a) in the creation of a 
government department, which was given the brief to intensify links between the state 
and the local-development sector, and (b) in the formation of the tri-ministerial initiative 
in 2002. These measures reflect the guiding principles for governance restructuring 
(cf. DoELG 1998). The launch of the cohesion process in 2003 was experienced by 
APCs as a paradigmatic shift in policy because it initiated the reconfiguration of power 
structures through the promotion of ‘institutional harmonisation’ between APCs and 
local government structures.
The key objective for the cohesion process was the development of better value in the 
delivery of services among a plethora of state-funded local development agencies. 
The cohesion process facilitates the institutional, operational and territorial alignment 
of APCs with local government-led structures and, effectively, replaces the philosophy 
of area-based targeting with an overall service delivery- or target group-based 
approach. Moreover, the announced restructuring of APC boards (see Chapter 6, 
Section 6.2.6) effectively brings an end to the local social partnership model (cf. 
McCarthy 1998; Harvey 2002). In particular, views expressed by national experts 
suggest that the cohesion process pursues an envisaged approximation between local 
development and local government systems that had long been on the agenda of key 
individuals involved in moulding the restructuring of local governance. As a result, the 
perceived gravitational centre of power moved towards Dublin City Council (DCC) and 
its affiliated structures. The area-based approach to local development is portrayed as 
a form of ‘decentralised centralisation’. APCs became an institutional fix locally, 
representing the central state rather than being an innovative mechanism promoting 
informed and citizen-oriented local development through democratic experimentalism. 
The latter proactively seeks to involve citizens in decision-making processes that affect 
their community. The concept, which informed the establishment of APCs in the early 
1990s, was based on the idea that creating room for constructive input and challenges 
from individuals and groups that are situated outside, or at arms-length distance from, 
the governance system could lead to vertical institutional learning and greater 
effectiveness in local governance (cf. OECD 1996).
The analysis of different viewpoints on governance arrangements for APCs suggests, 
however, that APCs operate in a ‘space of prescription’ (Murdoch 1998) that is 
increasingly being dictated by wider economic considerations of central government. 
The gradual co-option of APCs into the apparatus of the state provides few identifiable 
focal points for APCs to negotiate the terms for their re-positioning within the overall 
framework of governance186.
186 When the 2000-2006 LDSIP ended, APCs were still left without clear guidelines outlining the nature 
of a follow-up programme. Respondents from APCs felt that they were working in an environment of 
uncertainty and political indecision.
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8.2.2 Accountability and monitoring
This thesis demonstrates that the rationalisation of Dublin’s governance framework 
went hand in hand with an increasing focus on re-structuring funding arrangements for 
APCs. The analysis of the empirical material suggests that changing funding 
arrangements have been instrumental in facilitating the alignment of APCs into a state- 
led governance system. The analysis of the data identified three key factors that had a 
profound impact on funding and reporting arrangements of APCs:
• the withdrawal of direct EU funding after the 1994-1999 OPLURD (Chapter 6, 
Section 6.3.3.1);
• the change from multi-annual to an annual budget system in 2003 (Chapter 6,
Section 6.3.3.2); and
• the requirement for the endorsement of APC plans by the CDBs (Chapter 6,
Section 6.3.3.3).
The research findings underscore that the allocation of funding into designated 
disadvantaged areas became more regulated after the discontinuance of EU funding 
in 2002. Also, performance-oriented funding arrangements and competitive tendering 
for government resources became more prominent: under a new regime of 
accountability and monitoring, funding is not only to be accounted for but increasingly 
expected to maximise the social dividend in the form of tangible returns for society as 
measured by (output-oriented) performance-against plan evaluation and a set of less 
tangible extra-criteria that are considered to be indicative of good practice and value 
added benefits. The introduction of annual budgeting in 2003 created a systemic 
compatibility between public-sector budgeting and the practice in the state-funded 
local-development sector. This institutional coupling became further enhanced through 
the endorsement process of APC plans by CDBs that formally tie APCs into the local 
government-led local development.
It can be concluded that, in terms of organisational capacity and programme delivery, 
the changing governance framework in Dublin under the LDSIP increasingly 
challenged APCs. They had to invest more efforts in negotiating and clarifying their 
position vis-à-vis the DCC-affiliated Dublin CDB, whilst implementing their programme 
of activities in accordance with their contractual agreement with ADM. Interviewees 
from APCs stated that compliance with the performance-oriented funding system 
requires a disproportionate amount of resources for reporting requirements, which has 
adverse effects on the organisational capacity to pursue targets outlined in their area 
action plans. APCs voiced concerns about funding arrangements that were not tailored 
to local realities within which they operate (see, for example, Chapter 6, Section 6.3.1).
In particular, the discontinuance of multi-annual budgeting and the growing 
responsibility of APCs to comply with a growing variety of accountability and 
performance-monitoring requirements that were defined by their political funders are 
evidence of tighter managerial control over APCs. This move to annual budgeting
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contrasted with government intentions to consider the introduction of multi-annual 
budgets for the community and voluntary sector that were outlined in the 2000 White 
Paper on Volunteering (Government of Ireland 2000). It can also be demonstrated that 
efforts to achieve greater democratic representation in decision-making processes 
have become sub-ordinated to procedural issues ensuring evidence-based delivery of 
services and financial accountability. The empirical findings suggest that the 
institutional alignment of local development and local government systems had 
adverse effects on the modus operandi of APCs.
In particular, respondents from APCs and, to a lesser extent, ADM professionals fear 
that the business-like ethos of public-sector reform and associated output-oriented 
accountability, monitoring practices and annual budgeting is not compatible with APCs’ 
social-inclusion remit and, therefore, could result in sub-optimal use of resources such 
as:
• a dilution o f the anti-poverty and bottom-up focus, where the attention of the APC 
is diverted away from the most disadvantaged to those who can be supported in a 
way that shows results;
• playing it safe, when identified opportunities for innovative projects come second 
place to actions and provision of services that yield immediate results; and
• short-term planning, where insecurity over budgets prevents the development of 
strategies and alliances that need long-term (political) commitment and/or financial 
support from statutory agencies and strategic partners.
In addition, the somewhat arbitrary application of a mix of formal and informal 
indicators feeds into the (informal) ranking of APCs. The amount of funding allocated 
to APCs is influenced by two sets of indicators: formal indicators and, less obvious, 
informal extra-criteria. Whereas the former include factors such as population size and 
the degree of deprivation, the latter indicate the perceived institutional capacity of 
APCs to deliver what is wanted by funders. It was found that APCs are likely to be 
recognised as ‘good APCs’ by their political paymasters if they can:
• mobilise indigenous resources;
• secure commitment from senior officials from state organisations and other 
powerful allies for their cause; and
• effectively communicate and market their achievements.
Evidence presented in this study suggests that APCs that are considered ‘high-profile’ 
by ADM are rewarded when it comes to the allocation of funding (see also below). The 
contemporary practice of making resource allocation conditional on notions of ‘high- 
profile’ and competitive bidding procedures represents a pronounced inverse-care 
culture because the degree of deprivation as a key indicator for the allocation of public 
funding is superseded by a value system that is tailored to reward APCs that are 
‘marketeers’ or ‘social entrepreneurs’ (see Chapter 6, Section 6.3.1).
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The performance-monitoring system is designed to capture the achievement of 
contractually agreed numeric outputs and, hence, pre-defines the societal dividend 
that can be yielded by funding that is channelled into designated disadvantaged areas 
through APCs. This ‘performance-against-plan’ accounting does not sufficiently take 
into account the R & D brief given to APCs and, as indicated by respondents working 
in local development, potentially discourages the achievements of ‘performance- 
beyond-plan’ by APCs. The research findings clearly point out that the performance 
mechanism for APCs operates on the basis of centrally-defined VFM parameters that 
are not adjusted to meet the local realities within which APCs operate because such 
indicators cannot adequately capture qualitative aspects of APC work. As a result less 
tangible developmental efforts and outcomes of activities initiated by APCs are likely to 
be underrepresented in progress reports vis-à-vis measurable activities and outputs 
captured by common performance indicators. Respondents from APCs admitted that, 
as a result, they might fall into the trap of prioritising their work in accordance with 
previously agreed quotas and deadlines -  even though the innovative capacity and 
ultimate outcome of programmes might be sacrificed.
Interviews carried out for this study generally confirm findings of previous research in 
the case-study area (Bartley and Borscheid 2003; Bartley and Saris 1999; Saris et al. 
2000; Saris et al. 2002). On the one hand, the output-oriented funding arrangements 
might well be considered the best value by funders in regard to achieving a social 
dividend for public money funnelled into designated disadvantaged areas. On the 
other hand, the design of the funding and associated reporting arrangements was felt 
to be running counter to the area-based development and promotion of innovative, 
participatory and outcome-oriented programmes from the bottom up. APCs operate in 
an environment that is characterised by a reportedly pronounced dependency of APCs 
on informal relationships. Moreover, funders increasingly utilise a Teward-system’ that 
ranks APCs based on:
• their capacity to comply with contractually defined parameters so that it is “a 
pleasant and trouble-free experience for the funder” (Interview ADM 2); and
• their capacity to access additional resources.
A picture emerges in which resources channelled into designated disadvantaged 
areas are rather dependent on the professional skill set and the informal networking 
capacity of the APC than on the degree of disadvantage. Professional skills also were 
reported to come into play in the area of APCs ‘marketing’ their skills and promoting 
their achievements so that they appear as a ‘high-profile’ entity and, therefore, relevant 
partners for public officials, statutory agencies, politicians and social partners wanting 
to utilise APCs for their purposes.
It also can be shown that the monitoring of APCs follows a rhetoric of double 
accountability (i.e. ‘upwards’ and ‘downwards’). This requires APCs to be answerable 
to (a) their funders/political supporters (‘upwards’), mainly to account for the use of
258
resources vis-à-vis activities and output generated, and (b) the population in 
designated disadvantaged areas (‘downwards’), mainly to account for delivery of 
outcomes and participatory modus operandi. The analysis of the interview material 
also reveals that systematic procedures targeted at monitoring the quality of the APC’s 
participatory inclusiveness and democratic accountability towards the community 
interest are in place (cf. ADM 2000), but are not being pursued with similar vigour as 
those for reporting requirements to the political funders. In all, funding arrangements 
and, in particular, related accountability requirements have been found to be tailored to 
meet the expectations of the funders and political supporters of APCs rather than the 
core objectives identified by the local people (see Chapter 6, Section 6.3).
Evidence presented here indicates that APCs have been drawn into new 
administrative procedures and auditing processes which undermine their capacity to 
engage in activities that foster participatory approaches based on involvement from 
local citizens. The increasing funding dependency and the focus on the 
professionalisation of the governance apparatus including (a) the state-funded local 
community sector (Harvey 2002; McCarthy 2006), in general, and (b) the area-based 
approach to addressing deprivation and structural disadvantage, in particular, gives 
way to exerted control over both APCs and grassroots movements through strategies 
of co-option and exclusion:
• Strategy o f co-option: APCs are positively evaluated and financially rewarded if 
they engage in activities that facilitate the implementation of centrally-devised anti­
poverty strategies that are complementary to both welfare and competition 
policies;
• Strategy o f exclusion: APCs that pursue local bottom-up strategies that challenge 
mainstream agendas and central managerial control over local territory are 
frowned upon and will eventually be penalised -  despite rhetoric over the 
empowerment role of ACPs.
Views from government and city council officials and ADM clearly signal that 'high- 
profile' APCs not only comply with criteria and deliver on targets but also do not blame 
or overly criticise their funder. In turn, they are positively evaluated (see Chapter 6, 
Section 6.3.2 and 6.3.3). As these viewpoints leave no doubts about a clearly defined 
accountability of APCs towards their political paymasters, they throw up questions 
about the credibility of guidelines demanding a ‘downward accountability’ of APCs 
(see Chapter 6, Sections 6.3.1 and 6.4). The current focus on market-led priorities 
and practices in public-sector management threatens participatory democracy as a 
guiding principle of APCs. Based on the views expressed throughout the interviews, 
an intensification of the usage of contractual practices such as service-level 
agreements could further illustrate the systemic dependency of APCs on their political 
sponsors.
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Contemporary policies towards APCs:
• are an impediment to their pro-active pursuit of innovative risk-friendly approaches 
or their ability to scope out terrain for mainstreaming,
• emasculate participatory potential and, in a final step,
• incorporate APCs into the statutory arsenal of welfare-related services.
This study suggests that contemporary funding and reporting arrangements for APCs 
facilitate their instrumentalisation by the state. The research findings also showed that 
the practiced business-like approach towards the integration of local development and 
local government systems runs counter to the stated objectives of the cohesion 
process: to achieve value for money with a focus on the optimisation of outcome.
8.2.3 Value for money and success
Under the increasing influence of the SMI, private sector practices gained influence in 
the design of performance-monitoring and funding arrangements. Government 
publications promote new managerial approaches to achieve better regulation (e.g. 
DoT 2004: 46). Policies are increasingly couched in the language of the market place. 
Throughout the research value for money (VFM) was an omnipresent concept. The 
growing relevance of economic intra-organisational procedures finds expression in the 
proliferation VFM principles and efforts to promote good governance among APCs. 
The empirical evidence presented demonstrates that the desire to deliver ‘better value’ 
is a key objective for contemporary governance restructuring in Dublin. In particular, 
government officials and senior city council professionals made ample reference to 
VFM principles such as ‘cost-effectiveness’, ‘efficient service delivery’, ‘good 
management skills’ and mentioned other business-like codes of practice when they 
described what they considered the foundation of successfully operating APCs187.
The adoption of a ‘value-added philosophy’ for the public sector also came to affect 
APCs through governance changes that were instigated under the LDSIP. Traditional 
output-oriented evaluation and monitoring practices that focused on immediate results 
of funded activities, such as the number of individuals placed in training, are still high 
on the agenda, but have been supplemented by efforts assessing processes 
concerning internal economies of APCs (see Chapter 6, Section 6.4). According to 
McCarthy (1998: 46) “a lot of effort has gone into defining indicators to help in 
evaluating the work of the Partnerships“. Even though respondents from all quarters 
acknowledged the difficulty of capturing qualitative progress in regard to improving the 
situation of designated beneficiaries through participatory measures and capacity 
building (outcome-oriented focus), few resources seem to have been invested into 
developing an appropriate mechanism that can account for all aspects of APC work.
187 It was found, however, that VFM principles were regularly used interchangeably, both in government 
publications and by respondents throughout the interviews. In the interviews, respondents were 
asked to name or describe characteristic features that they associate with a successful APC. 
Thereby, it was hoped to identify shared views and differences among respondents concerning the 
concept of good practice and value added (see Chapter 6, Section 6.4).
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The proliferation of new auditing techniques for APCs complements traditional 
reporting requirements (e.g. submission of SCOPE data, case studies and quarterly 
reports). Performance-oriented assessment of APCs underwent a shift towards 
focussing on:
• compliance with good governance practice;
• investments made to encourage intra-institutional learning;
• the promotion of self-monitoring; and
• the capacity to network and achieve collaboration among relevant actors from the 
state and, to a lesser extent, civil society.
The following impact assessments and performance audits for APCs, for example, 
have been devised to look at qualitative aspects of APC work with a view to (a) 
enhancing cost-efficient management of internal operations and (b) ensuring 
compliance with good/professional practice in regard to company policies188:
• the definition of optimal working models measuring the mode and quality of 
programme implementation and collaborative practice (Chapter 6 , Section 6.4.1);
• the Excellence Through People Award and the Q-mark (Chapter 6 , Section 6.4.3); 
and
• government-commissioned VFM audits (Chapter 6 , Section 6.4.2).
In terms of demonstrating value for money within local partnership arrangements, the
onus of proof for achieving collaboration and positive output clearly challenges APCs 
more than other stakeholders; i.e. there is not a shared responsibility among relevant 
stakeholders represented at the partnership table pro-actively to pursue and commit 
themselves to achieving institutional learning and optimisation of collaborative efforts. 
The exemption of relevant statutory organisations from their responsibility to 
collaborate or constructively seek to promote an inter-institutional alliance for 
meaningful local partnership reduces the scope of APCs:
• to develop their full R & D potential through piloting new initiatives and seeking to 
address identified gaps in statutory service delivery;
• to pursue new approaches and respond to opportunities that could lead to the 
collaborative development and/or mainstreaming of new projects;
• to initiate vertical institutional learning (e.g. OECD 1996; NESC 2005).
According to the empirical interview material, VFM criteria are not perceived to be 
capable of assessing procedural effectiveness of APCs. They can neither measure 
“user satisfaction” (NESC 2005: 190-191) of individuals or organisations that have 
been supported by an APC nor account for qualitative aspects of APC work such as 
time and efforts invested into developmental work with local groups or forging
188 Respondents from APCs and local community groups, however, expressed the view that the time and 
effort that had to be invested to comply with self-monitoring practices -  and related accreditation of 
the achievement of prescribed quality standards -  is overly bureaucratic and disproportionate vis-à- 
vis the value gained from these exercises.
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collaborative arrangements with strategic partners. Moreover, they do not capture the 
factors associated with the informality of the procedural framework within which they 
operate. It is argued that the development of elaborated monitoring arrangements to 
capture qualitative work of APCs is only useful if the performance of statutory agencies 
with a stake in welfare-related service delivery is equally assessed and challenged in 
terms of their pro-active engagement with APCs at local level.
8.3 Theories
The primary objective of this thesis was to investigate to what extent the theoretical 
frameworks provided by actor-network theory (ANT), urban regime theory (URT) and 
the regulation approach (RA) can explain local-governance restructuring and the 
impact of associated business-like principles and practices on funding arrangements 
for Area Partnership Companies (APCs) in Dublin. After a preliminary review of early 
empirical material and previous research findings it was hypothesised that the RA 
would be the most promising theoretical framework for explaining contemporary 
funding arrangements for APCs in the light of governance restructuring. 
Methodologically, this study employed a null-hypothesis approach in regard to 
assessing theories. Accordingly, this research approach sought to ascertain if the 
alternative theoretical frameworks provided by ANT and URT are more suitable to 
account for the relationship between observed changes in Dublin’s governance 
landscape and funding arrangements for APCs than concepts rooted in the RA. If the 
evidence collected did not confirm this, then, by default, it would be reasonable to 
conclude that the RA was indeed the superior theory in this instance.
The exploration of the interview material was based on the different theoretical 
perspectives provided by ANT, URT and RA. It led to the conclusion that ideas rooted 
in Gramscian thinking and conceptual ideas developed by Althusser, both of which can 
be conceptually situated within the regulation school, provide the most relevant 
theoretical framework for the explanation of power structures within Dublin’s 
institutional governance ensemble and for its implications for funding arrangements of 
APCs. The next two sections summarise briefly the assessment of URT and ANT. 
They are followed by a section that outlines why the RA emerged as the superior 
theoretical framework.
8.3.1 ANT
ANT portrayed the restructuring of Dublin’s governance framework as a government- 
induced colonisation of an actor space by new institutional structures and DCC- 
affiliated actors. The analysis of the empirical material from the perspective of ANT 
was useful because it:
• allowed studying processes related to APC funding ‘from the inside out’;
• presented an opportunity for an in-depth description of interactions between 
circulated and networked actants (non-human entities) and agents (humans); and
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• facilitated the identification of key actors and their spheres of immediate and, to a 
lesser degree, extended influence.
ANT can also shed light on processes Pickering (1993) described as the ‘mangle of 
practice’: i.e. the complex interplay between intentional actions directed at creating 
immutable mobiles and resulting (complex) repercussions between such immutable 
agents, on the one hand, and humans and other (material) networked entities, on the 
other189. The employment of ANT as an analytical tool for the empirical data allowed 
mapping inter-agency connections and following the flow of power between APCs, 
immutable mobiles and a multiplicity of other agents. Based on the analysis of the 
interview material and policy reports, this study came to the conclusion that the 
reconfiguration of governance in Dublin occurs in a ‘space of prescription’, which is 
defined as a geographic area “of relatively fixed coordinates and will tend to be 
marked out by formal and standardised sets of heterogeneous relations” (Murdoch 
1998: 370). In the context of the institutional restructuring of Dublin’s governance 
system, ANT was extremely helpful in identifying connections between relevant agents 
of change and exploring their role in creating and/or transmitting flows of power. The 
examination of networked relations could describe the constituent parts of the 
governance network and map out the relations and (transformational) interactions 
between them.
ANT was found to be over-occupied with the principle of general symmetry, which 
makes no difference between the quality of material and human agency and, thereby, 
neglects questions of intentionality and ideology. It identifies sources of power but 
remains silent on processes of intentionality, motivation, passion or interest. Looking at 
the restructuring of Dublin’s governance landscape and its implications for funding 
arrangements of APCs under the LDSIP, the interviews highlighted the importance of 
human agency in consciously initiating and/or responding to social and economic 
circumstances that were perceived as undesirable. ANT is a useful but quite limited 
theoretical framework because the performative power of material devices could not 
be satisfactorily de-coupled from human agency. Therefore, ANT cannot provide a 
plausible explanation for the contemporary design of funding arrangements against the 
backdrop of observed shifts within Dublin’s governance framework.
8.3.2 URT
In the literature, Dublin is described as highly competitive and increasingly 
entrepreneurial city (see Chapter 4, Section 4.2.1). Whereas the state and the local
189 An example for ‘material agency’ that, in turn, influences human behaviour is the creation of the 
SCOPE system as an effort to measure the achievements of APCs. SCOPE, however, failed 
holistically to capture activities of APCs. From an ANT point of view, the failure of SCOPE to measure 
qualitative aspects of APCs can be interpreted as an act of systemic (material) resistance that, then, 
was hoped to be compensated for by the assessment of case studies and the measurement of 
collaboration (base on the Himmelman Model) and organisational performance standards (see 
Chapter 6, Section 6.3.2, Table 6.8). So, based on perceived shortfalls of SCOPE (material 
resistance), the performance measurement system became extended (human response).
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authorities provided the enabling framework for entrepreneurial urbanism to prosper, 
the development of Dublin was predominantly driven by “the activities of the private- 
sector property development forces” (MacLaran and Williams 2003: 171). Case 
studies provide examples of how capital provided by the private sector played an 
enabling role for the pursuit of ambitious urban development projects under private- 
public partnership agreements -  usually without meaningful involvement from local 
people (Bartley and Shine 2003; Hogan 2005). Against this backdrop, it was hoped 
that URT, a conceptual framework rooted in pluralism, could be used to identify and 
assess the extent to which the formation of alliances among representatives from the 
state, the private sector and the community have a role to play in the design of APC- 
type social urban regeneration projects and local development initiatives in Dublin.
According to Stone (1989) bi- or multi-lateral regime formation, as defined by URT, is 
conditional on a mutual resource dependency between potential allies such as 
business interests, the political sphere and other relevant groupings from civil society. 
An analysis of Dublin’s governance farmework, however, did not disclose relevant 
resource dependencies between private capital and the state sector in the formulation 
and implementation of objectives for governance restructuring or in the design of 
funding arrangements for APCs (see Chapter 7, Section. 7.3). Both the published 
material and the empirical data point out that the new framework for local governance 
has been conceptualised from within government buildings (see Chapter 6 , Section
6.2). Consequently, the application of URT as explanatory vehicle for processes 
impacting on funding arrangements of APCs was ruled out as a suitable theoretical 
framework for the further analysis of APC funding within Dublin's changing local 
governance framework.
8.3.3 The RA
The conceptual designs of URT and ANT were initially found to be useful for the 
investigation of the inner workings of localised neo-pluralist and complex 
heterogeneous local networks of governance in Dublin (see Chapter 3, Sections 3.2.1 
and 3.2.2). Neither could, however, satisfactorily explain the formation of new 
alliances that were influential in the design of funding arrangements for APCs. In 
contrast, Ideas rooted in Gramscian and Althusserian thinking can account for the 
social formulation of national hegemonic accumulation strategies. Furthermore, they 
can explicate how these strategies impact on state organisation and ideology (Section
3.3.4.2) and, consequently, are mediated into the local settings within which APCs 
operate (Chapter 7, Section 7.4).
This thesis illustrates how the design of funding arrangements for APCs is inextricably 
linked to the ideology of public-sector modernisation, the development and promotion 
of which emerged from ideas promoted by a number of senior government officials 
(see, for example, Chapter 1, Section 1.4.2 and Chapter 7, Section 7.4.1). These 
individuals were instrumental in influencing the ideological framework for governance
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restructuring within the wider competitive model of capitalist accumulation and, 
moreover, proactively facilitated the translation of global social and economic policies 
into the sphere of APC-type local development processes.
The forging of social partnership (e.g. MacSharry and White 2000) and its translation 
into the sphere of local development illustrates the role of key individuals in societal 
paradigm shifts. Viewed through the lens of overdeterminism and the statutory 
ideological apparatus, the creation of what is widely perceived as a dominant or 
hegemonic economic structure can be equally conceptualised as the embodiment of 
agency “exercised by collectives of humans” (Glassman 2003: 681). In other words, 
the manifestation of a meta-regulatory framework is not necessarily or exclusively 
dictated by an ‘ominous’ external global superstructure, by something that is 
disconnected from the locale and miraculously exerts ‘osmotic influence’ on the locale. 
This study provided evidence that the nature of regulatory efforts are also influenced 
by local responses that emerge as a result of perceptions or as a result of negotiated 
agency among competing ideologies (promoted by individuals in key positions) (ibid.).
The empirical research material provided evidence that funding arrangements for 
APCs are inextricably linked with the institutional restructuring of the governance 
system. Influence depends on the capacity of individuals or groups to exert systemic 
power (i.e. ‘the power to’), as -  for example -  outlined by Stone (1989). It can be 
demonstrated through this case study, that the driving forces for state modernisation 
and streamlining the governance system in Ireland are deeply rooted within the 
political desire of individuals in key positions. The individuals possessed the power to 
create a local-governance model within an economically competitive state that is 
conditioned to absorb and respond to challenges of processes associated with 
economic globalisation.
The gradual co-option of APCs into the apparatus of the state was based on the 
creation of systemic resource dependencies, which minimised the potential of APCs to 
negotiate the nature of their new relationship with the state or resist change. The 
cohesion process promoted a colonisation of the space of governance by local 
government players, which undermines the potential for developing forms of capacity 
building, grassroots empowerment and project development that could challenge what 
has been defined as the priority by the state (understood as the hegemonic model). In 
the light of the strengths and weaknesses of three theoretical concepts deployed in 
this study (see Chapters 3 and 7), the neo-Gramscian framework is evidently the most 
fruitful theoretical framework for explaining complex relationships and processes that 
impinge on funding arrangements of APCs in Dublin.
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8.4 The key contribution of this study
Under the 2000-2006 LDSIP, the conceptual bottom-up approach and the ethos of 
democratic experimentalism which has been promoted by APCs on behalf of their 
funders until the end of the 1994-1999 OPLURD have been systematically replaced by 
a neo-liberal service-delivery model of welfare. The case study research of one urban 
APC in west Dublin provides an in-depth analysis of how concepts that are at the heart 
of the new public managerialism have facilitated the gradual incorporation of a typical 
APC into the local government system through a reconfiguration of the funding and 
accountability arrangements. Currently, even though APCs are part of the state 
apparatus, they are still in a process of transition and have not been fully incorporated 
yet. The current upward reporting requirements place APCs in an invidious institutional 
position on the governance map (see Chapter 6 , Section 6.2, Figure 5): on the one 
hand, APCs are accountable to ADM190 that act on behalf of the Department of Rural, 
Community and Gaeltacht Affairs; on the other hand, they are accountable to the 
Dublin CDB that is closely affiliated with local government and, hence, the Department 
of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government.
A variety of studies on urban governance analyse the growth in neo-liberal tendencies 
and their socio-spatial manifestations in Dublin (e.g. Chapter 7, Section 7.3.2). As 
outlined in Chapter 3 (Section 3.3.1), only a few empirical studies on governance 
transition and local urban regeneration initiatives have been interpreted against the 
theoretical frameworks deployed in this thesis. Some analysts, for example, 
investigated developments in urban governance from the perspective of growth 
machine theory (Hogan 2006), pluralism and concepts of stakeholder governance 
(Bartley and Shine 2003), Latourian concepts of power (McGuirk 2000), or (Marxist) 
political economy ideas (Punch 2004, 2005). Most of these studies, however, deal with 
the socio-spatial impacts of planning and development in the area of urban 
regeneration policies that principally seek physical transformation (MacLaran and 
Williams 2003). In contrast, according to Bartley and Shine (2003: 161), APCs can be 
regarded as “complementary to traditional urban regeneration schemes in so far as 
they are more concerned with social and economic transformation”. APC-type 
approaches to local development clearly have a role to play in ameliorating adverse 
impacts of neo-liberal urban development policies on poor communities, which suffer 
because they offer little incentives for economic investments from the private sector.
In providing an in-depth analysis of a local governance network by means of a local 
study focusing on one APC in a suburban marginalised neighbourhood in west Dublin, 
this thesis contributes to the utilisation of theoretical frameworks that previously have 
not been applied to the empirical analysis of state-funded local initiatives. Also, a 
systematic comparison of three theoretical perspectives has not been undertaken in 
the Irish context of urban regeneration. Most of the studies reviewed (see above) only 
utilise one theoretical perspective to explicate power flows behind observed processes
190 ADM was renamed into Pobal in 2005 (see Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2).
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of urban regeneration. The focus on one in-depth case study has limitations (see 
Chapter 4). However, it allows comparison of the potential of three different theoretical 
frameworks to account for the driving forces for governance restructuring and its 
implications for state-funded local development initiatives in poor communities. This 
study, therefore, can be a useful baseline or point of departure for further 
investigations concerned with constructions of power that shape and influence policies 
and practices targeted at addressing social and economic regeneration initiatives in 
disadvantaged neighbourhoods.
The conclusion that the RA is the most suitable theoretical framework for explaining 
funding arrangements for APCs against the backdrop of shifting contours of 
governance in Dublin is a valuable finding of this thesis. It strengthens the case for the 
utility of the RA by demonstrating its explanatory credentials in an interesting setting of 
neo-liberal policy roll-out (i.e. the Irish Celtic Tiger). It also demonstrates some of the 
relative weaknesses of ANT and URT by illustrating their inability to adequately 
account for the experiences explored in this case study. The findings of this study do 
not, of course, constitute universal endorsement of the RA or a definitive rejection of 
ANT and URT. For example, it could be argued that even though URT was not 
considered a feasible concept in a suburban area with limited economic growth 
potential, it still might be of explanatory value (a) in an urban spatial setting where 
private sector interest in promoting economic activities prevails or (b) in a scenario 
when opportunities arise that transform formerly less valued spaces into areas of 
economic development potential. Also, in the case of ANT, subsystems that play an 
important role within governance restructuring such as the utilisation of powerful 
narratives or the issue of funding guidelines can complement and add value to our 
understanding of power that cannot conceptually be captured by theories that might 
be considered superior in a particular research context. It is also argued that a focus 
on ANT and URT allowed light to be shed on aspects of governance that might not 
have been discovered as influential, had the analysis of empirical data only been 
undertaken from a neo-Gramscian perspective. This thesis illustrated that a 
comparison of different theories by means of one specific case study can enhance our 
understanding of forces that drive governance transition and, therefore, should be 
taken into consideration in future research analysing governance. While the thesis 
focused on one in-depth study of an APC in a suburban neighbourhood in west 
Dublin, it made an attempt to check empirical findings from the case-study area with 
experiences of senior professionals from two additional APCs in Dublin. These 
interviews indicate that identified challenges, perceptions and implications of 
governance restructuring and associated funding arrangements are not unique to the 
case-study area but also prevail, and affect APCs, in other designated disadvantaged 
areas in Dublin. However, conclusive affirmation of this will require further research. 
Therefore, it is anticipated that additional comparative in-depth research will be carried 
out for other APCs to ascertain whether the findings of the case study in west Dublin 
are indicative of a general trend of governance restructuring.
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8.5 Final observations
The research suggests that the forces shaping accountability procedures, funding 
arrangements and performance criteria of state-funded Area Partnership Companies 
(APCs) in Dublin are part and parcel of public-sector reform. The latter is a centrally- 
driven strategy to restructuring governance in accordance with national priorities in 
regard to fiscal efficiency, social consumption and economic goals. The contemporary 
funding and accountability framework for APCs facilitates the repositioning of APCs 
within the statutory governance network in a way that shifts power in local decision 
making into the sphere of the state.
The integration of local development and local government systems resembles a 
shotgun marriage. The practical implementation of the cohesion process and the 
nature of value for money principles applied to APC suggest that the state lacks 
understanding as to how multi-stakeholder local development processes work in 
practice. Under the cohesion process, APCs have been caught up in, first, adapting to 
new political and bureaucratic processes at work and, second, challenging its adverse 
consequences. This involves an undue distraction of energy and resources from 
social-inclusion work, which endangers the achievement of APCs’ programmatic 
objectives.
The bureaucratic mode of re-ordering that has been adopted to integrate APCs into 
the apparatus of the state turns a blind eye to the developmental priorities identified by 
local groups and citizens that are situated, or operate, outside the state-funded 
community-development sector and/or that have no professional representation or 
access route for negotiating their position in relation to governance restructuring in 
Dublin. Also, the conditions for effective participation in APC structures that have been 
created expect individuals and groups to be compliant with rules and regulations and 
develop professional expertise that guarantees reliable representation at the local 
partnership table. It also does not take into account the potential of a local partnership 
approach that is based on the principle of parity of esteem. The timely involvement of 
locally-operating stakeholders from the statutory sector and interest groups from wider 
civil society in an open, facilitated consultation process might have added value to 
informing the ‘harmonisation’ of the relationship between the public sector and 
community development initiatives. It would probably have (a) resulted in a framework 
for a new governance model that is better tailored to take into account, and respond 
to, local realities within which state-funded APC-type local development initiatives and 
statutory service providers operate and, moreover, (b) led to the development of more 
satisfactory parameters for measuring value for money.
Being subject to change whilst being largely kept outside key decision-making circles 
that orchestrate the re-ordering of governance in Dublin, limits the scope for APCs to, 
first, contest, confront or mediate transformational powers impacting on their remit, 
agenda and action ability and, second, credibly to promote a local partnership process
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in their area that is based on principles of parity of esteem and democracy. However, 
political funders of APCs still expect them to build functional alliances with state 
agencies and local groups. In the absence of a formal regulatory framework that can 
ensure reciprocal responsibility among all relevant stakeholders concerned with local 
development issues in designated disadvantage areas, APCs are dependent on their 
capacity to (a) provide small incentives (e.g. trust, seed funding, experience, good 
plans) and (b) get commitment from senior officials/civil servants to pro-actively 
support APCs as the foundation for making public agencies more responsive to the 
development of co-operative approaches that address issues of poverty, deprivation 
and social exclusion in disadvantaged neighbourhoods.
In the light of the findings presented In this study, the key tasks of APCs, namely to 
add value through locally building functional multi-stakeholder alliances, utilising core 
funding for reeling in additional resources and, at the same time, retaining a risk- 
friendly approach to project development from the bottom up appears to be an 
unattainable mammoth task. Under contemporary conditions, APC are inextricably 
linked into the wider regulatory framework of governance -  the design of which is 
shaped by competitive economic policies. Within the broader competitive governance 
framework of social partnership, developmental welfare, SMI and better regulation, 
the financial dependency of APCs on the state and on both the goodwill and support 
from a variety of organic intellectuals situated at nodal points of power makes APCs 
what Raco and Imrie (2003: 25) refer to as a “vehicle for the promotion of instrumental 
or governmental efficiency”.
Drawing on Jessop’s (1990) dialectical notion that a coupling of institutional inertia 
and strategic selectivity can alter the elbowroom for capital forces to manoeuvre, 
Murdoch (1995: 736) stresses that “there is room for struggle [...] within certain 
structured formations; the outcomes are not predetermined, but some are made more 
likely than others”. The systematic subordination of APCs as an institutional vehicle 
caters to the centrally-defined objective to pursue economic growth and locally 
facilitate progression towards the competition state and ‘developmental welfare’. 
However, it is unlikely to create opportunities for a genuinely empowered and 
informed input from those who often have to bear the adverse effects of growth 
policies and who are considered the most disadvantaged within Irish society.
Processes of institutionalisation coerce APCs into collaborative arrangements with 
local authority-administered structures (see Chapter 6 , Section 6.2, Table 6.1). The 
capacity of disadvantaged communities to influence the design of, and participate in a, 
new city-wide governance framework for local development is dependent on their 
ability to strategically place ‘their’ organic intellectuals within decision-making 
structures of the emerging system of governance in Dublin. Also, successful 
representation and advocacy relies on the professional capacity and ‘high-profile’ of
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‘their’ APC to cope with changing institutional and funding arrangements -  namely 
without compromising on local needs and wants.
The institutional re-configuration under the cohesion process and changes in the 
funding framework illustrate that the bargaining capacity for APCs to oppose, negotiate 
or influence terms of reference for local-governance restructuring is limited. According 
to interviews with board members and professionals from APCs and ADM, the scope 
for interagency solidarity and lobbying through the national partnership network, 
PLANET, is perceived as a limited way to create ‘noise’ and attract some attention 
from within political circles. As a result, in the absence of independent funding, the 
bargaining potential of APCs very much depends on their capacity to work through 
informal networks -  which are usually accessible through strategic key individuals 
such as local politicians other influential key individuals (either represented on their 
board, from within statutory bodies or government departments), multi-agency 
alliances and/or strategic partners.
This thesis suggests that, so far, the designers of governance restructuring have not 
achieved their officially stated objectives: to maximise the utilisation of resources, to 
increase financial and democratic accountability and improve statutory service 
delivery to citizens. It is argued that they are not likely to do so unless governance 
ensures equal opportunities to participation in decision making and defining agreed 
terms of reference for value for money and outcome-orientation by all relevant players 
-  including statutory agencies, local politicians, social partners, APC-type local 
development bodies and, in particular, those who are most disadvantaged in Irish 
society.
APCs are challenged to mediate between the economically-driven interests of their 
political masters and the designated beneficiaries of their actions. Within systemic 
limitations identified APCs have to act as a facilitator seeking to provide a neutral 
space within which a variety of (often conflicting) interest groups can identify common 
objectives and, accordingly, agree on terms for collaboration. APCs operate at the 
interface between communities and the state and, hence, are effectively tasked to 
locally manage what Morgan describes as “the tensions between the ‘social’ and 
‘economic’ goals of regulatory politics” (Morgan 2003: 490). However, the analysis of 
different viewpoints on governance arrangements for APCs suggests that APCs 
operate in a ‘space of prescription’ (Murdoch 1998) that is dictated by wider economic 
considerations of central government.
Under the contemporary neo-liberal competition-oriented model of governance 
restructuring, limited scope exists for developing an agreed and independently- 
facilitated approach towards creating a platform for defining terms of reference for 
local-governance re-structuring. The gradual co-option of APCs into the statutory 
apparatus provides little potential for APCs to negotiate the terms for their re­
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positioning within the framework of governance. APCs might develop into subordinate 
service delivery agencies of the state that fulfil a role in welfare-related provision of 
services that, in the national scheme of governance, contributes to a consolidation of 
policies that pursue the establishment of the Developmental Welfare State.
Observations based on the analysis of the empirical case study lead to the conclusion 
that a successful integration of APCs into Dublin’s governance landscape and their 
potential to design and implement innovative local development measures ‘from the 
bottom up’ requires a move away from the contemporary policy of state-dictated co­
option of APCs that is practiced in Dublin and Ireland. Against the backdrop of plans to 
streamline governance and establish the Developmental Welfare State, it would be 
advisable to re-visit the ethos of citizenship, partnership and collaboration and think 
about a multilateral agreement on the creation of a neutral space for negotiating a new 
and inclusive modus vivendi between the state and APCs.
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APPENDIX 1: Relevant committees and groups
Table A-1.1: Central Review Committee
Members Organisation / Role
Government Departments
Mr. P. O’h Uiginn Taoiseach: Secetary (Chairman to 30 April 1993)
Mr. P. Teahon Taoiseach: Secretary (Chairman from 1 May 1993)
Mr. T. Arnold Agriculture, Food and Forestry: Assistant Secretary
Mr. S. O’Morain Enterprise and Employment: Assistant Secretary
Mr. C. O’Loghlin Finance: Secretary
Ms. J. O’Neill Tânaiste: Assistant Secretary
IBEC
Mr. J. Dunne Director General
Mr. B. Geoghegan Director
Mr. D. Croughan Chief Economist
Construction Industry Federation
Ms. M. Corboy President
Mr. L. Kelleher Director General
Mr. G. Hennessy Economist
Irish Farmers Association
Mr. A. Gillis President
Mr. M. Berkery General Secretary
Mr. C. Lucey Chief Economist
Irish Ceamery Milk Suppliers Association
Mr. T. O’Dwyer President
Mr. D. Murphy General Secretary
Mr. C. Dolan Economic Adviser
Irish Cooperative Organisations Society
Mr. J. Tyrell Director General
Mr. S. O’Donoghue Director
Macra na Feirme
Mr. M. O’Keefe President
Mr. T. Curran Chief Executive
Irish Congress of Trade Unions
Mr. P. Flynn General Secretary: Local Government and Public Service Union
Mr. W. Attley Joint General President: Services, Industrial, Professional and
technical Union
Mr. E. Browne Joint General President: Services, Industrial, Professional and
technical Union
Mr. B. Anderson National Secretary: Manufacturing, Science & Finance Union
Mr. D. Begg General Secretary: Communication Workers Union
Mr. D. Murphy Public Service Executive Union
Mr. P. Cassells General Secretary: ICTU
Ms. P. O’Donovan Assistant General Secretary: ICTU
Source:
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Table A-1.2: Co-ordinating group of secretaries
Members Name of Department / Office
Paddy Teahon Secretary Taoiseach (Chair)
Kevin Bonner Secretary Enterprise and Employment
Sean Dorgan Secretary Tourism and Trade (to 1 September 1995)
Michael Dowling Secretary Agriculture Food and Forestry
John Hurley Secretary Finance (Public Service Management and Development)
Cathal Mac Domhnaill Chairman Revenue Commissioners
Edward McCumiskey Secretary Social Welfare
Julie O'Neill Assistant Secretary Tanaiste
Dr Don Thornhill Secretary Education
Facilitator
Professor John Murray Trinity College Dublin
Secretariat
Brenda Boylan Taoiseach
Mary Doyle (Secretary) Taoiseach
Eric Embleton Finance
Karen Gibson Taoiseach
Adrian O'Donovan Taoiseach
Aidan Timmins Taoiseach
Source: Department of the Taoiseach (1996).
Table A-1.3: Participants in MSc Class for Assistant Secretaries in Trinity College 
Dublin
Member Government Department / Organisation
Denis Byrne Department of Agriculture
John Dully Department of Tourism and Trade
Donal Garvey Central Statistics Office Ireland
Wally Kirwan Department of the Taoiseach
Tom Mulherin Department of Social Welfare
Gerrry O'Hanlon Central Statistics Office Ireland
Seamus Rodgers Valuation Office
Oliver Ryan Department of Social Welfare
Catherine Treacy Land Registry
Brendan Tuohy Department of Transport, Energy and Communications
Michael Tutty Department of Finance
Source: Department of Finance Press Office.
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Table A-1.4: Task Force on the Integration of Local Government and Local
Development Systems
Members Name of Department / Office
Noel Dempsey, T.D Minister for the Environment and Local Government (chair) (FF)
Chris Flood, T.D. Minister of State at the Department of Tourism, Sport and
Recreation (FF)
John Fox Department of Agriculture & Food
Eoghan O’Conaill Department of Arts, Heritage, Gaeltacht & the Islands
Sean Murray Department of Enterprise, Trade & Employment
John Cullen Department of the Environment and Local Government
Kevin Cullen Department of the Environment and Local Government
Stephen O’Neill Department of Finance
Sylda Langford Department of Justice, Equality & Law Reform
Raphael Kelly Department of the Marine & Natural Resources
Deirdre Carroll Department of Social, Community and Family Affairs
Dermot McCarthy Department of the Taoiseach
Julie O’Neill Department of Tourism, Sport and Recreation
Dr. Ruth Barrington Department of Health and Children
Secretariat
Joe Allen
and Sabine Gunther Department of the Environment and Local Government
Source: Department of the Environment and Local Government (1998).
Table A-1.5: Members of the Excellence Through People Approvals Board
Member Organisation
Mr. Michael McDonnell Director, Chartered Institute of Personnel Development
Mr. Frank Walsh Manager, Services to Business, FÂS
Mr. Mike Fitzgerald SIPTU
Ms. Avine Me Nally Assistant Director, Small Firms Association
Mr. Bryan Andrews Chief Executive Officer, Public Appointments Service
Ms. Maria Callinan Chief Executive Officer, Portlaois Enterprise Centre
Mr. Liam Doherty previously IBEC
Mr. Peter Rigney Industrial Officer, ICTU
Ms. Mary O'Connor HR Manager, IITD
Mr. Jim Mulcahy Director, Enterprise Ireland
Source: FÂS, info provided by email
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APPENDIX 2: Correspondence ‘from Above’
Correspondence A-2.1: Letter sent to City/County Development Boards
Circular LG 03/04 
6 February
Improving local and community development structures and 
programmes
Dear Director,
I am directed by the Minister for the Environment, Heritage and Local Government 
to refer to previous correspondence and discussions regarding the above initiative 
involving the Minister and the Ministers for Community, Rural & Gaeltacht Affairs, 
and Justice Equality and Law Reform. As part of the initiative, a range of measures 
aimed at improving local and community development services on the ground have 
recently been adopted by Government. A copy of a press release setting out the 
main features of the Government's decision is attached.
Your attention in particular is drawn to the following:
Proposals for Improved Cohesion
Community and local development groups are being requested by the Department of 
Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs/ADM Ltd to bring forward measures for 
improved alignment of structures in their area by mid year, 2004. This process is to 
be co-ordinated at local level by the CDBs. CDBs should now initiate contact with 
the various agencies in their areas with a view to moving the process forward. The 
objective here is to develop measures such as the sharing of facilities and 
administrative supports, ground enhancement of and improved targeting of services 
on the I through better co-ordination or an integrated approach to the introduction of 
new and existing measures. Each Board should also feed into this process, based 
on its work to date, (including the COB Strategy) and experience on the ground.
Funding for Co-ordinated Measures
Funding is to be provided to support specific co-ordinated measures emerging from 
the above-mentioned process. The focus of this funding will be on enhanced 
service provision. Decisions on the selection of projects to qualify for such funding 
will be based on objective criteria and specific outcomes and outputs will have to be 
demonstrated. You will be notified as soon as any further information is available.
Review of Social Inclusion Measures Group
A review of the role and membership of the CDBs' Social Inclusion Measures (SIM) 
Groups will be carried out by this Department in consultation with Directors. The 
main purpose of the review is to ensure-balanced representation and effective 
operation. Further details will issue in this matter in due course.
Endorsement Process
The Government has formally approved the CDBs' responsibility for endorsement of 
plans of community and local development agencies and overseeing and the 
promotion of an integrated approach to service provision at local and community
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level. The endorsement of plans for 2004 should be finalised as soon as possible in 
line with the guidelines issued on 31 July 2003. In this context Directors are 
reminded that these are guidelines, not a straightjacket. Where sensible 
arrangements that achieve the objectives of the endorsement process in a real and 
practical way can be made, then such opportunities should be availed of.
A short progress report (no more than two pages max) on the endorsement 
process should be furnished to the Department by 27 February next.
Waterford 'Model'
Waterford City Development Board's initiative in tracking social inclusion 
expenditure in the city across Departments and agencies is to be advanced as a 
pilot project.
Integrated Target Group Plans
Finally, in line with the recommendation of the NOP Mid-Term Review and the 
NOP/CSF Evaluation of Social Inclusion Co-ordination Mechanisms, each COB 
should now take preliminary steps to prepare an Integrated Target Group Action 
Plan for one priority target group identified under the National Anti Poverty Strategy1 
(NAPS). Given the broad nature of the NAPS categories, the target group selected 
should be a tightly defined subset of these e.g. long-term unemployed men, at risk 
early school leavers between the ages of 9 and 14. Further guidance on the 
preparation of the Target Group Plan will issue in the near future.
If you have any further queries regarding the above, you can contact, Ms Mairead R 
an 01 888  2800) or Mr Eamonn Waters (0-1 888 2700).
Yours sincerely,
Joe Allen
Local Government Policy 
c.c. each County/City Manager
1 These are as follows: The Unemployed; Children; Women; Older People; People with Disabilities; 
Travellers; Migrants and Members of Ethnic Minority Groups; Disadvantaged Urban Dwellers; 
Disadvantaged Rural Dwellers
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Correspondence A-2.2: Endorsement of Community Development Plans
Endorsement of Community Development Plans by CDBs
The following are a number of key points in regard to the procedures which will 
apply in regard to the consideration and endorsement of plans by CDBs:
• It has been agreed with the Department of Environment & Local 
Government that the same annual workplan should be submitted 
simultaneously from CDPs to the Department of Community, Rural and 
Gaeltacht Affairs, and to the CDB. There will not be a separate workplan for 
each. The Department is anxious to prevent this process generating 
unnecessary extra work and bureaucracy for projects.
• The workplan will be based around existing practice in regard to preparing an 
annual workplan, with the added proviso that projects will be asked to show 
linkage between their activities and the relevant CDP strategic plan. A 
template detailing the information required in the workplan will issue in the 
next week or so.
• If the CDB seek some clarification or wish to query some of the actions in 
the workplan, they will raise those queries directly with the projects, in the 
first instance.
• Only in the case of a CDB being unable to resolve queries or issues with the 
project, will the CDB then contact the Department of Community, Rural and 
Gaeltacht Affairs, and raise those issues or concerns.
• The Department of Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs will then 
mediate those issues with the CDB and project concerned.
• In accordance with existing practice, the funding to projects will continue 
while this process is ongoing. Projects will not be prevented from receiving 
funding while the workplan is being teased out with either the CDB or with 
the Department. However, the issue of a new contract could be delayed in 
some case by the need to clarify issues.
• The 2004 contracts for projects are likely to be on a three year basis, but will 
be subject to submission of a satisfactory annual budget and annual workplan 
in each year.
• It is envisaged that CDPs will be asked to submit their workplans by 15th 
January. CDBs have been asked to try to complete the endorsement process 
by the end of February in order that new contracts can issue in March to 
those projects which will be out of contract at that stage.
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• The Departments concerned recognize that there is a need for greater
• consistency and coherence in regard to the membership of SIM Committees 
within CDBs and are taking steps to address concerns in this regard.
• Projects which currently have contracts until the end of 2004 will not be 
require to submit workplans until then.
• All projects are expected to co-operate with this process. In keeping with 
existing procedures, any project which refuses to submit a workplan to the 
Department or CDB will inevitably prevent the issuing of its new contract, 
and will inevitably prevent any prospect o f budget increase to its community.
As was indicated in earlier correspondence to CDPs, this is an evolving process, and 
the procedures are not set in concrete, but are amenable to change.
David Brennan 
Principal Officer
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Correspondence A-2.3: Scoping paper by Peter Finnegan (Director of Dublin CDB)
COHESION 2005-2006 
A Scoping Paper for information and discussion
This short paper will assist in meeting the role o f  the CDB in respect o f  Cohesion by 
identifying key issues and offering suggested wavs forward in respect o f Cohesion. It
does so hv addressing key questions.
What is this round of cohesion funding meant to do?
• Bring greater coherence to the Local development sector through 
amalgamation of structures. This specifically means the creation of new Local 
Development structures that fuse Area Based Partnerships and Community 
Development Projects in the first instance.
• These are specific programmes funded by CRAGI directly or through ADM. 
The process is open to the participation of other local development community 
based initiatives such as RAPID, Drugs Task Forces, and Family Resource 
Centres etc.
• Each of these programmes is independent and can choose to participate or not. 
CRAGI have however stated that they only intend funding these new 
overarching structures in the post 2006 funding scenario.
• The objective is a unified structure within each of the five areas of the City by 
the end of 2006
• This will widen access to supports under programmes by providing full city 
coverage of programmes
• Delivery of programmes via integrated structure by the end 2006
• The new structure is meant to be new. It is not a takeover of CDPs by 
Partnerships. Any new structure must give equal weight to all the local 
development interests involved.
What is the City Development Board asked to do?
Why the CDB at all?
The Board is seen as a partnership structure designed to promote the integration of 
services to the citizen. It has particular responsibility through SIM for the oversight 
and monitoring of Social Inclusion Measures. Local development funding is one such 
measure.
The CDB is expected to do the following:
• Invite applications for funding by way of a Cohesion Plan
• Facilitate process
• Assess applications based on criteria set out by department listed below. On the 
basis of such assessment approve or reject applications.
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What the Plan should look like ;
Essential
> Statement o f agreement on achievement o f county/city integrated 
structures by end 2006
> Clear milestones on progress towards such alignment
> Fit with Objectives for Improved Cohesion
> Business Plan co-ordination
Provision for service level agreements
Integrated working arrangements for staff in agencies involved 
Sharing of facilities and resources 
Evidence of multi-agency participation
Measure meeting the relevant priorities/actions/targets of the CDB Strategy 
Obvious improvement in the delivery of services
Must meet specific stated needs by
Identifying existing geographic gaps
Identifying population groups likely to benefit from changes
Must display within the proposal
Specific outcomes and deliverables 
Clearly defined milestones 
Strong fit with overall objectives
Should display additional features such as
Firm commitment to change
Potential as a National Demonstration Model
What does this mean for the future? 
In practice it means :
• Five Over-arching Local Development Structures for the City, one in each Area 
Committee Area subsuming Partnerships and CDPs in that area in the first 
instance.
In practice the implication in the city is as follows ;
>  Ballyfermot, Kimmage/Crumlin and Canals must combine/link. They can 
retain local structures and community partnerships (inclusive of statutory field 
staff) for each of the historical partnership areas. The current sub area of the 
Inner City Partnership known as South Inner City would be an equal element 
in its own right of this new over arching structure that links all parts of this 
area.
>  Northside simply extends to the entire North Central Area. Reconstitutes 
Board if necessary to include CDPs and other participating groups.
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> Fingals/Cabra links with Ballymun and the Cabra element co-operates with the 
Inner City Partnership within Dublin Central Area. This should be relatively 
easy as the Cabra element of this Partnership has a separate and autonomous 
structure.
>  Inner City Partnership and Cabra area link and reach out to all parts of Dublin 
central.
>  In the South East Area a new “Partnership” structure forms through the co­
operation and linkage of Rapid(Pearse Street) Ringsend CDP and 
Teneure/rathmines Community Development (ADM)
> At Area Level the umbrella structure would involve key management staff of 
statutory agencies.
>  Boards of overarching structures would recruit manager and team.
> Strengthen capacity to deliver services to targeted communities. This would be 
achieved through whole city coverage and ability to target communities of 
need.
How might this work in practice?
These are thoughts to help discussion.... not directives or stipulations
• The responsibility of developing a plan under cohesion in the first instance 
rests the local development sector (partnerships, ADM funded companies, 
RAPID, drugs task forces, family resource centres, other community based 
projects)
• Any plan should ideally provide for a overarchintz structure, while maintaining 
local expression
• This could mean the creation of a limited company or cooperative covering all 
of Dublin City Council area. The membership of the company or the 
cooperative would consist of the community interest/initiative that would join 
together in the plan. This area level company/cooperative could adopt the 
operational methodology successfully deployed as a Dublin inner city 
partnership of establishing more locally focused community development 
partnerships. These could be based on electoral areas or existing and 
understood community boundaries e.g. Ballyfermot, Finglas, Ballymun. 
Another approach would be that the over arching partnership would be a 
federation of existing or new community based structures.
• State and public sector representation at senior management level to be 
confined to the over arching structure e.g. city council area managers to sit on 
over arching structure.
• Local expressions of the structure would engage with field staff of agencies as 
appropriate.
• Community projects would be supported through the over arching structure 
and would deal specifically with Community Development issues in a manner 
akin to that of CDP
> The plan would identify critical milestones. The objectives would be to have 
an agreed over arching structure by November 2006.
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Milestones along the way might include:
1. Plan of action to include statements o f commitment from the parties 
collaborating in the plan. Plan to include funding proposals to include 
items such as costs negotiating and developing structures
2. Research into issues of viability
3. Providing services/structures in areas or in respective target groups not 
currently covered
4. Joint facilitated meetings of Boards/groups affected
5. Development of joint programme of action.
6. Identification of budget.
7. Agreement on deadlines for implementation.
What happens if the Local Development Sector opts out? 
Who knows ? ?
On present evidence there would be no “acceptable” structures within the city for 
Local Development Funding in 2006. Of course some groups in the sector might 
proceed in the absence of other group involvement and this could result in such groups 
being recipients of funding post 2006. Their work up to that could be funded by the 
Cohesion Funds.
This approach can be viewed as an opportunity or a threat
As an opportunity it extends the ability of the sector to address social inclusion across 
the city. This is particularly important given the evidence from groups like CORI that 
the nature of poverty and social exclusion and its location has changed.
As an opportunity the sector can write its own formula for how it happens as long as 
this provides an overarching structure using the five areas and is not seen as 
“business as usual”.
A threat to the existing structures ? Are those structures open to change ? Has the 
environment within which they work changed ? Can they continue to find expression 
or meaning within any alignment ?
What is current DEVELOPMENT BOARD POLICY ?
> Ensure vibrant and independent Civic Society organisations that can critically 
engage with the State and Local Authority around local development and 
social inclusion issues.
> Outcome focused and adequately resourced local development
> Whole city coverage through linking to boundaries of Area Committees
> Targeting Groups and communities of interests within City or Area Committee
> Greater commitment and accountability of State and local Authority to local 
development through service level agreements and funding.
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APPENDIX 3: Monitoring and evaluation templates
Table A-3.1: SCOPE -  Target Sheet
Partnership /  Community Group:
Services for the Unemployed
Total number or Indlvlduals receiving supports under this Meagre (case load)
No. of L.T.Unemployed
Full Time Job Placements over all Target Groups 
Part-time or Short-term Job Placements over all Target Groups 
Wbrlt Experience Placements over all Target Groups 
Labour Market Scheme Job Placements over all Target Groups
Numbeis or Individuals receiving pre-development self-employment supports 
Numbers or Groups receiving pre-development social economy supports 
Number or new businesses (up to Jyear) receiving support
Number or new social economy enterpnses/buslnesses
(up to lyear) receiving support
Number or established businesses receiving support
Number or established social economy enterpnsesf businesses receiving support
Number or Jobs created In enterprises and social economy enterprises/businesses
Number or individuals receiving education supports
Number or individuals receiving training supports
Nos. receiving recognised certlhcation e.g. NCVA. Leaving Cert. City & Glds
Number or networksFcoiiaboratlons (Services ror the Unemployed)
M ale Female Total
0
0
0
0
0
8 Value!
Female
M ale Female
M ale Female
Total
TOtal
Total
TOtal
Community Development
Total
Number or groups receiving pre-development support 
Number or new groups receiving support 
Number or established groups receiving support 
Number or environment and Infrastructure Initiatives 
Number of groups receiving training support
TOtal
Number of networks/collaborations (Community Development)_________________________________________ _______
Community Based Youth Initiative
M ale  Female Total
Total number or cmidren/young people supported under tnis Measure      o
Total number or adults supported under this Measure      o
Number or early childhood education Initiatives
Number of preventing early school leaving Initiatives___________________________________________________ __________
Number or initiatives addressing actual earty school leaving_____________________________________________ __________
Number or initiatives promoting developmental youtn work____________________________________________ __________
Number of Initiatives supporting access to further/third level eduction_____________________________________________
Number or I n Itl atives for tralnl ng of tral ners___________________________________________________________ __________
To tal
Number or networks/collaborations (Community Based Youth Initiative)
Source: ADM (2000).
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Table A-3.2: Programme of Activities -  action template
Strategy Number Project Name
Action Code Budget €
(if relevant)
Purpose of action?
General description of action, including 
what will actually happen, lead agency 
and strategic partners
Target groups? (Name & code). Please 
specify a maximum of 3 target groups 
that are prioritised in the action. (Note: if 
an action -  or part of an action -  has a 
broad focus, the more wide-ranging 
categories can be used, e.g. T4, T15, 
T16)
Estimated numbers that will be 
supported? (explanatory note provided)
SUE
Individuals
CBYI Youth CBYI Adults
Male Female M F M F
Groups:
Initiatives'
Networks:
Expected outcome /  progression from 
the implementation of the action?
How exactly is the bulk of money to be 
spent? What is the main cost involved? 
Detail financial contribution from each 
contributor,
Contributor
1
2.
3.
Total Budget
€ Expect
ed
Committed
What support staff will support the
action?
Detail any measures within this action 
which demonstrate your group's proofing 
strategy (This should include any  
evidence o f proofing under the headings 
of equality, gender, rural, poverty and 
environment.)
Source: Pobal.
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